

233

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

November 1959 to May 1960 **VOLUME XXXVII**

Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

© Copyright 1959 by the Modern Schoolman.
Maurice R. Holloway, S.J., Editor.
Printed in Belgium

PHE~~NOMENOLOGY~~
AND EXISTENTIALISM:
Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality

MAURICE NATANSON is associate professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina. He had previously taught at Nebraska University, the New School for Social Research, and the University of Houston. He received his M.A. from New York University, his Ph.D. from Nebraska University, and has a D.S.Sc. from the New School for Social Research. He is the author of *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology*, and *The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead*. He has previously written for *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN* and for other learned journals. This paper (in slightly modified form) was read as part of a symposium on phenomenology and existentialism held by the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association on April 30, 1959, at Madison, Wisconsin.

Heraldry and genealogy are cognate disciplines; the former often leads to exciting emblems, the latter sometimes to family embarrassments. An exploration of some central roots of existentialism certainly leads back to phenomenology, and following the line of Sartrean thought brings us quickly to Husserl's philosophy. Whether the results are more embarrassing than exciting may be decided later. Right now the problem is the nature of the family relationship. I will begin by suggesting that this relationship has as its ground Husserl's doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness and that Sartre's existentialism derives from a problematic critique and transformation of that doctrine. I will end by suggesting that Sartre's inadequacies illuminate Husserl's achievements.

The prime character of consciousness, for Husserl, is its implicit directionality. All consciousness is consciousness of something; all acts of consciousness intend some object. The ontological status of the

intended object is neutralized by phenomenological reduction, so that the question of whether the object intended is real, illusory, hallucinatory, imaginary, independent, subsistent, or transitory is set aside for purposes of description. Whether the intended object is veridical has nothing to do with its status as intended. The task of the phenomenologist, then, is to investigate phenomena as correlates of the acts which intend them. Just as phenomenological reduction neutralizes the ontological placement of the object, so it sets in abeyance the belief in personal identity, history, and empirical reality of the individual making phenomenological descriptions. The central terms of the phenomenological enterprise are within the structure of intentionality; real object and real person are no proper part of that structure. Instead, they may appear only as intentional concerns; that is, they may be considered as meant or intended objects of consciousness.

Some critics of phenomenology have taken this conception of intentional consciousness as a paradigm case of subjectivism or some kind of solipsism. They have suggested that Husserl has abandoned the real world, that his procedure of phenomenological reduction leaves the phenomenologist in epistemic isolation, and that, consequently, there is no way of ever achieving objective confirmation of phenomenological reports. An indirect but interesting answer to these complaints is found in Sartre's interpretation of intentionality, for the whole point of his positive reaction to phenomenology is that he found in Husserl's early writings a deliverance from subjectivism, an escape from the egocentric predicament. The overwhelming importance of intentionality for Sartre was what he took to be Husserl's insistence on a view of consciousness which transcended the subject-object dualism, which overcame the traditional debates of idealism and realism, and which opened up for the first time a view of consciousness which placed the self in the world, in the midst of life, in direct confrontation with being. Through phenomenology a return to "the things themselves" had taken place. What Quentin Lauer has called phenomenology's "triumph of subjectivity" was initially, for Sartre, a triumph over subjectivism. But victor and vanquished must be examined more closely.

¹Originally published in *Nouvelles revues françaises*, January 1939; reprinted in Jean-Paul Sartre's *Situations I* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), pp. 31-35. Our references are to the latter edition.

What impresses Sartre in the phenomenological theory of intentionality is the nonegological conception of consciousness developed in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Intentionality in this perspective does not derive from a subject pole which is the condition for its activity. At this stage there is no transcendental ego to serve as the dynamic matrix for intentional acts. The emphasis, then, is necessarily on the noematic side of the intentional stream. Consciousness brings us face to face with reality as the correlate of intentional acts. Instead of an ego building its world, constituting its experiential façade, consciousness is thrust into reality and locates its egological nature after the encounter. The ego arises with experience; it has no status prior to experience. It is at this point that Sartre seizes on the nonegological conception of consciousness and announces its existential possibilities. For if the ego is not an original resident of consciousness, consciousness reveals itself as translucent, as a nothingness which fulfills itself purely in its intentional activity. What for Husserl began as an emphasis on the noematic aspect of the phenomena is radically transposed by Sartre into a theory of consciousness in which the nonbeing of the ego is the prime phenomenological datum. Husserl's nonegological theory of consciousness becomes transformed into a philosophy of nihilation.

Although Sartre's essay "The Transcendence of the Ego" is the first major statement announcing his transformation of Husserl's doctrine, his fascination with the possibilities of the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality can be seen more dramatically perhaps in his note entitled "A Fundamental Idea of the Phenomenology of Husserl: Intentionality," published in 1939.¹ Here Sartre interprets Husserl as insisting on the co-givenness of object and consciousness. Consciousness and the world are given simultaneously. And consciousness is an irreducible fact which we can only characterize through metaphors that suggest its thrusting, volatile nature. Knowing is like exploding; mind is centrifugal; consciousness is a vortex; awareness is like combat. Here Sartre is struggling to rid epistemology of the metaphysical incubus of knowledge as possession. For Sartre, one does not have knowledge; one bursts out in the acts of knowing toward the object known. Consciousness fires itself toward its mark. These

strange metaphors (some of which are Sartre's and some of which are mine) support each other in suggesting a conception of consciousness as a nonsubstantial presence to the world. Sartre writes:

Knowledge cannot, without dishonesty, be compared to possession. . . . consciousness is purified, it is clear like a great wind, it no longer has anything in it, except a movement to avoid itself, a gliding beyond itself; if, against all impossibility, you were to enter "into" a consciousness, you would be seized by a vortex and thrown out . . . because consciousness has no "inside"; it is nothing but the outside of itself, and it is that absolute flight, that refusal to be substance which constitutes it as consciousness.²

Here, then, is the nexus between Sartre and Husserl, between existentialism and phenomenology. For Sartre the phenomenological doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness not only leads to but *is* an existential theory. Instead of the rather staid conception Husserl presented, Sartre sees in intentionality the full drama of the life of consciousness.

Imagine [he writes] a linked series of explosions which wrench us from ourselves . . . which throw us on . . . the dry dust of the world, on the rough earth, among things; imagine that we are thus rejected, forsaken by our very nature in an indifferent, hostile and restive world; you would then know the profound meaning of the discovery that Husserl expresses in that famous phrase: "All consciousness is consciousness of something."³

On the basis of this existentialized conception of intentionality Sartre builds his world. All of the structures of man's being that he explores—the body, concrete relations with other selves, the emotions, imagination—are comprehensible only in terms of their intentional foundation. Perhaps one way of viewing this procedure is to suggest that perception, understood in the broad Cartesian sense, possesses a cognitive dimension. Feeling, sensory awareness, emotionality are meaning-laden aspects of human experience, for their nature is

²Ibid., pp. 32-33.

³Ibid., p. 33.

grounded in intentional consciousness. Meaning here is not designative or referential; it is precisely that which is presented as the correlate of intentional activity. This approach to meaning becomes clearer if we turn to a further point of connection between phenomenology and existentialism.

Husserl and Sartre agree in their rejection of a naturalistic or scientistic *Weltanschauung*. Physics and mathematics are not accepted as disciplines whose methodological form is paradigmatic for all other intellectual enterprises. Rooted and remaining in the natural attitude, science commits the sin of pride if it insists on projecting its naive realistic vision of the world on to the concrete and unique problems of philosophy and the social sciences. The rejection of scientism is not a rejection of natural science. Rather, phenomenology and existentialism hold to a common front in their insistence on facing phenomena in their givenness, quite apart from causal and genetic considerations. The liberation of logic from physics and psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century must be matched by a liberation of epistemology from neurological and behavioristic grounds. This is the whole point of Husserl's refutation of psychologism. And implicit in Sartre's position is the same root dissatisfaction with psychologistic theories. Phenomenology and existentialism are thus bound to each other as much by negative as by positive agreements. The common denominator of intentionality is matched by a mutual disenchantment with the explanatory categories of naturalism.

Yet despite all sympathetic connecting bonds, there are still differences between Husserl and Sartre which are more than family quarrels. There are two points of basic conflict, and they center about Sartre's rejection of the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego. His radicalization of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality appears to require the abandonment of the central instrument of phenomenological method as well as the whole grounding of conscious life in a transcendental subject. Sartre's reasons for moving in this direction are complex. In addition to an early invocation of Occam's razor against the transcendental ego in his essay "The Transcendence of the Ego," Sartre goes on later in *Being and Nothingness* to protest against Husserl's idealistic reduction of the phenomenon to the noema as an unrealized object. Sartre writes:

Phenomenology and Existentialism
Maurice Natanson

It is futile to attempt, by a sleight of hand, to found the *reality* of the object on the subjective plenitude of impressions and its *objectivity* on non-being; the objective will never come out of the subjective nor the transcendent from immanence, nor being from non-being. But, we are told, Husserl defines consciousness precisely as a transcendence. In truth he does. This is what he posits. This is his essential discovery. But from the moment that he makes of the *noema* an *irreal*, a correlate of the *noesis*, a noema whose *esse* is *percipi*, he is totally unfaithful to his principle.⁴

Phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego rob intentionality of its genius by relinquishing the immediate world seized through intentional consciousness. What Sartre calls the transphenomenality of being is lost in the reduction. Now, this criticism relates to, but is not synonymous with, the argument that Sartre rejects the reduction because it brackets out precisely what the existentialist is most concerned with: existence. It is a distortion of Husserl's theory of reductions to accuse the phenomenologist of disregarding or of being unable to regard concrete existence as a philosophical problem. But the misunderstanding appears to me to be compounded by those who suggest it, since neither Husserl nor Sartre, in my opinion, makes this claim or is necessarily involved in such an interpretation. Sartre's attack against the reduction rests immediately on his conviction that the unrealized noema lacks transphenomenal being, that the whole purpose, therefore, of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality has been undermined. Instead of consciousness transcending itself toward the objects of reality, consciousness falls back upon itself. Sartre does not argue, however, that the phenomenologist's concept of existence is somehow a shadow of the real thing, that existence in its givenness as phenomenon is a surrogate for flesh and blood reality. Indeed, it might be suggested at this point that Sartre's rejection of the reduction is based partly on phenomenological considerations, upon a common refusal with Husserl to take what is called concrete existence at face value. Those who insist on a

⁴*L'Etre et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 28. The present translation is my revision of Hazel E. Barnes's translation, *Being and*

Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956), p. lxiii.

⁵*Being and Nothingness*, p. 109.

distinction between the object as intended or meant and the real honest-to-goodness object itself presuppose a theory of *action* in which the term "real" operates as a predicate of force, displacement, and material efficacy. One major consequence of the alignment between Sartre and Husserl, I submit, is the interpretation of action as an intentional category. The real honest-to-goodness thing is the thing interpreted as honest and good, and interpretation becomes the signal moment of action. Sartre's break with Husserl is not to be found along these lines. It is not a question of existence but of transcendence. Phenomenological reduction and the transcendental ego, according to Sartre, draw us away from the reality which intentionality not only promised but gave. The Husserlian *cogito* remains trapped in immanence. Sartre writes:

If Husserl's *cogito* is first given as instantaneous, there is no way to get outside it . . . Husserl for the length of his philosophical career was haunted by the idea of transcendence . . . But the philosophical techniques at his disposal removed from him any way of accounting for that transcendence; his intentionality is only the caricature of it. Consciousness, as Husserl conceived it, can not in reality transcend itself either toward the world or toward the future or toward the past.⁵

Sartre believes that he has liberated the lonely ego and delivered Husserl's theory of intentionality from the essential misunderstanding of its creator. It is now time to examine Sartre's good works.

Although the radicalization of intentionality requires the rejection of the transcendental ego, what is gained carries with it the impact of what is lost. Sartre is now faced with the problem of accounting for the unity and continuing identity of the ego. If the ego is, as Sartre maintains, "a being of the world, like the ego of another," if it arises only through reflection, then how is it possible to account for the ego as being *mine*? How is it that I do not confuse my ego with that of the other? Sartre answers these questions by appealing to a certain intimacy which attends my ego, to transverse intentions which spontaneously bind together the ego as object of reflection. The result, he says, is that "my I, in effect, is *no more certain for consciousness*

than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.”⁶ But this spontaneously personal ego constitutes itself as mysteriously as any transcendental ego. Moreover, a circle in explanation results. A phenomenology of intimacy is invoked to account for personal identity when the very recognition of the ego presupposes a recognizing agent. Recognizer and recognized are reconciled in the assertion that “my I . . . is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men.” And this, I am suggesting, is reconciliation at the price of circularity. Giving up the transcendental ego deprives Sartre of a constitutive ground for the unity and identity of the self.

Coeval with the rejection of the transcendental ego is the apparent though problematic repudiation of the phenomenological reduction. Sartre argues⁷ that Husserl cannot account for the transposition from the mundane to the phenomenological attitude of the individual who begins, as we all do, in the natural attitude. He interprets the natural attitude itself as a kind of objectification of the ego, an instance of “bad faith” in which consciousness seeks to escape from itself. A miracle becomes necessary for the individual in the natural attitude to perform the *epoché*. On Sartrean grounds, however, consciousness is perpetually confronted with *epoché* not as an intellectual method but, in Sartre’s words, as “an anxiety which is imposed on us and which we cannot avoid.”⁸ Phenomenological reduction, then, is really transposed by Sartre rather than simply repudiated. But in his efforts to avoid the idealistic implications of the reduction, Sartre fails to acknowledge his profound debt at this point to Husserl’s method. It is, rather, Merleau-Ponty who makes explicit the indebtedness of existentialist philosophy to phenomenological reduction. He writes:

The philosopher . . . is a perpetual beginner. This means that he holds nothing as established which the popular majority or

⁶*The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), p. 104.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 102 ff.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁹Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. lx. The present translation is my revision of John F. Bannan’s translation of the “Avant-Propos” which appears in Cross

Currents (VI [Winter 1956], 59-70) under the title “What is Phenomenology?” The quotation cited appears on pp. 64-65.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹“Husserl’s Phenomenology and Existentialism,” paper read as part of a symposium on phenomenology and existentialism held by the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association on April 30, 1959, at Madison, Wisconsin.

the scientists believe they know. It also means that philosophy cannot consider itself as definitively established in any of the truths which it can utter, that it is a renewed experience of its own beginning, and that it consists entirely of a description of this beginning. It means, finally, that this radical reflection is consciousness of its own dependence upon a non-reflective life which is its initial, constant and final situation. Far from being, as one might think, the formula for an idealistic philosophy, the phenomenological reduction is that of an existentialist philosophy.⁹

Reduction, then, opens up for phenomenological appreciation the full drama of consciousness and its initial placement in the *Lebenswelt*. And rather than Sartre, it is Husserl who should be credited with seeing the full depth of his methodological creation. Here as elsewhere, Sartre's efforts to correct Husserl's "mistakes" miscarry, and this miscarriage is our final theme.

Sartre sees in most of the major principles of phenomenology implicit clues to existential philosophy; he believes that he is carrying out the vital impulse of Husserl's discoveries. This attitude and its consequences are at once suggestive and misleading. More than anything else, Sartre's advances beyond Husserl illuminate the full range of insights achieved in traditional phenomenology. Husserl's original doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness is not "liberated" through Sartre's radicalization; it merely includes the existential dimension as one of its possibilities; phenomenological reduction is not positively transposed in Sartre's analysis, for the existential possibilities were there all along; and finally, Sartre's rejection of the transcendental ego ignores its existential implications.¹⁰ Here Sartre's determination to rescue Husserl from himself blinds him to the very subjectivity existentialism seeks. It is in this sense that Sartre's inadequacies illuminate Husserl's achievements.

If Sartre's existentialism cannot be examined without some concern for Husserl's phenomenology, it is no less the case today that Husserl is being looked at suspiciously because of Sartre's exploits. Professor Herbert Spiegelberg in a recent paper¹¹ warns us that phenomenology should not sell its birthright for a mess of existentialist

pottage. I would suggest instead that this warning should be the occasion for self-examination rather than embarrassment, and self-examination is the first principle of Husserl's philosophizing. Most, if not all, of the results of Sartre's technical contributions will have to be reexamined phenomenologically to separate the responsible from the purely spectacular, but there is no doubt in my mind that something responsible as well as original is there to be sifted. Talk of "existentialist pottage" may give comfort to those who have little patience with either existentialism or phenomenology but who are willing to admit that Husserl, at least, is respectable. If there is any conclusion to these considerations it is that Sartre stole much of his existential fire from Husserl. Or to put the same thing differently, the lesson to be learned from Husserl is that a responsible philosopher may also be a conceptual terrorist.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

MR. FRANCIS J. CATANIA received his M.A. from Loyola University (Chicago) and his Ph.D. from Saint Louis University.

He taught at Saint Louis University and is now teaching philosophy at John Carroll University.

The following bibliography represents an attempt to provide a complete reference to studies of the life and writings of St. Albert the Great. We note, however, that in 1931, M. H. Laurent and J. Congar ("Essai bibliographique albertinienne," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI [1931], 260-92) compiled a complete bibliography of St. Albert. Since to repeat this readily available bibliography in its entirety would serve no purpose, we have decided rather to concentrate upon listing the work done from 1931 to 1958. At the same time, we have included some important listings from Laurent and Congar. These listings are indicated by (LC) following the entry. Other abbreviations are *AHDLM* (*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*) and *BGPM* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* [Münster]).

OUTLINE OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- I. Albert's life
- II. Albert's writings
 - A. Editions of his works
 - B. Studies on the editions, composition, and authenticity of Albert's works
 - C. Chronology of Albert's writings
- III. Albert's thought
 - A. General studies which include Albert among others

B. Studies on Albert himself

C. Studies on Albert in his relations to other authors

IV. Bibliographies

I. ALBERT'S LIFE

ALBERT, SISTER MARY. *St. Albert the Great.* Oxford: Blackfriars (1948).

BARJON, J. "Zur Forschung um Albert den Deutschen," *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* II (1937) pp. 51-57.

BAUMGARDT, RUDOLF. *Der Magier. Das Leben des Albertus Magnus.* München: Funck (1949).

DEZANI, S. *Alberto Magno.* Brescia: La Scuola (1947).

DORCY, MARY JEAN. *Master Albert; the Story of Saint Albert the Great.* New York: Sheed and Ward (1955).

DORFLER, PETER. *Albertus Magnus.* Neuauflage, München: Dr. Schnell und Dr. Steiner (1946).

DYROFF, M. "Über Albertus von Sachen," *Festgabe Cl. Baeumker, BGPM Suppl.* I: Münster (1913) pp. 319-339.

GARREAU, ALBERT. *Saint Albert le Grand.* Paris: Desclée de Brouwer (1932).

GRABMANN, MARTIN. *Der hl. Albert der Grosse. Ein wissenschaftliches Charakterbild.* München: Hueber (1932).

HAERING, THEODOR. *Das Deutsche in der deutschen Philosophie.* 2. Aufl. "Albert der Deutsche." Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag (1942).

HERNÁNDEZ, M. I. *San Alberto Magno, Doctor Universal.* Perú: Arequina (1936).

KÜHLE, HEINRICH, *Albert der Grosse.* Augsburger Postzeitung, Sonntagsblatt 47 (1930).

LAURENT, M. H. "Les grandes lignes de la vie du bienheureux Albert," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 257-259. (LC)

LIERTZ, RHABAN. *Albert der Grosse. Gedanken über sein Leben und aus seinen Werken.* Münster i. W.: Regensberg (1948).

LOË, PAULUS VON. "De Vita et Scriptis B. Alberti Magni," *Analecta Bollandiana* XIX (1900) pp. 257-284; XX (1901) pp. 273-316; XXI (1902) pp. 361-371. (LC)

MANDONNET, PIERRE. "Albert le Grand," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique* I (1912) 1515-1524.

_____. "Albert le Grand," *D T C* I, 666-675.

_____. "La date de naissance d'Albert le Grand," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 233-258. (LC)

OSTLENDER, H. *Albertus Magnus.* Dusseldorf: Patmos-Verlag (1955).

_____. *Der hl. Albert der Grosse.* Dusseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann (1932).

PACELLI, EUGENIO (Pius XII). *Albert der Grosse.* Köln: Kath. Tat-Verlag (1932).

PANGERL, F. "Studien über Albert den Grossen," *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* XXXVI (1912) pp. 304-346, 512-549. (LC)

PELSTER, FRANZ. *Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schriften Alberts des Grossen.* (Inaug.-Dissert.) Munich (1918). (LC)

RINTELEN, FRITZ-JOACHIM VON. *Albert der Deutsche und Wir.* Leipzig: Mainer (1935).

SCHEEBEN, H. C. *Albert der Grosse, zur Chronologie seines Lebens.* Vechta (1931). (LC)

—. *Albertus Magnus.* 2. Auflage, Köln: Boehem (1955).

SCHNEIDER, ARTUR. *Albertus Magnus, sein Leben und seine wissenschaftliche Bedeutung.* Köln: Oskar Müller Verlag, (1927). (LC)

SCHWERTNER, TH. M. *St. Albert the Great.* New York (1932).

SIGHART, JOACHIM. *Albert le Grand, sa vie et sa science.* Paris: Librairie de Mme. Ve. Poussielgue-Rusand (1862). Translated from the French by T. A. Dixon, London: Washbourne (1876). (LC)

TAYLOR, F. SUERWOOD. "St. Albert the Great," *Month* 13 (1955) pp. 220-232.

VAN LAER, P. H. "De Heilige Albertus de Grote," *Annalen van het Thymogenootschap* XXXVII (1949) pp. 84-90.

(WALZ, ANGELUS). *Esposizione e documentazione storica del culto tributato lungo il corso dei secoli al B. Alberto Magno Vescovo e Confessore dell'Ordine Domenicano.* Rome: Scuola tipografico missionaria domenicana (1930). (LC)

WILMS, H. *Albert der Grosse.* München: Verlag Kösel und Pustet (1930).

WINTERSWYL, L. *Albert der Deutsche. Das Leben und Wirken des Albertus Magnus.* Potsdam: Athenaion (1936).

II. ALBERT'S WRITINGS

A. EDITIONS OF HIS WORKS

ALBERTUS MAGNUS. *Opera quae hactenus haberi potuerunt sub RR. PP. Thoma Turco, Nicolao Rodulphio, Joanne Bapt. de Marinis ejusdem ordinis: Magistris generalibus, in lucem edita studio et labore R. A. P. F. Petri Jammy, S. Theol. Doct. conventus Gratianopolitani, ejusdem ordinis.* Lyon (1651) 21 vols. (LC)

—. *Opera Omnia, ex editione lugdunensi, religiose castigata, et pro auctoritatibus ad fidem vulgatae versionis accuratiorumque patrologiae textuum revocata, auctaque B. Alberti vita ac Bibliographia suorum operum a PP. Quetif et Echard exaratis etiam revisa et locupletata cura et labore A. Borgnet.* Paris: L. Vives (1800-99) 38 vols. (LC)

—. *Opera Omnia, ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edenda apparatus critico notis prolegomenis indicibus instruenda curavit Institutum*

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

Alberti Magni Coloniense Bernhardo Geyer Praeside. Monasterii Westfalorum Aedibus Aschendorff (1951-).

—. *Autographum Upsaliense* (II Sent., dist. 3, a. 6 — dist. 4, a. 1). Edidit Fredericus Stegmüller. Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift 1953-7—Analecta Upsaliensia theologiam medii aevi illustrantia: I (1953) pp. 147-238.

—. *Commentarii in Librum Boethii de divisione*. Critical edition by Paulus von Loë (1913). (LC)

—. *De animalibus libri XXVI*. Critical edition by H. Stadler, BGPM XV and XVI (1916 and 1920) Münster. (LC)

—. *Des vertus admirables des herbes et des pierres* (transcrit d'après les grimoires du Grand Albert). Paris: Impr. de G. Levis Mano (1957).

—. *Libellus de Alchimia*. Tr. from the Borgnet Latin edition. Introduction and notes by Virginia Heines; foreword by Pearl Kibre. Berkeley: University of California Press (1958).

—. *Liber sex principiorum*. Auf handschriftliche Grundlage mit Einleitung herausgegeben von S. Sulzbacher, o.F.M. Cap. Wien: Mechitharistendruckerei (1955).

—. *Of Cleaving to God*. Translated by Elizabeth Stopp. Oxford: Blackfriars (1948).

—. *On the Intellect and the Intelligible*, I, 1-8; II, 1-5; III, 1-3, in Richard McKeon, *Selections*, I, pp. 368-375.

ANCELET-HUSTACHE, J. "Un traité inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la sainte Vierge," *Vie spirituelle* XXXIV (1933) pp. 156-170.

BLARER, JOSEPH. "Alberti Magni 'De antecedentibus ad logicam' recensuit Joseph Blarer" (in appendice traduzione italiana dell'introduzione) *Teoresi* IX (1954) pp. 177-242.

FILTHAUT, E. "Um die *Questiones de Animalibus* Alberts des Grossen," *Studia Albertina*, BGPM suppl. IV, pp. 112-127.

GRAEMANN, MARTIN. "Drei ungedruckte Teile der *Summa de creaturis* Alberts des Grossen," *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland* XIII, Leipzig (1919).

GREMPER, WALDEMAR. "Der Traktat 'De Substantia' der Praedikamentenparaphrase Alberts des Grossen," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* IV (1957) pp. 175-196. Critical edition of text.

HENQUINET, F. M. "Vingt-deux questions inédites d'Albert le Grand dans un manuscrit à l'usage de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *The New Scholasticism* IX (1935) pp. 283-328.

MEERSSEMAN, G. G. "L'original de l'abrégé napolitain d'un cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XL (1937) pp. 385-397.

OSTLENDER, H. *Das Kölner Autograph des Matthäuskomentars Alberts des Grossen*. Köln (1935).

—. "Das Kölner Autograph des Matthäuskomentars Alberts d. Gr.," *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins* 17 (1935).

SAILER, I. M. *B. Alberti Magni, Paradisus animae sive libellus de virtutibus.*
Ratisbonne: G. J. Manz (1878). (LC)

B. STUDIES ON THE EDITIONS, COMPOSITION,
AND AUTHENTICITY OF ALBERT'S WORKS

BACKES, IGNAZ. "Das zeitliche Verhältnis der *Summa de incarnatione* zu dem
dritten Buche des Sentenzenkommentars Alberts des Grossen," *Studia
Albertina, BGPM Suppl.* IV, pp. 91-98.

—. "Neue Gesamtausgabe der Werke Alberts des Grossen," *Trierer
Theologische Zeitschrift* (1952) pp. 55-65.

BIRKENMAIER, A. *Krakowskie widania takzwanej Philosophia Pauperum
Alberta wielkiego*, Krakow (1924).

BOURKE, VERNON J. "The Provenance of the *De Apprehensione* Attributed
to Albertus Magnus," *Speculum* XVIII (1943) pp. 91-98.

BRADY, IGNATIUS. "Two Sources of the *Summa de Homine* of Saint Albert
the Great," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XX (1953)
pp. 222-271.

FRIES, ALBERT. "Messerklärung und Kommuniontraktat keine Werke Alberts
des Grossen?" *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* II
(1955) pp. 28-67.

—. "Zum Daniel- und Psalmenkommentar Alberts d. Gr.," *Recherches
de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952) pp. 337-342.

—. "Zum Traktat Alberts des Grossen *De Natura Boni*," *Theologie in
Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Mélanges a. Michael Schmaus). München,
Zink (1957).

GEYER, BERNARD. "Das *Speculum astronomiae* kein Werke des Albertus
Magnus," *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* IV (1935) pp. 95-101.

—. *Die Albert dem Grossen zugeschriebene Summa Naturalium (Phi-
losophia Pauperum)*. BGPM XXV, No. 1 (1938) pp. 47-82.

—. "Die mathematischen Schriften des Albertus Magnus," *Angeli-
cum* 35 (1958) pp. 159-175. Latin text, pp. 170-175.

—. "Zur neuen Gesamtausgabe der Welke des Albertus Magnus,"
Gregorianum XXXVI (1955) pp. 197-205.

GOMEZ, EUSEBIO. "St. Albertus Magnus and His Works in Oxford Uni-
versity," *The New Scholasticism* VI (1932) pp. 315-327.

GRABMANN, MARTIN. "Die Autographe von Werken des hl. Thomas
von Aquin," *Historisches Jahrbuch* LX (1940) pp. 514-537.

JORISSEN HANS. "Messerklärung und Kommuniontraktat, Werke Alberts
des Grossen," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 78 (1956) pp. 41-
97.

KIBRE, PEARL. "The *De occultis naturae* Attributed to Albertus Magnus,"
Osiris II (1954) pp. 23-39.

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

KOLPING, ADOLF. "Die Drucke der Albert dem Grossen zugeschriebenen Messerklärung. Ein Beitrag zur Editionstechnik der Inkunabeln scholastischer Werke." *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* II (1955) pp. 197-205.

LOTTIN, ODON. "L'authenticité du 'De potentia animae' d'Albert le Grand," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XXXII (1930) pp. 321-338.

MANDONNET, PIERRE. "Albert le Grand et la Philosophia Pauperum," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XXXVI (1934) pp. 230-262.

MEERSSEMAN, G. G. "Die neue Kölner (1951) und die erste Lyoner (1651) Gesamtausgabe der Werke Alberts des Grossen," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) XXX (1952) pp. 102-114.

PELSTER, FRANZ. "Die ersten beiden Kapitel der Erklärung Alberts des Grossen zu De animalibus in ihrer ursprünglichen Fassung," *Scholastik* 10 (1935) pp. 229-240.

—. "L'istituto Alberto Magno in Colonia e la nuova edizione delle opere del S. Dottore," *La Civiltà Cattolica* I (1936) pp. 231-239.

—. "Der 'Tractatus de natura boni'. Ein ungedrucktes Werk aus der Frühzeit Alberts des Grossen," *Theologische Quartalschrift* 101 (1920) pp. 64-90. (LC)

RAMIREZ, SANTIAGO M. "La edición critica de las obras completas de San Alberto Magno, o.p.," *Revista de Filosofía* 11 (1952) pp. 511-516.

—. "Edicion critica de las obras completas de San Alberto-Magno, o.p.," *La Ciencia Tomista* 79 (1952) pp. 657-663.

ROSSI, GIOVANNI FELICE. "L'edizione critica della 'Postilla super Isaiam' di sant'Alberto Magno," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 58 (1955) pp. 183-185.

RUELLO, FRANCIS. "Le commentaire inédit de Saint Albert le Grand sur les Noms Divins," *Traditio* XII (1956) pp. 231-314.

SAFFREY, H. D. "Une brillante conjecture de Saint Albert et la recensio nova du *De Anima*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 40 (1956) pp. 255-263.

STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND VAN. "Le 'De quindecim problematibus' d'Albert le Grand," in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, pp. 415-439. Louvain, éd. de l'Institut supérieur de Philosophie (1948).

THÈRY, G. "L'autographe de S. Thomas conservé à la Biblioteca Nazionale de Naples," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* I (1931) pp. 15-86.

THOMSON, S. HARRISON. "Eine neue Bestätigung der Echtheit der Summa naturalium Alberts des Grossen," *Scholastik* VIII (1933) pp. 233-239.

THORNDIKE, LYNN. "Further Consideration of the *Experimenta, Speculum astronomiae*, and *De secretis mulierum* ascribed to Albertus Magnus," *Speculum* 30 (1955) pp. 431-443.

VANSTEENKISTE, C. "Il secondo volume dell'edizione critica di S. Alberto Magno," *Angelicum* 31 (1954) pp. 258-279.

—. "La nouvelle édition d'Albert le Grand," *Laval théologique et philosophique* VII (1951) pp. 202-212.

DONDAIN, HYACINTHE F. "Date du Commentaire de la *Hiérarchie céleste* de saint Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XX (1953) pp. 315-322.

DOUCET, VICTORINUS. "De Summa Fratris Alexandri Halensis historice considerata," in *Prolegomena ad Summam Halesianam, Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica*, t. IV, Quaracchi (1948) pp. ccxxv-ccxl.

ENDRES, J. A. *Chronologische Untersuchungen zu den philosophischen Kommentaren Alberts des Grossen*. In: *Festgabe zum 70 Geburtstag von G. von Hertling*. Freiburg, Herder (1913) pp. 95-108. (LC)

GEYER, BERNARD. "Die von Albertus Magnus in 'De anima' benutzte Aristotelesübersetzung und die Datierung dieser Schrift," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 22 (1955) pp. 322-326.

JUTRAS, A. M. "Le *Commentarium in Job* d'Albert le Grand et la *Disputatio*," *Etudes et recherches* 9 (1955) pp. 9-20.

KÜHLE, HEINRICH. "Zum Problem der *Summa Theologiae* und der Sentenzenkommentars Alberts des Grossen," in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters, BGPM Suppl. III*, No. 1-2, pp. 593-610.

LOTTIN, ODON. "Commentaire des Sentences et Somme Théologique d'Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* VIII (1936) pp. 117-153.

—. "Notes sur les premiers ouvrages théologiques d'Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* IV (1932) pp. 73-82.

—. "Problèmes concernant la *Summa de Creaturis* et le Commentaire des Sentences de saint Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XVII (1950) pp. 319-328.

OHLMEYER, A. "Der gedruckte Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Grossen. Wie verhält sich das vierte Buch zu den drei ersten Büchern?" *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* VI (1934) pp. 42-54.

—. "Zum Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Grossen," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* VI (1934) pp. 425-426.

—. "Zwei neue Teile der *Summa De Creaturis* Alberts des Grossen," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* IV (1932) pp. 392-400.

PELSTER, FRANZ. "Um die Datierung Alberts des Grossen Aristotelesparaphrase," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 48 (1935) pp. 443-461.

—. "Zur Datierung einiger Schriften Alberts des Grossen," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* (Innsbruck) XLVII (1923) pp. 475-482. (LC)

III. ALBERT'S THOUGHT

A. GENERAL STUDIES WHICH INCLUDE ALBERT AMONG OTHER AUTHORS

CROMBIE, A. C. *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science.* Oxford, Clarendon Press (1953).

DONDAIN, H. F. "Cognoscere de Deo 'quid est'", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XXII (1955) pp. 72-78.

TUSQUETS Y TERRATS, L. *Metafisica de la generacion.* Barcelona, Miscellanea Tomista (1924) pp. 326-360.

VERWEYEN, J. *Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der Scholastik.* Heidelberg (1909) pp. 112-127.

B. STUDIES ON ALBERT HIMSELF

"Albertus-Magnus-Festschrift," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) series 3, vol. X (1932). This issue includes the following articles:

Manser: "Albert der Grosse als Neuerer auf philosophischen Gebiete."

Schneider: "Aus Astronomie und Geologie des hl. Albert der Grosse."

Well: "Der Vitalismus Alberts des Grossen."

Graf: "Die Lehre des hl. A. d. G. über das psychische Subjekt der Tugenden."

Grabmann: "Die Lehre des hl. A. M. vom Grunde der Vielheit der Dinge und der lateinische Averroismus."

Planzer: "Albertus-Magnus-Handschriften in mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen des deutschen Sprachgebiets."

Walz: "Bestrebungen zur Heiligsprechung A. d. G. in alter und neuer Zeit."

ARENDT, WILHELM. *Die Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre Alberts des Grossen.* Jena, Verlag Gustav Fischer (1929). (LC)

Atti della Settimana Albertina. Rome (1932). This issue includes the following articles:

E. Ruffini: La filosofia e la teologia nel campo delle scienze secondo Alberto."

A. Masnovo: "Alberto M. e la polemica averroistica."

B. Geyer: "De aristotelismo B. Alberti Magni."

F. Pelster: "De traditione manuscripta quorundam operum S. Alberti Magni."

M. Grabmann: "De quaestione: 'Utrum theologia sit scientia speculativa an practica' a B. Alberto M. et S. Thoma Aquinate pertracta."

A. Vaccari: "S. Albertus M. Sacrae Scripturae interpres."

O. Lottin: "Le rôle de la raison dans l'Éthique d'Albert le Grand."

H. C. Scheeben: "De Alberto M. discipulis."

F. Calley: "Vita apostolica e azione sociale di Alberto Magno."

S. Dezani: "La figura del B. Alberto M. nel quadro storico della scienza sperimentale."

L. de Simone: "Il B. Alberto M. in Italia. Influsso di lui nella cultura italiana."

BACKES, A. JACOB. "Der Geist als höhner der Seele nach Albert dem Grossen," *Studia Albertina*, BGPM Suppl. IV, pp. 52-67.

GRABMANN, MARTIN. *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, Band II. München, Max Hueber (1936).

KLEINEIDAM, E. *Das Problem der hylemorphen Zusammensetzung der geistigen im 13. Jahrhundert bis Thomas von Aquino*. Inaugural-Dissert. Breslau (1930) pp. 51-57.

LOTTIN, ODON. "L'identité de l'âme et de ses facultés pendant la première moitié du XIII^e siècle," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XXXVI (1934) pp. 191-220.

—. *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*. Louvain (1942, 1948, 1949, 1954) II, 430-463, 470-473, 572-578; III, 309, 540-550.

I Maestri del Secolo XIII: S. Bonaventura, S. Alberto Magno, S. Tommaso d'Aquino. Introduzione, traduzione, e commento a cura di Carmine Buda (Classici della filosofia commentati per le scuole). Messina-Firenze, G. D'Anna (1956).

MAIER, ANNELIESE. *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie*. Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura (1951).

MARIÉTAN, J. *Problème de la classification des sciences d'Aristote à S. Thomas*. Paris (1901) pp. 156-175. (LC)

PEGIS, ANTON C. *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*. Toronto (1934).

PELSTER, FRANZ. *Die griechisch-lateinischen Metaphysikübersetzungen des Mittelalters*. 2nd Festgabe Cl. Baeumker, BGPM Suppl. (1923) pp. 89-118. (LC)

POUILLO, DOM HENRY. "La Beauté chez les Scolastiques," *AHDLM* XV (1946) pp. 293-301.

PRANTL, C. *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. Leipzig (1867) III, pp. 89-107.

STÉVAUX, ALBERT. "La doctrine de la charité dans les Commentaires des Sentences de saint Albert, de saint Bonaventure et de saint Thomas," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* XXIV (1948) pp. 59-97.

STÖCKL, A. *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Mainz (1865) II, pp. 352-421.

THÈRY, G. "L'Augustinisme médiéval et l'unité de la forme substantielle," *Acta Pontificiae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis* (1931) pp. 164-169.

BALSS, HEINRICH. *Albertus Magnus als Biologe. Werk und Ursprung*. Mit 37 abb. in Text. Stuttgart, Wissenschaft (1947).

BATTLE, JOHN J. "The Agent Intellect in St. Albert the Great." Unpublished Master's thesis, St. Louis University (1939).

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

BERTOLA, ERMENEGILDO. "La dottrine dello 'spirito' in Alberto Magno," *Sophia* XIX (1951) pp. 306-312.

BETZENDORFER, W. "Glauben und Wissen bei Albert d. Gr.," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* VII (1926) pp. 280-300.

BRANDL, LEOPOLD. *Die Sexualethik des heiligen Albertus Magnus. Eine Moralgeschichte.* Regensburg, Pustet (1955).

CATANIA, FRANCIS J. "Divine Infinity According to Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Sentences*." Doctoral Dissertation, St. Louis University (1959).

DÄHNERT, U. *Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus gemessen an den Stufen der "Abstractio".* Leipzig, Hirzel (1934).

DOMS, H. *Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus.* Breslau, Verlag Müller u. Seiffert (1929). (LC)

DOOLEY, WILLIAM. "St. Albert: A Point of Departure," *The Modern Schoolman* XVI (1939) pp. 83-87.

DUCHARME, LÉONARD. "'Esse' chez saint Albert le Grand. Introduction à la métaphysique de ses premiers écrits," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* XXVII (1957) pp. 209*-252*.

ENGLHARDT, G. "Das Glaubenslicht pach Albert dem Grossen," *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Mélanges à Michael Schmaus). München, Zink (1957) pp. 371-390.

ERNI, RAYMUND. "Albertus Magnus als Seelsorger," *Anima* 7 (1952) pp. 181-184.

ETHIER, A. M. "Les parties potentielles de l'intellect chez S. Albert le Grand," in *Philosophie*, cahier II, pp. 63-93. Ottawa, Ed. du Lévrier (1938).

(FALCONIUS, G. or P. BERTI.) *Theatrum omnium scientiarum arriumque collectum ex operibus Alberti Magni.* Venise (1613). (LC)

FECKES, KARL. *Aus Alberts Eucharistic- und Marienlehre.* (1944).

FEILER, W. *Die Moral des Albertus Magnus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ethik des Mittelalters.* Inaugural-Diss., Leipzig (1891). (LC)

FERNANDEZ-ALONSO, A. "Scientiae et Philosophia secundum Sanctum Albertum Magnum," *Angelicum* 13 (1936) pp. 24-59.

FERRO, CARMELO. "Metafisica ed etica nel *De Bono di S. Alberto Magno*," *Rivista della Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* XLV (1953) pp. 434-464.

FRIES, ALBERT. "Die Unter dem Namen des Albertus Magnus überlieferten Mariologischen Schriften," *BGPM* XXXVII, No. 4, Münster (1954).

—. "Eine Vorlesung Alberts des Grossen über den biblischen Kanon," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) XXVIII (1950) pp. 195-213.

—. "Um neue theologische Abhandlungen Alberts des Grossen," *Angelicum* 13 (1936) pp. 60-92.

—. "Vom Denken Alberts des Grossen über die Gottesmutter," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 5 (1958) pp. 129-157.

FRONOBER, H. *Die Lehre der Materie und Form nach Albert dem Grosse, nach der Quellen bearbeitet.* Inaugural-Dissert., Breslau (1909). (LC)

GILSON, ETIENNE. "L'âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand." *AHDLM* 14 (1943-45) pp. 5-72.

GLOSZNER, M. *Das objective Princip der aristotelisch-scholastischen Philosophie, besonders Alberts des Grossen Lehre vom objectiven Ursprung verglichen mit dem subjectiven Princip der neueren Philosophie*. Ratisbonne (1880). (LC)

GRABMANN, MARTIN. "Albertus Magnus, Theologe, Philosoph und Naturforscher," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch LXI* (1951) pp. 473-480.

—. "Zur philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Methode in den Aristoteleskommentaren Alberts des Grossen," *Angelicum XXI* (1944) pp. 50-64.

HANSEN, J. "Zur Frage aufanglossen und zeitlichen Schöpfung bei Albert dem Grossen," *Studia Albertina, BGPM Suppl. IV*, pp. 167-188.

HERTLING, G. VON. *Albertus Magnus. Beiträge zu seiner Würdigung*. 2nd. Auflage. Münster i. W. (1914). (LC)

HIEDL, A. "Die ursprüngliche Einteilung des Sentenzenkommentars Alberts des Grossen," *Studia Albertina BGPM Suppl. IV*, pp. 189-201.

HIPPTEL, ERNST, VON. "Die Rechtslehre Alberts des Grossen," *Neue Ordn.*, 7 (1953) pp. 325-341.

HUFNAGEL, A. "Das Person-Problem bei Albertus Magnus," *Studia Albertina BGPM Suppl. IV*, pp. 202-233.

—. *Die Wahrheit als philosophisch-theologisches Problem bei Albert dem Deutschen*. Bonn (1940).

KLAUCH, K. "Albertus Magnus und die Erkunde," *Studia Albertina BGPM Suppl. IV*, pp. 234-248.

KOLPING, ADOLF. "Eine Abbreviation der Albert dem Grossen zugeschrieben Messerklärung, *Scholastik* 31 (1956) pp. 70-84.

KOPP, PAUL. "Psychiatrisches bei Albertus Magnus. Beiträge zur Psychiatrie der Scholastik," *I. Z. Neur.* 147 (1933) pp. 50-60.

KOROSAK, BRUNO. *Mariologia S. Alberti Magni eiusque coaequalium*. Romae, Academia Mariana Internationalis (1954).

KÜHLE, HEINRICH. *Die Entfaltung des Gottesbegriffs zum Begriffe des höchsten Gutes nach Albert dem Grossen*. Inaug.-Dissert. Münster i. W., Aschendorffsche Buchdruckerei (1932).

—. *Die Lehre Alberts des Grossen von der Transzentalien*. In *Philosophia Perennis (Festgabe J. Geyser)* t. 1. Ratisbonne, Habel (1920). (LC)

LAUER, H. *Die Moraltheologie Alberts d. Grossen*. Freiburg, Verlag Herder.

LAUER, ROSEMARY Z. "St. Albert and the theory of abstraction," *The Thomist XVII* (1954) pp. 69-83.

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

LEMMER, JEROME G. "The Problem of the Plurality of Substantial Forms in a Compound as Treated by Saint Albert the Great." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, St. Louis University (1937).

LIERTZ, RHABAN. *Albert der Grosse. Der Staatsmann.* (1948).

—. "Der Gemeinsinn und das Gewissen bei Albert dem Grossen," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 57 (1947) pp. 381-387.

—. *Der selige Albert der Grosse als Naturforscher und Lehrer.* München, Salesianer-Verlag (1931).

—. *Die Naturkunde von der menschlichen Seele nach Albert d. Gr.* Köln, Verlag Bachem (1933).

LOTTIN, ODON. "Chronique de théologie médiévale. Saint Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* V (1933) pp. 423-427.

MANSION, AUGUST. "L'induction chez Albert le Grand," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XIII (1906) pp. 115-234, 246-264. (LC)

MASCARUGGI, PIETRO. "L'Omniscienza del Cristo in S. Alberto Magno," *Sapienza* III (1950) pp. 251-265.

—. "Il progresso di Cristo nella scienza in Sant'Alberto Magno," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) LI (1948) pp. 217-250.

MASTRORILLI, M. *La filosofia naturale di Alberto Magno.* Naples (1922). (LC)

MAZZANTINI, C. "La teoria della conoscenza in Alberto Magno," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 29 (1937) pp. 329-335.

MCWILLIAMS, JAMES A. "St. Albert the Great and Plurality of Forms," *The Modern Schoolman* IX (1932) pp. 43-61.

MEERSSEMAN, G. G. "Die Einheit der menschlichen Seele nach Albertus Magnus," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) X (1932) pp. 213-226.

MEISTER, R. "Zur Formulierung des Universalien-problem bei Albertus Magnus," *Wiener Studien* 50 (1932) pp. 160-165.

MURRAY, CAMPION. "The Composition of the Sacraments According to the *Summa de Sacramentis* and the *Commentarium in IV Sententiarum* of St. Albert the Great," *Franciscan Studies* 16 (1956) pp. 177-201.

NARDI, BRUNO. "La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull'inchoatio formae," *Rendiconti della Romana Academia Nazionale dei Lincei* 12 (1936) pp. 3-38.

OGARELE, J. S. *Die Sinneserkenntnis Alberts des Grossen.* Dissert. Lwów (1931). (LC)

PARTINGTON, J. R. "Albertus Magnus on Alchemy," *Ambix* 1 (1937) pp. 3-20.

PELSTER, FRANZ. "Zwei Untersuchungen über die literarischen Grundlagen für die Darstellung einer Mariologie des hl. Alberts des Grossen," *Scholastik* 30 (1955) pp. 388-402.

POMPEI, ALFONSO M. "L'atto generativo divino secondo S. Alberto Magno e le scuole francescana e domenicana," *Miscellanea Francescana* LII (1952) pp. 58-91.

POMPEI, ALFONSO M. *La dottrina trinitaria di S. Alberto Magno, o.r. — Esposizione organica del Sentenze in rapporto al movimento teologico scolastico.* (Dissertatio in Facultate theologica Universitatis Friburgensis in Helvetia.) Padova, Tip. della Prov. Palavina di S. Antonio dei Frati Minori Conventuali (1953).

QUANTIN, PIERRE MICHAUD. "Le traité des passions chez Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XVII (1950) pp. 90-120.

RAEYMAEKER, LOUIS DE. "Albert le Grand, philosophe. Les lignes fondamentales de son système métaphysique," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 36 (1933) pp. 4-36.

REILLY, G. C. *The Psychology of St. Albert the Great.* Washington, Catholic University of America (1934).

ROHNER, ANSELMUS. "De natura theologiae juxta S. Alberum Magnum," *Angelicum* 16 (1939) pp. 3-23.

SCHMIEDER, K. *Alberts des Grossen Lehre vom natürlichen Gotteswissen.* Freiburg i. Br. (1932).

SCHNEIDER, A. *Beiträge zur Psychologie Alberts des Grossen,* Inaug.-Dissert., Breslau (1900). (LC)

Serta Albertina, Angelicum XXI (1944): 22 studies on Albert as a scientist.

SIEDLER, DIONYS. "Intellektualismus und Voluntarismus bei Albertus Magnus," *BGPM* 36, No. 2, Münster (1941).

SOLAGES, BRUNO DE. "La cohérence de la métaphysique de l'âme d'Albert le Grand," *Mélanges Cavallera*, pp. 367-400. Toulouse, Bibliothèque de l'Institut Catholique (1948).

STAMMLER, WOLFGANG. "Albert der Große und die deutsche Volksfrömmigkeit des Mittelalters," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* III (1956) pp. 287-319.

STEENBERGHEN, F. VAN. "Les grandes synthèses doctrinales de 1250 à 1277," in *Le mouvement doctrinal du ix^e au xiv^e siècle* (vol. XIII of Fliche and Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise*) Bloud and Gay (1951): "Saint Albert le Grand," pp. 236-246.

STROBEL, ADOLF. *Die Lehre des sel. Albertus Magnus über das Gewissen.* Jahresbericht des Gymnasiums zu Sigmaringen (1901). (LC)

Studio Albertina (Festschrift für Bernhard Geyer) *BGPM Suppl.* IV, Münster (1952). Of the 23 studies on Albert contained in this volume, important ones have been listed in this bibliography.

TAYLOR, F. SHERWOOD. *St. Albert, Patron of Scientists* (Aquinas Paper No. 14). Oxford, Blackfriars (1950).

VANNI-ROVIGHI, SOFIA, "Alberto Magno e l'unità della forma sostanziale nell'uomo," *Medioevo e Rinascimento* II, pp. 753-778. Firenze, G. C. Sansoni (1955).

C. STUDIES ON ALBERT IN HIS RELATIONS TO OTHER AUTHORS

BACH, J. *Des Albertus Magnus Verhältniss zu der Erkenntnisslehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Araber und Juden. Ein Beiträge zur Geschichte der Noetik.* Vienne, W. Braumüller (1881). (LC)

BARBADO, F. M. "La physionomie, le tempérament et le caractère, d'après Albert le Grand et la science moderne," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 314-351. (Translated from Spanish to French by R. P. L. Duneste.) (LC)

BONNÉ, J. *Die Erkenntnisslehre Alberts des Grossen mit bes. Berücksichtigung des arabischen Neuplatonismus.* Bonn, Kath.-Theol. Diss. Bonn (1935).

BUSNELLI, G. S. "L'origine dell'anima razionale secondo Dante e Alberto Magno," *Civiltà Cattolica* 80 (1929) pp. 289-300; 81 (1930) pp. 97-107, 229-237, 336-347. (LC)

COLLINGWOOD, F. J. *The Theory of Being in the 'Summa de Bono' of Ulrich of Strasburg.* University of Toronto Abstract (1952).

CORTABARRIA, ANGEL. "Doctrinas psicológicas de Alfarabi en los escritos de San Alberto Magno," *La Ciencia Tomista* LXXIX (1952) pp. 633-656.

—. "Las obras y la filosofía de Alfarabi en los escritos de San Alberto Magno," *La Ciencia Tomista* LXXVII (1950) pp. 362-387.

—. *Las obras y la filosofía de Alfarabi y Alkindi en los escritos de San Alberto Magno.* Las Caldas de Besaya, Estudios Filosóficos (1954).

—. "Las obras y las doctrinas del filosofo Alkindi en los escritos de San Alberto Magno," *Estudios Filosóficos* I (1951-52) pp. 191-209.

—. "Tabla general de las citas de Alkindi y Alfarabi en las obras de San Alberto Magno," *Estudios Filosóficos* II (1953) pp. 247-250.

DEGEN, ERNST. *Welches sind die Beziehungen Alberts des Grossen "Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis" zur στοιχείωσις θεολογική des Neuplatonikers Proklus, und Was Lehren uns dieselben?* Inaug.-Diss., München (1902). (LC)

DONDAIN, HYACINTHE F. "Saint Albert et le grec," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XVII (1950) pp. 315-319.

ENDRISS, G. *Albertus Magnus als Interpret der aristotelischen Metaphysik.* Inaug. Diss., München, C. Wolf (1886). (LC)

FEIGL, MARIA. "Albert der Große und die arabische Philosophie. Eine Studie zu den Quellen seines Kommentars zum Liber de Causis," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* LXIII (1954) pp. 131-150.

GAUL, L. *Alberts des Grossen Verhältnis zur Plato. Eine literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Untersuchung.* Inaug.-Diss., München (1913); BGPM XII, No. 1 (1913). (LC)

GEYER, BERNARD. "Die handschriftliche Verbreitung der Werke Alberts des Grossen als Maßstab seines Einflusses," *Studia Mediaevalia in honorem Admodum Rev. Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin, O.P., Brugis Flandrorum, De Tempel* (1948) pp. 221-228.

GEYER, BERNARD. "Die Übersetzungen der aristotelischen Metaphysik bei Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* XXX (1917) pp. 392-415. (LC)

GORCE, M. M. "Le problème des trois sommes: Alexandre de Halès, Thomas d'Aquin, Albert le Grand," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 293-301. (LC)

GORMAN, WILLIAM. "Albertus Magnus on Aristotle's Second Definition of the Soul," *Mediaeval Studies* II (1940) pp. 223-230.

GRABMANN, MARTIN. "Der Einfluss Alberts des Grossen auf das Mittelalterliche Geistesleben. Das Deutsche Element in der Mittelalterlichen Scholastik und Mystik," *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II, pp. 324-412, München (1936).

—. *L'influsso di Alberto Magno sulla vita intellettuale del Medio Evo.* 2e trad. ital. accresciuta. Roma (1931).

—. "De theologia ut scientia argumentativa secundum S. Albertum Magnum et S. Thomam," *Angelicum* XIII (1937) pp. 39-60.

HANEBERG, B. *Zur Erkenntnislehre des Ibn-Sina und Albertus Magnus.* Abhandlungen . . . der bayer. Akad. (1866) XI, pp. 189-268.

HAUBST, R. "Zum Fortleben Alberts des Grossen bei Heymerich von Kamp und Nikolaus von Kues," *Studia Albertina BGPM Suppl.* IV, pp. 420-447.

HINZ, J. *Verhältnis des Sentenzenkommentars von Thomas von Aquin zu dem Alberts des Grossen.* Würzburg, Mayer (1936).

HORVATH, A. "Albert der Grosse und der hl. Thomas von Aquin als Begründer der christlichen Philosophie," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) III (1916) pp. 591-636.

JESSBERGER, L. *Das Abhangigkeitsverhältnis des hl. Thomas von Aquin von Albertus Magnus und Bonaventura im dritten Buche des Sentenzenkommentars.* Würzburg, Mayer (1936).

JOEL, M. *Verhältniss Alberts des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides. Ein Beitrag zum Geschicht der mittelalterlichen Philosophie.* Breslau, H. Skutsch (1836). (LC)

KNEIPP, RUDOLF. *Das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis des hl. Thomas von Aquin von Albertus Magnus im ersten Buch des Sentenzen-Kommentars.* Würzburg. Philos. Fak. Diss. (1947) pro manuscripto.

LOPES, DE MATTOS, CARLOS. "As 'auctoritates' em Alberto Magno e Tomás de Aquino," *Revista Brasileira de Filosofia* 6 (1956) pp. 213-223.

LOTTIN, ODON. "Aristote et la connexion des vertus morales," in *Autour d'Aristote. Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion.* Louvain, Publications Universitaires (1955).

—. "La synderèse chez Albert le Grand et S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 30 (1928) pp. 18-24. (LC)

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

MANDONNET, PIERRE. "Polémique averroïste de Siger de Brabant et de S. Thomas," *Revue thomiste* V (1897) p. 95-106.

—. *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*. 2nd ed., vol. II, Louvain (1911).

MATTOS, G. DE. "L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XLIII (1943) pp. 145-161.

MAZZARELLA, PASQUALE. *Il "De Unitate" di Alberto Magno e di Tommaso d'Aquino in rapporto alla teoria Averroistica. Concordanze, Divergenze, Sviluppi*. Napoli, Rondinella (1949).

MEERSSEMAN, G. G. *Geschichte des Albertismus*. Paris (1933).

—. "La lutte entre Thomistes et Albertistes Parisiens," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 40 (1937) pp. 397-403.

—. "Les origines parisiennes de l'Albertisme Colonial," *AHDLM* VII (1932) pp. 121-142.

MILLER, ROBERT. "An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert," *Medieval Studies* XVI (1954) pp. 57-71.

MINGES, P. "Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen Alexander von Hales und Albert dem Grossen," *Franziskanische Studien* II (1915) pp. 212-222. (LC)

MONT, GERARD DU. *Tractatus ostendens concordiam sancti Thomae et venerabilis Alberti in multis in quibus dicantur esse contrarii*. Cologne, Theodoric Rood (1485). (LC)

MULLER-THYM, BERNARD J. *The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of Hochheim*. Institute of Medieval Studies. New York, Sheed and Ward (1939).

MULLIGAN, R. W. "Ratio inferior and ratio superior in St. Albert and St. Thomas," *The Thomist* 19 (1956) pp. 339-367.

NARDI, BRUNO. "Note per una storia dell'averroismo latino. II: La posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all'averroismo," *Revista di Storia della Filosofia* 2 (1947) p. 197-220.

NEUFELD, HUBERT. "Zum Problem des Verhältnisses der theologischen Summa Alberti des Grossen zur theologischen Summa Alexander von Hales," *Franziskanische Studien* (Paderborn) XXVII (1940) pp. 22-56, 65-87.

NOBLE, H. D. "Note pour l'étude de la psychophysiologie d'Albert le Grand et de saint Thomas. Le cerveau et les facultés sensibles," *Revue thomiste* XIII (1905) pp. 91-101. (LC)

OGAREK, J. S. "Die Sinneserkenntnis Alberts des Grossen verglichen mit derjenigen des Thomas von Aquin," Dissert. de Fribourg en Suisse, Lwów (1931). (LC)

OPELT, ILONA. "Latente arabia bei Albertus Magnus," *Bulletin du Cange, Archivum Latin. Medii Aevi* 21 (1954) pp. 271-276.

OVERBECK, JOACHIM. "Der Einfluss des Pseudo-Dionysius auf die Sakramenten- und Kirchenlehre des hl. Albert des Grossen." Bonn. Kath. Theol. Fak. Diss., unpublished (1948).

QUENEAU, G. "Origine de la sentence 'intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus' et date du commentaire du *De Anima* de S. Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XXI (1954) pp. 307-312.

QUANTIN, PIERRE MICHAUD. "Les 'Platonici' dans la psychologie de S. Albert le Grand," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XXIII (1956) pp. 194-207.

RAMIREZ, SANTIAGO M. "San Alberto Magno y la filosofía del derecho de gentes," *Estudios Filosóficos* II (1953) pp. 271-290.

REGNON, TH. DE. *Méta physique des causes d'après S. Thomas et Albert le Grand*. Paris, Retaux (1886).

ROHNER, ANSELMUS. *Das Schöpfungsproblem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Thomas v. Aquino*. BGPM XI, No. 5 (1913). (LC)

ROUSSÉLOT, XAVIER. *San Alberto, San Tomas y San Buenaventura*. Traducion de Manuel Granell. Buenos Aires, Espasa-Calpe Argentia (1950).

RUELLO, FRANCIS. "Une source probable de la théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas (les commentaires dionysiens de saint Albert)," *Recherches de sciences religieuses* XLIII (1955) pp. 104-128.

SALMAN, D. "Albert le Grand et l'Averroïsme latin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* XXIV (1935) pp. 38-64.

SCHNEIDER, A. "Alberti Magni scientia comparata cum moderna," *Angelicum* 22 (1945) pp. 150-163.

—. *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen nach den Quellen dargestellt*. 2 vols. BGPM IV, V-VI (1903, 1906). (LC)

STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND VAN. *Aristotle in the West; the Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*. Translated by Leonard Johnston, Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts (1955).

—. *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédits*. Philosophes belges, XIII, Louvain (1942) pp. 439-442, 468-479.

STOHR, A. *Die Trinitätslehre Ulrichs von Strasburg mit besondere Berücksichtigung ihres Verhältnisses zu Albert dem Grossen und Thomas Aquinas*, BGPM 13 (1928) Münster.

THÈRY, G. *Contribution à l'histoire du procès d'Eckhart*. Ligugé (1926).

IV. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

BIRKENMAIER, A. "Zur Bibliographie Alberts des Grossen," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* XXXVII (1924) pp. 270-272. (LC)

CHEVALIER, U. *Albert (bx) de Bollstadt*, in *Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Age, bio-bibliographique*. Paris, A. Picard (1905) I, 105-107. (LC)

DAHLMANN and WAITZ. *Quellenkunde zur deutschen Geschichte*. Leipzig, Dieterich, 8th ed. (1912), No. 6970, No. 7096. (LC)

A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great
Francis J. Catania

GEYER, BERNHARD. "Der alte Katalog der Werke des hl. Albertus Magnus," in *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, vol. II, pp. 398-413. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (1946).

GILSON, ETIENNE. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. New York, Random House (1955); Bibl. pp. 666-673.

GLORIEUX, PIERRE. *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*. Paris, J. Vrin (1933) v. I, pp. 62-77.

(KÄPPELI, TH.) "Bibliographia albertina," in *S. Rituum Congregationis . . . Urbis et Orbis, Extensionis seu Concessionis Officii et Missae Addito Doctoris Titulo ad Universam Ecclesiam in Honorem B. Alberti Magni Confessoris Ord. Praed. et Episcopi Ratisbonensis*. (1931). (LC)

LAURENT, M. H. and J. CONGAR. "Essai de bibliographie Albertinienne," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 260-292.

MEERSSEMAN, G. G. *Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni*. Brugis (Belgii), G. Beyaert (1931). (LC)

PELSTER, FRANZ. "Neue philosophische Schriften Alberts des Grossen," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* XXXVI (1923) pp. 150-168. (LC)

QUÉTIF and ECHARD. *Scriptores Fratrum Ordinis Praedicatorum*. Paris, Lutetiae (1719), vol. I. (LC)

SCHEEBEN, H. C. "Les écrits d'Albert le Grand d'après les catalogues," *Revue thomiste* XXXVI (1931) pp. 260-292. (LC)

STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND VAN. "La littérature albertino-thomiste (1930-1937)," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* XLI (1938) pp. 126-161.

STÖCKL, A. *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Mainz (1865) II, pp. 352-421.

UEBERWEG, F. and B. GEYER. *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*. II ed., Berlin, E. S. Mittler (1928) II, pp. 402, 739-743.

WALZ, ANGELUS. "L'opera scientifica di Alberto Magno secondo le indagini recenti," *Sapienza* 5 (1952) pp. 442-457.

—, and AUGUSTUS PELZER. "Bibliographia S. Alberti Magni indagatoris rerum naturalium" *Serta Albertina, Angelicum* XXI (1944).

WEISS, MELCHIOR. *Primordia Novae Bibliographiae B. Alberti Magni*. Freising (1898); 2nd ed., Paris (1905). (LC)

GABRIEL MARCEL'S NOTION OF VALUE

MISS MARTHA E. WILLIAMS received her M.A. from Loyola University (Chicago). She has previously written for THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

Since it is a little known and little discussed subject in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, I would like to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of English-speaking philosophers the fact that Marcel has a theory of value. The problem of value is a metaphysical problem because for Marcel the principle of value is being.¹ Now, Marcel prefers to ground his metaphysics in a distinction between the full and the empty, rather than between the one and the many.

I have written on another occasion that, provided it is taken in its metaphysical and not in its physical sense, the distinction between the *full* and the *empty* seems to me more fundamental than that between the *one* and the *many*. This is particularly applicable to the case in point. Life in a world centered on function is liable to despair because this world is empty . . .²

Value is centered in being and must not be considered apart from being. If I am to consider value I must consider both being and a subject or living consciousness because the notion of value presupposes being and a subject; there can be no value without being, in which it is centered, and a subject to affirm or appreciate it. Something which realizes fulfillment (relative fullness of being) must be appreciated or valued by a consciousness which is a subject; it is meaningless without a subject to appreciate it. Ontology demands the addition of intersubjectivity to objective knowledge. A valued object has meaning for *me*, and when it has meaning for me it enters into an intersubjective relationship for me.³ I am open to this object and it has meaning for me. This is true both in my relationships with things considered as things and in my relationships with people considered

as things. So long as the thing or person is considered as a thing it is not appreciated by a consciousness—it is not valued and its fulfillment has no meaning.

Value varies directly with fullness of being. What is “full” of being is “full” of value and what is empty of being has no value. “The whole is of value as a whole, either for itself or for the agent that conserves it (for the moment I am not going deeper into this distinction).”⁴ Marcel refers to the mysterious dovetailing of being and value.⁵ They dovetail in a mysterious⁶ way and cannot be separated. “The fact, however, that being cannot be separated from the exigence of being, must never be lost sight of. Therein lies the fundamental reason for the impossibility of severing being from value.”⁷ Marcel is emphatic on this point. Not only does he say that they are inseparable but that to deny the connection between being and value, as certain logical positivists do, is to deny reality. “There is no surer way to the denial of reality as such. This devaluation of being means turning it into a *caput mortuum*, a mere abstract residue.”⁸ Marcel even says that value can only be thought of as reality.⁹

The problem of value is a mysterious problem of the full and the

¹“Si nous ne donnons pas à ce principe un nom propre, nous ne pourrons le désigner que par le mot *être*, car tout appel de la valeur nous invite à *être* davantage” (Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., *De l'existence à l'être* [Louvain, 1953] p. 311).

²*The Philosophy of Existence* (London, 1958), p. 3.

³Marcel, *Faith and Reality* (Chicago, 1951), p. 46.

⁴Marcel, *Being and Having* (Boston, 1951), p. 148.

⁵*Faith and Reality*, p. 46.

⁶Marcel defines mystery as “a problem which encroaches upon its own data” (*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 11).

⁷*Faith and Reality*, p. 61. It is interesting to note that Marcel speaks of severing being from value and not value from being, since being is a more fundamental notion than value.

⁸*Being and Having*, p. 223.

⁹“Value can only be thought of as reality—and by that I mean saved from

a verbalism which destroys while thinking to proclaim it—if it is related to the consciousness of an immortal destiny” (*Homo Viator* [Chicago, 1951], p. 152).

¹⁰“At bottom we are still dealing with the opposition between the full and the empty—an opposition which is infinitely more essential than that of the single and the multiple” (*Metaphysical Journal* [Chicago, 1952], p. 181).

¹¹“Thus we have a synthesis of the images and movements which form the deepest reality of the object, of the object considered as value and not simply as physical datum” (*ibid.*, p. 167).

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 174.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹⁴“What is lacking here is the necessary minimum of agreement about ends, about the supreme value” (*Faith and Reality*, p. 176).

¹⁵*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 25.

¹⁶*Faith and Reality*, p. 118.

¹⁷*Homo Viator*, p. 157.

empty.¹⁰ What is valuable to me, or presents a value to me, is interesting and meaningful to me-as-a-subject. I open myself to it and it is "present" to me—it exists for me in a special way, and I cannot be indifferent to it. I consider it as value and not merely as physical data.¹¹

I can have real communication with that which has value.¹² The valuable is real and mysterious.

Our world is certainly not a world from which the mysterious is excluded, a world in which all that has the power of communicating itself communicates itself directly and spontaneously. Hence there is an intimate relationship between the idea of mystery and the idea of value. Only that which is capable of interesting me and presenting a value for me is mysterious.¹³

What is valuable for Marcel covers a wide territory, ranging from God, the supreme value,¹⁴ to any inanimate object that may have meaning for me. (In any case, the value must be related to a subject —to *me*.) Even a word can have metaphysical value if it has meaning for me. There can be metaphysical value in a word such as the word "with" because of all that is implied in the word. To be with someone implies communication with the person—an intersubjective relationship whereby I have a greater share or fullness of being. "Even if I cannot see you, if I cannot touch you, I feel that you are with me; it would be a denial of you not to be assured of this."¹⁵ Another instance of the metaphysical value of a word is given by Marcel: "I emphasized the metaphysical value that attaches, or rather should be attached in the French language to the preposition *chez*, our equivalent of the Latin *apud* . . ."¹⁶ For Gabriel Marcel a word that is overused or misused loses its value of meaning through the abuse. As an example of this process he says that the term *mysticism* has been emptied of all value.¹⁷

Value is centered in being; it is in the realm of the personal or subjective (more properly intersubjective) and has no meaning in the realm of "scientific" impersonal facts. If I treat something which has value as a fact I take away its value. Scientific analysis of the type attempted by Freud in his work is the sort of treatment of the data of

Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value
Martha E. Williams

human experience that denudes it of value¹⁸—for instances, Freud's reduction of man's religious life to libido expressed in myth.

If I look at people in a pragmatic way rather than in a way that befits them as human beings, as subjects, I devalue them and take away from the fullness of their being. I suppress the value of their being.¹⁹ My relationship with that which is valuable must be an intersubjective relationship if what is valued is to remain valuable for me. Whether it be an object that is present to me or another person who is present²⁰ to me, it must never be treated mechanically.

According to Marcel, the technical progress that will take place in the future will not further the progress of the knowledge of values themselves; in fact, the technocratic craze will gradually drown the feeling for values.²¹

Our world today really gathers itself together against these needs . . . to the very extent to which technical processes have emancipated themselves today from the ends to which they ought normally to remain subordinate, and have staked a claim to an autonomous reality, or an autonomous value.²²

¹⁸*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 5.

¹⁹"In ordinary life there is nothing to prevent me from behaving to other people in a way which corresponds to this quite pragmatic way of looking at them. Servants are an obvious example. But a husband, after all, can treat his wife as a servant; a father his son, and so on. In these instances we cannot help seeing the real suppression of the value of being. But what we realize at the same time is that it cannot be so suppressed without involving a ghastly mutilation of human relations; we may put it more strongly and say that these human relations entirely lose their specific character. So this by-road has brought us back to intersubjectivity again" (*Faith and Reality*, p. 55).

²⁰"There is infinite value in the fact of feeling another to be present, and infinite value in contact as such" (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 302).

²¹"The outcome of all these considerations is the conclusion that whatever technical progress posterity may

make when compared with us, there will be no progress in its knowledge of values themselves. I shall go further and say that if there is no sign of conversion—in my last chapter we shall have to consider the nature of this conversion—the technocratic craze will gradually succeed in drowning every feeling for values; and this precisely because they are eternal, and a man who lived two thousand years ago was at bottom no worse off than we are, for knowing what is or is not right" (*Faith and Reality*, p. 99).

²²*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 21.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 85.

²⁵"Nevertheless we need to recognise clearly the transition from existence to presence; and I am wondering whether it is not by presence that we can effect the transition from existence to value. Is not that which has value also that which increases in us the feeling of presence . . ." (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 317).

Value is not something that can be learned through the development of science. It belongs to the realm of that which is intersubjective and not to the realm of physical facts.

How can one imagine for a moment that the future development of science will be able to throw any light on true values? All we can anticipate is a continuation of more and more extensive research, from which we shall learn what is judged to be good or bad in different types of society. We can easily imagine also that a sort of social physics might explain approximately the connection, for example, between various moral beliefs and the birth or suicide rate. But it is quite obvious that such conclusions can tell us nothing about values. It is beyond the power of science to tell us whether it is right or wrong to increase the population; it will only be able to remind us that unless certain economic conditions are fulfilled, over-population can become a grave social danger.²³

Sartre observes that this devaluation can radically depreciate humility. “[It] can . . . be robbed of its value in the name of existential psycho-analysis.”²⁴ That is to say, something that has value, meaning, or importance for me loses its value through being treated in a mechanical or scientific way—through being treated as a mere fact.

That which has value is that which increases in us the feeling of presence.²⁵ It increases the feeling of being “with” another; of being open to, and receiving, the other as a subject rather than as “other.” When I am open to, and accept, the other I recognize the value of the other; and insofar as I do this, I increase my being. On the other hand, insofar as I am closed to another, I become emptied of being and lose interest in the other. In a world which answers us mechanically there are times when life seems empty and nothing is of importance. Nothing interests us because nothing seems to have value or meaning for us.

Our activity needs to be exercised to the full in a world of fulness. The experiences in function of which the problem of being can be posited in an intelligible way are happiness, love and inspira-

Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value
Martha E. Williams

tion. But here the problem concerns *being* and not *some being*.²⁶

It is interesting to note that in many ways Marcel's notion of value is like that of the atheist existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. For Sartre also, value has reference to a fullness or completeness.²⁷ For Sartre it is something beyond our reach in this world. This was expressed in *La nausée*.

For Roquentin all *value* lies in the unattainable world of intelligible completeness which he represents to himself in simple intellectual terms; he is not (until the end) duped into imagining that *any* form of human endeavour is adequate to his yearning to rejoin that totality.²⁸

A major difference between the Christian and atheist existentialist is that for Marcel there is an afterlife in eternity²⁹ and therefore hope; whereas for Sartre there is no afterlife and nothing to look forward to. The atheist existentialist has no hope; for him man is left alone to make his way through the meaningless situation of life. This hopelessness is well brought out by Camus in *The Stranger*.

What difference could they make to me, the death of others, or a mother's love, or his God; or the way a man decides to live, the fate he thinks he chooses since one and the same fate was bound to "choose" not only me but thousands of millions of privileged people, who, like him, called themselves my brothers. . . . All alike would be condemned to die one day; his turn too would come like the others.³⁰

²⁶Ibid., p. 206.

²⁷"A sense of value then is a sense of lack, a lack of a certain completeness; and the reflective consciousness which reveals to us this lack (under the eye of which what we are shrivels, as it were, to nothing) is properly called a moral consciousness" (Iris Murdoch, *Sartre, Romantic Rationalist* [New Haven, 1953], p. 44).

²⁸Ibid., p. 18.

²⁹"In any event it seems to me established that the eternal cannot be defined

without reference to value" (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 151).

³⁰*The Stranger* (New York, 1955), p. 152.

³¹*Homo Viator*, p. 154.

³²Ibid., p. 270.

³³Ibid., p. 155.

³⁴Ibid., p. 141.

³⁵Troisfontaines, *De l'existence à l'être*, p. 312.

³⁶Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 141.

³⁷Troisfontaines, *De l'existence à l'être*, p. 312.

³⁸Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 152.

For Marcel the prospect of death is not provocative of despair; the way a man decides to live does make a difference because life in this world leads to a "world more firmly established in Being."³¹ Marcel closes his *Homo Viator* with the following invocation:

Let us allow hope to penetrate to our hearts that this spirit may transmute us so intimately ourselves that we shall be able to face the desolate prospect with a rejuvenated soul, full of acceptance and in tune with the unfathomable.

Oh spirit of metamorphosis:

When we try to obliterate the frontier of clouds which separates us from the other world, guide our unpractised movements! And, when the given hour shall strike, arouse us, eager as the traveller who straps on his rucksack while beyond the misty window pane the earliest rays of dawn are faintly visible.³²

It has been established that the value problem is a metaphysical problem, and it is now necessary to consider the fact that for Marcel value must be incarnate. Value is not a mere abstraction; it must be embodied. "A value is nothing if it is not incarnated."³³ What does it mean for a value to be incarnated, and in what is it embodied?

It is of the nature of value to assume a special function in relation to life.³⁴ "Elle [la valeur] lui appose son sceau; elle sacre ou consacre notre existence."³⁵ This means that if I dedicate myself to some cause, such as liberty, in which a value is involved, the value consecrates my life; it makes my life sacred. And by this consecration my life is delivered from the vicissitudes of history.³⁶ Value is embodied in us and can be seen in the acts we perform.³⁷ The word *justice* is not a value, but justice can be seen in my just action.

To dedicate myself to a cause in which a value is concerned is not an easy thing. Struggle and sacrifice are involved.³⁸ When I dedicate myself to some such cause as truth, it is to truth as an incarnate value that I dedicate myself and not to the abstract term.

It is obvious at first glance that a traditional formula, such as "truth is the adequation of the thing and the intellect", whatever its theoretic value may be, is by no means suited to throw

Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value
Martha E. Williams

light on such assertions. There would be no meaning in saying that somebody has died for the adequation of the thing and the intellect.³⁹

It is ridiculous to say that I give life for an abstract term like "liberty." I do not sacrifice myself for something that is not value-incarnated in something concrete and meaningful for me. I may die for an embodied value that is at stake but not for a definition.⁴⁰ To say this is false is to fall back into a game that does not recognize itself as such.⁴¹

We do not consent to die for beauty in general, or even for liberty in general; all that means absolutely nothing. We accept death in order to save our country, or perhaps more truly for our enslaved brothers. Again it would be well to ask ourselves exactly what we mean by *dying for*. Death must be an act, it must be felt as a possible mode of sharing in a certain good which is itself bound up with history.⁴²

To dedicate oneself to a cause in which a value is involved requires sacrifice whether the cause be liberty, justice, art, or anything else. In fact Marcel says that value is probably always related to sacrifice, at least to possible sacrifice.⁴³ Value involves sacrifice and so involves courage. "It seems probable then that a fundamental relationship is established between value and courage by the facts these reflections have disclosed and by the mediation of sacrifice."⁴⁴ Value is not separate from sacrifice and courage.⁴⁵ But this does not mean that "we must localise the value in the effort at the price of which,"⁴⁶ for instance, a work of art is created. It is absurd to reduce value to the

³⁹Marcel, *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 58.

⁴⁰The influence of Cardinal Newman on Marcel is manifest here as this notion is found in Newman's *A Grammar of Assent*.

⁴¹"In light of these remarks, we see clearly that value can only be incarnate; if indeed it is reduced to an abstract definition we fall back once more into our game and, consequently into falsehood, for here the game does not know itself to be a game" (Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 143).

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴⁵"We have seen clearly that it [value] is not separated from courage and sacrifice" (*ibid.*, p. 152).

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴⁸*Faith and Reality*, p. 48.

⁴⁹*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 295.

⁵⁰*Homo Viator*, p. 153.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 153-54.

mere effort we have paid in analyzing the works of art.⁴⁷ Why? Because from our foregoing analysis we know that with value is *insolubly* connected the vigilant rejection of the facile, the vulgar, and the self-complacent, which ever tend to grow up as a circumstance surrounding and devaluating what we do. However, there can be a maximum of effort without this vigilance. Hence value and merit-effort are different.

Value is incarnated in a person. Each person has his own value⁴⁸—has infinite value and should be treated accordingly.

I think that the Christian idea of the infinite value of souls is fundamentally no more than a negation of the belief in a price, in a tariff-rate that can be applied to persons. Of course we admit quite spontaneously that a person has no commercial value (even when we transpose the meaning of those words).⁴⁹

Each person or consciousness is the bearer of a unique value destined for eternity. There is a real relation between value and immortality. Man is destined for the "other world," and it is through value that we get a glimpse of our true destiny which is "truer than ourselves."⁵⁰ Value is a connection for us between this, the terrestrial world, and the other world, the eternal world.

Perhaps a stable order can only be established if a man is acutely aware of his condition as a traveller, that is to say, if he perpetually reminds himself that he is required to cut himself a dangerous path across the unsteady blocks of a universe which has collapsed and seems to be crumbling in every direction. This path leads to a world more firmly established in Being, a world whose changing and uncertain gleams are all that we can discern here below.⁵¹

The problem of value is a metaphysical problem. Marcel tells us that value is grounded in being and cannot be considered as separate from being. Along with value we must consider the subject that is open to, or affirms, value. Value is present to "me"—the subject. It exists for me in a special intersubjective way; not as mere physical

Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value
Martha E. Williams

data. For Marcel the valuable can be anything from a meaningful inanimate object or a word to God; but whatever it is, it must be related to a subject as another subject rather than as "other." It belongs to the realm of the personal as opposed to the "scientific" or impersonal.

A value must be embodied. It must be embodied in the subject or in something concrete and meaningful to the subject. To dedicate oneself to a cause where a value is concerned is not to dedicate oneself to an abstract term but to a value embodied in something concrete and subjective. Every person has an infinite, unique value; and it is through value that he gains some understanding of the other world, his proper destiny and goal.

THE MEANING OF "POTENTIAL WHOLE" IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

MR. CARL A. LOFY, S.J. received his M.A.
from Saint Louis University;
and studied at Marquette University.
He taught at Marquette University High School.
He is now studying theology
at the Jesuitenkolleg, Innsbruck.

There are three sorts of totalities—integral, universal, potential. This division is as well known to contemporary Scholastic philosophers and theologians as it was to St. Thomas. The integral and universal wholes are both familiar notions; that of "potential whole" is traditionally clarified by the example of the soul.¹ The soul is a potential whole; its parts are its powers or its levels of perfection. This seems simple enough.

But when we read in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa* that this or that virtue is a "potential part" of some other virtue, the relationship is not as clear. Humility, for example, is called a potential part of temperance,² and piety a potential part of justice.³ Does this mean that justice (paying the grocer, for example) includes piety (honoring, loving, obeying one's parents)? Or that humility is a lesser form of temperance, whereas temperance is a more perfect sort of humility?

Again, St. Thomas says that the speculative virtues of scientific knowledge, understanding, and wisdom are divided "in a certain order, as the parts of a potential whole."⁴ Does this mean that a science is an imperfect part of metaphysics? And even worse, how can science be a part of understanding, since it presupposes and includes understanding in its use of principles?

Such questions arise because the potential whole is not clearly distinguished from an integral one—and perhaps also because the example of the soul has been used in a misleading fashion. It may be advantageous to consider first the descriptions given by St. Thomas of

the three kinds of totality, and then to see how the notion of potential whole is actually used.

The human body, a line, a house, are common examples of integral wholes. The precise point that makes them integral wholes is that their parts add up to make the whole. From this characteristic it

¹For examples: ". . . sicut anima suam virtutem manifestat et exercet per potentias distinctas, tamquam per partes potentiales . . ." (Joannes B. Schuster, s.j., *Philosophia Moralis* [Freiburg: Herder, 1952], p. 70); ". . . eo modo quo vegetativum et sensitivum vocantur partes animae rationalis . . ." (Viktor Cathrein, s.j., *Philosophia Moralis* [15^a ed. Freiburg: Herder, 1929], p. 133); ". . . sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae" (Leonard Lehu, o.p., *Philosophia Moralis et Socialis* [Paris: Lecoffre-Cabala, 1914], Vol. I, "De habitibus, virtutibus, et vitiis," No. 29); cf. Eduard Hugon, o.p., *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticus* (Paris: Lethieulleux, 1927), I, 115; II, Part II, 195-96.

St. Thomas speaks of the vegetative and sensitive souls as "parts" in *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; of the powers as "parts" in *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8, and q. 77, a. 1. See also note 30 below.

²ST, II-II, q. 143.

³Ibid., q. 80.

⁴Ibid., I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

⁵In III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; ST, I-II, q. 57, a. 6 ad 4.

⁶De Spirit. Creat., a. 11 ad 2. Also In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1; ST, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1.

⁷ST, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1. Integral wholes may have quantitative parts or essential parts. The quantitative parts may be of identical or of diverse constitution. Examples used by St. Thomas are: a line or body (*ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8), a number (*De An.*, a. 10), or a tricubit (*CG*, I, cap. 72). Essential parts are always of diverse constitution and may be parts of a composite (matter and form) or parts of a species (genus and specific difference). See, for example, *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 21 (ed. Cathala, Nos. 1099ff); *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3; *ST*, I, q. 8, a. 2 ad 3 and q. 77, a. 1 ad 1; and *ST*, III, q. 90, a. 3 ad 3. For a

discussion of the integral parts of the various moral virtues, see *ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 6 ad 4 and *ibid.*, II-II, q. 48, a. unic.; q. 79, a. 1; q. 128, a. unic.; and q. 143, a. unic.

⁸In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰"Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo; et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1).

¹¹In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.

¹²". . . totum potestativum . . . quod est medium inter totum universale et integrale. . . . Totum potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1).

¹³"Virtus totius potentialis in partibus ejus, quae quidem complete in una invenitur et in aliis diminute" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2). Besides the texts listed in note 30 below, see also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.

¹⁴"Et ideo quodammodo [totum potentiale] potest praedicari de qualibet parte, sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale" (*ST*, I, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1). Also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ad 1.

A special problem in predication arises when the potential whole is not an abstraction but a reality. To our knowledge this happens in only two places in St. Thomas's writings. When the soul is divided into its powers, it remains a reality distinct from these powers, and therefore the soul cannot be properly predicated of these powers (*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 2; *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 8). The second instance is that of grace, which is a potential whole in relation to the virtues (*In III Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 2). Nothing is explicitly mentioned in this text about predication, but since grace is a reality and not an abstraction, it clearly cannot be properly predicated of the virtues.

follows that the whole is not present to each of its parts, neither essentially nor according to its full power. It is not present essentially, for the hand, head, or legs are not the body, nor can "the body" be predicated of any one of them. Nor is the whole present to any of its integral parts according to its full power, since the complete power of the human body is not exercised by any single part.

The four chief characteristics of the integral whole can therefore be listed as follows: (1) the parts add up to make the whole;⁵ (2) the whole is not present essentially to any of its parts (3) nor according to its full power;⁶ therefore (4) the whole cannot be predicated of any of its parts.⁷

The universal whole—a genus made up of species or a species of individuals⁸—has exactly the opposite characteristics. (1) The parts do not add up to make the whole.⁹ (2) The whole is essentially present to its parts and (3) also according to its full power. (4) Therefore the whole can be properly predicated of each of its parts.¹⁰

An example of St. Thomas's illustrates these characteristics. (1) The subjective parts of a universal whole do not add up to make a whole—"Three men are not 'animal,' but 'animals.'"¹¹ (2) The universal whole is essentially present to each of its parts, as the genus "animal" is essentially present in both men and brutes. (3) The full power of the whole, likewise, is present to each of its parts, since all the powers of "animal" are fully realized in each of the species. (4) Finally, the universal whole is properly predicated of each subjective part—a brute is an animal, a man is an animal, in a proper, univocal sense.

The potential whole lies between the integral and universal wholes, though perhaps a bit closer to the latter, since it resembles the universal whole in the first two characteristics and differs only partly in the third and fourth. In a potential whole, (1) the parts do not add up to make the whole. (2) The whole is essentially present to each of its parts, (3) but not according to its full power.¹² This power is found fully only in one of the potential parts, and in a lesser degree in the others.¹³ (4) Therefore,¹⁴ the whole is indeed properly predicated of the parts, but not in the same way as a universal whole of its

The Meaning of "Potential Whole" in St. Thomas Aquinas
Carl A. Lofy, S.J.

subjective parts. The more principal part receives the more proper predication.¹⁵

There are many potential wholes explicitly referred to in the writings of St. Thomas. It seems, however, that the example of the soul, far from clarifying these relationships, has been explained in such a way as to cause misunderstanding, or, at least, confusion. Hence, it may be helpful to consider four different instances, which St. Thomas explains rather fully and which exemplify the four characteristics given above: holy orders, vows, forgiveness of sins, and satisfaction for sin.

Holy orders, considered as a potential whole,¹⁶ can be divided into the priesthood, diaconate, and subdiaconate. Each of these is essentially (truly) an "order," but the fullness of the power of holy orders is found perfectly only in the priesthood and in a diminished way in the other two. Similarly, solemn and private vows¹⁷ are truly vows. The whole—vow—is essentially present, therefore, to each of these "parts," but not according to the fullness of its power, since the full binding force of the vows is found only in the solemn vows. So too, both baptism and penance¹⁸ can forgive sin. The whole—forgiveness of sin—is therefore essentially realized in each of these parts; but since baptism can forgive both original and actual sin, whereas penance

¹⁵In *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1. In this text St. Thomas actually says that the potential part does not receive the predication of the whole ("Potentialis vero pars neque praedicationem totius recipit"), but he is speaking here of the secondary part ("[quae] aliquid de potentia totius participat," whereas the more principal part shares in the full power). The passage necessary for our present purposes is what immediately follows: "Rationalis enim anima tota anima dicitur . . . Sensibilis vero in brutis et in plantis vegetabilis dicuntur partes, sed non totum." And from the texts referred to in the previous note, we know that even these secondary parts can receive the predication of the whole, though not as properly as the parts of a universal whole.

¹⁶In *IV Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1 ad 2.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1 ad 2.

¹⁹See above, n. 4, and the text quoted there.

²⁰For the division of the sacrament of penance into its integral parts, see *In IV Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2. For the division of satisfaction into its potential parts, see *ibid.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2.

²¹The entire text reads as follows: "Unde si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam, sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum dijudicans et de principiis earundem" (*ST*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2). For an explanation of the words "sub se continet" see n. 24.

can forgive only the latter, baptism alone has the full power of the whole. In the terminology used above,¹⁹ therefore, forgiveness of sin is not divided *ex aequo* into baptism and penance but *ordine quodam*.

Perhaps the most useful instance of a potential whole is found in the sacrament of penance.²⁰ This sacrament is an *integral* whole, having three integral parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. These three together add up to make the sacrament of penance, and the sacrament is present to these parts neither according to its essence nor according to its power. But satisfaction, the third integral part, is itself a *potential* whole, divided by St. Thomas into three parts of unequal "power," only one of which has the fullness of the power of satisfaction, although each is essentially a true form of satisfaction. These three parts are almsgiving (the more principal part), prayer, and fasting.

So far there has been little difficulty in understanding the nature of a potential whole. The study of the virtues as potential parts will not be as easy. We shall deal first of all with the intellectual virtues and then with the moral virtues.

St. Thomas says that the intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, and scientific knowledge are not divided *ex aequo*, *sed ordine quodam, sicut accidit in totis potentialibus*. What he means by this should now be clearer. The whole is "intellectual virtue," and it is essentially present to each of these three inasmuch as each is essentially or truly an intellectual virtue. But the full power of intellectual virtue is realized completely in wisdom, less so in understanding, and least of all in scientific knowledge. The reason for this progression, St. Thomas says, is that scientific knowledge depends on understanding and is therefore less perfect than it, and both scientific knowledge and understanding depend on wisdom and are therefore less perfect than wisdom.²¹

It should be noted that St. Thomas does not say what the "power of intellectual virtue" is which is shared by these three virtues in decreasing gradation. It is not necessary that he do this. For his concern is not to show how "intellectual virtue" fulfills the definition of a potential whole. He is concerned only with showing that these three intellectual virtues, because this dependence is found among

The Meaning of "Potential Whole" in St. Thomas Aquinas
Carl A. Lofy, S.J.

them, are not divided *ex aequo* but according to a progression of more perfect and less perfect; and this same thing, he says, happens in a potential whole (*sicut accidit in totis potentialibus*).²²

²²There are many ways in which one virtue can be more principal than another. For example, (1) as simply more perfect. Thus charity is a more more perfect virtue than faith, and prudence more perfect than the other moral virtues. The basis of this perfection is the more perfect attainment of the "regula humanorum actuum" (*ST*, II-II, q. 23, a. 6). (2) As prior in time. In this sense faith is more principal than charity (*ST*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 8 ad 2). (3) Precisely *qua* virtue. Thus the moral virtues are more principally called virtues than the intellectual virtues (*ST*, I-II, q. 56, a. 3 and q. 61, a. 2). (4) By reason of a more perfect subject. Thus the intellectual virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues (*ibid.*, q. 61, a. 2 ad 3). (5) Because one virtue depends on another for its full perfection. This is the type of principality in question in the intellectual virtues. (6) Because one virtue is more perfect in one general area of human perfection. This is the type of principality involved between the cardinal virtues and their secondary or "attached" virtues, which will be discussed in the following section.

²³*ST*, I-II, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

²⁴A full explanation of how precisely wisdom makes these judgments is an important question but would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, we can explain that the kinds of scientific knowledge—both their reasoning processes and the insight into their principles—depend ultimately on the validity of the universal first principles; and these principles the particular sciences can neither prove nor defend, since the subject matter of these principles extends beyond the area to which any particular science is limited and applies to all being. A natural philosopher, for example, can neither defend nor prove the principle of contradiction, and yet this principle (to which all the others can be reduced, according to *In XI Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [ed. Cathala, No. 221]) and also *ST*, I-

II, q. 65, a. 2) is implied in each judgment he makes about his proper object, just as being is implied in every "changeable being" (see *In III Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [ed. Cathala, No. 392] and *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 5 [Nos. 588-92]). Hence the scientific kinds of knowledge are dependent for their absolute certitude upon wisdom (metaphysics) which alone can defend these principles which are common to all beings (*In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1 [ed. Cathala, No. 531]). This is one meaning of the "judgment" that wisdom exercises over the conclusions and principles of the sciences. The second meaning of "judgment" is that by which a superior becomes a norm or standard of the lower, so that a lack of conformity is the fault not of the superior but of the inferior. (For this distinction of judgments, see *ST*, I-II, q. 93, a. 2 ad 3.) In this way a virtuous man is said to judge all other men, for his actions become the norm of human conduct (see *In Evangelium S. Matthei*, cap. 19, lect. unic.); actions which do not conform to this norm are "judged" evil. In the same way, wisdom judges the other kinds of knowledge, so that "whatever in these other sciences is found to be out of harmony with the truth of this science [sacred doctrine as wisdom] should be entirely condemned as false" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 6 ad 2. See also *In de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 3).

From what has been said, the meaning of the words in the text (see n. 21 above) "sapientia . . . quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum dijudicans et de principiis earundem" should be clear. The text does not mean that wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge *in it*, as the parts of an integral whole. As a matter of fact, wisdom does involve a reasoning process and therefore also presupposes understanding. But this is not what is meant by the text, which states that wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge (the Piana edition's reading of "the kinds of scientific

The question, therefore, becomes, not what the "power of intellectual virtue" is but how it is that scientific knowledge is dependent upon understanding and how the two of them are dependent upon wisdom. The first of these is quite evident and St. Thomas does not give us any explanation in this text. Scientific knowledge involves reasoning from principles to conclusions. Since the conclusions can be no more certain than the principles from which they come, and since the knowledge and certitude of these principles are derived (or rather intuited) through the virtue of understanding, it follows that scientific knowledge is dependent on understanding for its certitude. The virtue of understanding is in no way dependent, however, upon scientific knowledge.²³ Hence, although the different species of scientific knowledge presuppose (and therefore seem to include as an integral part) understanding, yet looked upon as potential parts of "intellectual virtue," the latter is more perfect because more independent.

But this only makes our second question more difficult, since wisdom also involves a reasoning process and therefore would seem to be equally dependent on, and therefore less perfect than, understanding. St. Thomas answers that the species of scientific knowledge and the understanding that they involve are dependent on wisdom because the latter can judge both their conclusions and the principles of these species of scientific knowledge;²⁴ he says that although wisdom is dependent upon the understanding of its own first principles, this understanding is itself dependent on wisdom for an explanation of the subject and predicate of these principles, without which explanation there could be no understanding. In this sense, wisdom (metaphysics)

knowledge" [scientias] seems more accurate to us) under it (*sub se*); that is, in the same way that a more principal part of a potential whole contains under it the secondary parts—the way, for example, baptism "contains" penance under it, and the way the priesthood contains the diaconate and subdiaconate under it. Only such a reading of the text can make clear the

relation of the "sub se continet" to what follows, "ut de conclusionibus scientiarum [note the plural] dijudicans et de principiis earundem," for wisdom contains understanding and scientific knowledge under it; that is, it is the more principal part of the potential whole because it can judge the conclusions of the sciences and their principles as well.

The Meaning of "Potential Whole" in St. Thomas Aquinas
Carl A. Lofy, S.J.

judges *its own* principles as well, and therefore the understanding of them is dependent on itself.²⁵

There remains now only the task of considering the moral virtues as potential parts. A particular difficulty arises here from the fact that St. Thomas frequently speaks of the principal virtue without even mentioning the whole or the "power." But as we saw in our discussion of the intellectual virtues, it is not necessary that he do so, because he is not trying to show how this or that virtue fulfills the definition of potential part but what the relationship is that exists between the different potential parts. In such a framework, the whole is not important.

We will consider first justice and temperance and then, very briefly, fortitude and prudence.

Justice, taken in the general meaning of "giving to another his due," is the whole. This is essentially (truly) realized in justice (in the narrow sense), piety, and religion. In the latter two, however, we do not (because we cannot) give to our parents or to God what is their *complete* due, whereas in justice (in the narrow sense) we do give another his complete due. This latter is therefore the principal potential part of "giving another his due," while the others are secondary or attached virtues because they do indeed involve giving another his due but lack the power of doing it fully. It is obvious, of course, that the whole ("giving to another his due") is not a virtue, any more than "intellectual virtue" is itself another virtue.

From what has been said, the answers to the questions placed at the beginning of this paper concerning the relationship between piety and justice should now be clear. Piety is a potential part of justice (taken in the wide sense); it is not a part of justice taken in the narrower sense. We exercise justice in the narrower sense when we pay the grocer; at the same time we do not practice piety because these are

²⁵The text for this, too long to quote here, is *ST*, I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4.

²⁶See text under n. 3 above.

²⁷*ST*, II-II, q. 143, a. unic. In *ibid.*, q. 161, a. 4, this hope is explained as "motus spiritus in magna tendentis."

²⁸See text under n. 2 above.

²⁹Fortitude in *ST*, II-II, q. 128, a. unic. and prudence in *ibid.*, q. 148, a. unic.

³⁰*In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 1; *In IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; *ibid.*, d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 1 ad 4; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 11 ad 2; *ST*, III, q. 90, a. 3, and *ibid.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

³¹They could of course draw the same false conclusion concerning the other virtues as well; for example, that justice, piety, and religion are not distinct virtues.

distinct virtues, two distinct parts of the potential whole, "giving to another his due."²⁶

The same relationship is involved in the temperance-humility relationship. Here again we find a wider and a narrower meaning. The wider meaning of temperance is "restraint in some area." The narrower meaning is restraint of the sense of touch. Since this is the hardest type of restraint, it is the principal part of the potential whole, temperance in the wide sense. Humility involves the restraint of hope and boldness,²⁷ and is therefore essentially a type of restraint. But because it is not as difficult as temperance in the narrower sense, it is only a secondary virtue or potential part, of which the whole is "restraint in some area."²⁸

Fortitude and prudence are treated in much the same way.²⁹ Fortitude in the wide sense means "facing difficulty." When this involves facing death, there is had fortitude in the narrower sense and this is the principal virtue, involving the complete power of the whole, whereas patience and perseverance, trust (*fiducia*), and *magnificentia* are secondary parts because they involve less difficult situations. Prudence in the wide sense is the potential whole, of which prudence in the narrow sense, *eubulia*, *synesis*, and *gnome* are the potential parts.

We have deliberately refrained until now from explaining what is perhaps the most frequently used instance of potential whole in the writings of St. Thomas, the soul.³⁰ The reason for the delay is that it is not always immediately evident whether he is speaking of the souls of men, brutes, and plants, or of the rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls in man. For this reason, if some were to think that he was speaking of the latter type, they might possibly conclude that—since St. Thomas held that the rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls of man are not three distinct souls—the point of a potential whole is that the parts are only rationally distinct. From this they could perhaps conclude (falsely, of course) that wisdom, understanding, and scientific knowledge are not really distinct virtues.³¹ On the other hand, if the example of soul were to be so understood that the human soul is the potential whole, and the souls of brutes and plants the

The Meaning of "Potential Whole" in St. Thomas Aquinas
Carl A. Lofy, S.J.

potential parts,³² it could be concluded (again, erroneously) that wisdom "virtually" contains within itself the complete perfection of some—or even all—of the species of scientific knowledge explicitly. These dangers have now been avoided, since from all that has been said, it is clear that the point of a potential whole is not that the parts are not really distinct but rather that each potential part truly (essentially) shares in some perfection, but only one of these parts possesses the full power of that perfection, whereas the others share in that power in a decreasing series of less perfect ways.

³²From the various instances and explanations which St. Thomas gives, it is clear that the notion of potential whole is not a simple notion, identically the same in all its details in the various uses. Not even the example of the

"three souls" needs to be understood in the same way in all cases, and the soul as a "totum potestativum" in relation to its powers clearly is a different sort of potential whole.

Necessary Truths and Postulational Method

STEPHEN O. MITCHELL, *Indiana University*

Like Plato and certain modern philosophers, St. Augustine was impressed by the existence of certain necessary and immutable truths—eternal truths, if you will—which are neither created nor altered by the human mind. And to review the obvious, the entire thrust of St. Augustine's argument for God's existence frequently seems to be dependent upon the presence of such eternal truths. The argument runs somewhat as follows. Since the human mind is limited and prone to error, the existence of such propositions can only presuppose some unlimited eternal being, God. As an example of such truth, St. Augustine suggests number as something offering itself to all who use reason (*Confessions*, X, 12). Some apprehend it with ease, while others have much difficulty; but number is always present. Further, number does not change when apprehended. For these reasons, Augustine would consider number to be a good example of wisdom given by something which must be called God or which must be subordinate only to God (*ibid.*, X, 24).

At this point, however, those familiar with modern mathematics can voice a supposedly devastating criticism. Apparently the entire idea of number is fluid and largely a product of the human mind. Disregarding the fact that an argument does not rest solely upon its examples, some would argue that modern number-theory shows that our customary numerical notation may be changed in such a way that many accepted ideas of number have no fixed meaning or no meaning at all. The sum $3 + 7 = 10$ provides a pertinent example of this objection. Suppose we postulate a number system of positive, whole digits based on a group of five. In this case our numerical notation might run: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20. In such a system the very idea of seven would no longer exist. Rather we would speak of eleven, or $3 + 11 = 14$. And continuing the objection to its obvious end, how can an arbitrary symbol and concept form a valid example in a proof of God's existence?

To this argument there are at least two answers. St. Augustine would first answer that number is only one example of eternal truth perceived by

reason. If number can be shown to be merely a product of the human mind and not an eternal truth perceived by reason, he would draw upon another example. His proof is not dependent upon a unique situation. This is the first answer. A second answer—and an answer based on a fallacy in the original objection—hinges upon the fact that the fundamental nature of number theory has been misapprehended. Basically, the object has been confused with its sign.¹ The existence of such a paralogism may be easily demonstrated by examining one or two possible notations. Taking the set a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, we find that several systems of notation, or signs, may be used to describe it—remembering the prime restriction that there be a one-to-one correspondence between the whole integers of the notation and the individual members of the set.² Our customary system of notation based on ten is valid because it fulfills this qualification.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

However, other systems of notation may be constructed. Using the group five as the basis of a numerical notation, we have:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	2	3	4	5	10	11	12	13	14

Or, using the set *, //, a we have:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
*	//	a	*O	**	*//	*a	//O	/*	///

These too, are valid systems of notation, for they possess a one-to-one correspondence between the members of the set and the elements of the notation. And as long as this one-to-one correspondence between the members of the set is maintained, any system of notation is valid. Even one may be used, as it is in most calculating machines. For example:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	10	11	100	101	110	111	1000	1001	1010

Now, what does this do to the argument that number is only an accident or a product of man's mind? Clearly it means that the basis of St. Augustine's proof remains untouched; indeed, in some respects it is augmented. That in one system "three plus seven equals ten" while in

¹See the various works on elementary semantics in which the basis of all discussion hinges upon a distinction between object and sign.

²Kenneth O. May, *Elementary Analysis* (New York, 1952), p. 37.

³*Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴*Principia Mathematica* (London, 1903).

⁵Frank Plumpton Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics* (New York, 1931), p. 21.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 9.

another system the idea of three plus seven does not exist is only an accident of notation. Actually, using the notation based on five, $3 + 7 = 10$ is equivalent to $3 + 11 = 14$. In reality, two sets are being added rather than two numbers, one set of "three" and one set of "seven," and to arrive at a correct and unique answer we must "add" the two sets by counting all the members of the combined sets.³ Again, the notation of the answer is only an accident. Ultimately, then, this apparent objection only strengthens St. Augustine's position, for human reason has been able to force its way through an appearance of fluidity to the real truth.

This is the first objection to St. Augustine's use of number as an example. More difficult to answer is the objection that all mathematics, number included, is only a projection of man's mind and not a reflection of any fixed, eternal order. This basic position, frequently called the axiomatic method, was first formalized by Whitehead and Russell⁴ and is vulgarly conceived to be a system which does away with all necessity for fixed rules. The gross argument runs as follows: Once a set of noncontradictory premises has been set forth, a mathematical system built upon these premises will be valid irrespective of its relation to the world of experience.

Again the bearing on St. Augustine's eternal truth is obvious. If all mathematical system, number included, is only an arbitrary creation of man's mind, how can it provide valid examples of truth given by God and discovered by man's reason? There are two possible answers to this objection. As might be expected, the first answer is merely a clarification of the axiomatic method. Ramsey points out that essentially the method of Whitehead and Russell is based on the existence of tautologies.⁵ That is, the so-called axioms are merely tautological statements. Ramsey feels that this makes the validity of the axiomatic method suspect, but more to the present point is the effect on St. Augustine's argument. For if all mathematical argument is based on tautologies, St. Augustine's mathematical examples remain valid. This can be seen if we inquire into the mathematical meaning of tautological. Commonly considered a needless repetition of an idea or phrase, in mathematics and logic it is more narrowly defined as a self-evident and self-exhausting statement.⁶ For example: It is either raining or not raining; or symbolically: p or not-p.

To the objection that all mathematical systems are man-made and therefore not valid indications of God's existence, St. Augustine would answer that only the superstructures are man-made. The basis of the various systems, the tautology, is something discovered by man's reason but created by God. More specifically, the manifest is not easily seen without the aid of reason. And while there is a difference between $3 + 7 = 10$ and

p or not-p, the difference can be held to be one of degree rather than one of kind.

Unfortunately, this argument verges on casuistry. Also, it tends to reduce the importance of man's reason by making him somewhat of an observer of the obvious; and since St. Augustine believed reason to be of fundamental importance in Christian thought, it tends to minimize the importance of his thought. If reason is reduced to discovering trivia in its search for God, there is the implication that reason is not as powerful as was first believed.

Fortunately, a second and much more powerful refutation of the axiomatic objection to St. Augustine's argument is given by Goedel's proof.⁷ Goedel attacks the entire axiomatic method, the basis even of Greek mathematics, and presents proof that this method has limitations that rule out systematizing even the arithmetic of whole numbers.⁸ Starting with efforts to prove arithmetic free from contradictions, Goedel shows that these are doomed to failure and comes to two major conclusions. First:

[It is] . . . impossible to establish a meta-mathematical proof of the consistency of a system comprehensive enough to contain the whole of arithmetic—unless, indeed, this proof itself employs rules of inference much more powerful than the transformation rules used in deriving theorems within the system.⁹

More specifically, no system can by and in itself be complete. There will always be truths that the given axioms of a system do not cover. Second, "any consistent set of arithmetical axioms is incomplete."¹⁰ That is, any finite number of added axioms will continue to give new truth so that any axiomatic approach to the theory of number cannot exhaust the domain of arithmetical truth.¹¹

Returning to St. Augustine, or for that matter any philosopher who believes in the existence and importance of eternal mathematical truth, we see that this proof gives his example a solid buttress. For while his specific example may be included in some particular system in such a manner as to become obvious or nonexistent, yet there will always be truths that can be discovered only by the use of reason and not by the mechanical manipulation of fixed rules—truths which imply the existence of God.

⁷Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman,
"Goedel's Proof," *Scientific American*,
CXCIV, No. 6 (1956), 71.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*, 80.
¹⁰*Ibid.*
¹¹*Ibid.*, 86.

The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in Abelard

O T T O B I R D, University of Notre Dame

Father Ong in his *Ramus* describes Peter of Spain as giving "short shrift" to the doctrine of places and explains this by saying: "The notion of the places is not scientific in any precise logical or psychological sense, since the exact application of the local analogy in play here is very difficult, if not impossible to determine."¹ Leaving aside the analogy, the question may be raised whether there is any "precise logical" interest in the doctrine of places, or of "topics," as I prefer to call them. There may be little in the Renaissance logics which are the main object of Father Ong's study. But it is quite a different matter for medieval logic, as is evident from a consideration of perhaps the first great figure in the development of a specifically medieval logic. I refer to Peter Abelard, whose main work on the topics is now available in the recent edition of the *Dialectica* by L. M. De Rijk, where it takes up 160 of the 548 pages of text.²

What I propose to do here is to show from Abelard's analysis that there is a precise logical interest in the topics and incidentally to indicate how at least some of the matters of traditional topical concern fall within the scope of modern logic.

Abelard begins his consideration of the topics (*De Locis*) immediately after that of the syllogism, as does Peter of Spain in his *Summulae*, which became the classical text in elementary logic from the thirteenth century on. In it he is still concerned with inference, the great object of the logician's interest. But in turning from the syllogism to the topics, he passes from what he calls perfect to imperfect inference.

"Inference," Abelard writes, "consists in necessary consecution in the sense that the antecedent compels the consequent." But this necessity may come about in different ways. It may come from the structure itself; that is, from the way in which the elements of the argument are arranged. Then

the truth of the consequent is manifested from the complex of the antecedent itself, the construction of the antecedent being so disposed that it contains within itself the construction of the consequent, as in syllogisms and in hypotheticals which have the form of syllogisms.

In this case we have perfect inference.³

On the other hand, the necessity may come from outside the structure,

Notes and Discussion

ex rerum natura, in the sense that it comes from what is being inferred, or from the meaning of the terms, and not from the construction.⁴

To make clear the difference Abelard cites the following examples:

PERFECT INFERENCE⁵

1. Omnis homo est animal, omne animal est animatum, ergo omnis homo est animatus.

2. Si omnis homo est animal et omne animal est animatum, omnis homo est animatus.

Both have perfect inference; and the only difference between them, Abelard says, is that the hypothetical, which he calls a *consequentia*, lacks the assertion of the antecedents (*concessione antecedentium propositum*).⁶ In other words, he distinguishes the categorical from the hypothetical syllogism as what would now be called an inference-scheme from an implicative statement. In each case the inference is valid from the construction and not from the meaning of the terms. His teaching can accordingly be represented by the use of variables. Using *A* for "all," *C* for "if . . . then," *K* for "and," " \vdash " for assertion, we have:

$$1'. \vdash Axy$$

$$\vdash Ayz$$

$$\hline$$

$$\vdash Axz$$

$$2'. CKAabAbcAac$$

¹Walter J. Ong, *Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Harvard, 1958), p. 117.

²Petrus Abelardus, *Dialectica*, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1956). The *De Loci*, which is *Liber Primus* of *Tractatus Tertius*, extends from page 253 to page 413.

³"Inferentia itaque in necessitate consecutionis consistit, in eo scilicet quod ex sensu antecedentis sententia exigitur consequentis. . . . Perfecta quidem est inferentia, cum ex ipsius antecedentis complexione consequentis veritas manifesta est et antecedentis constructio ita est disposita, ut in se consequentis quoque constructionem contineat, veluti in syllogismis aut in his hypotheticis quae formas habent syllogismorum" (*ibid.*, pp. 253-54). I should note that in translating I have tried to be as literal as possible, even at the risk of torturing the English language.

⁴"Quae quidem inferentiae, quamvis imperfectae sint quantum ad antecedentis constructionem, tamen necessitatem ex rerum natura saepissime tenent. . . . Perfectio itaque necessitatis etiam in his est inferentiis, non constructionis" (*ibid.*, p. 254).

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 255, 257.
⁸"Quantum quidem ad rerum naturam quam movimus, de veritate consequentiae certi sumus, quia scilicet animal sine animato non posse subsistere scimus, non quidem quantum ad complexionem inferentis" (*ibid.*, p. 255).

⁹"Earum itaque tantum inferentiarum vis proprie dicitur locus quae imperfectae sunt, ut quod ad perfectiorem inferentiae defuerit, loci assignatio supplet" (*ibid.*, p. 262).

¹⁰Boethius, *De Differentiis Topicis*, II, PL, LXIV, 1185A; cf. De Rijk's introduction, p. xxix.

3. si omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est animatus.
4. si est animal est animatum.
5. si est homo est animal.

All, according to Abelard, are both true inferences (in that one thing follows from another in each) and necessary. But the necessity lies in what is inferred, in the meaning and not the construction of terms. Thus he writes: "It is with respect to what we know about the nature of things, and not with respect to the complex of the inference, that we are certain of the truth of the consequence."⁸ In such cases we have to go outside the formal or logical structure and look at the relation between the meaning of the terms. It is here that the topic enters.

Consider No. 5 above. If we know that man is related to animal as species to genus, we have the "topic of species" (*locus a specie*) and can apply the topical maxim: *de quocumque predicatur species, et genus*. We now have all that is needed for a perfect inference, since, as Abelard says, "the assignment of the topic applies what is lacking to the perfection of the inference."⁹ Let us see, then, what we have and how it goes together to make a perfect inference.

- 5.1. the relation of man to animal as species to genus
- 5.2. the maxim: *de quocumque predicatur species, et genus*
- 5.3. the imperfect inference: *si est homo est animal*

What we have is in effect an instance of what would now be called the logic of classes, only expressed metalogically in terms of operations on language. The inference becomes clearer if we express it in the object-language of the class logic.

Using " α ", " β " for classes, " \subset " for class inclusion, x for individuals, " \in " for class-membership, " \supset " for "if . . . then", " \vdash " for assertion, and " (x) " for the universal quantifier, we have:

- 5.1. $\vdash \alpha \subset \beta$
- 5.2. $\vdash \alpha \subset \beta. \supset : (x). x \in \alpha. \supset x \in \beta$
- 5.3. $\vdash x \in \alpha. \supset x \in \beta$

So expressed it is clear at once why 5.3 is imperfect by itself and needs the topic, supplied by 5.1 and 5.2, to manifest the necessity of the inference. Given these two, 5.3 follows necessarily by the rule of detachment (if the sentence P is asserted [5.1], and the implication CPQ [5.2] is asserted, Q [5.3] may be detached and asserted, and dropping the universal quantifier).

Abelard, following his authority—Boethius, for the most part¹⁰—distinguishes two elements in the topic, which provides the division of topics into the *locus a differentia* and the *maxima propositio*. The first of these (of which 5.1 is an example) is defined as “that thing which in its relation to another constitutes the strength of the consecution.” The *maxima* (of which 5.2 is an example) is “that proposition, containing the sense of many consequences, which shows the common mode of proof that the differences have in themselves according to the power of its relations.” Thus Abelard claims that the maxim 5.2 “contains the sense of all these consequences: *si est homo est animal*, *si est margarita est lapis*, *si est rosa est flos*, *si est rubor est calor*, and others of this sort, in which species is antecedent to genus.”¹¹

The topical difference is extralogical, since it involves recognition that a certain relation holds between two things—in our example, that man in fact is related to animal as species to genus. The maxim is logical in that it involves no reference beyond itself. Expressed in the object language of modern logic, 5.2 is a law or thesis in the calculus of classes; in fact it is proposition *22.1 in the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. Stated metalogically as it is by Abelard, it corresponds more closely to an axiom-scheme than to a thesis; the examples given in connection with the definition are not so much substitutions in a thesis as realizations of a certain form; that is, man, pearl, rose, red, are not substitutions for *species*, but each is a species of a certain genus. But though distinct, both topical difference and maxim are needed to validate an imperfect inference. In this respect Abelard’s description of the use of a topic speaks for itself:

When of any terms we want to draw an inference by means of (*ex*) a Topical Difference and its Maxim, we consider first the relation (*habitudo*) of the Difference to the thing we want to infer (5.1). Having recognized it in those things, we then think of their mode of inference and designate the Maxim (5.2). Then according to it we at

¹¹“Est autem locus differentia: ea res in cuius habitudine ad aliam firmitas consecutio consistit. . . . Maxima vero propositio dicitur: ea propositio quae multarum consequentiarum continens sensus communem modum probationis, quam in eis sua differentiae tenent, secundum vim eiusdem habitudinis ostendit, veluti . . .” (*Dialectica*, p. 263).

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 313.

¹³“Locum ergo generaliter definientes vim inferentiae dicimus. . . . Locum autem artius accipientes philo-

sophi definierunt *argumenti sedem*, vel id esse unde trahitur conveniens argumentum ad propositam quaestionem comprobandum” (*ibid.*, p. 253).

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Cf. I. M. Bochenski, *Formale Logik* (München), p. 219; E. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953), pp. 64-65, 80 ff.; K. Durr, *The Propositional Logic of Boethius* (Amsterdam, 1953). For the logical interest of Aristotle’s *Topics*, see I. M. Bochenski’s *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam, 1951), pp. 32-35, 63-70.

once compose the consequence concerning the things proposed (5.3). . . . Thus if we want to constitute a consequence from *man* to *animal*, we first consider the relation of man to animal, and when we have seen it to be that of species (5.1), we excogitate the common mode of inference from species to genus, which we express in the Maxim thus: *the genus can be predicated of whatever the species is* (5.2). Then we can state (*disponimus*) the consequence: *If it is man it is animal* (5.3). If anyone should doubt this consequence, we prove it through the assigning of the relation and the Maxim which have already been conceded, thus: *But man is a species of animal, and therefore this consequence is true: If it is man it is animal.*¹²

From this it is clear why Abelard wants to define a topic generally as a "force of inference" (*vis inferentiae*). He proposes this in order to make clear what he calls the narrower traditional definition of it as "a basis of argument (*argumenti sedes*), or that from which a fitting argument can be drawn to prove a proposed question."¹³

We have considered but one of the many topics. But this is sufficient to manifest their logical interest. In the topical maxim we have found a logical entity that has a precise logical sense according to even the most rigorous standards. Our example has its analogue in the modern logic or calculus of classes, and there are others of this kind. However, the logical interest is not exhausted by these. As Abelard notes, the topics involve the consideration of hypotheticals;¹⁴ and, as is now well known, the medieval treatment of these corresponds in several ways to the modern logic of propositions.¹⁵ Thus although some of the topics may be philosophical or rhetorical rather than logical, others are of strictly logical concern.

Chronicle

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME held a symposium on Christian wisdom on March 6 and 7, 1959. Professor W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., of Yale University, reported on work in progress in the field of English and criticism. Professor Alceu Amoroso Lima, of the University of Brazil and the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, spoke on Christianity and sociology. Professor Frank L. Keegan, of the University of Notre Dame, spoke on the most significant achievements of the work of M. Jacques Maritain. Professor Joseph J. Sikora, of Loyola University (Chicago), discussed the relations between modern science and Christian wisdom. On Friday evening, March 6, there was a panel discussion on the problem of academic excellence in a Catholic university. The Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, c.s.c., was chairman; participants were Sister Madeleva, c.s.c., the Reverend Edward O'Connor, c.s.c., Professor F. J. Crosson, and Professor Alvan Ryan. Professor William K. Franken, of the University of Michigan, spoke on religion in the universities; and the Reverend Virgil C. Blum, s.j., of Marquette University, discussed freedom of choice in education.

THE AQUINAS LECTURE for 1959, annually presented by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University, was given on March 8 by Professor William Oliver Martin of the University of Rhode Island. Professor Martin spoke on metaphysics and ideology. He maintained that only a realistic analysis could lead to a metaphysics as a science of the real. With the rejection of realism, philosophers were driven to substitute for metaphysics a system of postulates, built up after the fashion of a theory in experimental science. Such a postulation system Professor Martin calls an ideology.

THE METAPHYSICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA held its tenth annual meeting at Brooklyn College, March 20 and 21, 1959. The first paper was read by Professor William Barrett (New York University); the commentator was Richard M. Millard (Boston University). Professor Barrett maintained that the world of Homer is characterized by presentness, clarity, and substance, and that our contemporary understanding of time would not have been accepted by the Greeks. Professor Henry Aiken (Harvard University) spoke on the "metaphysics of nostalgia"; the commentator was William A. Earle (Northwestern University). Professor Aiken rejected the possibility of a metaphysics; he then tried to give a psychological aetiology of nostalgia. After the dinner meeting, Professor Rudolf Allers (Georgetown University) gave the presidential address; the commentator was the Reverend Robert O. Johann, s.j. (Loyola Seminary). Professor Allers spoke on the inherent limitations of the "subjective knowledge" extolled by existentialists. He

insisted on the need to pay attention to our common world, on the reality of the transsubjective and the intrasubjective as well as the subjective. For him, the object of metaphysics is "being-in-a-world-*that-is*." On Saturday, Professor Donald C. Williams (Harvard University) attempted to explain mind on the basis of matter alone, a thesis which he joined to direct realism, and held for a complete actualism (a total denial of potency). The commentator, Frank Parker (Haverford College), sharply distinguished the thesis of realism from that of materialism. The last paper was by Dr. Rollo May, who inquired about an ontological basis for psychoanalysis; the commentator, George Schrader (Yale University), pointed out that there were a host of ontologies, some of them mutually incompatible.

At the business meeting, the offices of secretary and treasurer were combined into one; and the incumbent secretary, Professor Frank Parker, consented to take on the new office. Professor Richard McKeon (University of Chicago) was elected president for the next year.

THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL Association was held in New York, March 31 and April 1, 1959. The theme of the program was contemporary American philosophy. On Tuesday morning, the general session consisted of a panel discussion on Platonic elements in epistemology by Professor Fulton H. Anderson (University of Toronto) and the Reverend Robert J. Henle, s.j. (Saint Louis University). Professor Anderson gave an analysis of the Platonic theory of knowledge and presented the arguments in favor of it. Father Henle analyzed the presuppositions behind both contemporary empiricism and classical idealism, and showed that these were (usually unanalyzed) Platonic positions. In contrast, he proposed a phenomenological analysis of the act of knowing leading to a Thomistic theory of knowledge. On Wednesday morning, there was a panel discussion on trends in phenomenology and existentialism by Professor Herbert Spiegelberg (Lawrence College), Professor William A. Gerhard (Brooklyn College), and the Reverend Quentin Lauer, s.j. (Fordham University). Professor Spiegelberg gave an excellent description of the origins of phenomenology and its various developments up to the present. Professor Gerhard discussed the philosophy of Heidegger, concentrating on the function of "nothingness" in that philosophy. Father Lauer went into the historical antecedents of modern phenomenology. The various sectional meetings dealt with more or less closely connected problems in particular areas, according to the usual sectional divisions. At the banquet, a citation for the award of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal to the Reverend Gerald B. Phelan, prepared by M. Jacques Maritain, was read in the latter's absence. Father Phelan responded with an address in which he spoke of the interrelations of being, order, and

knowledge. This was followed by the presidential address of the retiring president of the association, Professor Lawrence E. Lynch (St. Michael's College). Professor Lynch talked about some of the difficulties involved in learning philosophy. At the business meeting, last year's vice-president, the Reverend Robert Lechner, C.P.P.S. (St. Joseph's College, Collegeville, Ind.) took over as president, and Professor William M. Walton (St. Joseph College, West Hartford, Conn.) was elected vice-president for the coming year. It was announced that next year's meeting will be held in St. Louis, and the general topic will be contemporary European philosophy, with an emphasis on British analysis.

THE "AQUINAS CIRCLE" OF THE COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS presented a philosophical disputation in honor of St. Thomas, on Wednesday, May 13, 1959. Four theses from the philosophy of human nature were defended by two seniors, and five seniors acted as objectors. The audience also took part in asking questions of the defenders.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY held a symposium on evolution on April 4, 1959. The participants were Bernard J. Boelen (Duquesne University), Frederick C. Bawden (director of the Rothamsted Experimental Station, Gottfried O. Lang (Catholic University of America), Andrew G. van Melsen (Universities of Nijmegen and Gronigen), and the Reverend Cyril Vollert, s.j. (St. Mary's College). It is planned to publish the lectures.

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY OF MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, conducted its third biennial Philosophical Institute in the Teaching of Philosophy in a four-day session from June 15 through June 18. Participants at the institute addressed themselves to the topic of demonstration and its realization in the several philosophical disciplines in the expectation that a fuller appreciation of the nature and employment of demonstration would make for increased effectiveness in their teaching of philosophy. One paper was delivered each day by a speaker who served as that day's discussion leader. Small group discussions on the topic of the day followed the paper and were themselves followed by a general discussion of that same topic. Reverend William Baumgaertner, of the St. Paul Seminary, spoke on "Demonstration from the Point of View of the Logician." Dr. Francis Collingwood, of Marquette University, spoke on "Demonstration in the Philosophy of Nature." Dr. James Anderson, of Villanova University, delivered a paper on "Demonstration in Metaphysics." Reverend William Dooley, s.j., of Marquette University, spoke on "Demonstration in Moral Philosophy." Over fifty philosophy teachers participated in the institute, representing twenty-four schools from thirteen states and one Canadian province. The institute was under the direction

of Dr. Edward Simmons, assisted by Mr. James Murphy, both of Marquette University.

THE AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, at its 1959 summer meeting in the East (held at Marquette University, June 18, 19, and 20) presented a symposium "On the Nature of Physical 'Knowledge.'" Professor P. W. Bridgman, of Harvard University, read a paper, "Can Physical 'Knowledge' be Expected to Lead to a Full Understanding of Reality?" He insisted on having the word "knowledge" put in quotation marks, so that it could be defined as the knowledge of the physical sciences. In answering in the negative, Professor Bridgman wished to exclude the idea that there might be other kinds of knowledge; his point was that scientific knowledge is necessarily limited by its instruments, especially by the human nervous system which to him is the organ of thought. Professor Frank Collingwood, of Marquette University, maintained that physical knowledge is distinguished by its quantitative approach to reality; he argued his point especially through Plato and Aristotle. Professor Henry Margenau, of Yale University, discussed the undemonstrable presuppositions of science, carrying his analysis somewhat further than he had in his previous works. The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., of Saint Louis University, discussed the relevance of physical laws and facts to moral and social action; he pointed out that such knowledge must be taken into account in certain types of moral and ethical judgment. Professor Alfred Landé, of Ohio State University, argued that physicists should not be content with the present dualism of wave and particle, and proposed a way of dealing with the facts which would accept the particle view as ultimate. The appointed commentators were Professor Adolf Grünbaum, of Lehigh University, and R. L. Seeger, of the National Science Foundation. The formal papers were followed by a good discussion from the audience.

XAVIER UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI held an institute on the philosophy of education, August 3 to 14, 1959, under the leadership of the Reverend Bernard J. F. Lonergan, s.j., of the Gregorian University.

THE SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE POUR L'ÉTUDE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALE, founded during the course of the first International Congress for Medieval Philosophy held at Louvain and Brussels, August 28 to September 4, 1958, has announced a number of projects. It has determined to encourage the contribution of all medievalists to the *Glossaire du Latin philosophique médiéval*, a project established in 1946 in connection with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Results of textual studies should be sent to Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 17, rue de la Sorbonne, Paris 5. The society is also interested in knowing

whether medievalists are in need of copies of out-of-print texts which might be reproduced by photo-offset. Scholars are urged to communicate their needs to Professor Michaud-Quentin, so that publishers can find out whether there will be a market for such editions. The society has also established a secretariate for information concerning work on medieval philosophy; the secretary is M. M. Giele, 2, place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain. It is hoped that all who are doing research in medieval philosophy will give their names to the secretary and indicate the work they are doing, with as complete an indication of future publication as possible. The secretary hopes eventually to publish a *Bulletin* of studies in progress.

BOOK REVIEWS

CLIFFORD G. KOSSEL, S.J., *Mount St. Michael's Seminary*

The Idea of Freedom. By Mortimer J. Adler. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvii + 689. \$7.50.

This work, to be completed in another volume, is "the first in a series of studies which the Institute for Philosophical Research plans to carry forward by producing similar treatments of other fundamental ideas" (p. xvii). The institute, established in San Francisco in 1952 for such studies, hopes that they "will make a substantial contribution to the clarification of the central idea to which they are all related —the idea of man" (p. xxvii).

While the volume is the fruit of a co-operative effort by the staff and consultants of the institute, it is fittingly authored by the institute's leader and director, Mr. Adler. His gift for dialectic and his persistent determination clearly to state and face issues and to lead others to face them seems to reach its most comprehensive and useful scope in such work. He, indeed, reminds one of Abelard to whose *Sic et Non*, as well as to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, this work is compared (p. 77).

A brief general introduction describes the aim and approach of the institute. Faced with increasing philosophical and cultural diversity and a relativism which would maintain that such diversity is ultimate and irreducible, the institute starts from the assumption (to be verified in their studies) that the Western tradition of philosophical thought manifests not merely diversity but genuine disagreements which presuppose genuine agreements as to pertinent topics and issues. By discovering, explicitly formulating, and ordering these we might hope to replace a "great, blooming, buzzing confusion" with an "*understood diversity or diversity within the framework of an intellectual community*" (p. xxii).

Book I (pp. 1-79) explains the dialectical method and terminology to be employed in this and subsequent studies, and points to its uses in science and philosophy. The data of the study is the immense philosophical literature in Western culture dealing with human freedom (or another basic idea). The function of the corps of dialecticians is to "listen" impartially to this great discussion and to reconstruct it as controversy, taking account of the implicit as well as the explicit content. It is neither history nor philosophy. It abstracts from historical contexts to get at the purely

philosophical issues, but it does not of itself involve doctrinal development of the philosophical content. While the author carefully indicates the limitations of this method, he maintains that comprehensive and exclusively dialectical work is an indispensable condition for the sound development of philosophy.

Excluding purely equivocal uses, the terms which express the basic ideas in our philosophical tradition have been employed in distinct but related meanings. The first task of the dialectician is to discover and formulate these irreducibly distinct subjects of discussion in such fashion that all parties engaged would agree to the identification although they might disagree about other attributes of this subject. With these as guides he can now formulate an identification of the general subject (for example, freedom) which provides the analogical unity for the particular subjects. Finally, he can reconstruct the special and general controversies about these subjects and marshal the arguments for each side of each issue.

Book II, the remainder of the volume, is concerned entirely with the identification of the special and general subjects which go by the name of freedom. Book III, which will appear in a subsequent volume, will construct the controversies, issues, and arguments.

With regard to freedom, Adler and his staff identify three principal and two subordinate distinct subjects of discussion. These should be familiar to Thomists (St. Thomas holds for all but one, the collective freedom, the specialty of Marx and a few others), but the author skillfully employs the precision instruments of logic to bring out their exact meaning and distinction. And in the course of this identification much more is accomplished; the differences which have to be examined already point to the issues and give insight into the attitudes and tendencies in the various schools.

The comprehensiveness of the work is attested by the large bibliography of works referred to or examined. Obviously the evidence adduced in the text to support the interpretation had to be selective and will be contested in many instances. But the author has examined the data with care and respect, and has selected telling texts which will be hard to dispute.

One review has already questioned the author's impartiality, maintaining that "he calls favorite witnesses to the stand time and again" (*Time*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 56). In fact, one does not read far in this book before seeing that Aquinas is a prominent name, and Maritain is not far behind. This might be partiality; but it might be impartiality. Aquinas does seem to have been a rather intelligent fellow, open to all aspects of reality, exacting, and orderly. He may have discussed these matters with more precision and comprehensiveness than others—than even our "analysts" and journalistic pundits. By consulting the fine author index to Book II,

one will also note that Dewey, Locke, Kant, and Hegel, who are not exactly Thomists, run pretty close to Aquinas. Some Thomists may be surprised also to find Aquinas so frequently on the same side with Locke and Montesquieu and, somewhat less frequently, with Dewey.

Of course, this work tells us nothing directly about the reality of freedom, only about the idea of freedom. But Mr. Adler seems right. This is of no little importance to intelligent controversy and philosophical growth. The work provides the framework for orderly treatment and a wealth of texts and references on freedom. Possibly its most interesting aspect is the possibility opened by its method. Scholastics might even take a second look at the "Scholastic method"—much derided, and sometimes deservedly—to see if they haven't something worth rehabilitating in a new way lest their philosophy appear "mere poetry" (cf. pp. 73-74).

ROBERT O. JOHANN, S.J., Loyola Seminary

La philosophie de la nature: La nature en général (deuxième fascicule).

By Joseph de Tonquédec, S.J. Paris: Lethielleux, 1957. Pp. 279.

The first fascicle of the present work, which appeared in 1956, concerned itself with prolegomena to a philosophy of nature. There the author took up such topics as the idea of nature, the definition of science, the notion of matter, the distinction between the philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences, and so on. In the present second fascicle, he begins his elaboration of the philosophy of nature itself and brings a basically traditional approach to a consideration of the ultimate structure of cosmic reality; that is, substance-accident composition and hylomorphism. A third and final fascicle, yet to appear, will be devoted to an analysis of motion, space and time, and the various accidents of material being: quantity, quality, relations, and so on.

Father de Tonquédec has a penchant for detached notes and appendices. Eight appendices and eight notes take up more than 100 of the 279 pages of the present volume. They range from a consideration of whether or not St. Thomas changed his mind about *dimensiones interminatae* to a study of Bergson's cosmology. Some of these are quite interesting. For example, the appendix devoted to distinguishing substantial unity from quantitative continuity, while basing itself strictly on texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas, represents a real advance over the thinking found in most manuals.

The body of the book consists of two chapters. The first considers the substance-accident structure implicit in cosmic restlessness, the nature of

Book Reviews

the relationship between substance and accident, the evidence for asserting a plurality of substances, and the "authentic" notions of substance and accident as contrasted with some of the bizarre interpretations that have appeared in the course of history. The second and longer chapter takes up hylomorphic composition and, after a twofold demonstration of the fact of such composition (first from the active-passive aspects of material reality, secondly from substantial change), treats in detail the traditional ideas and problems connected with the notions of prime matter and substantial form. Both chapters are characterized by a marked effort on the author's part to substantiate his various positions by quoting from Aristotle and St. Thomas, and, moreover, to stand with these thinkers against all comers.

Yet, despite the author's obvious and thorough familiarity with his chosen masters—a familiarity that enables him to utilize to full advantage the riches they contain—there is, nevertheless, an air of unreality about the whole approach. This unreality is not due to maintaining a strictly philosophical methodology in the realm of material nature; too many contemporary writers on cosmology err, I think, in the other direction. In their effort to link their work with the trends of modern science, they too often provide us with some strange hybrid that is neither philosophy nor science. The unreality is due rather to the fact that some of the basic notions remain ultimately unexamined. I have in mind particularly the idea of substance, which is central to the present volume. It seems to me that a satisfactory cosmology will remain a desideratum until something of an analogy of substance in the material order has been worked out. Such an analogy would demand that attention be paid to other characteristics of substance than its simply being substrate for accidents. We have in mind, for example, the varying degrees of "self-hood" or independence manifested on the different levels of material reality; or conversely, the greater or less aptitude that particular material entities show for entering as elements into larger systems. Indeed, this tension between being a *thing in itself* and being *part of a whole* would seem to be characteristic of material being as such, so that while one or the other gains prominence as one ascends or descends the scale of nature, neither of the opposing features is ever absent. If such is the case, however, then it is not surprising that a wholly univocal view of substance should seem somewhat out of touch with the real.

This, however, is not so much a criticism of Father de Tonquédec's work in particular as it is of Scholastic treatises in general. A fault more peculiarly his own might be that of excessive wordiness. But this—if indeed it is a fault—is of little importance when compared with the high level of competence that our author brings to his work.

The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form. By Henry G. Bugbee, Jr. With an introduction by Gabriel Marcel. State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958. Pp. 232. \$5.00.

It is not easy even to approximate the climate of humility and wonder from which the formal philosophies which we know today have grown. In the formal study of philosophy, we go to considerable pains to rehearse questions as they have been shaped by being passed on from others. We have often heard answers before we are effectively aware of the questions to which they correspond. The answer itself, rather than the not too articulate state of mind leading originally to formulation of the question, may be our starting point in philosophizing.

Although it may no longer be possible to establish ourselves in a pre-philosophical climate, Professor Bugbee has undertaken to do something very much like this in *The Inward Morning*. He wishes to take us back to the threshold of philosophizing—not the threshold as it was known to antiquity or to any age before our own, but to a kind of threshold within our American culture today. This book is not a book about philosophy, although it is by a philosopher. It is a deliberate dipping into experience. As a consequence it is strange, almost quaint, and may prove unattractive and even unnerving to those philosophers who could profit from it most.

Even in the case of philosophies with which we are familiar the initial starting points or grounds of philosophizing are often strange, unreal, and comprehensible, if at all, only with extreme effort and attention. Thus, for example, in a work such as Joseph Owen's *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), we find the grounds of some of Aristotle's thinking laid out with profound perception and understanding; but the understanding is achieved only by the author's introducing himself and his readers into an entire culture—the ancient Greek culture which, despite our continuity with it, as a whole is to us quite bizarre. But its very bizarreness is our asset. It restores to us something of the sense of awe and bafflement with which early man encountered reality and with which sensitive persons still encounter it today.

A similar sense comes over us as we read Bugbee's work. In this case the sense has to do with the bizarreness of our own culture, conveyed by minute and scrupulous descriptions of the writer's relationship to things outside, descriptions which include vignettes of the effects produced on the author by such activities as rowing, building a dam, and "swamping"

(boyhood exploration of swamps). Any description of "immediate" experience reveals the culture which has made possible this particular immediacy, and Bugbee is entirely conscious of the fact that his descriptions register many aspects of the particular culture of which he and we are heirs. Here is the transcendentalist vision (with perhaps some fresh increment of Eastern influence), the close attention to experience which derives in great part from desperately sincere Protestant religiosity, a somewhat related reflective aestheticism reminiscent of Santayana, a *joie-de-vivre* suggesting Saint-Exupéry (as Marcel himself notes in his introduction, p. 27), and much else besides.

But principally Bugbee reveals the intimate relationship between the grounds of experience known to Americans because of their particular place in history and certain currents in non-American philosophy which can be labeled existentialist. Bugbee's procedure through his work is not unlike Marcel's in his *Journal métaphysique*. An intermittent diary provides reflections and occasional quotations, after the fashion of a somewhat expanded old commonplace book. But Bugbee's concerns are not quite the same as Marcel's. Everywhere the warp and woof and seams of the past and contemporary American mind show through the fabric:

Moby Dick seems to me an articulate introduction into the presence of things in their finality: After all is said and done, after all attempt at final reckoning has run its course, and shipwreck places a seal on human lips, there is yet a word spoken: "Now small fowls flew screaming over the yet yawning gulf; a sullen white surf beat against its steep sides; then all collapsed, and the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago." Things exist in their own right; it is a lesson that escapes us except as they hold us in awe (pp. 163-164).

Bugbee's outlook has a great attraction for Marcel, and it is to the credit of the French philosopher that he recognizes the attraction at the very time when, as someone outside American culture, he protests his own limitations for assimilating all that Bugbee's sensibility has to offer. Bugbee's thought and Marcel's meet in that they are both exploratory, both attempts at communication deriving from facing honestly the isolation of the self, and both reverent in a way which makes them fruitful. However, Marcel's reverence tends to lodge in persons, Bugbee's in things; and thus the isolation of the American is—true to the American tradition—more complete. The various themes which weave through the discussion—the self, the meaning of man, God, meditation, prayer, critiques of or extrapolations from what this or that philosopher says—tend to focus on the person-thing mystery more, it seems, than on any one other subject. This

is what gives Bugbee's thought its value, for the person-thing mystery is in great part America herself and could offer grounds for America's contribution to the development of philosophy. (Here and throughout, "America" and "American" refer specifically to the United States.) Bugbee catches this mystery in an inspired, if wraith-like, fashion through his concept of the "wilderness"—the exterior wilderness and its interior correlative in human consciousness. He devoted numerous passages to the wilderness theme, which Marcel with great discernment singles out in his introduction as crucial. The wilderness is America (the America of the United States). It is man alone on the frontier, man-against-things rather than man-against-man (the Old World).

In the polar attraction between Marcel's thought and Bugbee's thought there lies, I believe, great hope, not merely for Marcel's continuing better understanding of America but for some kind of philosophical development of major significance. Apart from the remarkable thinking of Père Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, s.j., I know of no serious full-scale attempts to interpret a personalist world with full and honest respect for the fact that such a world, as we now know, comes into being only after an incredibly long and elaborate evolution of a material universe which has for billions upon billions of years no persons in it at all, although all through this period it is building itself up by a progressive "interiorization" to the point where man becomes a cosmic possibility. A great weakness of personalist existentialism generally, as well as of almost all other philosophies to date, has been an inability or unwillingness to view the human person in the full perspectives in which we now know material creation really exists. From one point of view this means an inability or unwillingness to explore the full relationship of person and thing. Certainly, we shall never get quite to the bottom of this mysterious relationship. But in the tension between Marcel's personalist personalism and Bugbee's personalist objectivism some new thinking on the matter should be generated. The particularization of reflection in two somewhat different, if related, cultures is itself good, for one feels that in an evolving universe there is need for philosophy to pay more attention to contingency, to rootedness, environment, and history than was the case when the cosmos was supposed to be static in ways we know today are impossible. The humility and reverence which each thinker here shows gives us special reason for hope.

Ramus and Talon Inventory. By Walter J. Ong, S.J. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 558. \$10.00.

Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. By Walter J. Ong, S.J. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 408. \$10.00.

The first of these volumes is a list of editions of the works of Peter Ramus and Omer Talon, which provides part of the evidence which the author, in the second work, uses to establish the development of Ramism and its influence. An introductory discussion (pp. 1-31) and comments on the contents and inter-relationships of various editions, interspersed at strategic points throughout the listing, are most illuminating for the bibliophile and the historian of ideas.

The second of the two volumes is a study of Ramism, its influence, and its meaning. In the first section, the author begins by recalling what is generally known and supposed about Ramism, then gives a carefully authenticated version of Ramus's life, and concludes with an examination of his program of "anti-Aristotelianism." The second section gives the background: Scholastic logic, Agricola's place-logic, the nature of the "philosophy" in the medieval arts curriculum, and the urge to rapidly prepare teachers for the rush of young students. Some of this historical background has been developed by other historians. Father Ong has juxtaposed some of these hitherto isolated results and has added evidences of his own. Most significant, in this section, in his contention that university statutes are not always descriptions of fact; textbooks, accounts of lectures given, programs of courses, give a different and more realistic picture. One of the items noted concerns the content of the philosophy courses as they were given. These were devoted to logic (which reached down into grammar) and natural philosophy, with the emphasis on the more particular aspects of physics, biology, physiology. Metaphysics and ethics were occasionally not covered at all, most often were given only a cursory nod. Father Ong gives concrete examples: in a textbook of over two hundred pages, only six were devoted to metaphysics; in one course program, six weeks were allotted to ethics. Moreover, he notes that the students were in their early teens (that is, younger than the average high-school students of today).

The third section deals with Ramism. The most important elements of this are the Ramist dialectic and the notion of method. Dialectic, for Ramus, is identical with logic (and with the classical rhetoric); it is the art of speaking well, and this is identical with the art of reasoning. It is composed of two movements, invention and judgment. Ramus insists that

his dialectic be "natural"; as Father Ong points out, the "nature" in question seems to be nothing more than the content of the curriculum. And it is to this same point of reference that we must look for the meaning of exhortation to look to "things." The invention part of dialectic was the discovery of an appropriate middle term; and the way to find such terms was to look through the appropriate "paces," or arguments. The "judgment" of Ramist dialectic is the comparison or assembling of the terms discovered. The notion of method in Ramus is complex and varying. At first, method is proceeding from the more universal to the less and thence to the singular; at the same time, it is conceived of as proceeding from the definition to the properties. Later on, the notion of first principles comes in; and the final result is the statement that method consists in proceeding from what is clearer (the definition and the universal are still cited as examples) by means of homogeneous axioms to the clarification of unknown consequents. In this transformation, as Father Ong points out, reasoning, proof, and teaching are all identified. The third major contribution of Ramism is the modified notion of rhetoric. It consists now merely of the ornamentation of speaking and in a kind of way can be considered as superfluous, just as poetry, by being reduced to rhythm, becomes unnecessary.

Throughout his discussion of Ramism, Father Ong employs two terms to characterize the style of that movement: it is "visual," and it is "quantitative." Father Ong contrasts the visual approach of the Ramists to the "aural" approach of the older Aristotelians. As evidence of the latter, he refers to expressions such as "praedicaments" (involving the root *dicere*, to say), "categories" (involving the root, *agoreuein*, to address, assert). Following Louis Lavelle, he exploits the visual-aural distinction to show how the shift to visual treatment was hastened by the necessity for simplification, for teachability, and for uniformity. Not only does the printed word take precedence over the spoken, but the visual diagram becomes more significant even than the word. The teacher becomes a lecturer and, even worse, an expounder of a textbook. In the aural tradition, however, diagrams cannot be used; the emotional and imaginative overtones of language cannot be suppressed; the discussion or "dialogue" predominates over the monologue and the monograph. All this is true in the context of language itself, as well as in that of teaching. Yet we must also remember that visualization, when it is concerned with things rather than with verbal symbols, is not poorer but richer than the aural manipulation.

Father Ong also speaks often of the quantification of logic. Here, an

Important distinction is in order. The quantification which was begun in the late Middle Ages, and recovered in modern logic, is a quantification along the lines of algebra. The quantification of the Ramists, by contrast, is modeled on geometry. Here the visual approach to language is a strong contributory factor. The Ramists wished to make the relationships between terms "visible at a glance." The representation of these symbols in space was the means most often used (and the very notion of "logical places" and of "method"—from the Greek word for "way" or "road" is connected with such symbols). The kind of diagram that became almost a symbol of Ramist technique is that of table of divisions of a subject by dichotomies. Father Ong includes a number of such diagrams in his text, and the extent to which they were carried is a sure sign of the significance attached to them. In such works, the mere making of divisions into two disjunctive classes seems to be all that is done. To proceed by making complete disjunctions seems to be the essence of a scientific treatment. The irony is that such procedures were at a later period imagined to be a characteristic of ancient and medieval thinking.

After reading through this richly documented study, some readers may wonder whether Ramus was worth so much work and why he had such an influence. There seems to be something like a "law of history" to the effect that any period deserves its leaders. From this point of view, a prudent reader may fear for our own times.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ALVES, JOSEPH T. *Confidentiality in Social Work*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1959. Pp. 268. Paper, \$3.00.

APPLETON, LEROY H., and BRIDGES, STEPHEN. *Symbolism in Liturgical Art*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; May, 1959. Pp. 120. \$3.50.

[AUGUSTINE, ST.] *La cité de Dieu*. Livres I-V. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1959. Pp. 869. 330 fb.

—. *Nine Sermons of Saint Augustine on the Psalms*. Trans. with introd. by Edmund Hill, O.P. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1959. Pp. xi + 177. \$3.50.

BEATTIE, MARY. *Though Your Sins Be as Scarlet*. Stockbridge, Mass.: Congregation of Marian Fathers, 1959. Pp. 102. \$1.00.

BERGLER, EDMUND. *Principles of Self-Damage*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. [xiii] + 469. \$6.00.

BRACKEN, HARRY M. *The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism, 1710-1733*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. xii + 123 gld. 9.50.

BRADY, IGNATIUS, O.F.M. *A History of Ancient Philosophy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. xi + 261. \$5.00.

BRETON, STANISLAS. *Approches phénoménologiques de l'idée d'être*. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 254. Paper, 2,100 f.

—. *Situation de la philosophie contemporaine*. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 197. Paper, 900 f.

BUNGE, MARIO. *Causality*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 380. \$7.50.

—. *Metascientific Queries*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 313. \$6.75.

CADAVÍD URIBE, GONZALO. *El Mundo Novelesco de Tomás Carrasquilla*. Medellin, Colombia: Universidad de Antioquia, 1959. Pp. 473-508. Paper.

CARACCIOLÒ, ALBERTO. *Studi Jaspersiani*. Milano: Marzorati Editore, 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, L. 1,700.

CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. 241. Paper, \$1.85.

CARROLL, LEWIS. *Mathematical Recreations of Lewis Carroll*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. 2 vols. Paper, \$1.50 each.

Catholic Catechism, A. American ed. adapted by Gerard S. Sloyan. New York: Herder and Herder, 1959. Pp. 428. Paper, \$1.25.

CHARLESWORTH, MAXWELL JOHN. *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis*. "Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series," 9. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1959. Pp. xiii + 234. \$5.50; paper, \$4.75.

CIRNE-LIMA, CARLOS, S.J. *Der personale Glaube*. Innsbruck: Verlag Felizian Rauch, 1959. Pp. 156. Paper, DM 10.

CLARK, MOTHER MARY T., R.S.C.J. *Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom*. New York: Desclée Co., 1959. Pp. 273. \$4.50.

COLLINS, JAMES. *God in modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 476. \$6.50.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *The Movement of World Revolution*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 179. \$3.00.

DE TONQUÉDEC, JOSEPH, s.j. *La philosophie de la nature*. Part I, fascicle 3. Paris: Lethielleux, 1959. Pp. 186. Paper, 1,500 f.

DEWEY, ERNEST W. *A Three Dimensional Graph of Value Relations*. "Arts and Sciences Studies, Humanities Series," No. 5. Stillwater: Oklahoma State Univ., 1959. Pp. 11. Paper.

DUDENEY, H. E. *Amusements in Mathematics*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. 258. Paper, \$1.25.

—. *The Canterbury Puzzles*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. 255. Paper, \$1.25.

DUNS SCOTUS Philosophical Association Convention Report, 1959. Vol. XXIII. Cleveland: Our Lady of Angels Seminary, 1959. Pp. x + 189. Paper.

[EMERSON, RALPH WALDO.] *The Heart of Emerson's Journals*. Ed. Bliss Perry. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. 357. Paper, \$1.85.

FELDMAN, A. BRONSON. *The Unconscious in History*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 269. \$4.75.

FERGUSON, JOHN. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.

GARRIGUET, L. *The Good God*. Stockbridge, Mass.: Congregation of Marian Fathers, 1959. Pp. 181. \$3.00, paper, \$2.25.

GOULD, SAMUEL B. *Knowledge Is Not Enough*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1959. Pp. 232. \$3.50.

GRODZINS, MORTON. *The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 28. 50¢.

GUSTAVSON, REUBEN G.; VIERECK, PETER; and WOODRING, PAUL. *Education in a Free Society*. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series II," Vol. 1. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. Pp. 47. \$3.00.

HAAS, JOHANNES. *Das Lebensproblem heute*. München: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1959. Pp. 150. DM 9.20; paper, DM 7.20.

HAYEN, ANDRÉ, s.j. *La communication de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin. II. L'Ordre Philosophique de saint Thomas*. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959. Pp. 355. Paper, 246 fb.

HEGYI, JOHANNES, s.j. *Die Bedeutung des Seins*. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1959. Pp. 173. Paper, DM 18.40.

HILDEBRANDT, K. *Platon, Logos und Mythos*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 396. DM 32.

HIRSCHBERGER, JOHANNES. *The History of Philosophy*. Vol. II. Trans. Anthony N. Fuerst. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. viii + 752. \$8.50.

HOLLAND, L. VIRGINIA. *Counterpoint. Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xv + 128. \$3.75.

HOLLOWAY, MAURICE R., s.j. *An Introduction to Natural Theology*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959, Pp. xxv + 492. \$4.00.

JAWORSKI, MARIAN. *Arystotelesowska I Tomistyczna Teoria Przyczyny Sprawczej na tle Pojęcia Bytu*. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1959. Pp. 135. Paper, 25 zl.

KAMINSKI, KS. STANISLAW. *Gergonne'a Teoria Definicji*. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 140. Paper, 25 zl.

KESSLER, JOHN J. *A Metaphysics for Humanists*. St. Louis: Humanist Center, 1959. Pp. 14. Paper.

KREYCHE, ROBERT J. *First Philosophy: An Introductory Text in Metaphysics*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. xviii + 328. \$4.00.

[LOYD, SAM.] *Mathematical Puzzles of Sam Loyd*. Selected and ed. Martin Gardner. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. 167. Paper, \$1.00.

LYNCH, WILLIAM F., s.j. *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the 'Parmenides.'* Washington: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1959. (Distributed by University Publishers, Inc., New York.) Pp. xiii + 255. \$6.00.

—. *The Image Industries*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 159. \$3.50.

MALCOLM, NORMAN. *Dreaming*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 128. \$2.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Degrees of Knowledge*. New trans. supervised by Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1959. Pp. xix + 476. \$7.50.

MARTIN, WILLIAM OLIVER. *Metaphysics and Ideology*. "The Aquinas Lecture," 1959. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 104. \$2.50.

MAYER, FELIX. *Schöpferische Sprache und Rhythmus*. Ed. with postscript by Erich Simenauer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 114. DM 12.

MAZIERSKI, STANISLAW. *Pojęcie Konieczności w Filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu*. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniw. Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 122. Paper, 25 zł.

Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum. Warsaw, Polska Akademia Nauk. II, 1958, pp. 30. III, 1959, pp. 26.

MONTESSORI, MARIA. *L'Esprit absorbant de l'enfant*. Trans. from the Italian by Georgette J. J. Bernard. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959. Pp. 244. Paper, 145 fb.

OGIERMANN, HELMUT. *Materialistische Dialektik*. München: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1959. Pp. 275.

O'NEIL, CHARLES J. (ed.) *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 360. \$7.00.

PFLUG, GÜNTHER. *Henri Bergson. Quellen und Konsequenzen einer induktiven Metaphysik*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. vi + 393. DM 38.

POINCARÉ, HENRI. *The Value of Science*. Trans. George Bruce Halsted. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. 147. Paper, \$1.35.

QUILES, ISMAEL, s.j. *Más allá del existencialismo*. Barcelona: Luis Mircale, 1958. Pp. 198.

QUIRING, HEINRICH. *Heraklit*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 164. DM 18.

RAUH, MORTON A. *College and University Trusteeship*. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press; Apr., 1959. Pp. 112. Paper, \$1.00.

RÉGIS, L.-M., o.p. *Epistemology*. Trans. Imelda Choquette Byrne. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 549. \$6.50.

REICHENBACH, HANS. *Modern Philosophy of Science*. Ed. and trans. Maria Reichenbach. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. ix + 214. \$5.50.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Dictionary of Thought*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 152. \$5.00.

TAMOSAITIS, ANICETUS, S.J. *Church and State in Maritain's Thought*. Chicago: 2345 West 56th St., 1959. Pp. 125. Paper, \$1.25.

True Doctrine of Merciful Love, The. Stockbridge. Mass.: Association of Marian Helpers, 1959. Pp. 40. 50¢

VANN, GERALD, O.P. *The Paradise Tree. On Living the Symbols of the Church*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 320. \$4.00.

VON CAMPENHAUSEN, HANS. *The Fathers of the Greek Church*. Tr. Stanley Godman. New York: Pantheon Books, 1959. Pp. 170. \$5.95.

WARNER, W. LLOYD. *The Living and the Dead. A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 528. \$7.50.

WASSELL, B. BOHDAN. *Group Psychoanalysis*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xiii + 306. \$3.75.

WEISS, PAUL. *Our Public Life*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.

WEST, PAUL. *The Fossils of Piety*. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1959. Pp. 85. \$2.75.

BERKELEY ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

MR. HARRY M. BRACKEN received his M. A.
from Johns Hopkins University
and his Ph. D. from the State University of Iowa.

He is the author of the recent book,
The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism: 1710-1733
and has previously written for the Philosophical Quarterly
and the Journal of the History of Ideas.
He is now assistant professor of philosophy
at the State University of Iowa.

In the prefaces to both the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and *Three Dialogues*,¹ Berkeley claims that one of the products of his work will be a demonstration of the "natural immortality of the soul." Rather than writing this off either as an inconclusive argument or as a matter for religious speculation only, I wish to suggest that Berkeley's interest in the question of the soul's immortality had a marked effect on his more strictly philosophical considerations. Specifically, I wish to suggest that the immortality question may provide some insights into Berkeley's account of the self, his reduction of primary to secondary qualities, and the extent to which *Siris* reveals a major change in his philosophical outlook.

My method will be to discuss certain aspects of the immortality question as they occur in the writings of three philosophers generally taken to have been major influences on Berkeley: Locke, Malebranche, and Bayle. With regard to Locke, I wish to discuss his controversy with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, or at least that part of it concerned with the adequacy of the "way of ideas" to cope with the topic of a substantial self—a self which could reasonably be taken as potentially immortal. As for Malebranche, like many another philosopher in the Cartesian tradition, he attempts a "solution" to the problem of the soul's immortality. Perhaps even more than in Locke's case, Malebranche's "solution" will, I hope, make evident the extent to which major philosophical issues are bound up with what might

otherwise be written off as a historical curiosity. Having chosen these two discussions in order to mark out a historically appropriate philosophical framework within which to examine Berkeley's own views, I have added some comments by Pierre Bayle, from whom I believe Berkeley derived the clue to his own radical solution of the problem of the immortality of the soul. In the second part of the paper I examine several Berkeleyan texts, and it is my hope that taking Berkeley seriously on the immortality issue will prove fruitful in understanding them. Far from immortality being forgotten after the statement of purpose in the preface, I hope to be able to show that the claim of *Principles of Human Knowledge* to have revealed man's soul as "naturally immortal" need no longer be taken as idle.

Berkeley wrote the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* in an atmosphere in intellectual turmoil over, among other things, materialism, Pyrrhonism, Spinozism, and Newtonian physics. However, as John Wild has noted:

There was another phase of the contemporary fermentation brought forth by the scientific philosophy which must also have influenced Berkeley during his student days. This was the Deist controversy. Newton's *Principia* had appeared in 1687, Locke's *Essay* in 1690, and Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious* in 1696. The result was a wave of liberalism and so-called rationalism in religion which caused a veritable furore. Toland's treatise was burned by the hangman in Dublin, censured by the Irish Parliament, and denounced from every pulpit . . .²

Wild argues that Berkeley could not have altogether escaped the strife, but concludes from the lack of references to the issue that "one cannot read [Berkeley's] early works without realizing that he is throughout

¹All references to Berkeley will be to the texts in *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (9 vols.; London, 1948-57), hereafter abbreviated 'Works.'

(In the preparation of this paper I have benefitted considerably from discussions with Mr. Edwin B. Allaire of the State University of Iowa.)

²George Berkeley (Cambridge, Mass., 1936) p. 9.

³Ibid., p. 10.

⁴Ibid. Cf. pp. 117 and 140 f.

⁵See, however, Jessop's review in *Mind*, XLVI (1937), 232-39.

⁶Cf. A. A. Luce, *Life of George Berkeley* (London, 1949), especially Chap. II.

⁷Peter Browne, *A letter in Answer to a Book Entitled, Christianity not Mysterious . . .* (London, 1697).

⁸See especially Luce's *editio diplomatica* (1944) of *Philosophical Commentaries*.

this period essentially a Deist."³ Wild takes the principles of the "natural immortality of the soul" and the "existence and immateriality of God"⁴ to be products of Berkeley's deistic proclivities and their proofs out of harmony with Berkeley's radical philosophic insights.

I am not interested in specifically questioning Wild's assertions,⁵ but I shall try to show that Berkeley can plausibly be read as concerned wholeheartedly with these very principles. If being essentially a defender of immortality and immateriality makes Berkeley a deist, I fear that much ill-used label must be applied to many a hitherto orthodox theologian, including St. Augustine. But if Berkeley has failed to state outright his opposition to Toland and the deists in the *Philosophical Commentaries*, *New Theory of Vision*, *Principles*, or *Three Dialogues*, his arguments can nevertheless be read as attacks on that very "new way of thinking" which aroused Stillingfleet to arms against Locke.

Certainly we do know that Locke's own work had received early attention at Trinity College, Dublin—thanks to William Molyneux⁶—and that Toland's application of Locke's "way of ideas" to Christian doctrine resulted in an extended published controversy between Locke and Stillingfleet. The students of Locke at Trinity could hardly have avoided knowing something of the fight. Peter Browne, provost during Berkeley's student days, joined in the attack on Toland⁷ and Locke; and as the earlier quotation from Wild shows, Toland succeeded in irritating more than a few of his fellow Irishmen. Furthermore, Luce⁸ is correct, I think, in interpreting Entry 720 in the *Philosophical Commentaries* as opposing the views of Toland and others on rational religion. It is an especially interesting entry, coming as it does as part of a long series on Locke. One of that series reads: "We have assuredly an Idea of substance. It was absurd of Locke to think we had a name without a Meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians" (*Philosophical Commentaries* 700). I think Luce is also correct in reading Entry 517 ("I take not away substances . . .") against the Stillingfleet background. And so while Toland's name is not mentioned, the issues in the controversy certainly are.

Now Stillingfleet had hit hard at both Locke and Toland on several counts, for he saw the "way of ideas" leading to disastrous conse-

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

quences in matters of religion. Among those consequences were the denial of substance, the possibility that matter might think, and the resultant danger to the existence as well as to our knowledge of a "thing" which might be immortal, and also the threat to the doctrine of the Trinity. Locke's protests that Toland's conclusions were not his business proved of no avail. Stillingfleet saw the threat to substance and a substantial self as implicit in the foundations of *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* and, indeed, often explicit in its structure. It remained for Toland merely to spell out the complete antiorthodox position. For Berkeley, I suggest this controversy between Locke and Stillingfleet became crucial. On the one hand he found certain elements in the *Essay* attractive; on the other he saw that the dangers of skepticism with respect to the self and in respect to substance in general must be avoided for precisely the reasons that Stillingfleet had given.

Stillingfleet wished to show Locke that if we start with the "way of ideas" we can never come to any "certainty of reason" about substance. He is not interested in Locke's *belief* in substance but rather in the intellectual bankruptcy revealed in Locke's appeal to substance as "something, I know not what," and his repeated example of the Indian and the tortoise. Not only is Stillingfleet unhappy with Locke's account of substance in Book II, Chapter 23 of the *Essay*, and in particular with the account of spiritual substance, but also with the related suggestions made in Book IV, Chapter 3, section 6.

Locke's attempt in his *First Letter*⁹ to make his accounts of substance, spirits, and immateriality more acceptable to Stillingfleet is met alternatively with sarcasm and argument. As dissatisfied with Locke's restatements and revisions as with the *Essay* itself, Stillingfleet again argues that the "way of Certainty from Ideas"¹⁰ simply fails to give us certainty on "one of the points of greatest importance, viz. that

⁹Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, initiated the correspondence in 1697 and his contributions were: *A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter . . .*; and *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter*. Locke's three book-length letters were: *A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*; *A Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's*

Answer to his Letter; and *Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter*. Stillingfleet died in 1699.

¹⁰Stillingfleet, *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter* (London, 1697) pp. 49-50.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 54-5.

¹²Locke, *Letter to the Bishop of Worcester in Works of John Locke* (11th ed.; London, 1812) IV, 40.

there is a Spiritual Substance within us . . ." After suggesting that Locke's "way of Certainty from Ideas" may well be threatened by the assertion that the "Power of Thinking may belong to modified Matter," inasmuch as for him all Certainty must rest on simple ideas and one of the sources of these had originally been granted to be operations of the mind, Stillingfleet returns to the substance problem:

I am of opinion, that the *great ends of Religion and Morality are best secured* by the Proofs of the *Immortality of the Soul* from its *Nature and Properties*; and which I think prove it *Immaterial*. I do not question whether God can give *Immortality* to a *Material Substance*; but I say it takes off very much from the evidence of *Immortality*, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is not capable of. For if the *Soul* be a *material Substance* it is really nothing but *Life*; or Matter put into Motion with such Organs and Parts as are necessary to hold them together; and when Death comes, then this *Material Substance* so modified is lost. God may by his Power grant a new Life; but will any man say, God can preserve the Life of a Man when he is dead? There is a plain Absurdity, and I think no such thing tends to *preserve Religion or Morality*.¹¹

Now throughout the controversy, Stillingfleet was also concerned with faith and revelation, with the effect of Locke's doubts about substance upon a theologically respectable account of the Trinity, and with the question of certainty and evidence and how they were to be achieved by the "way of ideas." But Stillingfleet increasingly applied himself to Locke's discussions of spiritual substance and the immateriality and immortality of the soul.

However, when Berkeley commented in *Philosophical Commentaries* 517 "I take not away substances . . ." I think he meant what he said. In the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy, he was siding with orthodoxy—with Stillingfleet. As a philosopher he felt more strongly than Stillingfleet did Locke's often plaintive refrain: "If your lordship, or anybody else, will show me a better way to a certainty [with respect to spiritual substance, and so on] I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of ideas."¹² The "way of ideas" seemed to be the only "way," and so

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

far he sided with Locke—but as a priest he was dismayed to see philosophers start with ideas and end in doubting or denying basic Christian teachings¹³ such as the immortality and immateriality of the soul and the doctrine of the Trinity. As it eventually turned out, Berkeley, too, began with ideas; but unlike Locke, he found that this led to the immateriality and immortality of the soul.

Thus far, however, I have sought simply to call attention (a) to the important position Locke's account of spiritual substance had in the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy, (b) to the acknowledged intimate connection between that account and the question of the soul's immortality, and (c) to Berkeley's own awareness of the controversy as revealed in several passages in his *Philosophical Commentaries*.

The second figure in this exposition is Malebranche. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency to rank his influence on Berkeley as at least the equal of Locke's, Pierre Bayle being a third major influence. Quite apart from the fact that his contemporaries linked him with Malebranche¹⁴ (not always for lofty philosophical reasons), Berkeley could take comfort in the Augustinian atmosphere of Malebranchianism and the nonsecular philosophy that developed within it. Furthermore, Malebranche was an antimaterialist and one who, like Descartes, sought to defend the integrity of spiritual substances.

Descartes himself had, as he makes clear in the Synopsis to the *Meditations*, sought to distinguish soul from body in such a way that the immateriality of the former would be untainted and thus the sort of "thing" which could be immortal. Immateriality and immortality were issues of some consequence in the seventeenth century, as a casual glance at the literature of, for example, the souls of beasts will show. My reason for choosing to discuss Malebranche, when many others wrote on immortality, is that quite apart from the fact that Berkeley

¹³He was not alone. For some indication of the scope and importance of the Stillingfleet controversy, see John W. Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas* (Oxford, 1956), especially Chap. IV.

¹⁴*Mémoires de Trévoux*, May 1713, p. 921.

¹⁵Richard H. Popkin, "The New Realism of Bishop Berkeley," *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, XXIX (1957), 1-19.

¹⁶See, for example, Anita D. Fritz,

"Berkeley's Self—Its Origin in Malebranche," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), especially 568 f; and Denis Grey, "Berkeley on Other Selves: A Study in Fugue," *Philosophical Quarterly*, IV (1954), 44.

¹⁷"... nous ne la connaissons que par conscience . . ." (Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, ed. Geneviève Lewis [Paris, 1945], I, 257). Subsequent references are to the text in this edition.

was familiar with him, an examination of Malebranche allows us to appreciate some of the critical problems a philosopher had in defending immortality within a context that in several important ways was Cartesian.

Malebranche, however, proved not to be a voluntarist in the same sense that Descartes had been. He never proposed the demon hypothesis, and he held that the entities of mathematics were coeternal with God. As for getting outside our ideas to bodies, Malebranche argued that we do not know bodies in themselves. He went so far as to assert that the existence of matter is known only through revelation. What we do know are Ideas. Arnauld, in his objections to Descartes's *Meditations*, had alluded to a difficulty capable of generating an insoluble skepticism, for if there were one set of truths for us and still another for God, how would one ever bridge the gap? Malebranche grasped the nettle. He proposed direct realism with respect to these Divine Ideas. Admittedly this left him with a problem of error, but Augustinianism offers some theological possibilities in this direction.

Malebranche's direct realism relative to the Ideas, his "seeing all things in God," may well have been seized upon by Berkeley, as Popkin¹⁵ has suggested, with the Ideas converted into empirical ideas-of-sense rather than considered Platonically. Furthermore, Berkeley seems, at least on occasions, to have found the step from ideas to God as direct as it was for Malebranche (and St. Augustine); and like Malebranche, he did not treat ideas as mental. And while Berkeley sought to distinguish his own account of our physical actions from Malebranche's ("We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malebranche" [*Philosophical Commentaries* 548]), it is by no means clear that his theory of perception, his "sensory occasionalism," will permit this.¹⁶ Malebranche also held that we have no Idea of the self;¹⁷ for if we "saw" the Idea in God, then we would be able to deduce all its properties. But while Berkeley might have been happy with the claim that we do not have an idea of the self, even granted their different uses of "idea," Malebranche's proof of the immortality of the soul was hardly calculated to satisfy Berkeley—if, as I have suggested, he was seriously concerned with the soul and its immortality.

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

Of immortality, Malebranche commented, reminiscent of Descartes:

. . . the distinction of body and soul is the basis of the main tenets of philosophy, and among others of the immortality of the soul. For, let me say this in passing, if the soul is a substance distinguished from the body, it is clear that, even if death were to annihilate our body (which it does not do), it would not follow from that that our soul was also annihilated.¹⁸

The distinction, however, is not so sharply made but that its adequacy might not be questioned. For ". . . it is only indirectly and by the clear idea that you have of your body, that you realize that your soul is neither material nor mortal."¹⁹ The indirect proof upon which the distinction rests seems to amount to this: While we never know material things in themselves, we do "see," that is, conceive "in God" the Idea of the material world, its essence—which Malebranche calls *intelligible extension*. By exploring this Idea, we "see" clearly and distinctly that everything that could be said about matter can be reduced to geometrical properties; that is, that all possible modifications of matter are comprehended in its essence—extension. This, however, leaves certain things still not talked about; for example, pleasure, sensation, and so on. But these cannot pertain to material substance—since we know the essence of that, extension, and these are not reducible to it. These modes of being must, however, subsist in some substance—and that substance is presumably spirit.

¹⁸Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion*, trans. M. Ginsberg (London, 1923), p. 74. See also *Recherche*, III, 88 f. (Ecl. X).

¹⁹*Méditations chrétiennes*, ed. Henri Gouhier (Paris, 1928), p. 184 (Med. IX, section 22).

²⁰See, for example, Malebranche, *Correspondance avec J.-J. Dortous de Mairan*, ed. Joseph Moreau (Paris, 1947).

²¹Thanks in no small measure to the violently anti-Malebranchian Père Tourneur and the other Jesuits involved with the *Mémoires de Trévoux*. See Chapters I and II in my *Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism: 1710-1733* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). See also Alfred R. Desautels, s.j., *Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouve-*

ment des idées au XVIII^e siècle, 1701-1734 (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1956).

²²See especially *Recherche*, I, 234 ad fin. and III, 74 f. Also, Henri Gouhier, *La philosophie de Malebranche . . .* (2d ed.; Paris, 1948), especially Part III.

²³In this connection see Gustav Bergmann, "Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche," *Review of Metaphysics*, X (1956), 212 f, reprinted in G. Bergmann, *Meaning and Existence* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1959).

²⁴*Recherche*, II, 182-83. See also, for example, pp. 159, 184, and 238 f; and in Vol. I, pp. 230 f, and 252 f. See also Gouhier, *Philosophie de Malebranche*, pp. 306 ff.

The essential feature of this proof is Intelligible Extension, but unfortunately, the notion was found to be unclear in Malebranche. Critics charged him with Spinozism, with making extension an attribute of God and creation impossible. He thought the charge was the result of a gross misinterpretation of his position, and until the end of his life tried to state and restate his arguments so that critics would cease to misunderstand them.²⁰ Misunderstanding (assuming that is what it was) prevailed—and eventually caught up Berkeley himself.²¹

Very crudely and briefly, Malebranche seems to have meant by Intelligible Extension the archetype of all possible worlds.²² We do not *know* that material things exist and indeed are aware of their existence only from the report of the creation revealed to us in Scripture. What we do know is the essence of bodies, the Ideas, and not the bodies themselves, for whether bodies exist is dependent not on the Ideas but on the action of God's will. That which we know of bodies is *intelligible extension*, for this "represents" material things in the sense of *making them known*. To "see" is to know the mathematical formula for the construction of the thing; it is *not* to "see" the body-in-itself. In effect, all that is to be known of bodies pertains to their essence (extension) and not to their existence, and to know their extension is to grasp them geometrically. Intelligible Extension seems to be something like the axioms and theorems of arithmetic and geometry taken as deducible from one axiom. "All things" are thus "in" Intelligible Extension in that the mathematical rules for constructing all possible bodies are contained in it as theorems are contained in axioms.²³ Thus we "see all things in God"—but with spirits excepted, as already noted; for to "see" the Idea of spiritual substance would mean that we would know the spiritual axioms, as it were.

As becomes clear when Malebranche seeks to show the extent to which his account may possibly differ from St. Augustine's, Malebranche maintains that, strictly speaking, the eternal truths are not the Ideas. The eternal truths that we "see" are eternal and real relations holding either between the Ideas or between other relations. "Truth is nothing other than a real relation, either of equality or inequality . . . Truths are therefore only relations, and the knowledge of truths the knowledge of relations."²⁴ It is, then, by the activity of our pure spirit

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

in making comparisons among the Ideas and thereby discovering the eternal relations, that we may be said to learn the eternal truths. Thus the numbers that you "see" or the geometrical formulae that you "see" are the same as those that I "see"; indeed they are the same as God "sees," although admittedly He does not need to go to the trouble of deriving them since He "sees" them, as it were, "in" the axiom. Furthermore, if a circle is drawn on a blackboard, the sensations are presumably merely modifications of a spiritual substance and wholly unextended, whereas the circle we "see" is not the one of chalk but rather the geometrical rule for constructing a circle. As for the wondrous (and unknown) laws which express the relations between mind and body, these of course constitute Malebranche's occasionalism; and while we may learn them empirically in a Humean way, they are never eternal truths or objects of demonstration.

The axiom metaphor may not prove ultimately satisfactory in trying to get at Malebranche's notion of *intelligible extension*, but it has the advantage of bringing out his point that an Idea is no more extended than a theorem in Euclid; and it also throws some light on the sense in which "all things" might be thought to be in God. But this Idea, this Intelligible Extension which represents bodies, Arnauld found anything but intelligible.

Honestly, I cannot fathom what he wanted us to understand by this *infinite intelligible extension*, in which he now claims we see all things; for he says things so contradictory, that it seems to me as difficult to form a distinct notion about what he says as to conceive of a mountain without a valley. It is a created thing, it is not a created thing. It is God, and it is not God. It is divisible and it is not divisible. It is not only eminently in God, but it is formally; and it is only eminently and not formally.²⁵

Arnauld was extremely concerned with Malebranche's claim that

²⁵*Des vraies et des fausses idées*, Chap. XIV in *Œuvres philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld*, ed. Jules Simon (Paris, 1843), p. 120.

²⁶*Ibid.*, Chap. XIV (p. 116).

²⁷*Ibid.*, Chap. XIX (p. 164).

²⁸*Ibid.*, Chap. XII (p. 102).

²⁹Cf. *ibid.*, Chap. XVIII f.

³⁰*Réponse du Père Malebranche au livre des vraies et des fausses idées*,

Chap. V, section ix in Arnauld, *Œuvres philosophiques*, p. 311.

³¹"'Representative Ideas' in Malebranche and Arnauld," *Mind*, XXXII (1923), 449-61.

³²*Méditations chrétiennes*, No. IX.

³³Cf. *Réponse du P. Malebranche*, Chap. VI in Arnauld, *Œuvres philosophiques*, p. 313.

we see all things in God. On the one hand, Malebranche seemed to be saying that "God comprehends in himself millions of intelligible gnats and fleas; for he knows them, since he made them";²⁶ or again, ". . . women, who are idolators of their beauty, see God in looking in their mirror, because the face that they see is not their own, but an *intelligible face*, which resembles it and which makes up a portion of that *infinite intelligible extension* that God comprehends."²⁷ On the other hand, "there is a great curtailing of the scope of the therm 'all things,'"²⁸ since all we seem to see are material things and numbers and not even our souls. Arnauld took the view that Malebranche's unintelligible venture into Intelligible Extension and his claim that "we see all things in God" were both based on the doctrine of representative ideas.²⁹ This doctrine in turn arose from a thoroughly confused and faulty account of perception. Arnauld maintained that the *êtres représentatifs* of Malebranche were totally superfluous, since our ideas taken as perceptions were already representative.

Malebranche, for his part, tried to show that the key to Arnauld's "misunderstanding" was an alleged failure to appreciate the difference between ". . . the *perceptions* of the soul, as modalities of its substance, and the *ideas of the objects*; [Arnauld] takes the *perception* and the idea as the same thing . . ."³⁰ As Lovejoy has put it: ". . . there are no 'representative mental entities' in Malebranche's account of perception. The factors in perception which for him are 'representative' are never 'mental' and those which are 'mental' are never 'representative.'"³¹

As Arnauld saw it, Malebranche, having been misled into postulating the *êtres représentatifs*, proceeded to try to find a home for them "in God." But not only did Malebranche thereby place all sorts of unworthy things in God; his attempt to state this in terms of Intelligible Extension seemed to suggest that creation was impossible. In fact, Malebranche had tried to forestall the charges of Spinozism by distinguishing sharply between Intelligible Extension and material extension,³² but the analysis only served to convince Arnauld that the distinction could not be maintained.

Malebranche attempted to prove that Arnauld simply didn't understand the difference between *connaître* and *sentir*,³³ but Malebranche's immaterialism and—what is, I suggest, more important—his account

of immortality had to stand or fall with the intelligibility of Intelligible Extension. As ideal as Malebranche sought to make this Idea, it became besmirched with the corporeal, thereby tainting the soul and even God Himself; and, unfortunately, the Oratorian was forced to spend the balance of his life in a fruitless attempt to extricate himself from charges of Spinozism. Rightly or wrongly, even so brilliant a metaphysician as Malebranche was interpreted as failing in his idealization of extension.

Descartes and Malebranche had both "failed" in their attempts to construct an ontology in which the immateriality of the soul could be demonstrated, thereby making arguments for its immortality more, as Stillingfleet put it, "reasonable." Berkeley seems to have attributed this "failure" to problems arising from extension. His sensitivity to the broader theological issues raised by extension was revealed in his *Philosophical Commentaries*:

The great danger of making extension exist without the mind. in y^t if it does it must be acknowleg'd infinite immutable eternal etc. w^{ch} will be to make either God extended (w^{ch} I think dangerous) or an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate being beside God [Entry 290].

But while Berkeley was clearly unhappy both with the contempt Malebranche often expressed for sensible "knowledge," as well as with his account of extension, Berkeley also borrowed a good deal as well. Accordingly, his protest to Percival over being classed with Malebranche ("Fine spun metaphysics are what I on all occasions declare against" [*Works* VIII, 41]), must be taken with a grain of salt. For Berkeley proceeded to produce an ingenious coupling of Malebranche and Locke, wherein the spectre of extension was banished, a substantial and immaterial self restored, skepticism refuted, and common sense vindicated. The first task was to eliminate extension from Male-

³⁴The review actually spans two issues of *Nouvelles de la republique des lettres*, October and November 1699, pp. 363-85; 483-513.

³⁵Le Clerc, *Parrhasiana, ou pensées diverses* (Amsterdam, 1699), especially pp. 386-92. Cf. Locke's Second Letter in his *Works* (11th ed.; London, 1812), IV, 474-77.

³⁶*Works*, IV, 476.

³⁷He also cites "Rorarius" G. Locke is discussed in K. In this connection, see *Pierre Bayle: Le philosophe de Rotterdam*, ed. Paul Dibon (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1959), especially articles by P. J. S. Whitmore and C. L. Thijssen-Schoutte.

branchianism and the clue to this Berkeley may well have gotten from Bayle.

But before turning to that, it is worth noting that Bayle himself was interested in the problem of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. It is discussed in several *Dictionnaire* articles; and in more than one, reference is made to the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy. Thus in "Dicearque," Remark M, one finds an extended discussion of that aspect of the controversy concerned with whether matter can think and with the nature of substance in general and spiritual substance in particular. The cited sources of Bayle's information are (a) an article in *Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, for November, 1699, and (b) Jean Le Clerc's *Parrhasiana*.

The first item reviews the third exchange between Locke and Stillingfleet—with particular emphasis on the questions of whether matter can think, the soul's immortality, and Locke on substance.³⁴ The reference to *Parrhasiana* turns out to be a citation³⁵ from Locke's *Second Reply* where Locke attempts to meet the charge of "lessening the credibility of these articles of faith [immortality of the soul and the resurrection]" by arguing:

any one's not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immaterial takes off not very much, nor at all of the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be immortal, because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonstration of a proposition that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it.³⁶

Most of this citation is to be found in article "Perrot," Remark L, and the items are cross-referenced. Bayle cites "Perrot" in his *Réponse aux questions d'un provincial*³⁷ (1704-7) Part III, Chapter XV, where he presents an interesting criticism of Locke on substances and their accidents. He suggests that inasmuch as Locke holds that extension is not the essence of material substance, it is only an accident—a view which agrees with the Roman Catholics who must defend transubstantiation. But Bayle then goes on to comment: "In a word, this doctrine of Mr. Locke's leads us directly to grant only one kind of substance, which by one of its attributes is joined with extension, and

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

by the other with thought; once this has been granted, no longer can one conclude that if a substance thinks, it is immaterial,"³⁸ Bayle concludes the section with a mention of Spinoza and his doctrine that thought and extension are attributes of the same substance. The entire discussion greatly aroused Locke's friend, Jean Le Clerc, who, in an extended review of the fifth edition of the *Essay*,³⁹ offered a bitter rejoinder. "I do not know what Spinoza held, but I see clearly that what Mr. Bayle says here is only for the purpose of smearing Mr. Locke, after having commended him for the sake of an appearance of equity, and finally, to make him suspect of Spinozism" (p. 119). Locke, however, was more explicitly accused of Spinozism by, for instance, William Carroll; and Berkeley himself seems not to have been unaware of the possibility, to judge by *Philosophical Commentaries*, 825: "Hobbs & Spinoza make God Extended. Locke also seems to do the same."

Bayle again cites the remarks from "Dicearque" and "Perrot" in "Pomponace," Remark F, where, as in "Perrot," Remark L, Bayle is up to his old game of playing the truths of faith off against those of reason. But in "Dicearque," Bayle seems pleased to have Locke make an appeal to revelation; but he also notes that Stillingfleet became a defender of Philosophical Orthodoxy by his defense of the thesis that matter is incapable of thought and that with respect to Philosophical (as distinguished from Theological) Orthodoxy, Stillingfleet had the better of Locke. Bayle even suggests an argument against Locke that he failed to find in his sources: "It has always seemed to me most proper to show the impossibility of combining in the same subject both the three dimensions and thought."

The nature of extension and its relations to our minds and to God were recurring themes in Bayle. In "Zeno"⁴⁰ (and in "Pyrrho"), Bayle is seen pressing the argument from perceptual variations, which had been used by philosophers to make the secondary qualities mind-

³⁸ *Oeuvres diverses* (La Haye, 1727), III, 942.

³⁹ In *Bibliothèque choisie*, XII (1707), especially 105-123. For Berkeley's own interest in Le Clerc and his important journals, see *Works* IX, 16. Le Clerc's estimation of Stillingfleet ("Cet illustre Prélat avoit consumé sa vie principalement à étudier les Antiquitez Ecclesiastiques, & à lire une infinité de Livres; mais il n'avoit que très peu de

connaissance de la Philosophie . . .") appears in his *Éloge* for Locke, *Bibliothèque choisie*, VI (1705), 342-411.

⁴⁰ Locke is cited in "Zeno", I.

⁴¹ Cf. Richard H. Popkin, "L'abbé Foucher et le problème des qualités premières," *xvii^e Siècle*, December 1956, pp. 633-47.

⁴² *Recherche*, II, 310.

⁴³ Cf. "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 223-46.

dependent, against the primary qualities as well. This, I suggest, was Berkeley's clue to a solution of the problem of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Bayle himself got the suggestion from the Abbé Simon Foucher's⁴¹ attack on Malebranche's representative ideas. By taking these Ideas as modifications of the soul (and thus "in" us) and as representative in the sense of "like" perceived things, Foucher was able to get his objections off the ground, prompting Malebranche to comment: "When one criticizes a Book, it seems to me one ought at least to have read it."⁴² Bayle generalized the attack on Malebranche by urging the argument against any dogmatist who had a "real" world of primary qualities.

But where Bayle paused to glory in one more skeptical gambit, Berkeley pressed on to his New Principle. That he did so, indebted to Bayle, is mentioned by Jessop in a note to the text of *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 9 (*Works II*); and Berkeley's use of Bayle's skeptical arguments to overthrow skepticism has been discussed at length by Popkin.⁴³ Berkeley held that skepticism followed from accepting a dichotomy between the *esse* and *percipi* of things. He used Bayle's argument to collapse the distinction and asserted the reality of the sensible world. But if I am correct, Berkeley also saw that so long as the traditional mind-matter distinction was maintained, arguments in favor of the sort of "thing" which might be thought potentially immortal seemed ultimately to be threatened. Locke, for example, had not only been in some doubt over "real" as opposed to sensible objects; he had in the end been so unsure about spirits that he admitted the possibility that matter might think. But immaterialism had more to fear than Lockean matter, for Spinoza had made the Cartesians keenly aware of the dangers inherent in extension.

Even Malebranche, with the most pious intentions, with a grasp of the dangers, and with considerable metaphysical genius, found that refinements and sophistications were not an adequate popular defense against attacks on the entire mind-matter distinction. A radical solution was called for, and Bayle's skeptical argument suggested it. Extension could be banished from the scene by treating it as a sensation.

This radical solution not only afforded Berkeley an opportunity to root out the source of the trouble in Malebranchianism; it also allowed him to have the best in Locke, the common-sense empiricism which

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

had had such an impact on the Republic of Letters, without paying the horrendous price of suggesting that matter might think and that substance was virtually unknowable. Having dissolved even the primary qualities into sensations and noting “that neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every body will allow” (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 3), Berkeley reinstates spiritual substance definitively in *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 26 and § 27. He makes it clear not only that he accepts the view that ideas must be ontologically dependent on a substance but that ideas could *not* inhere in an entity (for example, material substance) which by definition is inert. An inactive substance is unintelligible to Berkeley; and it is basically unintelligible to the defenders of material substance as well, since they often find themselves holding that matter is inert and yet, through its dispositional properties, causally efficacious. And if they hold strictly to the latter view, Berkeley notes: “Matter once allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter” (*Philosophical Commentaries* 625). Finally, ideas could not themselves be substances, for, as he was at great pains to point out, they have no causal properties (see *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 25); they are totally inert, nor can they be independent of spirit. And Berkeley repeatedly argues that we should not expect to have an idea of a spirit, for we cannot know that which is active by means of that which is passive.

Thus in the end, we have only spirits, their acts, and the objects of those acts—ideas. Have we, however, succeeded in banishing extension by taking Bayle's hint and making it a sensation?

. . . it may perhaps be objected, that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute, which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of *idea*; and it no more follows, that the soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and no where else (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 49).

This answer reveals, I think, Berkeley's delight in having eliminated the threat of extension; and he need only appeal to what is "on all hands acknowledged" finally to dispose of the problem. Actually, he had expressed his pleasure earlier, as in *Philosophical Commentaries*, 391:

The Philosophers lose their Matter, the Mathematicians loose their insensible sensations, the Profane their extended Deity Pray w^t do the Rest of Mankind lose, as for bodies &c we have them still.
N.B. the future Philosoph: & Mathem: get vastly by y^e bargain.

Berkeley had purged his universe of extension and he had revealed a spiritual substance. Far from sympathizing with Toland and the deists, far from tossing in comments on the immortality of the soul as a sop to tradition, his whole argument can be seen as an attempt to rescue Christian orthodoxy from deism. What Berkeley attempted to do was to show that the soul was the sort of "thing" which would make a credible candidate for immortality. He was not attempting a rational proof of God's grace or a demonstration of an article of faith. Stillingfleet had argued that the "way of ideas" induced such doubts over the nature of the soul as to make the notion of a soul virtually unintelligible. Locke had tried to counter that God could make anything He chose immortal and that in any case revelation sufficed for faith. But as Stillingfleet maintained repeatedly, belief in an article of faith was made more difficult when one of the items in the article to be believed was itself a "something I know not what."

And for the Soul [one] cannot be certain, *but that Matter may think*, (as you affirm) and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, say you, *his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis*. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as *Matters of Faith*? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on Account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

of Certainty, [i.e. Locke's 'way of ideas'] all that is lost; and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever . . .⁴⁴

When Berkeley set about trying to prove that the soul was immortal he was trying to repair the damage Stillingfleet indicated Locke had done. For an article of faith is clearly threatened when a philosophical theory tells us that one knows so little about souls as to admit they might be material. Berkeley attempted to prove both that "soul" was a meaningful term and that souls were purely immaterial. In so doing, he was not echoing the deism of Toland and others but was standing squarely in the orthodox Christian tradition. Other philosophers and theologians had tried; Descartes and Malebranche had both tried and failed. Having gotten rid of extension, Berkeley thought he had succeeded in giving an account of the soul which would fulfill the basic requirements of orthodoxy. That he thought his contribution on the topic important is indicated in his first letter to Percival in reply to the latter's report of the reception of the *Principles* among the London wits. At the end of his opening paragraph, Berkeley writes:

If, therefore, it shall at any time lie in your way to discourse with your friends on the subject of my book, I entreat you not to take notice to them I deny the being of matter in it, but only that it is a treatise of the *Principles of Human Knowledge* designed to promote true knowledge and religion, particularly in opposition to those philosophers who vent dangerous notions with regard to the existence of God and the natural immortality of the soul, both which I have endeavoured to demonstrate in a way not hitherto made use of [*Works* VIII, 36].

[To be continued]

⁴⁴The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter, pp. 28-9.

EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

MR. TAD W. GUZIE, S.J., received his M. A.
from Saint Louis University
and is now teaching at Creighton Preparatory School (Omaha).
He has previously written for the New Scholasticism,
the Classical Bulletin, and the Classical Journal.

Various studies of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas have revealed that the Angelic Doctor had a highly elaborated view of scientific method and a rigorous criterion of philosophical meaning. Summarily stated, the full commitment of the intellect to a scientific conclusion involves seeing that conclusion in the light both of the rational principles leading to the conclusion and of the basic evidence of experience from which the conclusion is obtained. The establishment of a philosophical conclusion consequently entails a resolution of the higher-order proposition to a twofold principle or source—the first organizing principles of the science in question, and the experiential evidence or data of sense experience upon which the validity of the conclusion and of the first logical principles themselves ultimately rests.

The philosophical reasoning process thus consists of two stages—the way of discovery or inquiry, involving a gathering and analysis of experiential evidence; and the way of judgmental exposition, the demonstrative and organized moment of scientific reasoning. It is significant to note that, in Aquinas's view, neither of these stages is complete without the other. A philosophically descriptive analysis of experience naturally gives way to judgmental organization, in which the intellect becomes committed to the intelligible necessity of what the analysis reveals; while, conversely, demonstrative exposition is meaningful and scientifically valid only after a careful consideration of the pertinent concrete evidence.¹

The *via inventionis* or stage of inquiry does yield true knowledge, and a judgment made in the course of experiential reflection will entail a true intellectual commitment to some real necessity. An existential judgment, for example, is as necessary as some higher-order philosophical conclusion, for a thing cannot simultaneously exist and not exist in the same respect. However, within the framework of a larger philosophical inquiry, judgments made in the way of discovery are ordered to judgments of a more universal character. Since in the present study we shall be considering the way of inquiry in relation to the stage of organized demonstration which completes the entire analysis, the term *judgmental* has been reserved for referring to the *via iudicii*. Hence, for our purposes, a "judgmental statement" will always mean a more universal philosophical proposition, one which is founded upon, and thus presumes true and necessary, judgments of a lower order made in the stage of inquiry.

Though St. Thomas's *teaching* on the matter of philosophical method can be found throughout his works, his personal *use* of the method poses another problem. Aquinas presents his teachings in judgmentally organized form, often giving only the briefest indications of the pertinent experiential evidence. Thus, while we find him giving a detailed picture of his philosophical positions according to the way of demonstrative exposition, we do not often discover him detailing concrete evidence according to the way of discovery. His writings might be compared to many textbooks of experimental science of our own day; current theories are thoroughly presented in judgmental fashion, but the author rarely elaborates the many detailed experiments on the basis of which the theory was actually established. Thorough analysis of the evidence of experience—in St. Thomas's mind a necessary procedure and one actually prior to judgmental exposition—must for the most part have been left to the individual teacher, much as the

¹For the textual bases of these very summary remarks, see Louis-Marie Régis, o.p., "Analyse et synthèse dans l'œuvre de s. Thomas," *Studia Mediaevalia* (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), pp. 303-30; and J. Peghaire, c.s.sp., "'Intellectus' et 'ratio' selon s. Thomas d'Aquin" ("Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales d'Ottawa," VI [1936], esp. pp. 100-280). See also

Patrick J. Burns, s.j., "St. Thomas and Judgment: Selected Texts" (unpublished master's thesis, Dept. of Philosophy, St. Louis University, 1957), pp. 66-94.

²The dates given throughout are those of M. Grabmann as cited by V. J. Bourke in his introduction to the American reprint of the Parma edition of the *Opera Omnia* (I, xii-xiii).

physics textbook leaves most questions of concrete experimentation to the student's laboratory work.

However, while the same philosophical question will often be treated according to the way of judgment in several of Aquinas's works with no apparent *doctrinal* evolution, there is no reason for assuming that St. Thomas's view of the *method* proper to a strictly philosophical quest did not undergo a gradual development. In fact, considering how St. Thomas for the first time in the history of Christian thought detached from a strictly theological context various issues that could be handled at the level of natural reason, one might be led to suspect that his method of approaching philosophical problems would undergo some revision in the course of this detachment, even though his basic teaching on the matter itself remained unchanged.

The purpose of the present study will be to explore various facets of the evolution of philosophical method in St. Thomas's own thinking, his personal *use* of the scientific procedure which we find *described* even in his earliest works. Two examples have been chosen to illustrate this methodological development. The first set of texts will be used largely to point out the meaning of an "evolution in method." The second series of illustrative texts will be developed in greater detail and will exemplify the doctrinal effects of St. Thomas's shift in procedure.

EXAMPLE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF METHOD

A clear-cut instance of methodological evolution can be seen in St. Thomas's discussions of whether the intellect can understand many things at one time. Taking up this question in the *De Veritate* (1256-59)² in terms of the angelic intellect, he goes through a lengthy and detailed *formal* analysis. Having discussed how forms in general are related to their subjects, how one potency cannot be simultaneously determined by different acts of the same order, and how forms belonging to one genus can variously exist in a subject, Aquinas finally proceeds to apply this analysis specifically to intelligible forms: the

Evolution of Philosophical Method in St. Thomas
Tad W. Guzie, s.j.

intellect can be perfectly in act with respect to only one species at a time. An application is then made to the angelic intellect.³

This elaborate analysis may be compared with that found in the

³"Respondeo. Dicendum, quod intellectus, omne quod intelligit, intelligit per aliquam formam; et ideo ex formis intellectus, quibus intelligit, oportet considerari, an simul angelus possit multa intelligere.

"¹) Scendum est igitur, quod formarum *quaedam* sunt unius generis; *quaedam* autem generum diversorum.

"Formae quidem quae sunt diversorum generum, diversas potentias respiciunt; cum unitas generis ex unitate materiae sive potentiae procedat secundum Philosophum. Unde impossibile est unum subiectum simul perfici diversis formis diversorum generum: quia tunc una potentia non determinabit ad diversos actus, sed diversae [Parma: diverse]; sicut si aliquod corpus est simul album et dulce, albedo inest ei secundum quod participat de natura diaphani, dulcedo autem secundum naturam humidi.

"Formae vero quae sunt unius generis, unam potentiam respiciunt; sive sint contrariae, ut albedo et nigredo; sive non, ut triangulus et quadratum. Hae igitur formae in subiecto *tripliciter* esse dicuntur.

"*Uno modo* in potentia tantum; et sic sunt simul, quia una potentia est contrariorum, et diversarum formarum unius generis.

"*Alio modo* secundum quod sunt in actu imperfecto, ut cum sunt in fieri; et sic etiam simul esse possunt, ut patet cum aliquis dealbatur: tunc enim toto dealbationis tempore albedo inest ut in fieri, nigredo vero ut in corrumphi.

"*Tertio modo* ut in actu perfecto, ut cum iam albedo est in termino dealbationis; et sic impossibile est duas formas unius generis esse simul in eodem subiecto. Oportet enim eamdem potentiam ad diversos actus terminari: quod est impossible, sicut et unam lineam ex una parte terminari ad diversa puncta.

"²) Scendum est igitur, quod omnes formae intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quantumcumque res quarum sunt, sint generum diversorum. Omnes enim

eamdem potentiam intellectivam respiciunt. Et ideo in potentia omnes simul esse possunt in intellectu, et similiter in actu incompleto, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum perfectum. Et hoc est species esse in habitu, qui est medius inter potentiam et operationem; sed in actu perfecto plurium specierum intellectus simul esse non potest.

"Ad hoc autem quod actu intelligat, oportet quod sit in actu perfecto illius speciei secundum quam intelligit; et ideo impossibile est quod simul et semel secundum diversas formas actu intelligat. Omnia igitur diversa quae diversis formis intelligit, non potest simul intelligere; illa vero quae intelligit per eamdem formam, simul intelligit.

"Unde omnia quae intelligit per unam Verbi essentiam, simul intelligit; ea vero quae intelligit per formas innatas, quae sunt multae, non simul intelligit, si diversis formis intelligat. Quilibet enim angelus per eamdem formam multa intelligit, ad minus omnia singula ria unius speciei per unam speciei formam. Superiores vero angeli plura possunt una specie intelligere quam inferiores: unde magis possunt simul multa intelligere.

"³) Scendum tamen, quod aliquid est *unum* quodammodo, et alio modo *multa*; sicut continuum est unum in actu et multa in potentia. Et in huiusmodi si intellectus, vel sensus feratur ut est unum, simul videtur; si autem ut est multa, quod est considerare unamquamque partem secundum se, non sic potest totum simul videri.

"Et sic etiam intellectus quando considerat propositionem, considerat multa ut unum; et ideo in quantum sunt unum, simul intelliguntur, dum intelligitur una propositio quae ex eis constat; sed in quantum sunt multa, non possunt simul intelligi, ut scilicet intellectus simul convertat se ad rationes singulorum secundum se intuendas. Unde Philosophus dicit in VI *Metaph.*: *Dico autem simul et separatim intelligere affirmationem et negationem, quasi non*

First Part of the *Summa Theologiae* (1266), where St. Thomas approaches the same problem by way of an analysis of cognitive experience.

Just as unity of term is required for unity of movement, so unity of object is required for unity of operation.

Now it is possible that several things be taken either as several or as one, like the parts of a continuous whole. If any part is considered in itself, the parts are *many* and hence are not grasped in one operation, nor all at once through sense and intellect. But in another way, the parts are taken as forming *one whole*, and thus they are known together in one operation, through both sense and intellect. This holds true as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in III *De Anima*.⁴ It is in this way that our intellect understands a subject and predicate together, as being parts of one proposition; and also two things being compared, according to their agreement in one point of comparison.

Thus, by reflection on cognitive experience, we find that many things can indeed be understood "together," as long as the intellect focuses its attention on some intelligible aspect common to the various things; different intelligibilities, on the other hand, constitute separate acts of knowledge. From this analysis in the way of inquiry, St. Thomas moves to the causal level and the way of demonstrative exposition.

From this it is evident that many things, insofar as they are distinct, cannot be understood all at once; but insofar as they are grouped together in an intelligible unity, they can be under-

deinde, sed unum quid sit. Non enim simul intelliguntur in quantum habent ordinem distinctionis ad invicem, sed in quantum uniuntur in una propositione" (*De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14 [ed. Marietti-Spiazzi, I, 170]).

⁴"If in thought you think each half [of a line] separately, then by the same act you divide the time also, the half-lines becoming as it were new wholes

of length. But if you think it as a whole consisting of these two possible parts, then also you think it in a time which corresponds to both parts together" (Aristotle, *De Anima* III, vi, 430b11-14 [trans. J. A. Smith; from R. McKeon. *Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941)], pp. 592-93).

stood together. Now anything is actually intelligible insofar as its likeness is in the intellect. Hence, all things that can be known through one intelligible *species* are known as one intelligible object and thus are understood together. But those things that are known through different intelligible *species* are apprehended as different intelligible objects.⁵

The article is concluded with an application of this analysis to the angelic intellect.

Though it is an extremely concise piece of writing, the *Summa* article is a good example of a method of procedure that is distinctly philosophical: the movement from experience and the stage of discovery to a judgmentally organized causal exposition which sketches the necessity seen in the evidence. The formal analysis seen in the early *De Veritate* treatment of the question is dropped. And the experiential analysis—which in fact is found in a somewhat similar form at the end of the *De Veritate* text—is used as the way of approaching the same problem in the *Summa*. The formal, logical analysis is helpful for details, but it is not necessary for answering the

⁵“Respondeo. Dicendum quod sicut ad unitatem motus requiritur unitas termini, ita ad unitatem operationis requiritur unitas obiecti. Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura, et ut unum; sicut partes alicuius continui. Si enim unaquaeque per se accipiatur, plures sunt; unde et non una operatione, nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum in toto, et sic simul una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III *De An.* Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subiectum et praedicatum, prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod convenient in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur. Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius similitudo est in intellectu. Quaecumque igitur per unam speciem intel-

ligibilem cognosci possunt cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile; et ideo simul cognoscuntur. Quae vero per diversas species intelligibiles cognoscuntur, ut diversa intelligibilia capiuntur. Angeli igitur . . .” (*ST*, q. 58, a. 2 [ed. Ottawa, I, 351b45-52a24]).

“Respondeo dicendum, quod causa quare non possunt plura simul intelligi in actu, haec est quam Algazel assignat, quia oportet semper intellectum configurari actu secundum speciem rei intelligibilem, quam apud se habet, rei intellectae in actu, ut sit assimilatio utriusque quae exigitur ad cognitionem rei. Sicut autem impossibile est corpus secundum eamdem partem diversimode figurari diversis figuris, ita impossibile est unum intellectum diversis simul speciebus ad diversa intelligenda actu informari; et ideo considerandum est, quod quicunque intellectus plura intelligit per plures species, oportet quod ea non simul intelligat, ut patet in intellectu humano secundum statum viae a rebus accipiente . . .” (*In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4 [ed. Mandonnet, II, 123]).

precise question at hand. In fact, it throws no light on the point that the same object can be known under one or many of its intelligible aspects; to establish this fact, an analysis of experience is necessary.

That an example of this sort indicates an evolution in St. Thomas's way of handling a philosophical problem is confirmed by a glance at his *Commentary on the Sentences* (1254-56, thus antedating the *De Veritate*) and at the *Summa contra Gentiles* (1258-64, thus falling chronologically between the *De Veritate* and the *Summa Theologiae*). In the *Commentary* treatment, Aquinas cites Algazel's reason for saying that many things cannot be understood at one time: the intellect is determined to actual understanding of a thing by a single intelligible *species*. St. Thomas then goes on simply to elucidate the impossibility of an intellect's being simultaneously informed by different *species*. This judgmental elaboration does not possess the intricate detail of the formal analysis seen in the *De Veritate*; nor, on the other hand, is the experiential analysis found in the *Summa Theologiae* text seen here.⁶

In the *Contra Gentiles*, Aquinas's treatment is very brief, and the matter is tersely summarized according to the way of judgmental exposition. In spite of the relative brevity of the discussion, however, St. Thomas does introduce the experiential evidence developed later in the *Summa Theologiae*, placing emphasis on the intellect's ability to consider what it wishes and thus to form intelligible *species* representative of many things under one intelligible aspect.

Since a substance which understands is also a substance which wills and hence is the mistress of its own act, it is in its power after it has an intelligible *species* to use it for actual understanding, or if it has many *species* to use one of them. Hence it is that we do not actually consider all those things of which we have knowledge. Thus, an intellectual substance, having knowledge through many *species*, uses the one that it wishes and thus actually knows at one time everything which it does know through one *species*. For, all things are as one intelligible object to the extent that they are known through one thing, just as our intellect simultaneously knows many things composed with each

other or related in a certain unity. But those things that it knows through different *species* it does not know at one time.⁷

It may also be noted that this text does not exhibit the maturity and precision of organization seen in the *Summa Theologiae* article, even in the presentation of evidence.

Thus, in historical order, St. Thomas's method of handling this matter seems to have developed from (1) a simple judgmental elucidation of an *auctoritas*; to (2) a complex and detailed formal analysis, with the pertinent experiential evidence tacked onto the end of the discussion; to (3) a judgmental summary with some emphasis placed on the experiential aspects of the problem; and finally to (4) a complete and well-ordered philosophical argument, the stage of demonstration and causal explanation being prefaced with the moment of inquiry and experiential analysis. Although St. Thomas's doctrine remains essentially the same throughout all four treatments of the problem, the examination of cognitive experience, as we have noted, enables the real philosophical issue to be pinpointed.

Now, the question discussed above is quite identically stated in all of the texts cited—whether angels or intellectual substances can understand many things at one time. Thus, the *question itself* is clearly determined throughout Aquinas's works, even though there is a significant shift in the manner of handling the philosophical aspects of the problem (which becomes theological, insofar as three of the four texts discuss how angels know through the Word). And because of the doctrinal consistency found here, the threads of methodological evolution in St. Thomas's various approaches stand out quite clearly against

"... Sed sciendum est quod non omne illud est intellectum in actu cuius species intelligibilis actu est in intellectu. Cum enim substantia intelligens sit etiam volens, ac per hoc sit domina sui actus, in potestate ipsius est, post quam habet speciem intelligibilem, ut ea utatur ad intelligendum actu; vel, si habet plures, ut utatur una ipsarum. Unde et ea quorum scientiam habemus, non omnia actu consideramus. Substantia igitur intellectualis, per plures species cognoscens, utitur una, qua vult, ac per hoc simul actu cognoscit omnia quae per unam speciem cognoscit: omnia enim sunt ut unum intelligibile in quantum

sunt per unum cognita; sicut et intellectus noster simul cognoscit multa ad invicem composita vel relata ut unum quiddam. Ea vero quae per diversas species cognoscit, non cognoscit simul. Et ideo, sicut est intellectus unus, ita est intellectum in actu unum ..." (*CG*, II, cap. 101 [ed. Leon, man., p. 225]).

⁸*Opera Omnia* (Cologne: Aschendorff, 1955), II, 18-44.

⁹The principal texts on this matter are: *In III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4; *De Ver.*, q. 19, a. 1; *CG*, II, cap. 81; *De An.*, a. 15; *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1; *ST*, I, q. 89, a. 1; *In I Cor.*, cap. 13, lect. 3.

the over-all pattern of thought. We may now proceed to a more complex series of texts, where we shall be concerned not only with a shift in procedure but also with the doctrinal development that accompanies the change in method.

EXAMPLE 2: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EVOLUTION OF METHOD

The problem of the state of the human soul after death was a popular speculative question among medieval thinkers. St. Albert, for example, devotes half of his *Liber de Natura et Origine Animae* to this matter, exploring throughout the course of seventeen chapters the opinions of Plato, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, Avempace, Pythagoras, the Epicureans, and others.⁸ St. Thomas himself is especially interested in the cognitive aspects of this problem, and he discusses it throughout his writings.⁹

Now, within this theologically oriented frame of reference, Aquinas finds it necessary to take up the matter of phantasms in human understanding. For, if the human intellect must use phantasms in its state of union with a body, how will the intellective soul have knowledge after it has been separated from the body and from material phantasms? Thus, the context outlined above is one of those in which the question of the necessity for phantasms in human understanding especially arises; for in St. Thomas's early writings this question is not handled as a distinct philosophical issue. Following this question through his writings (and prescinding from the larger issue of the knowledge had by separated souls), we shall observe how it emerges as a separate problem.

Turning his attention in the *Commentary on the Sentences* to the matter of knowledge after death, Aquinas writes of the way we understand in this life:

It is the intellect's way of acting that it understand with a phantasm, since what the Philosopher says in III *De Anima* is true for our present state: in no way could the soul understand without a phantasm, not only with regard to the acquisition of knowledge, but also with respect to a person's consideration of

Evolution of Philosophical Method in St. Thomas
Tad W. Guzie, s.j.

those things that he already knows. For phantasms are related to the intellect as sensible objects are to sense . . .

This manner of understanding is proper to the human soul for two reasons. The first is that the human soul is the last according to the order of nature in the grades of intellect. Hence, the soul's possible intellect is related to all intelligible objects as prime matter is related to all sensible forms. For this reason it cannot go into act before it receives the *species*, and this comes about through sense and imagination.

A second reason is that the human soul is the form of a body. Hence, its operation must be an operation of the whole man. And thus the body joins in, not as an instrument through which the soul operates, but as representing the object; and this the phantasm does. Hence it is that the soul cannot understand without a phantasm even those things that it knew previously.¹⁰

¹⁰"Modus autem agendi est ut intellegat cum phantasmate, quia in statu viae verum est quod dicit Philosophus in III *De anima*, quod nequamque sine phantasmate intelligere anima non solum quantum ad acquirendam scientiam, sed etiam quoad considerationem eorum quae quis jam scit; quia phantasmatum se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum. . . . Modus autem intelligendi praedictus accidit humanae animae ex duobus.—Uno modo ex hoc quod anima humana est ultima secundum naturae ordinem in gradibus intellectus. Unde se habet intellectus ejus possibilis ad omnia intelligibilia, sicut se habet materia prima ad omnes formas sensibiles; propter hoc non potest in actu exire prius quam recipiat species: quod fit per sensum et imaginationem.—Alio modo ex hoc quod est forma corporis. Unde oportet quod operatio ejus sit operatio totius hominis. Et ideo communicat ibi corpus non sicut instrumentum per quod operatur, sed sicut repraesentans objectum, scilicet phantasma. Et inde contingit quod anima non potest intelligere sine phantasmate etiam ea quae prius novit . . ." (*In III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4 [ed. Moos III, 996-97]).

¹¹St. Thomas will continue to use this

statement as an *auctoritas* in these contexts throughout his writings, though he will move away from a simple commentary on it. J. A. Smith translates the pertinent section from Aristotle (*De An.* III, vii, 431a14-16) as follows: "To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image" (McKeon, *Basic Works*, p. 594).

¹²"Ad septimum dicendum, quod nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere non convertendo se ad obiectum suum, ut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem. Unde, cum phantasmatum se habeant hoc modo ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in III *de Anima*, quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se habeat, nunquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmatum. Et ideo, sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatis ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7 [ed. Marietti-Spiazzi, I, 195]; cf. q. 10, a. 8, ad 1).

This text presents us with a basic doctrine that remains essentially unchanged throughout St. Thomas's works—that the human intellect must use phantasms in *any* act of understanding. But the point especially to be noted here is that the discussion is strictly demonstrative and closely tied to Aristotle's remark that the soul never thinks without phantasms.¹¹ Aquinas's emphasis on the body as an integral part of man and not simply an instrument is noteworthy, considering the dominance of Platonistic Augustinianism at Paris. However, the judgmental arguments given here are on the whole quite sketchy and not as clearly stated or as well pointed as the demonstrations we shall find in his later works. The argument based on the human intellect as the lowest form of intellect, for instance, does not appear in any of the later texts, perhaps because St. Thomas himself felt it to be weak; for the nature of the human intellect (involved in Aquinas's second reason above) is actually presupposed in any discussion of its place among other types of intellect.

The *De Veritate* presents no significant methodological development of this matter. In the historically elaborate article in which St. Thomas takes up the problem of the soul's knowledge after death (q. 19, a. 1), the necessity for phantasms in the present life is mentioned but not developed as fully as in the above text from the *Commentary*. However, the issue is introduced into a more strictly psychological context; in discussing the presence of memory in the human mind, Aquinas writes in answer to one of the objections that

a potency cannot know anything without turning to its object, as sight does not have knowledge except by turning to color. Hence, since phantasms are related to the possible intellect as sensible objects are to sense (as the Philosopher makes clear in III *De Anima*), even though the intellect may possess some intelligible *species*, it never actually considers anything in accord with that *species* except by turning to phantasms. And thus, just as our intellect in its present state needs phantasms for actually considering anything before it receives a habit it also needs them after it has received the habit.¹²

St. Thomas again works directly from Aristotle's statement, basing his argument on the parallel found between the senses' need for a sensible

object and the intellect's need for phantasms. It may be noted that this analogy is valid only on the supposition that the intellect *does* require phantasms for its operation; the analogy is not a proof, and it presupposes the nature of the human intellect.

The above text from the *De Veritate* has been quoted especially to call attention to the term *se convertere*—the intellect's “turning to” phantasms—an expression that will keep recurring in later texts. Drawn from transient activity by extrinsic analogy, the phrase refers to no more than the necessity for a cognitive power to be united with its object in order to be knowing-in-act. Since (as was seen in the *Commentary on the Sentences*) the phantasm represents the real object of the intellect, it is precisely in its *representative* function that the phantasm is called the “object” of the intellect. It is the intellect's psychological object, therefore, and not that which the intellect knows. Aquinas's language in this context becomes more and more technical, and one must take care not to transfer his psychological or structural descriptions to the order of knowledge considered as a total experience.

Although none of the experiential evidence for the dependence of the human intellect upon phantasms is given in the *Commentary* and *De*

¹³The context in which this remark is made is again largely theological—“utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox nati fuissent perfecti in cognitione.” The objection is placed that the intellect needs the senses only for acquiring knowledge, just as one deprived of vision can recall his previously attained knowledge of color. Aquinas answers: “Cum phantasma sit objectum intellectus possibilis, ut dictum est, secundum statum viae, anima ad suum actum phantasmatis indiget, non solum ut ab eis scientiam accipiat secundum motum qui est a sensibus ad animam, sed etiam ut habitum cognitionis quam habet circa species phantasmatum, ponat secundum motum qui est ab anima ad sensus, ut sic inspiciat in actu quod per habitum cognitionis tenet in mente. Unde etiam Dionysius dicit in *Epistola ad Titum*, quod illi qui intellectuales revelationes accipiunt, eas quibusdam figuris circumponunt; unde laesa imaginatione per laesionem organi, ut est in phaeneticis, intellectus impeditur ad

[sic] actuali consideratione etiam eorum quae prius sciebat” (*In II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 [ed. Mandonnet, II, 514-15]).

¹⁴“Ad quantum dicendum quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens, sed sicut permanens, ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis, sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam representationem vel per negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitione impeditur, oportet totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus etiam in divinis. Patet enim quod non possumus intelligere Deum esse causam corporum sive supra omnia corpora sive absque corporeitate, nisi imaginem corpora, non tamen iudicium divinorum secundum imaginationem formatur” (*In de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 5 [ed. Wyser, p. 65]).

Veritate texts already quoted, St. Thomas was certainly conscious of it at this time. In another place in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, having again mentioned that the intellect needs phantasms even for recalling previous knowledge, he adds that

if the imagination is injured through damage of an organ, as in the case of the mentally diseased, the intellect is hindered from actually considering even those things that it already knows.¹³

A remark like this indicates that, in St. Thomas's own thinking, the human intellect's need for phantasms is not a proposition simply to be deduced from the nature of man, as one might be led to gather from the type of argument found in the first text from the *Commentary*, quoted above. It is true that, given the composite nature of man, one might argue aprioristically to the necessity for phantasms in every act of understanding in this life. However, there is *separate* evidence for this dependence, evidence over and above that which is needed to establish the nature of man. Thus, we already have indications in the Thomistic texts for the fact that this issue is susceptible of a complete philosophical treatment, by way of both judgmental demonstration and experiential inquiry.

The largely negative piece of evidence noted above is supplemented by a fuller and more positive consideration in the *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate* (1257-58, roughly contemporaneous with the *De Veritate*).

The phantasm is the principle of our knowledge, as that from which the intellect's operation begins; it is not a fleeting thing, but rather remains as a kind of foundation of intellectual activity, just as principles of demonstration must remain in every procedure of science. For phantasms are related to the intellect as objects in which the intellect sees whatever it does see, whether through a perfect representation or through a negation. And hence, when knowledge of phantasms is obstructed, the intellect's knowledge must be totally obstructed even in divine science. For it is evident that we cannot know that God is the cause of bodies or transcends all bodies or is not a body unless we could imagine bodies. But a judgment about divine things is not formed according to the way we imagine them.¹⁴

Evolution of Philosophical Method in St. Thomas
Tad W. Guzie, s.j.

The judgmental statement that opens the text again emphasizes the need for phantasms in any subsequent use of knowledge previously obtained (although the statement does not demonstrate this point). St. Thomas's description of the phantasm as a "foundation" for intellectual activity will be further elaborated in a later text. The use of the term *inspicere* to describe, in somewhat pictorial fashion, the intellect's need for phantasms may also be noted here; the intellect, as it were, "looks at" its object psychologically represented in the phantasm, and it "sees in the phantasm" whatever meaning it actually conceives of the object.

But the point especially to be noted with regard to this text is that the positive role of phantasms in understanding is suggested, and this is done in the light of a reflection on cognitive experience in the area of metaphysical knowledge. Thus, just as Aquinas's analysis of experience in the case of understanding many things at one time led to a statement of the way in which many things *can* be understood simultaneously—namely, if they are considered under one intelligible aspect—so, in the case at hand, his reflection on metaphysical knowing begins to bring out the real implications of the intellect's dependence upon phantasms. Phantasms, though they are not to be confused with the intelligible content of the judgment itself, must nevertheless be present as sensory representations or symbols of what is affirmed or denied in the act of judging; and in their representational, symbolic function they remain as the foundation of intellectual knowledge.

Written shortly after the *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate*, the *Summa contra Gentiles* will echo the terminology found in the above text. It is in this latter work that our problem finally emerges in a strictly philosophical context, where Aquinas is answering Averroes's

¹⁵I include here the rather involved argument leading into the text translated above: "Si ex phantasmatisbus quae sunt in nobis intellectus possibilis non recipit alias species intelligibiles, quia iam recepit a phantasmatisbus eorum qui fuerunt ante nos; par ratione, a nullorum phantasmatisbus recipit quos alii praecesserunt. Sed quodlibet aliqui alii praecesserunt, si mundus est aeternus, ut ponunt. Numquam igitur intellectus possibilis recipit alias species a phantasmatisbus. Frustra igitur ponitur intellectus agens

ab Aristotele, ut faciat phantasmata esse intelligibilia actu.

"Praeterea. Ex hoc videtur sequi quod intellectus possibilis non indiget phantasmatisbus ad intelligendum. Nos autem per intellectum possibilem intelligimus. Neque igitur nos sensu et phantasmate indigebimus ad intelligendum. Quod est manifeste falsum, et contra sententiam Aristotelis.

"Si autem dicatur quod, par ratione, non indigeremus phantasmate ad considerandum ea quorum species intelligibiles sunt in intellectu conser-

doctrine concerning a single possible intellect for all men (Book II, chapter 73). St. Thomas here moves far beyond a simple refutation of Averroes's position, and it is clear that he is attempting to draw out all of the implications of his own teaching. The general framework at certain points of the argument turns out to be something like this: "Even if the preceding statements were true, which they are not, the following argument would not be true." It is in an intricate context of this sort that the question of the necessity for phantasms in human understanding arises. St. Thomas proceeds:

The possible intellect, like any substance, operates in accord with its own nature; and according to its nature it is the form of the body. Hence, the intellect does understand immaterial things, but it sees them in some material thing. An indication of this is that in teaching abstract matters, particular examples are proposed, and in these the intellect sees what is stated.

The possible intellect, therefore, is related to the phantasms which it needs, in one way before the reception of the intelligible *species*, and in another way after it has received the *species*.

Beforehand, it needs the phantasm in order to receive from it the intelligible *species*. Hence, the phantasm is related to the intellect as an object which puts in motion.

After the intellect has received the *species*, however, it needs the phantasm as a sort of instrument or foundation for its *species*. Hence, the intellect is related to phantasms as an efficient cause. For, upon the intellect's command, there is formed in the imagination a phantasm that is appropriate to a particular intelligible *species*, a phantasm in which the intelligible *species* shines forth as does an ideal pattern in an object that exemplifies or reflects it. . . . Hence, we see that when we have once received knowledge of something, it is within our power to consider it again at will. Nor do phantasms hinder us; for it is in our power to form phantasms suited to what we wish to consider.¹⁵

vatae, etiam si intellectus possibles sint plures in diversis: quod est contra Aristotelem, qui dicit quod *nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima*:—patet quod non est conveniens obviatio. Intellectus enim possibilis, sicut et quaelibet substantia, operatur secundum modum suae naturae. Secundum autem suam

Though the argument that opens the text is extremely laconic, it is a real demonstration and not just a judgmental summary of the sort seen in some of the previous texts. The essential point of the whole matter is succinctly stated: The intellect must operate according to its determined nature; since it is naturally the form of a body, it must make use of the body when it understands anything, even immaterial objects, which it knows only by reason of its knowledge of material things. The force of St. Thomas's argument might be brought out by recalling that if a power possesses a determined nature it is not a free power. Hence, if the intellect is found to use corporeal phantasms in one instance of intellectual knowledge, it must use them in any act of understanding, even when noncorporeal objects are in question. This demonstration thus echoes the analysis seen in the text from the *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate*.

St. Thomas immediately proceeds to a consideration of what may be summarized as two experiential evidences. As an indication of the

naturam est forma corporis. Unde intellegit quidem immaterialia, sed inspicit ea in aliquo materiali. Cuius signum est, quod in doctrinis universalibus exempla particularia ponuntur, in quibus quod dicitur inspicitur. Alio ergo modo se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasma quo indiget, ante speciem intelligibilem: et alio modo postquam recepit speciem intelligibilem. Ante enim, indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem: unde se habet ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum movens. Sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei: unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens; secundum enim imperium intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili, in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine. . . . Unde videmus quod illud cuius scientiam semel accepimus, est in potestate nostra iterum considerare cum volumus. Nec impeditur propter phantasmata: quia in potestate nostra est formare phantasmata accommoda considerationi quam volumus . . ." (CG, II, cap. 73 ad fin. [ed. Leon, man., pp. 175-76].)

¹⁶The context here makes clear that it is the *possible* intellect which is related to phantasms as efficient cause (and we can legitimately speak of the intellect as "schematizing" phantasms, insofar as it guides the imagination in the organization and combining of phantasms for more abstract thought activity). Although the causal role of the *agent* intellect is prescinded from in this text, this power cannot be said to have anything directly to do with the organization of images. For potential intelligibility is not "put into" phantasms by the intellect; the intellect as a higher power controls the imagination (which always operates according to its own sensory nature), but the intellect does not "do anything" to phantasms. The fact of experience involved here is that we can understand whatever we wish and that the recall of phantasms can be controlled. This does not permit a negation of the fact that *actual* intelligibility exists only in the intellect (and hence cannot be put into phantasms), and that *potential* intelligibility exists only in matter (and hence cannot be "given" to phantasms by the intellect). See ST, I, q. 54, a. 4; q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

fact that immaterial things must be "seen in" or known through sensible objects, Aquinas calls attention to the fact that the effective teacher brings concrete examples to the aid of the student when abstract matters are in question. Though this evidence will be developed in a later text, it may be noted here that such concrete examples, in St. Thomas's mind, are not simply an aid to understanding. Rather, man necessarily and naturally understands the abstract through the concrete. Thus (if we may exploit this evidence) abstract knowledge learned apart from concrete examples is liable to be verbal knowledge; in this case, verbal phantasms would take the place of concrete phantasms, and the full meaning and implications of the abstract words represented in phantasms might remain quite unknown.

The second piece of evidence in the above text is tangent upon the experiential fact that, though we need phantasms to understand any intelligible object, we are nonetheless able to understand what we wish by forming the phantasms necessary for producing or recalling the appropriate intelligible *species*. In the light of this evidence, the relationship between possible intellect and phantasm is developed. As necessary instrument in the production or recall of a *species*, the phantasm is like an object that puts another thing in motion; for the intellect needs the phantasm in order to be determined to act. Thus, one idea cannot give rise to another without the instrumentality of a phantasm.

The intellect, on the other hand, is able to guide the power of imagination in the formation of phantasms suitable for the production or recall of a *species*, and in this function the possible intellect is related to phantasms as an efficient cause.¹⁶ This relationship is tangent upon what experimental psychologists will often call "controlled association." In philosophical terms, the intellect is an efficient cause in controlling the imagination's preparation of suitable phantasms for organized thought activity, much as external perceived objects or the sense appetites are the efficient causes of the recall and combining of phantasms in instances of "free association."

Turning finally to the treatise on man in the *Summa Theologiae*, we find St. Thomas's most penetrating synthesis of the whole matter, one which makes use of all of his previous insights. The whole of

Question 84 of the *Prima Pars* is devoted to the problem of how man knows material reality; and St. Thomas here rather consistently locates his own teachings (often in the name of Aristotle) as a sort of middle path between materialism, usually represented by Democritus's sense empiricism, and Platonic exaggerated realism. The argument proceeds cumulatively throughout the question. Having established the fact of intellectual knowledge which, though obtained from sensible things, is universal and necessary (a. 1), Aquinas goes on to discuss the need for knowledge to be immaterial (a. 2) and the impossibility of innate knowledge in man (a. 3). This latter point, developed in the light of the intellect's essential union with a sensing body (a. 4), leads to a consideration of how the immaterial intellect receives genuine knowledge through the senses (aa. 5 and 6).

It is in this context that our problem finally emerges, in article 7, as a distinct philosophical issue; and it appears in the form of a complete philosophical argument, an analysis of experience according to the way of inquiry preceding judgmental organization according to the way of demonstrative exposition. To recapitulate the argument of Question 84 to this point (for the over-all context is important): Granted that the intellect, even though it is immaterial and essentially different from the senses, must obtain all knowledge through sense experience, still, cannot the intellect ever break away from the particularities of sense and sensory phantasms in its act of thought? St. Thomas answers that

it is impossible for the intellect in its present state of union with a corruptible body to have actual understanding of a thing unless it turn to phantasms. Two evidences illustrate this fact.

First of all, since the intellect is a power that does not in itself employ a bodily organ, it would in no way be hindered in its activity by damage done to an organ if its act did not require the act of some power that does make use of a bodily organ. Now such organs are employed by the senses, the imagination, and the other powers belonging to the sensitive order. Hence, it is evident that for the intellect actually to understand—not only when it attains new knowledge, but also when it uses knowledge

¹⁷In a different context, St. Thomas will assert that one of the primary roles of the teacher in learning is to present sensible examples from which the pupil

can form the phantasms necessary for understanding. See, for example, *CG*, II, cap. 75 ad fin.; *ST*, I, q. 117, a. 1.

already acquired—there is need for an act of the imagination and the other sense powers. For when the activity of the imagination is obstructed by a damaged bodily organ (as in mentally diseased persons) or, again, when the activity of the memory is hindered (as in the case of drowsiness), we observe that a person is prevented from actually understanding even those things that he already knows.

Secondly, as anyone can observe from personal experience, when he is trying to understand something, he forms phantasms of some sort to serve as examples; and in these he as it were sees what he wants to understand. Thus it is that, when we wish to help a person understand something, we present examples to him, in order that from these he can form phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

The moment of inquiry here includes two evidences that we have already seen in earlier texts: the *negative* fact that thought is blocked by organic damage to the internal senses which contribute to the phantasm's formation (and here we could add the innumerable evidences of psychogenic as well as organogenic disorder brought to light by experimental psychologists); and the *positive* fact that phantasms, far from being a detriment to human thought activity, are found to be definitely helpful for learning and understanding.¹⁷ Both evidences are elaborated more fully here than in the earlier texts. Aquinas then moves to the causal level and the moment of judgmental demonstration.

The reason for this is that a knowing power is proportioned to the thing known. Hence, the proper object of an angelic intellect, which is completely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body; and through intelligible objects of this sort the angel knows material things. The human intellect, on the other hand, which is united to a body, has as its proper object a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things the human intellect rises to some knowledge of things that are not visible.

Now it is characteristic of such a nature to exist in an individual thing that has no existence apart from corporeal matter. For

instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in this particular stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in this particular horse, and so on. Hence, the nature of a stone or of any other material thing cannot be known completely and truly unless it be known as existing in the particular. And we apprehend the particular through sense and imagination.

Thus, for the intellect actually to understand its proper object, it must necessarily turn to phantasms in order to perceive a universal nature existing in the particular. If, however, the proper object of our intellect were a separated form, or if, as the Platonists assert, the forms of sensible things subsisted apart

¹⁸"Respondeo. Dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo possibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmatum. Et hoc duobus indicis appareat. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentiae utens organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito actu memorativa virtutis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeacepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua phantasmatum per modum exemplorum, in quibus inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando aliquem volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmatum formare possit ad intelligendum.—Huius autem ratio est quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angeli,

qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmatum, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si formae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos, non oportaret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmatum" (ST, I, q. 84, a. 7 [ed. Ottawa I, 521b4-22a20]).

¹⁹See ST, I, q. 84, a. 8; q. 85, aa. 1, 5, 8; q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 3.

²⁰See ST, I, q. 78, a. 1; q. 79, aa. 2, 7; q. 79, a. 9, ad 3.

from particulars, our intellect would not always have to turn to phantasms in an act of understanding.¹⁸

The argument by “proper object” used here is correlative and quite equivalent to the *Contra Gentiles* demonstration in terms of the nature of the human intellect, as quoted in the preceding pages. For it is a direct consequence of the essential union of the human *intellect* with a *material* body that, whatever man knows in an *intellectual* fashion, he knows ultimately because of his primitive experience of *material* reality. Invisible and immaterial objects are not directly and immediately proper to the human intellect, as they are for the angelic intellect. Rather, the object that is proper to man’s intellect—the object that is directly proportioned to the human intellect precisely as *human*—is some immediately intelligible aspect or quiddity or nature of a sensible thing.

It is worthwhile noting that this is the first time in the treatise on man in the *Summa Theologiae* that St. Thomas speaks of the “proper object” of the human intellect. He exploits this analysis and this particular terminology in later articles;¹⁹ but up to this point he has only spoken of the object of intellect qua intellect (being, *ens universale*) or of the formality under which any intellect attains its object (*ratio entis*).²⁰ This is, however, the most meaningful context in which to introduce this terminology; for it is the phantasm which psychologically presents to the human intellect its proper object. Thus, the judgmental exposition in terms of proper object found in this text is an advancement over the demonstration in the broader terms of the determined nature of the human intellect as seen in the *Contra Gentiles* or the *Commentary on the Sentences*; for the analysis by proper object is more closely related to the psychological question of phantasms and their positive role in human understanding.

The present text lays the foundation for knowledge of the singular and the conformity of the intellect with reality in judgment. Since a sensible object is known in its particularity only by the powers of sense, intellectual knowledge of the singular will have to be a *composite act* of intellect and sense, in which the intellect knows as particular that which the phantasm represents. And because the intellect can know concrete singulars only in a composite act with sense, formal

truth will involve, psychologically speaking, a turning of the intellect to phantasms, in which a universal is seen as realized in the concrete existent represented in the phantasm.²¹

However, St. Thomas prescinds in this text from any explicit discussion of these matters. In the light of the over-all context of Question 84 and of this article in particular, the phrase "complete and true" intellectual knowledge (adverbially expressed in the text—*complete et vere cognoscere*) does not mean that absolutely all human knowledge is judgmental. Rather, it here seems to mean nothing more than that "seeing an intelligibility in phantasms" is the way of knowing proper to the human intellect precisely as human; for the universal exists only in the particular, and there is no other way the human intellect can get at the universal except by finding it in the particular, seeing it in the phantasm. Thus, Platonic knowledge turns out to be a form of angelic knowledge; it would not be "complete and true" intellectual knowledge for man, simply because it is not the way man knows *secundum modum naturae* in his present state.

Maintaining the historical framework that he constructs throughout Question 84, Aquinas exemplifies the proper object of the human intellect with universals that have a direct foundation in reality; the notions of "horse" and "stone" are most convenient for contrasting his own teaching with that of the Platonists. However, if we may be permitted to draw out the full implications of the text and to make a further use of the evidence that St. Thomas himself suggests, a further conclusion can be made. We can at this point see *why* abstract matters are best learned when seen in concrete examples, why sensible

²¹For a thorough textual study on knowledge of the singular and the different terms St. Thomas uses to express the intellect's activity in such knowledge, see G. P. Klubertanz, s.j., "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular," *New Scholasticism*, XXVI (1952), 135-66.

²²Any verbalization of a philosophical judgment is, of course, a symbolization; and any extrinsic analogy will to some extent involve symbolic rather than completely ontological knowledge (for example, conceiving composite acts of the mind in terms of a matter-form composition, or conceiving immanent activity in terms borrowed from our experience of transient action). Thus, any symbol can have a more or less

perfect correspondence with the reality in question and hence can be more or less helpful in the actual understanding of the reality. The point emphasized above (and in Aquinas's text) is the psychological efficacy of a *concrete symbol*. St. Thomas's use of concrete images like the ones suggested above might be the subject of a fruitful textual study. In this context, it is worthwhile to note the symbolic import not only of extended examples but also of *single terms* which St. Thomas will use to describe some reality; for example, "seeing a meaning in" phantasms and "turning to" phantasms are quite concrete ways of conveying the intellect's real activity.

examples are a positive aid to understanding. "Sensible examples" of any sort function at the level of the intellect's proper object, insofar as they are concrete and directly intelligible representations of the more abstract ideas that the intellect understands. Hence, when abstract meanings are attached to, or read into, concrete singulars, the intellect in its turn can "see the meaning in" the phantasms, which thus serve as *symbols* of the abstract meaning.

This is an important point, especially in the light of St. Thomas's own persistent practice of exemplifying his philosophical teachings, of supplying images for an abstract proposition. The archer aiming his arrow at a target is not a direct and perfect representation of intrinsic finality; nor does the image of the air illuminated by sunlight exhaust the implications of the relationship between essence and the act of existing; nor, again, is light illuminating color a direct representation of the agent intellect's function in knowledge. But perfect correspondence between meaning and thing is not the point here. Rather, by attaching a philosophical meaning to images of concrete situations with which his readers were familiar and often to images drawn from medieval physics or biology—in other words, by *symbolizing*—Aquinas brings abstract philosophical principles in a symbolic form back to the level of objects which in their concreteness are more directly proportioned, more immediately intelligible, more *proper* to the human intellect as human.²²

At this point, viewing St. Thomas's treatment of the problem of phantasms in understanding as a whole, we find a methodological evolution that somewhat parallels the shift in procedure seen in the first series of texts concerning the unicity of intelligible *species* in acts of understanding. Beginning with more simple judgmental commentaries on an *auctoritas* (a statement of Aristotle, in the present case), Aquinas gradually proceeds through analyses of further experiential evidence of the intellect's dependence upon phantasms, eventually arriving at a complete philosophical argument with the two stages of inquiry and demonstration. In contrast to our first series of texts, however, where the philosophical issue was determined from the start, the second group reveals an evolution of the question itself—a gradual emergence, from theologically connotative contexts, of a problem that becomes more and more distinctly a separate philosophical

issue. Thus, when the problem of the knowledge of separated souls finally arises in the *Summa Theologiae* (and this is the context in which St. Thomas's first detailed analysis of our question originally appeared), Aquinas is able to refer the reader to his previous discussion of the need for the intellect to turn to phantasms; and he does so with the significant remark that this necessity *patet per experimentum*.²³

Now the salient point concerning this twofold development, as has already been suggested, is that St. Thomas's more and more careful reflection on experience seems to be the chief factor contributing to this evolution. For, while the bare *fact* of the intellect's dependence upon phantasms might be judgmentally established by a simple demonstration in terms of the structure of human nature, analysis of evidence seems to have indicated to St. Thomas that the issue was not as simple as that. The fact is that the various positive functions of the phantasm in human intellection as well as the complementary relationship existing between possible intellect and phantasm cannot be brought to light except by an experiential analysis. And thus, in the *Summa Theologiae*, we find Aquinas making his judgmental demonstration in terms of the pertinent evidence itself; for the argument by proper object, which necessarily implies the determined nature of the human intellect and the composite structure of man, is, as we have noted, adapted precisely to the matter of the intellect's need for phantasms as this need is actually experienced.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The analysis conducted throughout this study gives some indication of the fact that St. Thomas's teaching on philosophical method, summarized at the beginning of this paper, is quite a different thing from his own use of that method. Although we have no real way of knowing precisely how he handled philosophical matters in his class lectures, there is sufficient evidence in his writings to indicate an increasing concern for careful analysis of experience. Aquinas's later works evidence in their judgmental organization and demonstrative arguments a precision, a care for evidential detail and a unification of data that are not nearly as remarkable in his earlier writings; and the

²³See *ST*, I, q. 89, a. 1.

sort of analysis conducted in the present study indicates that this precision in the stage of demonstrative exposition is to no small extent due to greater attention to the stage of inquiry.

That Aquinas's own use of scientific method should have undergone a gradual evolution is not surprising. St. Thomas, after all, like any thinker, was a man of his own age. Philosophical problems, if they did not actually arise first in theological contexts, were in his day at least chiefly oriented in their solutions toward answering theological questions. Thus, although he was extremely well read in the writings of Aristotle and other philosophers, St. Thomas would at first bring this knowledge to bear upon contemporary questions and in a contemporary context. In practice, this initial application would involve judgmental statements drawn from, and elaborated out of, the thought of his masters rather than a concern for detailed and intricate verification of such statements through lengthy reflection on experience. Though even the earliest of St. Thomas's writings reveal a rather clear line between theological doctrines and philosophical analyses, the balance between reason and revelation seen in a later work like the *Summa Theologiae* would not be something to be achieved in a day. It is suggested, then, that the type of methodological shift illustrated in the present study was a most important factor in this historical achievement.

Turning from the milieu in which we find St. Thomas writing to the psychological truths in the light of which he presents his teachings, we might profitably conclude our inquiry by drawing together two lines of thought, reading Aquinas's doctrine on the nature of philosophical method in the light of the second series of texts discussed above. As has been noted, it is an essential point in St. Thomas's teaching that a scientific conclusion be seen in the light of the first principles or sources—including the data of sense experience—which give rise to the conclusion and provide it with scientific validity. Now, the human intellect knows abstract meanings only by reason of its directly intelligible experience of concrete reality. It knows them ultimately because of its contact with the objects proper and directly proportioned to it by nature. From this it follows that the resolution of a metaphysical meaning or of any scientific conclusion to sense data is not merely a requisite for scientific validity but also a psychological

Evolution of Philosophical Method in St. Thomas
Tad W. Guzie, S.J.

necessity. Seeing a conclusion in the light of concrete evidence is for man the *natural* way of attaining truth. And reading an abstract meaning into sensory signs that may symbolize it at the level of the intellect's proper object is the *natural* way of maintaining that grasp on truth.

The real nature of human understanding thus suggests a lesson to the contemporary Thomist who is interested in really *telling* the truth of philosophy in contemporary language, in a contemporary milieu, in the light of what experiential evidence is further revealed in contemporary experimental sciences. For St. Thomas could not conceive philosophical demonstration apart from evidential inquiry to be psychologically coercive, much less scientifically valid. And, learned apart from an analysis of experience and in isolation from symbols which may render truth more meaningful to the contemporary mind, philosophy could not be viewed by him as a truly *human* enterprise. Aquinas told the truth in his day. But the *way* he told it will not always be the human way of telling it again in our own day.

**THE NATURE
OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT
ACCORDING
TO ST. ALBERT THE GREAT**

THE REVEREND LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C.S.B., received his M. A. and Ph. D.
from the University of Toronto
and is now assistant professor of philosophy
at St. Thomas More College in the University of Saskatchewan.
He has previously written for Culture.

The place of St. Albert the Great in the thirteenth-century synthesis of Greek, Arabian, and Christian philosophy has not yet been fully established. There are still required detailed investigations of many aspects of his thought. This paper proposes to examine one of these aspects; namely, his doctrine of the nature of the human intellect. Concerning this doctrine, it is still the fashion to hold that St. Albert's teaching is substantially the same as that of his pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas.¹ We propose to demonstrate that such a view is erroneous and that on this point St. Albert closely followed Averroes.

The most formidable obstacle to this demonstration is the historians' fear of accepting St. Albert's purely philosophical treatises as stating his own thought. After all, St. Albert has declared:

All these things, however, are said according to the opinion of the Peripatetics, because we are not saying anything of our own in these matters or in other matters in the field of philosophy, for we are not here attempting to explain our own doctrine in philosophy, but shall state it elsewhere.²

As positive and all-inclusive as it seems, this statement and others like it do not prevent us from making legitimate use of some of St. Albert's works. The first justification for this use is his own declaration in certain important texts that what he writes expresses his personal conviction:

And because I am undertaking things which are most difficult, yet most worthy of being known, I therefore wish first of all to explain as well as I can all that Aristotle teaches, and then mention the opinions of other Peripatetics, and after this to consider Plato's opinions, and then finally to give my own opinion.³

To these doubts, however, we wish first of all to give the response of some philosophers, and afterwards add what we think should be said of these matters.⁴

However, because of the excellence of the doctrine, we wish to make an examination here in order to pass judgment on all the operations of the intellect together, as much as God will give us

¹A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen . . . in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Münster), IV, 5-6 (1903, 1906), p. 233. G. Reilly, *The Psychology of St. Albert the Great compared with That of St. Thomas* (Washington, 1934), pp. 44, 57.

There are others who do not draw the comparison between St. Albert and St. Thomas, but who give a description of St. Albert's doctrine which is the same as that given by the above. See U. Dahnert, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus . . .* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 77-79. See also A.-M. Ethier, "Les parties potentielles de l'intellect chez S. Albert le Grand," *Etudes et Recherches Publiées par le Collège Dominicain d'Ottawa*, III (1938), 63-93; and R. Z. Lauer, "St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction," *Thomist*, XVII (1954), 69-83.

²*Metaphysics*, XI, 1, 9; VI, 598. (All references to St. Albert's works are to *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet [38 vols.; Paris: Vives, 1890-99]. The volume and page are cited.) Similar statements of St. Albert may be found in *De Causis et Processu Universitatis*, II, 5, 24; X, 619, and in G. Meersseman, *Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni*, o.p. (Bruges, 1931), p. 7.

³*De An.*, III, 2, 1; V, 330.

⁴*Ibid.*, 3; V, 335.

⁵*Ibid.*, 3, 6; V, 378.

⁶*De Unit. Intell.*, cap. 7; IX, 469. See also cap. 1; IX, 437.

⁷" . . . breviter naturam intellectus explanantes, et nostram de eo opinionem ponentes: quia nos haec quae hic dicimus, alibi probavimus, et prolixe tradidimus (*ibid.*, cap. 6; IX, 462).

⁸G. Meersseman also concludes that legitimate use may be made of many of St. Albert's paraphrases. See *Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni*, o.p., p. 8. The same opinion is voiced by A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen . . .*, pp. 48, 294-308.

⁹For the sake of brevity we omit references concerning the dating of St. Albert's works.

¹⁰"Forma sensati per seipsam generata in medio sensus secundum esse sensibile . . . Frustra queritur, quid conferat ei illud? sicut si quaeritur, quid conferat luci lucere secundum actum?" (*De An.*, II, 3, 6; V, 242). "Haec autem dubitatio [de sensu agente] magna indiget consideratione, et in sequenti capitulo secundum facultatem nostram determinabitur" (*ibid.*, II, 3, 3; V, 236). "Omnis sensus est susceptivum specierum sine materia" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 34, a. 3, sol.; XXXV, 303). "Omnis potentia quae fit in actu per susceptionem formae alicujus agentis in ipsam, est passiva: sensus est potentia hujusmodi: ergo sensus est potentia passiva" (*ibid.*, a. 1; XXXV, 294). "Sensus nihil transmutat, sed potius transmutatur ab objecto" (*ibid.*).

¹¹St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Littram*, XII, 16, 32-33. Also *De Musica*, VI, 5, 8.

light in these matters. But first we wish to indicate what the Peripatetics have said concerning this question, and then our own teaching. And we shall show how it agrees with or differs from what the other Peripatetics have said.⁵

The second justification for employing St. Albert's philosophical tractates is his approval of parts of them in other works which certainly represent his own opinion. For example:

And this is what can more truly be said concerning the intellect and its nature. We have disputed about this more fully in the book dealing with the perfection of the soul, which is the second part of the book *De Intellectu et Intelligibili* which we wrote.⁶

This quotation is from a work in which St. Albert was giving his own teaching. It was composed at the request of Pope Alexander IV and incorporated in large part into St. Albert's *Summa Theologiae*. Moreover, St. Albert explicitly endorses it.⁷

Having now established the possibility of utilizing St. Albert's philosophical writings, we must nevertheless be careful to establish that the actual texts to which we shall refer truly present his own doctrine. This complicates our task but is absolutely necessary. The reader may rest assured that every employment of important texts of this kind will be vindicated before our final conclusions are drawn.⁸

The philosophical commentaries in question were composed between 1257 and 1270, according to more recent opinions.⁹ The ones with which we are concerned, in their order of composition, are the following: *De Anima*, *De Sensu et Sensato*, *De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, *De Natura et Origine Animae*, *Metaphysicorum Libri XIII*, and *De Causis et Processu Universitatis*. The other writings of St. Albert to which reference will be made are: *Summa de Creaturis* (before 1243), *Commentary on the Sentences* (1243-1249), *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroem* (1256-1257), and *Summa Theologiae* (1270-1280).

We may begin the account of the Albertine doctrine of the intellect by noting that both the senses and the possible intellect are passive powers. By an immaterial operation natural to them, physical objects produce sensory species which act on the external senses.¹⁰ St. Albert is well aware that St. Augustine¹¹ denied the passivity of the powers of

The Human Intellect according to St. Albert
Leonard A. Kennedy, c.s.b.

sense but nevertheless considers that the senses may be acted upon in a spiritual manner.¹²

The internal senses are likewise passive. The common sense is active, it is true, but also receptive, being "distinguished" by

¹²"Opinio autem secunda [de passione sensuum] . . . erat . . . Augustini et multorum aliorum magnorum viorum. Tamen sine praejudicio aut ego non intelligo eos, aut ipsi falsum dixerunt . . . Et sic communicantiam habent forma sensibilis agens et sensus patiens, in eo quod sicut sensus spiritualiter patitur, ita etiam forma sensibilis spiritualiter agit in ipsum" (St. Albert, *De An.*, II, 3, 6; V, 243-44).

¹³*Ibid.*, 4, 12; V, 313.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, III, 1, 3; V, 318.

¹⁵"Intellectus autem possibilis sicut recipiens et subiectum intelligibilium" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 56, a. 6; XXXV, 476).

¹⁶"Anima rationalis [secundum intellectum possibilem] . . . non movetur aliqua specie motus physici, licet ibi sit transmutatio secundum species intelligibiles" (*ibid.*, q. 55, a. 4, part. 1, ad 4; XXXV, 470). (See also *De An.*, III, 2, 17; V, 361.)

¹⁷"Possibilis enim intellectus transmutatur ex alio quod est intellectus agens, et sua transmutatio est exitus de potentia intelligendi ad actum intelligendi" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 56, a. 1, sol.; XXXV, 478).

¹⁸Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 5, 430a13-17.

¹⁹"Color est visibilis non omni modo, sed in ratione formalis, hoc est, per actum luminis, qui dat ei actum et speciem secundum quod potest agere in visum" (St. Albert, *Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 21, a. 3, part. 1, sol.; XXXV, 188). "Cum igitur constet actum colorum esse lumen . . ." (*Sens. et Sens.*, II, 1; IX, 39).

²⁰"Esse autem formale coloris est esse coloris quo est actu in potentia activa immutandi visum secundum actum: et hoc esse color visus habet a luce" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 21, a. 1; XXXV, 182-83).

²¹"Color enim secundum actum cum lumine quo agit, unum visibile est:

sicut materia et forma non faciunt duo, sed unum: et ideo cum lumen illud sit ut forma, color autem ut materia, erit ex illis duobus unum visibile secundum actum: et ideo visus non est nisi unius visibilis" (*ibid.*, a. 3, part. 3, sol.; XXXV, 200). This is from Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 565-66. All references to Averroes are to Averrois *Cordubensis in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

²²"Lumen est color perspicui secundum actum facti, quando color accipitur: quia lumen secundum veritatem est actus colorum in eo quod colores sunt: et ideo est natura formalis eorum, et cum propria potentia in qua habet fieri hic actus, fit perspicuum necesse est quod omnis color sit participatio luminis in tali vel tali perspicuo" (St. Albert, *De Sens. et Sens.*, II, 1; IX, 39). "Non oportet dicere quod aliquid sit color praeter esse quoddam luminis in perspicuo terminato . . . Et sic ex esse luminis in diverso in perspicuo erit accipere coloris naturam et omnem colorum diversitatem" (*ibid.*, 2; IX, 47).

²³"Lumen est hypostasis colorum secundum esse formale quod est esse simpliciter colorum, sicut supra diximus. Hanc igitur veram putamus esse sententiam de luce et lumine" (*De An.*, II, 3, 12; V, 255-56). This is a common medieval doctrine. See Avicenna, *De Anima* (Venice, 1508), III, 3; f. 11rb. See also St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; and *In II De Anima*, lect. 14.

St. Albert attributes to Jacob Alkindi (d. 873) the teaching that light is the species and hypostasis of colors. See St. Albert, *Sum. Theol.*, P. II, q. 77, m. 3, obj. 5; XXXIII, 76. This doctrine, however, is not found in Alkindi's published works. See A. Nagy, "Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des Ja'qub ben Ishaq Al-Kindi," *Beiträge*, II, 5 (1897), 1-64.

sensibles.¹³ The phantasy, imagination, and estimative power are also passively acted upon by individual sensible forms.¹⁴

In the same way the possible intellect receives intelligible forms, becoming their subject.¹⁵ Since it is an immaterial power it is not passive, properly speaking, but simply receptive.¹⁶ Its activation is brought about by the agent intellect.¹⁷

What we wish to point out primarily in St. Albert's doctrine of the intellect is that the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect in a direct rather than an indirect manner. If the agent intellect were to act on the phantasy so as to produce a universal which in turn activated the possible intellect, the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect would be indirect. If, on the other hand, the agent intellect were to act *per se* on the possible intellect and not merely by rendering intelligible that which activated the possible intellect, the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect would be direct. We desire to demonstrate that for St. Albert the latter is the case.

The proof of the direct action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect is four-fold: (1) from the comparison of the agent intellect to light, (2) from the nature of the intellect's knowledge of itself, (3) from the manner in which the intellectual memory functions, (4) from the way in which man knows separated substances.

PROOF FROM THE COMPARISON OF THE AGENT INTELLECT TO LIGHT

The Peripatetics and Scholastics, following Aristotle's lead,¹⁸ regularly compared the agent intellect to light. St. Albert pushed this comparison very far.

In order for a color to be visible, it must be activated or informed by light,¹⁹ which gives it formal being.²⁰ This does not mean, however, that color and the light informing it are seen by the eye as two distinct things. On the contrary, from the very fact that light and color are related to one another as form and matter, they constitute one visible object.²¹

Another way of expressing the relationship of color to light is to say that color is light with a certain kind of existence or that it is a participation of light. As light exists in different ways in opaque or partly transparent bodies, it gives rise to different kinds of colors.²² Light is even said to be the substance (*hypostasis*) of color.²³ What-

ever any color has of the nature of color, it has it from light; and whatever comes from any other source is rather a privation of the nature of color than part of its essence.²⁴ Therefore light contains all colors eminently, and what happens to light when a color is produced is that the light is reduced to one particular color, which it contained virtually within itself all the time. Color is thus merely a limited or weakened light.

St. Albert's teaching on the nature of light and color may be summed up in the following propositions: (a) Light is the form of color; (b) light and color form one visible object; (c) color is light in a certain mode of existence.

²⁴"Amplius autem in lumine quod est universalis causa colorum . . . quidquid aliquis color de natura habet coloris, ab ipso habet, et si quid aliud est in ipso, potius est de privatione naturae coloris quam mereatur dici coloris essentia" (St. Albert, *De Int. et Int.*, I, 1, 4; IX, 482).

²⁵"Aristoteles loquitur ibi de intellectu agente prout ipse est formale esse universalis, sicut lumen formale esse est coloris. Omne enim universale suum esse formale habet ab intellectu agente" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 55, a. 3, ad 2; XXXV, 466).

²⁶"Intellectus agens . . . per hoc idem quod aliud intelligit active, est intelligibilia [sic] in quibus intelligit se ut actum ipsorum" (*ibid.*, a. 6, ad 1; XXXV, 476). See Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 5, 691-97.

²⁷"Similiter est in omnibus: plura enim ad speciem unam formata, necesse est quod habeant agens unicum quod formet ea ad speciem illam: est autem omnium intelligibilium secundum quod intelligibilia sunt, sicut est etiam omnium visibilium secundum quod visibilia sunt, species una qua visibilia sunt: oportet igitur quod ipsum sit agens unum ad speciem illam formandam in eis" (St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 2, 18; V, 364).

²⁸Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 559-66 and 591-98.

²⁹"Ad id quod juxta hoc quaeritur, scilicet utrum sit [intellectus possibilis] potentia ad duas species simul? Dicendum, quod suscipit speciem agentis, et speciem intelligibilis. Sed illae duae

species non sunt nisi actus unius. Species enim agentis est actus speciei intelligibilis, sicut lux est actus coloris" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 57, a. 4, ad quaest.; XXXV, 495).

³⁰"Ita etiam est de formis imaginatis et in sensitivis acceptis a lumine intellectus agentis. Et ideo non accipiuntur ab intellectu possibili, nisi separatae sint ab eadem luce quae est actus et perfectio possibilis" (*De Unit. Int.*, cap. 6; IX, 484). "Lux agentis quae est actus possibilis, est actus intelligibilis" (*ibid.*, cap. 7, ad 27; IX, 472). "Lumen quod est actus intellectus agentis, est forma et intellectus possibilis et ejus quod intelligitur" (*De Int. et Int.*, II, 1, 5; IX, 510).

³¹"Ex his autem facile adverti potest, quod duo sunt opera agentis, quorum unum est abstrahere formas intelligibiles, quod nihil aliud est nisi facere eas simplices et universales. Secundum est illuminare possibilem intellectum, sicut lumen se habet ad diaphanum, quod oportet quod species universalis quamdiu est universalis, semper sit in lumine agentis: et ideo quando recipitur in possibili intellectu, oportet quod in lumine agentis recipiatur: et ideo oportet possibilem illuminari lumine intellectus agentis. Similiter autem possibilis dupliciter habet comparationem: comparatur enim ad agentem sicut complectus suo, et comparatur ad formas exphantasi elicitas sicut motus et formatus ab eis" (*De An.*, III, 2, 19; V, 366). "Et ideo in omnibus [intelligibilibus] accipit continue intellectus possibilis lumen agentis" (*ibid.*, 3, 11; V, 386).

We shall now see that for St. Albert all these properties of light and color have their counterpart in knowledge, when intellection is compared to physical illumination. The agent intellect may be compared to the colorless light of the sun, the intelligible to the color on which the light shines, and the possible intellect to the sense of sight.

Agreeing with Averroes, St. Albert teaches that the agent intellect is the formal being²⁵ and the act²⁶ of intelligibles. Where many things are fashioned so as to be of one form, there must be one agent making them to be so. Now, all visible things, insofar as they are visible, have one form of visibility. Similarly all intelligibles, insofar as they are intelligible, have one form of intelligibility. There must therefore be one agent responsible for this.²⁷ This is the light of the agent intellect.

Following Averroes,²⁸ St. Albert holds that the intelligible and the light of the agent intellect form one intelligible object.²⁹ Another manner of stating this is to say that the agent intellect is the form of both the intelligible and the possible intellect.³⁰ That is, the agent intellect has two functions. It abstracts a universal form, which must be constantly illumined by the agent intellect's light in order to be intelligible; but it also "accompanies" this form into the possible intellect. The possible intellect is then informed not only by the intelligible but *also*, at the same time and in a unity of intelligible object, by the light of the agent intellect itself.³¹

A more precise expression of the relationship between an intelligible and the light of the agent intellect is that an intelligible is the light of the agent intellect seen in a certain way. When color is seen, the light which actualizes it is also seen, because nothing is visible unless it is incorporated in light. Similarly, in all intelligibles what is understood is only the light of the agent intellect. In some intelligibles this light is incorporated in sensible matter; in some, incorporated in imaginable quantity; and in some, not incorporated in anything at all but seen in itself. For one can see light (the *hypostasis*, the substance, of color) as brilliant (in white) or somewhat dimmed or almost extinguished (in black); but what is seen is always light itself. So,

The Human Intellect according to St. Albert
Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B.

too, whatever intelligible is grasped, what is received is simply the light of the agent intellect.³²

The reader will have noticed that many of the texts quoted to explain St. Albert's comparison of intellection to physical illumination are taken from works whose authority is not questioned. On the other hand, some belong to his philosophical commentaries, especially *De Anima III* and *De Intellectu et Intelligibili II*. The legitimacy of relying on these will be defended presently.³³ Meanwhile we may sum up as follows St. Albert's position concerning the nature of intellection, noticing to what lengths he has gone in likening it to physical illumination: (a) The light of the agent intellect is the form of intelligibles; (b) it is also the form of the possible intellect when intellection takes place; (c) the intelligible and the light of the agent intellect form one intelligible object; (d) the intelligible is the light of the agent intellect in a certain mode of existence.

Since the light of the agent intellect informs the possible intellect

³²"Et sicut in colore viso videtur lumen quod de potentia coloris facit actu colorem, eo quod nihil aliud agit in visum nisi illud sit terminatum, et quasi sit luce incorporatum: ita in quolibet eo quod intelligitur de omnibus intelligibilibus, non intelligitur nisi lumen intellectus agentis, licet in aliquo intelligatur incorporatum in materia sensibili, et in aliquo intelligatur incorporatum in quantitate imaginabili, et in aliquo intelligatur clarum in esse simplici intellectuali: sicut lumen quod est colorum hypostasis, et in aliquo videtur candens, sicut in albo, et in aliquo submersum, et in aliquo fere extinctum, sicut in nigro. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod intellectus possibilis in actu efficitur per lumen intellectus agentis, et quod in omni eo quod intelligit, hoc intelligit" (*De Int. et Int.*, II, 1, 5; IX, 511).

³³See nn. 64-67.

³⁴*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 55, a. 6, ad quaest. 1; XXXV, 476.

³⁵"Dicimus quod sic, eodem modo quod impropter dicimus intellectum agentem intelligere se: hoc enim est intelligere se ut actum possibilis: suum enim intelligere est suum esse, cum semper sit in actu: et hoc est quod sit actus possibilis, sed ille actus non perficit possibilem nisi secundum quid:

sicut si lumen per se solum esset in oculo sine colore, tunc esset immutatus oculus ab actu colorum, sed non esset distincta immutatio ad aliquam speciem coloris determinatam. Similiter quando non solum lumen agentis est in possibili, tunc possibilis est in actu indistincto secundum aliquam speciem intelligibilem, et intellectus agens intelligit se ut talem actum semper: et iste motus non excludit motum intelligibilium, eo quod intellectus agens . . . sit actus omnium intelligibilium: sicut etiam motus luminis non excludit motum coloris in oculo, eo quod sit actus ejus" (*ibid.*). "Ut subjectum intelligit se intellectus possibilis; et hoc semper; quia intellectus agens semper est actus intelligibilium, et intellectus possibilis, vel utrorumque" (*ibid.*, ad obj. 1; XXXV, 477). The same doctrine is found in *I Sent.*, d. 3, a. 29, ad 3; XXV, 130-131.

³⁶"Oportet quod species universalis semper sit in lumine agentis" (*De An.*, III, 2, 19; V, 366). See n. 3 as a justification for using this text.

³⁷"Cum medium conjunctionis possibilis ad agentem sint speculata, oportet ipsa manere, aut extrema dividentur" (*ibid.*, 3, 11; V, 388). This is given as a proof of the existence of an intellectual memory. See n. 5 as a defense for the use of this text.

in addition to producing intelligibles and since what is received in all intelligibles is solely the light of the agent intellect, we may conclude that the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect directly.

PROOF FROM THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF

Strictly speaking, the human intellect does not understand itself since it is merely a power of the soul and not the first principle of action. Nevertheless, improperly speaking, the agent and possible intellects may be said to understand themselves.³⁴ According to St. Albert, the agent intellect always understands itself as the act of the possible intellect. This constant activation, however, perfects the possible intellect only in an incomplete manner. It is as if light were in the eye by itself, without being colored; it would act on the eye but would not be seen distinctly according to a determined color. The light of the agent intellect in the same way can shine by itself in the possible intellect; but when it does so it actuates it only in an indeterminate manner and not in a distinct way as when this light informs an intelligible species. Thus the agent intellect always understands itself as the act, at least the indistinct act, of the possible intellect.

This constant action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect, however, is not incompatible with the action of intelligibles on the same intellect, since the agent intellect is the act of all intelligibles and informs the possible intellect by the same act by which intelligibles inform it. Therefore the possible intellect always understands itself either as the subject of intelligibles informed by the light of the agent intellect or as the subject of the light of the agent intellect alone.³⁵

We may conclude from this that according to St. Albert the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect constantly and directly.

PROOF FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH THE INTELLECTUAL MEMORY FUNCTIONS

In order that man bring to consciousness what is already in his intellectual memory, it is necessary that the intelligible species possessed be re-illumined by the light of the agent intellect.³⁶ Indeed, the function of the intelligible species is merely to join the possible intellect to the agent intellect;³⁷ without this union there is no

The Human Intellect according to St. Albert
Leonard A. Kennedy, c.s.b.

remembering. Since the possession of intelligible species does not suffice for memory but the action of the agent intellect is further required, it is not just the intelligible species but also the light of the agent intellect which must act directly on the possible intellect.³⁸

PROOF FROM THE WAY IN WHICH MAN KNOWS SEPARATED SUBSTANCES

Aristotle raised the question³⁹ whether or not we can know anything immaterial and said that he would consider it later. He did not carry out his promise; but the problem was taken up by commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Alfarabi, Avempace, Avicenna, and Averroes. St. Albert reviewed the teachings of these men.⁴⁰ His chief source for discovering their doctrines was Averroes' *Commentary on the De Anima*,⁴¹ although other texts were also available. St. Albert's treatment followed rather closely that of

³⁸Angelic knowledge also requires illumination by an agent intellect of intelligible species already possessed. See *Sum. Theol.*, P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 2, part. 1, ad 1; XXXII, 180. Also a. 1, obj. 4; 171.

³⁹*De Anima*, III, 7, 431b18-19.

⁴⁰*De An.*, III, 3, 6-11; V, 378-88.

⁴¹III, 36.

⁴²Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Intellectu*, in G. Théry, *Autour du Décret de 1210: II.—Alexandre d'Aphrodise* (Le Saulchoir: Kain, 1926), p. 79. Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 128-69. St. Albert, *De Anima*, III, 3, 6; V, 378-79.

⁴³Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 235-57. St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 3, 7; V, 381.

⁴⁴Alfarabi, *De Intellectu et Intellecto*, in E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicenniant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 4 (1929), pp. 115-26, 11, 202-7. Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 180-87. St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 3, 8; V, 381.

⁴⁵Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 185-87; III, 36, 331-34. St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 3, 8; V, 381.

⁴⁶Avicenna, *De Anima* (Venice, 1508), V, 5; f. 25va. See also *Metaphysics* (Venice, 1508), IX, 7; f. 107rA. St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 3, 9; V, 383.

⁴⁷Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 5, 678-83; 36, 617-19; 36, 623-25.

⁴⁸Avicenna, *De Anima*, V, 6; f. 26va.

⁴⁹See n. 42.

⁵⁰See n. 44.

⁵¹See n. 48.

⁵²Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 578-639.

⁵³See n. 48.

⁵⁴Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 36, 650-64.

⁵⁵"Nobis videtur quod in hac vita continuatur [scil., intellectus possibilis] cum agente formaliter, et tunc per agentem intelligit separata" (*De An.*, III, 3, 12; V, 390).

⁵⁶"Colligitur enim ex his, quod intellectus agens tribus modis conjungitur nobis, licet in se et secundum essentiam suam sit separatus; a natura enim conjungitur ut potentia et virtus quaedam animae, sed faciendo intellecta speculata conjungitur ut efficiens: et ex his duabus conjunctionibus non est homo perfectus ut operetur opus divinum: tandem conjungitur ut forma" (*ibid.*, III, 3, 11; V, 387).

⁵⁷"Nos autem dissentimus in paucis ab Averroë" (*ibid.*; V, 385).

⁵⁸Averroes, *De Anima*, III, 4, 54-58; 5, 424-26, 5, 556-76; 5, 581-85; 18, 71-76; 19, 62-64.

⁵⁹St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 2, 7; V, 343.

⁶⁰"In causa autem quam inducemos et modo conveniemus in toto cum Averroë" (*ibid.*, III, 3, 11; V, 386).

Averroes, and in the end the Universal Doctor subscribed to the position of the Commentator.

We have no wish to delve into the details of what each of Aristotle's followers said concerning the problem under discussion, or to examine minutely the fidelity with which their statements were reported by Averroes and finally by St. Albert. Such an undertaking would distract us from our primary intention of demonstrating that for St. Albert the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect is a direct one. We shall merely sum up the opinions of St. Albert's forerunners concerning man's knowledge of separated substances and show how St. Albert, in following Averroes, adopted and furthered the doctrine that the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect directly.

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias,⁴² Themistius,⁴³ Alfarabi,⁴⁴ Avempace,⁴⁵ Avicenna,⁴⁶ and Averroes,⁴⁷ man is capable of understanding separated substances. Avicenna, however, taught that this knowledge is possible only in the next life.⁴⁸ According to Alexander,⁴⁹ Alfarabi,⁵⁰ Avicenna,⁵¹ and Averroes,⁵² this power of knowing separated substances is acquired after the possible intellect has been perfected by intelligibles. Avicenna held that in this state the agent intellect is joined in a special way to the possible intellect,⁵³ and Averroes taught that the agent intellect becomes man's form.⁵⁴

The conclusion arrived at by St. Albert is that in this life the possible intellect can be joined to the agent intellect as to its form and can then know separated substances.⁵⁵ It is possible for the agent intellect to be joined to man in three ways. First, it is naturally joined to him as a power of his soul. Secondly, when it illuminates intelligibles, it is joined to him as the efficient cause of his knowledge. Thirdly, it is joined to him as the form of his possible intellect.⁵⁶

St. Albert realizes that his doctrine is very similar to that of Averroes.⁵⁷ It is true that for Averroes the agent intellect and the possible intellect are separated in being from the human soul and are one in number for all men,⁵⁸ and of course St. Albert elsewhere combats Averroes vigorously on this point.⁵⁹ But what St. Albert is concerned with here is merely man's knowledge of separated substances. He agrees with Averroes that such knowledge is possible. He also agrees with him completely as to the manner in which it comes about.⁶⁰ That is, he agrees that the agent intellect becomes the form of

The Human Intellect according to St. Albert
Leonard A. Kennedy, c.s.b.

the possible intellect and that this is brought about by the gradual perfection of the possible intellect by the agent intellect acting as efficient cause of intellection. That is why St. Albert can say that he changes nothing in the doctrine of Averroes except the teaching concerning the unicity of the possible and agent intellects.⁶¹

Having accepted the teaching of Averroes, St. Albert goes a step beyond the Arabian and adds a further clarification as to how the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect. The agent intellect makes what is potentially understood to be actually understood and thus is the efficient cause of intellection. We have seen, however, that in all intelligibles the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect.⁶² This teaching becomes a key doctrine at this point. When the possible intellect receives more and more the light of the agent intellect, it becomes more and more like the agent intellect. When the possible intellect has received all intelligibles, it has the light of the agent intellect adhering to it as its form. But, since the agent intellect is its own light, the agent intellect itself is now the form of the possible intellect. This composite of the possible intellect and the agent intellect is what was called by the Peripatetics the acquired intellect or divine intellect.⁶³

That St. Albert is giving his own opinion in the part of the *De Anima* we are considering is proved by his own words already quoted.⁶⁴ Also, at the close of the treatise, he says:

⁶¹"Nos autem in dictis istis nihil mutamus nisi hoc quod etiam Aristoteles mutasse videtur, quoniam dixit quod in omni natura in qua est patiens, est etiam agens: et ita oportet in anima esse has differentias" (*ibid.*, V, 385-86).

⁶²See nn. 31-32.

⁶³"Et haec omnia fiunt intellectu agente influente eis intellectualitatem, et faciendo haec intellectu esse intellecta secundum actum intellectus agens con jungitur nobis ut efficiens: et quia in omnibus his influit intellectualitatem et denudationem, sunt omnia sibi similia in hoc quod separata sunt et nuda: et ideo in omnibus his accipit continue intellectus possibilis lumen agentis, et efficitur sibi similius de die in diem: et hoc vocatur a Philosophis moveri ad continuitatem et conjunctionem cum agente intellectu: et sic cum acceperit omnia intellecta, habet lumen agentis in

formam sibi adhaerentem: et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo quod lumen suum essentia sua est, et non extra ipsum, hunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma: et hoc compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et divinus" (St. Albert, *De An.*, III, 3, 11; V, 386-87). The word *adeptus* is taken from Alfarabi. See his *De Intellectu et Intellecto*, 11, 202-6.

⁶⁴Nn. 3, 5, 55, 57, 60, 61.

⁶⁵*De An.*, III, 3, 12; V, 390.

⁶⁶"Demonstratio autem dicti vera est, quae nunc est inducta" (*De Int. et Int.*, II, 1, 8; IX, 515).

⁶⁷Nn. 6-7.

⁶⁸See n. 65. See also *De An.*, III, 3, 11; V, 386 and 388. See also *De Int. et Int.*, II, 1, 9-11; IX, 517-20.

⁶⁹Cap. 1 and 6; IX, 437 and 452.

⁷⁰I, 1, 1; IX, 478.

We have said in that question what seemed [true] to us, for it seems to us that in this life [the possible intellect] is joined to the agent intellect as to its form, and then through the agent intellect understands separated substances.⁶³

Moreover, after teaching the same doctrine concerning the acquired intellect in the second book of the *De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, St. Albert says that he has written the truth.⁶³ This book is also endorsed in a quotation given earlier.⁶⁷

It is clear that St. Albert considers it possible for the agent intellect to become the form of the possible intellect in this life.⁶⁸ It is also plain that this information takes place in the natural, and not the supernatural, order. St. Albert has followed the Greek and Arabian philosophers, none of whom mention that they are discussing powers above man's nature. In St. Albert's *De Unitate Intellectus*, where he teaches the doctrine of the acquired intellect, he says that he will discuss only what can be demonstrated syllogistically and that he will speak solely "according to philosophy" and not according to Christian faith.⁶⁹ At the beginning of the *De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, he says:

We shall treat of whatever things seem to demand inquiry here, as much as we shall be able to investigate by demonstration and reason, following the footsteps of our leader.⁷⁰

Since he is speaking "according to philosophy" and basing his doctrine on "demonstration and reason," St. Albert is concerned with the natural properties of the soul, which can be discovered independently of revelation.

From our study of the way in which man knows separated substances, we may once more conclude that St. Albert believed that the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. The intelligibles grasped by the possible intellect are informed by the light of the agent intellect. In receiving the intelligibles gained by abstraction from the material world, the possible intellect continually receives into itself the agent intellect's light. Indeed, it receives the agent intellect itself, because the light of the agent intellect is the agent intellect. Thus abstraction involves direct illumination of the possible intellect by the agent intellect.

The Human Intellect according to St. Albert
Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B.

In demonstrating that the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect directly we have also discovered that intelligibles are merely the light of the agent intellect seen in a certain way.⁷¹ The reason for this is that the agent intellect is pure intelligibility; as gold is true gold because it is all gold, so the agent intellect is the only thing which is truly intelligible because it consists solely of intelligible being.⁷² The agent intellect is like art and has in itself in advance all intelligibles.⁷³ It is complete in itself and has all perfections, giving them to everything which is perfected in intellectual being.⁷⁴ It contains all intelligibles in itself in an undivided simplicity.⁷⁵ These statements are made by St. Albert concerning the human agent intellect and not concerning God's intellect, which becomes clear from an attentive reading of the context of each statement.

⁷¹See n. 32.

⁷²"Et est verum quod est ab entitate et forma rei . . . sicut diximus verum aurum; et sic intellectus separatus est solum quod vere intelligibile est et circa verum, quod nihil habet praeter esse intelligibile" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 55, a. 5, ad quæst. 2, ad obj.; XXXV, 474). That *intellectus separatus* means man's agent intellect is clear from the objection itself and from the answer to the *quaest.*

⁷³"Hic autem intellectus agens comparatus arti, et est comparatio quae essentialiter convenit ei secundum quod præhabet in seipso omnia intellecta" (*De Int. et Int.*, II, 1, 3; IX, 508).

⁷⁴"Ex his constat intellectum agendum esse perfectum, et supra perfectum, perfectiones omnes habentem et largientem omni ei quod secundum esse intellectuale perficitur" (*ibid.*).

⁷⁵". . . et quod indivisac sunt intelligentiae in ipso [intellectu agente], et quod omnes in ipso sunt sua substantia et vita ex [et?] lux sua" (*ibid.*, IX, 507). *Intelligentiae* has here the meaning of "intelligibles." For this meaning see *Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 60; XXXV, 517.

⁷⁶"Diversitas actionis intellectus agentis non est ex intellectu agente, sed ex phantasmate: et hoc est quod Averroës in commento super tertium de Anima dicit . . . Actio enim intellectus agentis determinatur ad phantasma, et sic determinata movet intellectum possibilem et

educit eum in actu: sicut actio luminis determinatur ad colores, et sic determinata visum educit in actu" (*ibid.*, a. 3, ad 14; XXXV, 467-68).

⁷⁷"Quia cum agens sit una et simplex essentia, non potest esse causa distinctarum specierum in speculando: et ideo speculativus est ut instrumentum ejus ad distinguendum intellectum possibilem" (*De An.*, III, 3, 11; V, 387). *Speculativus* here means "intelligible."

⁷⁸See n. 76.

⁷⁹Averroës, *De Anima*, III, 36, 559-66 and 591-98.

⁸⁰*De Nat. et Orig. An.*, I, 7; IX, 394. That the separated intelligence here mentioned is the agent intellect of man and not God's intellect is quite clear from the context, since the chapter in question deals with the agent intellect in man. Moreover, the agent intellect being discussed has been coupled with a possible intellect in the preceding paragraph, and God has no possible intellect (*I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 3, ad 8; XXVI, 21).

⁸¹"Sic autem informatur intellectus possibilis apud se habens intellectum principiorum ex lumine illo, quo omnia quidem principia unum sunt et simpli- citer, secundum quod pendent ex uno lumine intellectus: divisionem tamen habet et compositionem et intellectio- nem secundum quod lumen id determi- natur et diffinatur ad terminos dignita- tum" (*De Unit. Int.*, cap. 6; IX, 464).

The question naturally arises why the human intellect needs sense knowledge if the intelligibles received by the possible intellect are already contained in the light of the agent intellect. St. Albert's answer is that the agent intellect contains intelligible forms only in an indeterminate manner and requires phantasms for its determination. As light is determined by colors before acting on the sense of sight, so the agent intellect's light is determined by phantasms before acting on the possible intellect.⁷⁶ Unless phantasms differentiated or "broke up" the light of the agent intellect, the possible intellect would receive it without its being determined to one intelligible or the other, and the possible intellect would not know things.⁷⁷ This explanation of the necessity of phantasms for intellectual knowledge is attributed by St. Albert to Averroes,⁷⁸ although it is contained only implicitly in the Commentator's teaching.⁷⁹

The Albertine position is that the agent intellect is a "super-intelligible" which is too bright for the possible intellect and gives a knowledge which is too concentrated. In order to be fully intelligible it must be "broken up." It is a light which contains all intelligibles eminently; that is, actually but implicitly, in an undivided simplicity. The function of phantasms is merely to "distinguish" this light. Consequently the content of knowledge can be said to come from the agent intellect itself. St. Albert declares explicitly:

This is what many say and few understand, that all intelligibles flow into the soul from a separated intelligence [*scil.*, the agent intellect] and not from the things of which the intelligibles are the quiddities and forms.⁸⁰

The first principles of knowledge, for example, are a unity, an indistinct simplicity, in the agent intellect's light. It is only when this light is *determined* and *delineated* by the terms of the first principles that it receives division and composition, and can thus be explicitly understood.⁸¹

In teaching that the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect directly and that phantasms are necessary merely to limit the agent intellect's light, St. Albert has carefully avoided accepting the position of Avicenna. Avicenna held that the possible intellect, when consid-

ering phantasms, is illumined by the agent intellect directly, receiving from it intelligible forms.⁸² St. Albert's criticism of Avicenna is that, for the latter, phantasms are in no way necessary for intellectual knowledge. Since the forms of such knowledge are received solely from the agent intellect, the intellect gets no help whatever from the senses.⁸³

St. Albert's doctrine resembles Avicenna's in this, that the agent intellect contains within itself all intelligibles. But it differs from it also, because it teaches that the agent intellect contains these intelligibles in an undivided simplicity and not as actually distinct. As a result, for St. Albert phantasms have a real function to perform and are absolutely necessary for intellectual knowledge.

We may now summarize our demonstration that the doctrine of St. Albert the Great concerning the nature of the human intellect is different from that of St. Thomas Aquinas and substantially the same as that of Averroes. Though St. Albert agrees with St. Thomas that the external senses, internal senses, and possible intellect are passive powers, he disagrees with him concerning the manner in which the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect. For St. Thomas this action is indirect;⁸⁴ for St. Albert it is direct.

St. Albert borrowed this doctrine from Averroes but also further developed it. Averroes held: (a) that the agent intellect directly perfects and illuminates the possible intellect;⁸⁵ (b) that the agent intellect and the intelligible constitute one intelligible object;⁸⁶ (c) that the agent intellect can become man's form after the possible intellect has been perfected by intelligibles;⁸⁷ (d) (implicitly) that the role of intelligible species is merely to differentiate the agent intellect's light.⁸⁸ St. Albert accepted all of these teachings and added: (a) that an intelligible is simply the light of the agent intellect seen in a certain way; (b) that the agent intellect contains in itself

⁸²*De Anima*, V, 5-6; f. 25rb-va.

⁸³"Si intellectus agens est intelligentia habens formas, ut dicunt, aut easdem quas habet, ponit in intellectu possibili, aut alias. Si easdem, tunc species quae sunt in anima, non abstrahuntur a rebus extra, et sic a sensibus in nullo juvatur intellectus possibilis" (*Sum. de Creat.*, P. II, q. 55, a. 3, sed contra 6; XXXV, 465).

⁸⁴"Et si quis recte consideret, intel-

lectus agens, secundum ea quae Philosophus de ipso tradit, non est activum respectu intellectus possibilis directe; sed magis respectu phantasmatum, quae facit intelligibilia actu, per quae intellectus possibilis reducitur in actum" (*Quaest. Disp. de An.*, a. 18, ad 11).

⁸⁵See n. 26.

⁸⁶See n. 28.

⁸⁷See nn. 52, 54.

⁸⁸See n. 79.

all intelligibles in an undivided simplicity; (c) (explicitly) that the role of intelligible species is merely to differentiate the agent intellect's light; (d) that the agent intellect *is* its light (thus explaining *how* the agent intellect can become the form of the possible intellect). It can be seen that even the specifically Albertine notions which are added to the Averroistic ideas are but developments of the latter.

Philosophical Sociology

WALTER J. ONG, S.J., Saint Louis University

The number of contemporary philosophers who have kept their philosophic interests free from what Husserl calls concern with the human life-world is becoming smaller and smaller. As John Wild has recently reported in the *Philosophical Review* (LXVII [Oct., 1958], 460-76), the living thinkers of Continental Western Europe are almost all concerned with man in his concrete, full *Lebenswelt*. They have progressed beyond a critique of the limitations of abstraction and are seriously engaged in making up for these limitations as far as possible. In the English-speaking world, firsthand concern with the human life-world is less marked, both among logical positivists and among their more strenuous adversaries; but interest in the subject at secondhand is growing by leaps and bounds as reports from the Continent pour in.

Western philosophy is thus acquiring a range and freedom of movement somewhat like that which it had in the past before the explosive developments of thought from the seventeenth century to the present blew apart the old field of "natural philosophy" into reciprocally intolerant areas. However, the new range and freedom of movement is unlike the old in being concentrated on man, frequently on the human person as such rather than on a world of mere objects, or even on man as an object.

The world of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy belongs to this line of philosophical development; and, with the appearance of the second and concluding volume of his *Soziologie*, the massive book *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten*,¹ it becomes manifest that his entire life's work merits more attention than it has so far received. Such attention is now encouraged by the appearance also of a collection of his articles and addresses over the last eight years, *Das Geheimnis der Universität*, with a subtitle advertising that these were directed "against the decay of the time-sense and of the power of speech."² This volume contains

¹Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1958 (774 pp.). Volume I, *Die Übermacht der Räume* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer), had appeared in 1956 (335 pp.).

²*Das Geheimnis der Universität: wider den Verfall von Zeitsinn und Sprachkraft. Aufsätze und Reden aus*

den Jahren 1950 bis 1957 herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Georg Müller, mit einem Beitrag von Kurt Ballerstedt: "Leben und Werk Eugen Rosenstock-Huessys" (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1958), 320 pp.

a brief life of Rosenstock-Huessy and a bibliography of his writings, most of which are in German, though some are in English. Having taught law and sociology in his native Germany and theology at Harvard before he became, in 1935, Professor of Social Philosophy at Dartmouth College, where he is now emeritus, Rosenstock-Huessy has lived his life in the penumbra of phenomenological and "existentialist" developments. It would seem inaccurate to view his work as resulting from the "influence" of the standard phenomenological and personalist figures, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Lavelle, Marcel, Denis de Rougemont, or even Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. He breathed the same air as these men, sensed many of the same questions; but one feels that he has made his own distinctive contributions to the climate of ideas.

These contributions are suggested in the title of his last two volumes, *Soziologie*. At one point, not far perhaps from the point at which it is tangent to psychoanalysis, phenomenological analysis opens into a sociology, since it finds the human person, for all his interiority, situated within society and thus sees the organization of society as the complement of the interior consciousness and interior resources of the individual. Here is the field in which Rosenstock-Huessy works, where his devotion to the unity of the social sciences (history included), theology, and language finds its outlet. His view of man and of reality is based on his profound awareness of psychological processes and of their historical grounding, and ultimately on his keen apprehension of the fact that all human concepts are formed within history, that in learning to form concepts every man is from infancy coached by the culture into which he is born. World views and philosophies are the coefficients of cultures and languages, not in the sense that we must despair of finding one which is true but in the sense that all concepts and insights and judgments, even when entirely true, involve some specialization; and the precise specialization which is resorted to in any one case is determined, at least in part, by a culture and a corresponding set of linguistic practices. The fact that these cultures can reach out to embrace one another saves us, of course, from the charge of facile "relativism." The specialized views can be made to interpenetrate—but not in abstraction. One cannot learn to form concepts without assimilating particular cultures. To know what "laboring man" means to an American, a Frenchman has in one way or another to learn to participate in the history of the United States; and to learn what *ouvrier* (applied to persons who are only somewhat the same as the American "laboring man") means to a Frenchman, an American must become in some sort a partaker of French history.

Although he follows phenomenological trends in reflecting on psycho-

logical processes, Rosenstock-Huessy examines these processes not within the horizon of the individual self alone but through their development in social, linguistic, and conceptual history. Louis Lavelle has skillfully and patiently illuminated the effects of speech and writing in the individual life, assessing the psychological import of transactions conducted in one or the other medium. Rosenstock-Huessy is fully aware of the different psychological values of the media; but he is also interested in the historical, sociological causes for the emergence of writing, in the differences between an oral and a manuscript culture, and in the significance of the change from the one to the other in the forward-moving trajectory of history. This forward movement is an essential part of his vision; and it brings him to situate psychological phenomena themselves not merely in the individual self but in the real cosmos—which means, of course, the cosmos as influenced by Christianity, which has actually provided the vision of a cosmos in eschatological time; that is, in forward movement.

In the two volumes of *Soziologie* Rosenstock-Huessy produces a most unorthodox and philosophical treatment of this subject. First considering the significance of the emergence of sociology as a focus of human attention in this particular age of cosmic history, he goes on, more or less in the tradition of Continental sociology generally, to break down sociological phenomena in terms which demand philosophical handling. These are most often dialectical terms, dyads played against one another to generate meaning by contrast: sport and struggle, companionship and authority, art and love, children's speech and mother-tongues (what does "mother-tongue" say that "father-tongue" would not say?), disputation and philosophy, grammar and logic, and so on. Without discarding the results of "objective" sociological studies, this kind of treatment cuts back of such studies to their suppositions and the historical matrix in which they, too, have been formed.

One returns here from a world of "observation" and measurement to an older world of gnomic expressions and chthonic wisdom. Rosenstock-Huessy's "conclusions" tend to be of the nature of apothegms—not apothegms uttered in a vacuum but brought to bear on particular developments in culture and thought. A typical judgment from *Die Vollzahl der Zeiten*, at a moment when he is touching on the thought of Friedrich Hölderlin and Père Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, s.j., is the following: "From this we draw the important conclusion: experiences of the first order, of the first rank, are not realized through the eye."³ But if this is a kind of proverbial wisdom, it is a highly informed and sophisticated one—much more so than other such wisdoms in the past because it is generated out of,

³"Daraus ziehen wir den wichtigen Auge gemacht" (*Die Vollzahl der Zeiten*, Schluss: Erfahrungen ersten Grades, p. 33). ersten Ranges, werden nicht durch das

and brought to bear on, a mass of particular detail inaccessible to earlier ages. The detail gives gnomic pronouncement tremendous range. On the basis of an utterance such as the foregoing, it becomes possible to conduct a careful scrutiny of the entire modern enterprise of "framing" knowledge in visualist fashion, through charts and tables at one level, and at another through fixing attention on "objects" and even treating human beings as though they were objects (a necessary tactic, but one entailing definite disabilities). The titles of the two volumes of *Soziologie* have themselves a gnomic ring: *The Conquering Power of Space* and *The Full Count of the Ages* (this seems a more adequate rendering of the German than the more familiar English *The Fullness of Time*). As titles, however, they are perhaps a little contrived in that they suggest a compactness of organization which the leaping progression of thought in the volumes sometimes belies.

Rosenstock-Huessy's thought involves ultimately a kind of theology. Protestantism, he insists in a letter after the 1954 Evanston ecumenical meeting, did not make all the laity into priests, as some have thought, but simply into theologians. Even when one does not agree with his theological nuances or interpretations—and it is not too often that one does not—his thought is invariably seminal and its very movement stimulating. These volumes, like the other works of Rosenstock-Huessy, are difficult to classify. And this is as it should be, for a dissatisfaction with all classification because of the disability it unavoidably entails is a mark not only of Rosenstock-Huessy's thought but of contemporary philosophy generally. If it is true, as those who are intelligently ill at ease in the presence of classification well know, that we can never avoid it, however industriously we may conceal it, it is also true that man can never again be so smug about classifying things as he rather consistently has been in the past. Philosophy today is spilling out of its old containers, not shrinking but growing, developing a social dimension and cast which is personalist and even poetic and literary. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how the practicing philosopher can fail to pay attention to Rosenstock-Huessy's work.

GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHEMANN, *Southern Illinois University*

The Logical Problem of Induction. By Georg Henrik von Wright. 2nd rev. ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xii + 249.

As a rule, induction is treated as a concept in close conjunction with at least one, and very likely all, of the following: universal, probability, deduction, causality, prediction. "The problem of Hume"—by which Professor von Wright means just *one* of the problems of that philosopher, but at any rate the one arising out of Hume's formulation of his experimental method of reasoning—this problem is taken in the book under review to be that of justifying induction. We begin, in other words, with the supposition that inductive knowledge is possible; and then, by examining the linguistic devices in which such knowledge is set out, we show whether, and in what sense, our language forms can give it good foundation. Yet von Wright's own conclusion is quite negative, much as was Hume's:

It is impossible [that is, it is self-contradicting] to guarantee, with certainty or with probability that an unknown instance of the property A will also exhibit the property B, if A and B are different properties (p. 178).

This is the net result. To reach it, the author examines a number of constructive proposals, familiar in the history of philosophy, which by and large make the error, he thinks, of joining questions of fact somehow to questions of language. In the past, philosophers have ordinarily asked for justifications of induction in ways they have rarely asked for when they talk about deduction—principles of uniformity and necessity in nature, and the like. These justifications are themselves either inductive, or they are not. If inductive, our reasoning is circular; if not inductive, the reasoning seems to be *ad hoc*, gratuitous. Only if we are made to realize that no justification can be allowed to retain either of these faults (faults which arise mainly from the notion that the world reflects speech forms or that likenesses in speech are the same as likenesses in things) can we come to grips with what inductive necessity should look like. Von Wright examines, among other views, conventionalism, pragmatism, the probability-interpretation of induction, the doctrines of Mill, Kant, Fries; and if he is critical of all their results he is at least hopeful that he has cleared the underbrush again

and that philosophy can proceed anew. What philosophy is to do, after eight or ten of the most comprehensive and persuasive theories have been demolished, the author does not say. In other books, he has gone further in providing an answer.

The Logical Problem of Induction is an early work, a doctoral thesis, but an extremely good one. This revision brings the notes and bibliography up to date, and affords opportunity for a recasting of many sections, indeed whole chapters. There is no space in the present little review to discuss the objections to the doctrine that come to mind; and I shall have to be content to remark that despite differences of opinion I feel that in the independence, conciseness, and baldness of his book one finds a counterpart to other works associated with Helsinki—I mean, for instance, that most lucid, if least popular, *Symphony No. 4* of Jan Sibelius.

CORNELIUS RYAN FAY, *Notre Dame College of Staten Island*

The Elements of Logic. By Vincent Edward Smith. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. ix + 298.

Well-known Scholastics teaching in the best known institutions write textbooks that—more often than not, somehow—are poor. Perhaps it is because they are so used to writing for their fellow professionals. Mr. Vincent Smith is an exception. Though he has written many professional books and articles, his text here is brilliantly simple and eminently teachable.

The students' attention is engaged in a novel way, through case histories. Logical principles are brought out against the background of the original words of important arguments in the history of Western thought. Going all the way back to the pre-Socratics, two hundred and eighty-four case histories are given the student. When Hume's opening argument against the possibility of miracles is shown to contain an illicit process in the major term, the student who might be indifferent to pure logical theory is made to feel its relevance. In the atmosphere of an open intellectual market the student sees case after case of the power of traditional logic and the Scholasticism that grew up around it to criticize competing systems and to withstand criticism from them.

The book makes no pretense at being an exhaustive treatise. There are happy simplifications. Mr. Smith, for instance, reduces the number of rules for the syllogism to five, and he does not go into the moods at all. The thirty-five chapters are all brief, but they are as good as they are short. The discussion of concepts is simultaneously a defense of moderate realism,

a proof that concepts and ideas are natural signs, and a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion that words could have only extension. Good quotations from Rousseau and Locke are enlisted against Berkeley's own statement of his nominalism.

The discussion of induction, though it is very simple, seems to me to be a positive contribution to Scholasticism in ordering and clarifying our general, if slightly ill-stated, position. So far as I know, Mr. Smith is the first person to use the term "abstractive" induction. He distinguishes between abstractive and enumerative induction, dividing the latter into complete and incomplete; for example, "The twelve Apostles were Jews," and "Water freezes at 32 degrees." In penetrating exposition the student is made to see that enumerative induction could not be the only type of induction, that, in fact, it itself requires abstractive induction—for example, the mind must first establish what Jews are, "Jews are people who . . ." In this abstractive induction "the strength of the conclusion does not depend intrinsically on the number of cases examined." True, the idea that the whole is greater than its part *does* depend on experience but only to the extent of getting us to understand the meaning of the subject and the predicate. When Hume and Kant say that we could not know that everything must have a cause unless we experienced everything, they are asserting implicitly (and gratuitously) that enumerative induction is the only type of induction.

In discussing the difference between dialectic and demonstration, Mr. Smith shows that dialectic is the ordinary tool for determining the relevance of material used in induction. Hence Mill's canons taken alone would be valueless. Our theories in science, for example, "are not themselves the product of induction but of preinductive dialectic."

A brief survey of symbolic logic in two chapters gives the student enough of the symbols to demonstrate in principle the strengths and the weaknesses of the propositional calculus. Complicated hypothetical arguments can be handled more easily. The Aristotelean syllogism cannot prove that "if Dad is taller than Mom, and if Mom is taller than the baby, then Dad is taller than the baby." We come out with four terms. Mr. Smith also shows the weaknesses in symbolic logic, the weakness, for instance, in ignoring causal connections in propositions. In symbolic logic if the consequent (q) is true, then the implicative truth function "if p then q " is true whether or not the antecedent (p) is true. To take an example, bears are protected from the cold if they have fur, an example of material implication. According to symbolic logic, then, if bears are protected from the cold, both of the following propositions are true simultaneously: (a) If bears have fur they are protected from the cold; (b) If bears do not have

fur they are protected from the cold. This is the paradox of material implication.

Many more than the usual proportion of my students became persuaded of the earthy usefulness of knowing the logic of the four basic types of discourse: demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, and literary. In past years I found that they had greater difficulty and less interest. Congratulations to Mr. Smith and the publisher for giving us this book.

THOMAS LANGAN, *Saint Louis University*

Aesthetics. By Edward Bullough. Ed. with an introd. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 158.

These three lucid essays of about World War I vintage were written by the first lecturer on aesthetics at Cambridge. The late Edward Bullough (d. 1934) was by vocation a linguist, although art and aesthetics fascinated him as much as language and literature. Clarity and good sense but little profundity characterize these lectures; and, although they move in an atmosphere of psychologism characteristic of the time, they avoid its worst excesses, thanks to Bullough's conviction that the reality of the aesthetic experience is centered about its transcendence. On the other hand, they are neither critical nor systematic enough to earn consideration as pioneer efforts in a genuine phenomenology of aesthetic experience.

The second essay, "‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," being the most original contribution, provides the best gauge of Bullough as a philosopher of aesthetics. In an aesthetic experience the object must be capable of making an appeal, not to mere pleasure or any other selfish or practical need or end but essentially to man’s contemplative powers; this does not keep it from engaging the entire person, and feelings perhaps even more than intellect. "It is distance which makes the aesthetic object ‘an end in itself.’" Distance explains, too, how an art object, while remaining fully concrete in being and appeal, can take on the allure of a universally valid truth; distance is the secret of its paradoxical capacity to be for no one and for everyone. It is also what makes the art object transcend distinctions of "objectivity and subjectivity"; for the "distance" is the selfless detachment of the artist, which gives an essentially personal and subjective art production that objective character capable of making a direct appeal to the selflessness of many foreign subjectivities. Throughout this brief exploration of a notion that certainly touches the essence of the aesthetic experience very centrally, Bullough never strays from the path of an unshakeable common sense; nor,

Book Reviews

on the other hand, does he plunge very deeply into the problems of the constitution of the aesthetic object that alone could give this analysis some extensive explicit philosophical significance.

The longer first essay, "The Modern Conception of Aesthetics," contains efficient and economical criticisms of the major conceptions prevalent in 1907 of what aesthetics is supposed to be. Bullough points to the emptiness of metaphysical definitions of beauty and to the unrealistic denial of common experience perpetrated by an explanation that would reduce aesthetic experience to mere feeling. In explaining what the study of aesthetics is supposed to accomplish, Bullough is careful to distinguish it from art criticism or from the effort to develop rules for artists. Aesthetics, rather, has the task of describing the experience of beauty. Because of the great variety of manifestations of beauty between, and even within, the different art forms, the approach to describing beauty cannot be an abstract one. Bullough even goes so far as to assert that, viewed objectively, beauty cannot be contained in a single abstract structure because the appeal of the beauty of each lovely thing lies precisely in its distinctiveness. Yet aesthetics must find in the rich multiplicity of aesthetic experiences that which is common to them all. This can be done without betraying a single facet of this rich reality, by viewing it as *experience*, making it possible to subsume

all of the modifications of the beautiful under the general conception of the aesthetic—not because all of these effects are alike, but because they contain, though in various degrees and combinations, the main features of the essence of aesthetic effect in general.

In this way, the time-worn arguments that arose from admitting both clarity and obscurity, smallness and vastness, elegance and suddenness, and so on, as objective characteristics of the beautiful can be avoided, for all are in fact facets of aesthetics *experience*.

The third essay, "Mind and Medium in Art," is less aptly chosen to stand by itself, since it is a mixtum-gatherum of remarks in reply to a symposium. It does contain some valuable suggestions concerning the artist's ability to "translate" a common experience into the lines or the words or other symbols that are precisely capable of communicating aesthetically—concretely and symbolically—this reality to others.

In editing these essays Elizabeth Wilkinson has made us regret that Edward Bullough has left behind no major treatise in aesthetic philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol † in the left hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ABÉLARD, PETER. *The Story of My Misfortunes*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. \$3.50.

ABERNETHY, GEORGE L. *The Idea of Equality*. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1959. Pp. 351. \$6.00.

ADLER, ALFRED. *Understanding Human Nature*. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Pubns., Inc.; September, 1959. 50¢

AIKEN, ALFRED. *Lectures on Reality*. New York: Hillier Press, 1959. Pp. 251. \$5.50.

ALDRIDGE, ALFRED OWEN. *Man of Reason; The Life of Thomas Paine*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1959. Pp. 348. \$6.00.

ALLEN, G. F. *Buddha's Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co.; June, 1959. \$4.75.

ALVES, JOSEPH T. *Confidentiality in Social Work*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1959. Pp. xvi + 268. Paper, \$3.00.

This is a dissertation presented to the Catholic University of America. The author examines the principle of confidentiality in social work from three points of view: (1) principles of the natural law, (2) prescriptions of civil law, and (3) social work theory (including codes of professional ethics) and practice (including questionnaire studies of social caseworkers).

A Modern Introduction to Ethics. Ed. Milton K. Munitz. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. \$7.50.

ARENDT, HANNAH. *The Human Condition*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Pp. 394. Paper, \$1.45.

[ARISTOTLE.] *Philosophy of Aristotle*. Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

—. *Politics and the Athenian Constitution*. Ed. and trans. by John Warrington. New York: Dutton & Co.; June, 1959. \$1.85.

ASOKA, KING OF MAGADHA. *The Edicts of Asoka*. Ed. and trans. by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 95. \$1.75.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Nine Sermons of Saint Augustine on the Psalms*. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1959. Pp. xi + 177. \$3.50.

These sermons illustrate St. Augustine's way of preaching on the Psalms; none of them touch, except in passing, on philosophical topics. The introduction is good, and could be helpful outside the particular application to this volume. The translation is very free and colloquial; the translator argues that St. Augustine's Latin was equally colloquial, but the comparison does not seem altogether valid.

[AVICENNA.] *Avicenna's 'De Anima.'* Ed. F. Rahman. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 311. \$10.10.

BAHM, ARCHIE JOHN. *Philosophy of the Buddha*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 175. \$3.00.

BAILLIE, JOHN. *Our Knowledge of God*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1959. Pp. 263. \$4.00.

BARKER, SIR ERNEST. *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1959. Pp. 581. \$7.50.

BARZUN, JACQUES MARTIN. *The House of Intellect*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 284. \$5.00.

BASTIEN, HERMAS. *Philosophies et philosophes américains*. Montréal: Les Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes; Mar., 1959. Pp. 260. \$8.00.

BATTESTIN, MARTIN C. *The Moral Basis of Fielding's Art*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 207. \$4.50.

BECK, STANLEY D. *The Simplicity of Science*. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 212. \$3.75.

BECKER, CARL LOTUS. *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 168. Paper, 95¢.

BELL, P. R. (ed.) *Darwin's Biological Work*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 352. \$7.00.

BELLAK, LEOPOLD, and OTHERS. *Conceptual and Methodological Problems in Psychoanalysis*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1959. Pp. 163. Paper, \$2.75.

BERGLER, EDMUND. *Principles of Self-Damage*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xii + 469. \$6.00.

In a number of earlier works, this well-known author has propounded the theory of a "psychic masochism," a mechanism of "finding pleasure in displeasure." This volume recapitulates the theory and presents much new clinical evidence. The conclusion that some people find pleasure in self-inflicted torture seems warranted. But by means of extrinsic analogies the theory is extended to all human beings. Some psychiatrists seem to maintain that there are no sane people, but only more and less insane ones; the present author makes sanity, or "normality," seem an improbable accident, a compromise not only unexpected but inexplicable, a departure from the nature with which the child is born. Yet many discussions and analyzes presented in the book are entirely in harmony with common sense evaluations.

BERGSON, HENRI. *Matter and Memory*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. 95¢

[BERKELEY.] *Philosophy of Berkeley*. Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

BERKELEY, EDMUND C. *Symbolic Logic and Intelligent Machines*. New York: Reinhold Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 208. \$6.50.
† BEVAN, EDWYN. *Stoics and Sceptics*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959. Pp. 152. \$4.50.

This work, first published in 1913, is one of the best brief accounts, and its British and American publishers are to be congratulated on making it available to a new generation of students. For a reprint it seems rather expensive.

BINDRA, DALBIR. *Motivation*. New York: Ronald Press, 1959. Pp. 368. \$5.50

BIOT, RENÉ. *What Is Life?* Trans. from the French by Eric Earnshaw Smith. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 92. \$2.95.

BLACK, MAX. *The Nature of Mathematics*. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959. Pp. 233. Paper, \$1.50.

BOAS, GEORGE. *The Inquiring Mind*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 439. \$4.50.

BONNER, HUBERT. *Group Dynamics*. New York: Ronald Press, 1959. Pp. 539. \$6.50.

BORDEAUX, HENRY. *Edith Stein*. Trans. Don and Idella Callagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co; September, 1959. \$3.95.

BOYER, CARL B. *History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development*. New York: Dover Pubns.; June, 1959. \$2.00.

BRADY, IGNATIUS, O.F.M. *A History of Ancient Philosophy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. xi + 261. \$5.00.

This is an introductory textbook in the history of ancient philosophy, intended to be the first volume of a three-volume series sponsored by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University. It contains a somewhat unusual division of matter. It begins with ancient Oriental philosophy, takes up Greek and Roman philosophy to the end of the Neoplatonic period, and concludes with a treatment of Oriental Scholasticism to Averroes. The text is provided with footnote references, and there is in addition a bibliography of source materials and readings. There are three indices: of philosophers treated, of historians, and of philosophical doctrines.

The text is well written and printed with an eye to the student's needs (in the use of bold face headings, larger and smaller type, and so on); the pages are printed in double columns. It might be somewhat brief for some purposes, but it will probably be found excellently suited for many purposes.

BRAIN, SIR WALTER RUSSELL. *Science, Philosophy and Religion*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 33. Pamphlet, 90¢

† ——. *The Nature of Experience*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 75. \$2.00.

BRANDT, RICHARD BOOKER. *Ethical Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. Pp. 514. \$6.75.

BRECHT, ARNOLD. *Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 603. \$12.00.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *The Way Things Are*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. x + 333. \$5.75.

Already known for his contribution to the philosophy of science, the author here extends his consideration to cover other fields as well. The book begins with several chapters on method. In principle agreeing with the method of philosophical analysis, he describes philosophy as a predominantly verbal activity, as talking about the way we talk about things. He also generalizes his notion of "operation." In his consideration of the physical sciences, he insists on the necessary connection between the instrument of knowledge and what

is known; he also discusses some particular problems, such as velocity, state of a system, particles, empty space. Some of these special analyses are very sharp. In dealing with psychology, the author insists on the radical difference between the world of introspection and the world of external experience. Yet his straightforward acceptance of conscious experience is combined with the view that consciousness is a function of the brain, or perhaps of the nervous system as a whole, in exactly the same way that any other operation is a function of matter and structure. "May consciousness be merely certain aspects of this complex self-relationship, i.e., the relation of any system to itself, *seen from the inside?*" (p. 208). In dealing with the social sciences, the author insists on the primacy of the individual over society, yet does not flinch before the notion of control through education and even cerebral stimulation. He has some good common-sense things to say about law, military service, the advantages of minimum codes.

Throughout, the author insists that science (or any other kind of thinking) is the activity of some individual, that proof must be seen by someone, and that it is not present to a public mind or existing in a vacuum. The thesis of the personal or "private" factors in all knowledge is carried by the author to the extent of saying that we can never get away from ourselves and that thus we never know things as they are but only as they manage to affect ourselves and in particular our nervous systems (a fine example of defining intellection as if it were sensation). This limitation, combined with an exaggerated, one-sided view of meaning (the thesis that operational definitions constitute the only meanings), leads the author to a monism of knowledge after the manner of Hume.

BRINTON, CRANE. *A History of Western Morals*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 512. \$7.50.
BROAD, CHARLIE DUNBAR. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959. Pp. 313. Paper. \$1.75.
BROWN, NORMAN O. *Life against Death*. Middletown, Conn.; Wesleyan Univ. Press. Pp. 366. \$6.50.
BUNGE, MARIO. *Causality*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 380. \$7.50.

This is a study of the causal principle and its place in modern science. The scope of the investigation is broad and covers many areas. In general, by "cause" the author understands "efficient cause." The burden of the book is twofold. On the one hand, it takes a frankly realistic position on the ontological status of causation; on the other, it attacks the doctrine that causality is the sole species of determinism.

The book has four parts. The first part is concerned with the meanings of the terms "causation," "causality," "determination," and "determinism." In this part, there are also discussions of chance and principles of lawfulness and determinacy; it concludes with a study of the formulations of the causal principle. The second part treats of "what causal determinism does not assert." Here the author examines the empiricist criticism of causality as well as the "romantic" view (interconnectedness of all); he also considers fatalism and mechanism. In the third part, he treats of the positive assertion of causality, stating that it is linear, involves artificial isolation, requires either a first cause or an infinite regress, is unidirectional, requires the summation of causes, is external, denies spontaneity, requires the distinction between substance and attribute, and denies all real novelty. In the fourth part, he presents his own

views, discussing cause, reason, the principle of sufficient reason, scientific law, explanation in science, prediction, and certainty. He concludes that the causal principle has a place but must be supplemented with other types of determination.

There are many excellent things in this study. The chief difficulty is that the opinions of other thinkers, often cited and criticized, are often enough understood in terms of the author's own definitions. For example, Aristotle is made to uphold the theory that all determination comes from efficient causes; the "scholastics" are made to say that all material things are totally passive; the "potency" involved in change is said to be "pre-existent" and to imply that nothing new ever happens since it pre-existed in potency.

. *Metascientific Queries*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 313. \$6.75.

The author has chosen his title in order to avoid the restrictions often implied in such titles as "philosophy of science" or "scientific philosophy." He wishes to stress the many-sidedness of the relation between philosophy and science.

His first question is about the nature of science, in which he considers both formal and factual science. He next asks about the method of science, and distinguishes between discovery, testing, theory, hypothesis, and technique. Then he discusses the meaning of "scientific law." The next chapter deals with the levels of science and the levels of being, in which he accepts the hypothesis of levels of reality. The next two chapters examine several cases of reductionism: the notion that computing machines think and the attempt to reduce physics to mechanics. The final three chapters deal with special problems in theoretical physics. First, the theory of complementarity is discussed, and its scientific and philosophical status is radically questioned; secondly, the author refers to this "crisis in quantum mechanics" and concludes that new theories are called for; thirdly, the space-time approach to quantum electrodynamics is questioned.

On the whole, the author makes a successful attempt to avoid the self-defeating restrictions of positivism as well as the attitudes of uncritical acceptance and a-priori legislation in regard to scientific theories. It is unfortunate that he mistakes (or has too narrow a conception of the scope of) the work of some other philosophers of science and that there are lapses in the handling of the English language.

CAMPENHAUSEN, HANS VON. *The Fathers of the Greek Church*. Trans. Stanley Godman. New York: Pantheon Books, 1959. Pp. 170. \$3.95.

This series of studies ranges from Justin to Cyril of Alexandria. Though the terms "philosophy" and "theology" are used often enough, there is little of significant interest for a philosopher or theologian in this volume; and all too often selection, emphasis, and interpretation are questionable.

CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Introduction to Semantics and Formalization of Logic. "Studies in Semantics,"* Vols. I and II. 2 vols. in 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 225, 159. \$7.00.

. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. xiv + 241. Paper, \$1.85.

The German original of this work was first published in 1954. The present translation was made by William H. Meyer and John Wilkinson but has been checked by the author himself, who has made both many minor corrections and some major changes. Among the latter listed by the author are the explanations of "language,"

"syntactical system," and "semantical system," an additional section on the formalization of syntax and semantics, another explication of linear order, a new distinction between a basic and an axiomatic language, and several changes in the axiom system. The bibliography has been brought up to date.

This book has been recognized as a classic, and it is very fortunate that such a careful translation has been made. All workers in symbolic logic will need a copy. The printing and production of the volume are excellent.

CARROLL, LEWIS. *Mathematical Recreations of Lewis Carroll*. Vol. I. *Symbolic Logic and The Game of Logic*. Vol. II. *Pillow Problems and A Tangled Tale*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Vol. I, pp. xxxi + 199 + 96. Paper, \$1.50. Vol. II, pp. xx + 109 + 152. Paper, \$1.50.

The first of these four works was intended to be the first part of a work on symbolic logic. It contains a method of notation and some simple rules. Its chief value lies in the interesting examples and problems proposed for solution—the author is able to be humorous without being banal. Teachers of logic courses could well assign some of the problems for class exercises. The second work, *The Game of Logic*, presents an exercise through the use of a diagram and colored counters. As a supplement or variation on some of the traditional diagrams these might also be of help to a teacher; and, again, the exercises might be useful. The material contained in the second volume is largely mathematical, being like puzzles to be solved.

CARY, M., and HAARHOFF, T. J. *Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World*. New York: Barnes & Noble, September, 1959. \$3.50.

‡ CHABOD, FEDERICO. *Machiavelli and the Renaissance*. Trans. from the Italian by David Moore. Introd. by A. P. D'ENTRÈVES. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 276. \$5.50.

‡ CHADWICK, HENRY. *The Sentences of Sextus*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 204. \$5.50.

CHARLESWORTH, MAXWELL JOHN. *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis*. "Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series," 9. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1959. Pp. xiii + 234. \$4.50; paper, \$4.75.

This is a historical and critical examination of the school of philosophical thought that is often called "analysis." After a general introduction, successive chapters deal with G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, and the schools of Cambridge and Oxford. The last chapter is a conclusion and evaluation.

This is the most detailed and complete study yet done by a Thomist of a movement and a field of work whose importance cannot be denied. It has therefore an obvious importance; perhaps—less obviously—the analysts themselves could profit from this examination and critique.

CHARLTON, DONALD. *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire, 1852-1870*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 251. \$5.60.

CHENU, M. D., O.P. *Is Theology a Science?* Trans. A. H. N. Green-Armytage. "Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism," Vol. II, Section 1. New York: Hawthorn Books; August, 1959. \$2.95.

CHRISTIAN, ROBERT R. *Introduction to Logic and Sets*. Boston: Ginn & Co. Pp. 75. Paper, 90¢

CHRISTIAN, WILLIAM A. *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 431. \$6.00.

CHURCHMAN, C. WEST, and RATOOSH, PHILBURN (eds.). *Measurement*. New York: Wiley & Sons; July, 1959. \$7.95.

[‡] CLARK, MOTHER MARY T., R.S.C.J. *Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom*. New York: Desclée Co., 1959. Pp. 273. \$4.50.

This study of St. Augustine is broadly conceived. In the first part of the book, the Greek philosophers are studied and found not to provide the materials of St. Augustine's thought. In the second part, St. Augustine's own thought is examined, both chronologically in his writings and doctrinally, to see its content and coherence with his other doctrines. In the third part, St. Augustine's doctrine is compared with that of St. Anselm; St. Thomas's teaching is presented briefly; and some contemporary views on freedom are discussed and analyzed. There are a bibliography and an index.

The subject is an important one in itself; the author is also concerned to show that many scholars have somewhat misjudged St. Augustine.

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. *Studies in Philosophy and Science*. [Reprint.] New York: F. Ungar Pub. Co. Pp. 278. \$4.50.

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL, and DRABKIN, ISRAEL EDWARD, *A Source Book in Greek Science* [New ed.]. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 602. \$7.50.

COLLINS, JAMES. *God in Modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959. Pp. xii + 476. \$6.50.

In spite of the impression that a small number of philosophers are trying to give, questions about our knowledge of the existence of God and the relation of the world to Him remain central and significant for philosophy. The present study is a historical exposition of the doctrines of God in modern philosophy, joined to a critical analysis of these doctrines. The value of such a study today is expressed by the author in his claim that "it is not that the alert philosopher today will make more progress in the study of God by consulting what his predecessors have thought on the matter, but rather that he cannot make any headway without such consultation" (p. ix).

The historical introduction to the modern problems is to be found on the one hand in Cusanus, Calvin, and Bruno, and on the other in skepticism. The next two chapters present the bipolar themes of God as a function in rationalism and the minimizing of God in empiricism. The fifth chapter considers the Enlightenment as a transitional period. Kant's position on God is treated at great length. The next two chapters again present bipolar themes: the Hegelian absolute on the one hand and atheism as naturalism on the other. Two contemporary themes are treated in the final expository chapters: that of God who is finite and in process, and God as attained by nonrational ways. The final chapter sums up the results of the critical analyses given throughout and relates them to a realistic metaphysics. There are extensive notes and a detailed bibliography.

This profound and original study is a contribution both to the understanding of modern philosophy and to the further development of a realistic metaphysics and natural theology.

[‡] COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *A History of Philosophy*. Vol. IV, *Descartes to Leibniz*. Westminster: Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 381. \$4.50.

—. *A History of Philosophy*. Vol. V, *Hobbes to Hume*. Westminster: Newman Press, 1959. Pp. 449. \$4.75.

CROMBIE, ALASTAIR CAMERON. *Medieval and Early Modern Science*. Vols. I & II: *Science in the Middle Ages*. Pp. 318, 397. Garden City: Doubleday & Co. Paper, 95¢ each.

[‡] CRUICKSHANK, JOHN. *Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 248. \$5.75.

DACIER, A. *The Preface to Aristotle's Art of Poetry*. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1959. Paper, 60¢.

D'ARCY, M. C., s.j. *Meaning and Matter of History*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy; August, 1959. \$4.50.

[DARWIN.] *Darwin's Biological Works*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; September, 1959. \$7.50.

DAVITT, THOMAS E., s.j. *The Elements of Law*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959. Pp. 391. \$9.00.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *The Movement of World Revolution*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 179. \$3.00.

This is philosophical history by one of its most prominent advocates. In a relatively long introductory chapter, the author argues that European history is still the only history of civilization about which we know very much and that the development of world history, so much desired by many, can best be brought about from this vantage point. Next he examines the meaning of revolution in the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. The next section considers the expansion of European culture into other cultural areas and even into primitive nations. The final section deals with Asia, its development, and its relation to the West and to Christianity.

[DESCARTES.] *Descartes' Earlier Philosophical Writings*. Trans. Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959.

—. *Philosophy of Descartes*. Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

DEUTSCH, FELIX (ed.). *On the Mysterious Leap from the Mind to the Body*. New York: International Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 282. \$5.00.

DEWEY, ERNEST W. *A Three Dimensional Graph of Value Relations*. "Arts and Sciences Studies, Humanities Series" No. 5. Stillwater: Oklahoma State Univ., 1959. Pp. 11. Paper.

This is an attempt to portray graphically the relations between values as proposed by Nicolai Hartmann. He takes the view that virtue is the synthesis of two oppositional values over against two disvalues. In addition, he considers that higher values are conditioned by the lower, so that the lower values are stronger than the higher, yet are inferior in value rank. The author then tries to combine these relationships into a single graph, in terms of which he believes that we can more easily understand the multiple relationships which any goodness has.

DICARLO, LOUIS M. *Our Educational Dilemma*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 51. \$2.00. Paper, \$1.00.

DONDERO, BROTHER E. AUSTIN. *Subliminal Perception and Set*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1959. Pp. 40. Paper, 50¢.

DUNLOP, D. M. (ed.). *The Fusūl al-Madāni of Al-Fārābī*. Trans. with introd. by D. M. Dunlop. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 210. \$13.50.

Duns Scotus Philosophical Association Convention Report, 1959. Vol. XXIII. Cleveland: Our Lady of Angels Seminary, 1959. Pp. x + 189. Paper.

This volume contains the papers read at the annual convention, together with a few from other occasions. Bennet Spivey, o.f.m., in "The Origin of the Philosophy in the Declaration of Independence," traces the ideas to Locke and Bellarmine. Irvin Tye, o.f.m., in "The Two Roads of Technology," shows that man can use technology to bring about a better world or lose himself. Arthur Feltman, o.f.m., in "Is Capital Punishment Justifiable?" argues that it is not an effective deterrent today. Vernon Olmer, o.f.m., in "Scheler's Notion of Love," gives an analysis of that philosophical position. Leander Zimmerman, o.f.m., in "An Evaluation of the Scholastic Theory of

Sense Cognition in the Light of the Ames Experiments," finds that the evidence does not destroy the traditional doctrine. Isaac Braun, O.F.M., in "Right-to-Work Laws—Just or Unjust?" considers the various arguments and concludes that they are unjust.

In the second part, the first entry is a debate on the Supreme Court decision concerning integration, by Tobias Baxter, O.F.M., and Russell Rexing, O.F.M. Leon Reuter, O.F.M., in "Homeostasis and the Philosophy of Organism," concludes that "negative feedback" is not a sufficient explanation of life. LeRoy Runde, O.F.M., has an expository paper, "The Role of Concentration in Reading."

ECKARDT, URSULA M. von. *The Pursuit of Happiness in the Democratic Creed*. Introd. by Carl Friedrich. New York: Praeger, 1959. Pp. 430. \$5.50.

EDEL, MAY, and EDEL, ABRAHAM. *Anthropology and Ethics*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 264. \$4.50.

ELIADE, MIRCEA. *Cosmos and History*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1959. \$1.35.

—. *The Sacred and the Profane*. Trans. from the French by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.

ELIADE, MIRCEA, and KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M. (eds.) *The History of Religions*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 192. \$5.00.

[EMERSON, RALPH WALDO.] *The Heart of Emerson's Journals*. Ed. Bliss Perry. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. ix + 357. Paper, \$1.85.

This one-volume selection from the ten volumes of Emerson's *Journals* was first published in 1926. In compiling this work, Mr. Perry closely followed the grouping of the years of Emerson's life as it is preserved in the complete edition of the *Journals*. Each group is prefixed by a brief editorial note explaining the events or circumstances to which Emerson makes allusion. There is a brief preface and an index. The quality of the binding and printing is excellent.

EMMET, E. R. *Thinking Clearly*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Oct., 1959. \$2.95.

Ethics for Teachers. [3d ed.] Washington, D.C.: Natl. Educ. Assn. of the U.S., Dept. of Classroom Teachers and Research Division, 1201 Sixteenth St., N.W. Pp. 24. Paper, 25¢

Etienne Gilson, *Tribute Presented by His North American Students*. Ed. Charles J. O'Neil. "Response" by Etienne Gilson. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. x + 347. \$7.00.

This memorial volume in honor of M. Etienne Gilson on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday contains philosophical papers by twenty of his former students now working in the United States and Canada. Just as the authors are stationed in various parts of the continent, the subjects of the papers are varied. The topics treated include problems in the history of philosophy ancient, medieval, and modern; and more purely speculative problems in ethics, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and natural theology. Yet the inspiration of M. Gilson can be seen in both types of studies, for the historical and textual papers have a doctrinal importance as well and the speculative ones make use of historical research.

All libraries and all scholars who are interested in possessing works of scholarship should possess this volume.

FAIRCHILD, JOHNSON EDDY. *Basic Beliefs*. New York: Sheridan House, 1959. Pp. 190. \$4.00.

FARBER, MARVIN. *Naturalism and Subjectivism*. "American Lecture in Philosophy." Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; September, 1959.

FELDMAN, A. BRONSON. *The Unconscious in History*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 269. \$4.75.

This is a quasi-philosophical extension of Freudian theory to the race. Its scope can be gathered from a look at the contents. It deals with the birth of Christianity, the notion of mother-country and fatherland, the psychoanalysis of nations (war, culture, national traits), the economy, the cycles of history, and—the same techniques being used—a single recent event, the creation of the cult of Lincoln. Mere historical inaccuracies, of which the book has more than its share, would hardly bother the author, since his conviction of the validity of the theories used seems to be prior to the evidence. When love and the Oedipus complex explain everything, there seems little need for asking for evidence.

FERGUSON, JOHN. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.

This book examines the moral ideas which guided the Greek, Roman, and Hebrew worlds during the classical period. There is an account of the cardinal virtues, of the place of friendship, of Plato's Love, of that love of mankind which the Greeks called *philanthropia*, of *homonoia*, of the pursuit of self-sufficiency or non-attachment, of the ancient Roman virtues and the new qualities the emperors tried to inculcate, and of the moral insight of the Jewish prophets. All these failed in some way or another to fulfil the moral aspirations of mankind, according to the author's analysis. Only the appearances of the Christian concept of *agape* provided an adequate moral concept for the men of the classical period.

FITZSIMONS, M. A., and OTHERS (eds.). *The Image of Man*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press. Pp. 457. \$6.00.

† FOSTER, KENELM, O.P. (ed.). *The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Trans. with introd. by Rev. Kenelm Foster, O.P. Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1959. \$5.50.

FRANKL, VIKTOR E. *From Death-Camp to Existentialism*. Trans. from the German by Ilse Lasch; introd. by Gordon W. Allport. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. 123. \$3.00.

FROMM, ERICH. *Sigmund Freud's Mission*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 136. \$3.00.

GALLAGHER, THOMAS. *The Contemporary Status of the Notion of Existence—and Its Limitation in Thomistic Metaphysics*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 43. Paper, 50¢.

GAY, PETER. *Voltaire's Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 429. \$6.00.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Elements of Christian Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1959. Pp. 352.

—. *God and Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 165. Paper, 95¢.

GLAD, DONALD D., and OTHERS. *Operational Values in Psychotherapy*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 339. \$8.50.

GLASS, H. B., and OTHERS (eds.). *Forerunners of Darwin*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 471. \$6.50.

GOLDSCHMIDT, WALTER ROCHS. *Man's Way*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 253. \$2.90.

GOULD, SAMUEL B. *Knowledge Is Not Enough*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1959. Pp. 232. \$3.50.

This book contains fifteen addresses given by the president of Antioch College. The topics range from the goals of education to the practical problems of obtaining more teachers. The general point of view is inclusive and humanistic; the title is meant to indicate that

the college ought to be concerned with the moral, social, and "spiritual" dimensions of life as well as with the intellectual.

Great Cases in Psychoanalysis. Ed. Harold Greenwald. New York: Ballantine Books; Sept., 1959. 50¢

‡ GREAVES, H. R. G. *The Foundations of Political Theory*. New York: Essential Books (Oxford), 1958. Pp. 208. \$3.80.

GREENWOOD, DAVID C. *Nature of Science*. New York: Philosophical Lib., June, 1959. \$3.75.

GRENE, MARJORIE GLICKMAN. *Introduction to Existentialism*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Pp. 156. Paper, \$1.25.

GROSS, LLEWELLYN. *Symposium on Sociological Theory*. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1959. Pp. xiv + 598. \$7.25.

GRUBER, FREDERICK CHARLES (ed.). *Aspects of Value*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 88. \$2.75.

GUSTAVSON, REUBEN G.; VIERECK, PETER; and WOODRING, PAUL. *Education in a Free Society*. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series II," Vol. I. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. Pp. 47. \$3.00.

These three lectures were delivered at the University of Pittsburgh during the spring of 1958. Reuben G. Gustavson, in "The Impact of Science on a Free Society," discusses the accomplishments of modern science, America's role as "the watchdog of freedom" in today's world, and the need for improved courses in mathematics and biology if America is going to influence the world through science. Peter Viereck, in "Inwardness: The Dimension behind the Forehead," pleads against a short-sighted rejection of the humanities and religion in American education and highlights the need for "unadjusted men" to compensate for the "overadjusted men" of our society. Paul Woodring writes in "The Prospect for Higher Education" of the challenge of expansion now facing our colleges and of the need for maintaining standards of instruction and scholarship; he feels the gap between "academic" and "professional" educators must be bridged if America is to produce learned men who are also competent teachers.

HALLIE, PHILIP PAUL. *Maine de Biran, Reformer of Empiricism*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 227. \$4.50.

‡ HANKE, LEWIS. *Aristotle and the American Indians*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. 174. \$3.50.

HARDIN, GARRETT. *Nature and Man's Fate*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1959. \$6.00.

HART, CHARLES ALOYSIUS. *Thomistic Metaphysics*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959. Pp. 431. \$5.50.

HARVARD, WILLIAM C. *Henry Sidgwick and Later Utilitarian Political Philosophy*. Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press; September, 1959. \$6.00.

HAUSER, ARNOLD. *The Philosophy of Art History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. Pp. 488. \$7.50.

HAWLEY, DON. *The Nature of Things*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 187. \$3.75.

HAYAKAWA, SAMUEL ICHIYE (ed.). *Our Language and Our World*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 414. \$5.00.

HEGEL, WILHELM. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib., August, 1959. \$6.00.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 214. \$3.75.

—. *The Question of Being*. Trans. from the German by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne Publishers. Pp. 109. \$3.00.

HIMMELFARB, GERTRUDE. *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution*. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 480. \$5.95.

HIRSCHBERGER, JOHANNES. *The History of Philosophy*. Vol. II. Trans. Anthony N. Fuerst. With a section on "American Philosophical Thought" by Donald A. Gallagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. viii + 752. \$9.50

This second volume continues the history of Western philosophy from Renaissance philosophy to the present time. The major figures are treated extensively (Kant, for example, is discussed for 87 pages), yet a very great number of minor figures are more briefly handled. For each major figure or movement a bibliography lists editions and studies; the translator has taken care to substitute English translations where possible, and English studies where they are equivalent or equally good. The translation is ordinarily good, only rarely awkward or misleading.

For this edition, a section (pp. 637-708) on American philosophy has been written by Donald A. Gallagher. Though brief, the presentation is complete, clear, and well written.

There is a complete index of names (with subdivisions) and a very detailed subject index (pp. 729-52). As a result, the book will serve as a reference tool as well as a textbook.

The author apparently believes in a continuously developing perennial philosophy; in ancient and medieval philosophy (treated in Volume I) this interpretation provides a special emphasis but can be sustained to some extent. The course of modern and contemporary philosophy is more difficult to interpret in this way; fortunately, the author usually keeps his expositions distinct from this evaluation and so provides objective and well-grounded accounts of the philosophies of this period.

HOLLAND, L. VIRGINIA. *Counterpoint. Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xv + 128. \$3.75.

This doctoral dissertation is an analysis and synthesis of Kenneth Burke's theories, and a comparison of them to Aristotle's. The first chapter examines Burke's notion of man, society, and the function of the speaker or writer as social critic. Burke's ideas on the function and definition of rhetoric, its scope, and its methods, are presented in the next three chapters, while chapters five to seven compare Burke and Aristotle on these three points. The final chapter summarizes the thesis.

The author is concerned with showing similarities (not necessarily dependence). Her point is well made. She does not deny differences, but perhaps the differences are more significant than they are made to seem. That man is best defined as an "actor," that the rhetorician is primarily a social critic, and that the ethical dimension of rhetoric consists in manipulating symbolic word magic—these basic views of Burke's make his immediate similarities to Aristotle seem superficial rather than essential.

HOLLOWAY, MAURICE R., s.j. *An Introduction to Natural Theology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., Inc., 1959. Pp. xxv + 492. \$4.00.

This textbook is intended for courses in natural theology at the college level. The book begins with an examination of the nature of natural theology and its relations to metaphysics, sacred theology, religion, and science. Then the possibility of the proof of the existence of God is discussed; after this, there is a careful analysis of *a posteriori* demonstration. These chapters are followed by a

presentation of the five ways of St. Thomas. The next two chapters take up man's knowledge of the Divine Nature, and the problem of naming God. Then come a chapter on the perfections of God, followed by other chapters on the absolute attributes, knowledge, and love in God. The final chapters are on creation, providence, and God as the end of man. A number of appendices deal with invalid philosophical proofs, agnosticism, invalid proofs from science, existentialism, atheism, and the natural desire for the beatific vision. There is a detailed index.

Throughout, there are frequent references to St. Thomas, and many texts are included. The presentation is well organized and very systematic; each chapter ends with a summary, definitions, and proofs, followed by a selected bibliography of readings.

HOLZMAN, DONALD, and YUKIHIKO, MOTOYAMA. *Japanese Religion and Philosophy*. "Univ. of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies. Bibliographical Series," No. 7. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press. Pp. 108. Paper, \$4.00.

HOOK, SIDNEY. *Political Power and Personal Freedom*. New York: Criterion Books; June, 1959. \$7.50.

—. (ed.) *Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy*. New York: New York Univ. Press. Pp. 383. \$5.00.

‡ HULL, L. W. H. *History and Philosophy of Science*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959. Pp. 351. \$5.00.

[HUME, DAVID.] *Philosophy of Hume*. Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

HUPPÉ, BERNARD FELIX. *Doctrine and Poetry*. New York: Univ. Publishers. Pp. 254. \$6.00.

‡ [ISRAELI, ISAAC.] *Isaac Israeli, a Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century*. Ed. and trans. by A. Altmann and S. M. Stern. New York: Oxford Book Co., 1958. Pp. 252. \$4.80.

JASPERS, KARL. *The Idea of the University*. Ed. Karl W. Deutsch; introd. by Robert Ulich; trans. from the German by H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. 155. \$3.75.

—. *Truth and Symbol from 'Von der Wahrheit.'* Trans. Jean T. Wilde, William Kluback, and William Kimmel. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1959. Pp. 79. \$3.25.

JOHNSON, EDGAR N. *An Introduction to the History of the Western Tradition*. [2 vols.] Boston: Ginn & Co., 1959. Vol. I, pp. 831; Vol. II, pp. 806. \$8.00 ea.

JOHNSTONE, HENRY W., JR. *Philosophy and Argument*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press; May, 1959. \$4.00.

JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD. *One Great Society*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 254. \$4.50.

KAISER, BROTHER F. JAMES. *The Concept of Conscience According to John Henry Newman*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 317. Paper, \$3.25.

KALLEN, HORACE M. *Study of Liberty*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press; September, 1959. \$3.00.

KANE, WILLIAM J. *The Philosophy of Relation in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 62. Paper, 75¢.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment?* Trans. by Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press; July, 1959. 75¢.

KAUFMANN, WALTER ARNOLD. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. 414. \$5.95.

KEMENY, JOHN GEORGE. *A Philosopher Looks at Science*. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co., 1959. Pp. 285. \$4.95.

KESSLER, JOHN J. *A Metaphysics for Humanists*. St. Louis: Humanist Center, 1959. Pp. 14. Paper.

This pamphlet is a reprint from *Semantika*, Vol. V (1959), Nos. 1 and 2. The author begins with the fact that there is a common language structure. In accordance with semanticist theory, he refers the different kinds of words back to "the facts of science"; words that do not so refer he declares illegitimate.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN. *Either/Or*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Vol. I, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marwin Swenson, with revisions and foreword by Howard A. Johnson. Pp. 477. Paper, \$1.45. Vol. II, trans. Walter Lowrie, with revisions and foreword by Howard A. Johnson. Pp. 393. Paper, \$1.25.

[—.] *The Journals of Kierkegaard*. Ed. Alexander Dru. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 254. \$3.50.

KOCH, SIGMUND. *Psychology: A Study of a Science*. Vol. I, *Conceptual and Systematic*; Vol. II, *General Systematic Formulations. Learning, and Special Processes*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. 716. \$10.00.

KOESTLER, ARTHUR. *The Sleep Walkers*. Introd. by Herbert Butterfield. New York, Macmillan Co. Pp. 624. \$6.50.

KÖHLER, WOLFGANG. *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 427. Paper, \$1.95.

KOREN, HENRY J., C.S.S.P. (ed.) *Readings in the Philosophy of Nature*. Westminster, Newman Press. Pp. 412. Paper, \$2.25.

KÖRNER, STEPHAN. *Conceptual Thinking*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. viii + 301. Paper, \$1.75.

First published in 1955, this book was noted in the "Current Bibliography" for November, 1957 (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Vol. XXXV, Supplement, p. 11). Various reviewers have pointed out that it is a very worth-while analysis of the functions of concepts and of the differences between types of concepts. Though the author touches often upon metaphysical and epistemological considerations, he usually deals with them by means of logic.

The present edition is a corrected but otherwise unchanged reprinting. It is carefully and cleanly printed and bound sturdily enough to stand up under hard student use.

KREYCHE, ROBERT J. *First Philosophy: An Introductory Text in Metaphysics*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1959. Pp. xviii + 328. \$4.00.

This textbook is written for college courses in metaphysics. An introduction discusses the nature of metaphysics. In the first section, on being, the problems of reality, change, matter and form, and essence and existence are treated. The second section, on the one and the many, treats potency and act, limitation and division, the analogy of being, and the analogy in our knowledge of being at some length. The third section is on the transcendentals in general and on the one, the true, and the good. The fourth section is on being and the causes of being; this deals with the efficient cause, both as cause of change and as cause of being, and also with final and exemplary causes. The fifth section is on the categories, especially substance, and accidents in general. There is a bibliography of suggested readings and an index.

The chapters are carefully organized, and each chapter is followed by review questions.

KRIKORIAN, YERVANT HOVHANNES, and EDEL, ABRAHAM (eds.). *Contemporary Philosophic Problems*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 723. \$7.00.

KRUTCH, JOSEPH WOOD. *Human Nature and the Human Condition*. New York: Random House, 1959. Pp. 211. \$3.95.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Illusion of Immortality*. 3d ed. Introd. by John Dewey. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 318. \$3.95.

LANDAU, ROM. *The Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabī*. "Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West," No. 22. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 126. \$3.25.

LANGAN, THOMAS D. *Meaning of Heidegger*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; September, 1959. \$4.50.

LAPIERE, RICHARD TRACY. *The Freudian Ethic*. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1959. Pp. 309. \$5.00.

LEETHAM, CLAUDE. *Rosmini*. Introd. by Giuseppe Bozzetti. Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1959. Pp. 508. \$7.50.

LEFEVRE, ROBERT. *The Nature of Man and His Government*. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1959. Pp. 64. Paper, \$1.00.

LEIBRECHT, WALTER (ed.). *Religion and Culture*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 410. \$7.50.

LEMAITRE, SOLANGE. *Hinduism*. Trans. from the French by John-Francis Brown. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 126. \$2.95.

LERNER, DANIEL (ed.). *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences*. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 323. Paper, \$1.45.

[LOCKE, JOHN.] *Locke's Two Treatises of Government*. Ed. with an introd. by Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 530. \$14.00.

LOEWENBERG, JACOB. *Reason and the Nature of Things*. La Salle, Ill.; Open Court Pub. Co. Pp. 395. \$4.50.

Logical Positivism. Ed. A. J. Ayer. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. \$6.00.

LYNCH, WILLIAM F., s.j. *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the 'Parmenides.'* Washington: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1959. Distrib. by University Publishers, New York. Pp. xiii + 255. \$6.00.
This new approach to Plato's thought arises from the author's conviction that the *Parmenides* is almost a summary of basic metaphysical positions. After an introduction and a single chapter devoted to the first part of the dialogue, the author takes up each of the Hypotheses in turn and submits them to a very detailed logical, and sometimes textual, analysis. In his view, the Platonic metaphysics is a philosophy of unity, and it is on this ground that he finds consistency and coherence in the dialogue.
Platonic scholars will want to weigh this book carefully.

—. *The Image Industries*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 159. \$3.50.
This is a reflective book about the arts, especially moving pictures and television. The author begins with a consideration of the sources of these activities and finds them effectively monopolistic. These sources produce an art that confuses fantasy and reality, hides reality with a glossy finish, prettifies, and disguises. There is little deep sensibility; the emotional responses are flat and superficial; hence, most of the important human emotions are left out. Moreover, instead of liberating the imagination, the artists, borrowing the advertisers' techniques, fix it on less important details. Instead of breadth, the producers indulge in quantitative exaggeration—thousands of actors, miles of scenery, and so on. In place of these limiting factors, the author pleads for courageous imagination on the part of artists, breadth of understanding among the critics, creativity among the theologians, and an interest on the part of universities.

MACGREGOR, GEDDES. *Introduction to Religious Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1959. Pp. 384. \$4.50, paper, \$2.95.

† MALCOLM, NORMAN. *Dreaming*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959.
Pp. 128. \$2.50.

This is a study in the "conceptual problems" involved in statements about dreams. The author begins by showing that the phrase "I am asleep" cannot be meaningfully asserted. He goes on to say that "actions" during sleep go on only to the extent that a person is not entirely asleep but asleep in one way and waking in another. Then he discusses dreaming, which he says is an exception. But he handles it this way. A person experienced something; later on he finds out that the events did not happen; hence he infers that he dreamt about those happenings. He maintains that a person can legitimately talk about his own dreams as they present themselves to him when he talks about them. But such questions as, Did he really dream this? When did he dream it and for how long? Did he have images or other mental processes in his sleep?—all such questions he asserts to be meaningless. Obviously the author is using the very narrow criterion of meaningfulness favored by one wing of the language analysts; namely, that there must be a present external referent. It is doubtful whether this part of the book is going to be at all helpful to psychologists. Finally, in the last several chapters, the author tries to show that one of the typical skeptical objections to certitude (How do I know that I am not dreaming?) is a pseudo-question. Unfortunately, the efficacy of this solution is involved in the difficulties of his prior analysis of dreaming itself.

MANDLER, GEORGE, and KESSEN, WILLIAM. *Language of Psychology*. New York: Wiley & Sons; May, 1959. \$6.75.

MANUEL, FRANK EDWARD. *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 352. \$6.75.

† MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Degrees of Knowledge*. Trans. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1959. Pp. xix + 476. \$7.50.

This work has been hailed as one of the major writings of contemporary Thomism, and it is not necessary to detail its contents to informed philosophers. Neither are the difficulties of the previous translation unknown. The present translation has been done very carefully and checked by the team of translators. All the content of the fourth French edition (1946) has been included; the only new matter is a redaction of Appendix IV, "On the Notion of Subsistence," which is dated 1954. Thanks to the translators and to the publisher, it will now be possible to refer students to this work in the expectation that they will be able to understand it without recourse to the French.

† MARTIN, RICHARD MILTON. *The Notion of Analytic Truth*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 139. \$5.00.

MARTIN, WILLIAM OLIVER. *Metaphysics and Ideology*. "The Aquinas Lecture," 1959. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 104. \$2.50.

The author tries to formulate the relationship between metaphysics and ideology. He sets up four criteria for a genuine metaphysics and finds that these criteria are fulfilled principally in the tradition of moderate realism of "Thomism" in a broad sense. These criteria are: autonomy, continuity, system, and adequacy. An "autonomous" metaphysics must have its own object, evidence, and principles. A "continuous" metaphysics must manifest historical development and refinement. A "systematic" metaphysics must be coherently organized in such a way as to allow for development without espousing skepticism; it must be open at one end but not

both ends. An "adequate" metaphysics not only possesses and can account for certain philosophical truths but is open to further truths. Professor Martin distinguishes metaphysics as he has described it from ideology, which is "an instrument for dealing with life-situations." Ideology examines reality with an eye to practice; it aims at putting ideas to work; it is radically antiphilosophical in its subordination of the objective order to human needs and in its polemics against those genuine metaphysicians who insist on ontological and ethical truth.

MARX, KARL, and ENGELS, FRIEDRICH. *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. Ed. Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. \$1.25.

MASCIA, CARMEN. *Logic according to the Principles of Aristotle*. Loretto, Pa.: Mariale Press, 1959. \$1.50.

—. *Metaphysics*. Loretto, Pa.: Mariale Press; Spring, 1960.

MASLOW, ABRAHAM HAROLD (ed.). *New Knowledge in Human Values*. Foreword by Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 282. \$4.50.

MASON, A., and LEACH, R. *In Quest of Freedom*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; May, 1959. \$6.95.

MASON, MICHAEL. *The Center of Hilarity*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. ix + 266. \$4.50.

This book is a reflective, informal essay on the Christian, human attitude toward life. The author contends that this attitude is at the center of opposing forces; it is not a passive quiescence but an active maintaining of balance. The author has a considerable historical knowledge which is at the service of this theme, but the major tool of his analysis is literary criticism. Its object ranges over many works in passing, spends much of its time on T. S. Eliot and G. K. Chesterton, and makes a somewhat briefer but intense examination of Shakespeare. The theme of the work and its handling are Chestertonian, especially the notion that comedy is the greatest dramatic form.

‡ MAYS, W. *The Philosophy of Whitehead*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 259. \$4.25.

The author maintains that the philosophy of Whitehead is more coherent than is commonly supposed and that its basic elements are physical and logical concepts. He divides his study into two parts: the structure and the dynamics of the philosophy. In the first part, after some introductory material on the nature of that philosophy and its relation to contemporary language analysis, he discusses natural theology, eternal objects, the algebraic method, the extensive continuum, and the method of extensive abstraction. In the second part, he takes up prehension, perception, consciousness, change, causality and time, society, organism, physical theory, and determinism and free will. There are two appendices (one on probability, the other on the multiple location theory of perception) and an index, which is quite detailed.

MEAD, HUNTER. *Types and Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 474. \$5.50.

MESSINESI, XENOPHON LEON. *Meet the Ancient Greeks*. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1959. Pp. 261. \$5.00.

MEYERHOFF, HANS (comp.). *The Philosophy of History in Our Time. An Anthology*. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 358. Paper, \$1.25.

[MILL, JOHN STUART.] *Prefaces to Liberty. Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill*. Ed. Bernard Wishy. Boston: Beacon Press; Dec., 1959. \$3.95.

MILLER, DAVID L. *Modern Science and Human Freedom*. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1959. Pp. 310. \$6.00.

MILLER, HENRY, and SHORR, PHILIP (eds.). *Essays in Social Science*. Brooklyn: Philip Shorr, 4627 Beach St. Pp. 171. \$2.00.

MILLER, RANDOLPH CRUMP, and OTHERS. *What Is the Nature of Man?* Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1959. Pp. 218. \$3.00.

MINNEMA, THEODORE. *The Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Pub. Co. Pp. 132. \$3.00.

MIXTER, R. L. (ed.). *100 Years After Darwin*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co.; August, 1959. \$4.00.

‡ MONTEFIORE, ALAN. *A Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. New York: Praeger, 1959. Pp. 220. \$4.00.

MOORE, GERALD EDWARD. *Philosophical Studies*. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959. Pp. 350. Paper, \$1.75.

MOORE, THOMAS V. *Heroic Sanctity and Insanity*. New York: Grune & Stratton; May, 1959.

MORRAY, JOSEPH P. *Pride of State*. Boston: Beacon Press; May, 1959. \$4.00.

MORRIS, CLARENCE (ed.). *The Great Legal Philosophers*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 571. \$10.00.

MORTIMER, ERNEST. *Blaise Pascal*. New York: Harper & Bros.; June, 1959. \$4.00.

MURTY, K. SATCHIDANANDA. *Revelation and Reason in the Advaita Vedanta*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; September, 1959. \$7.50.

NEFF, MARY V. *Ethics for Everyday Living*. Chicago, Science Research Associates. Pp. 48. Paper, 50¢.

NORTHROP, F. S. C. *Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.; September, 1959.

—. *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 416. Paper, \$1.45.

O'BRIEN, JUSTIN (ed.). *From the N. R. F.* Ed. with introd. by Justin O'Brien. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. \$1.95.

OGDEN, CHARLES KAY, and RICHARDS, IVOR ARMSTRONG. *The Meaning of Meanings*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 385. Paper, \$2.25.

OVERSTREET, H. A. *Mature Mind*. 10th edition. New York: Norton & Co.; August, 1959. \$3.95.

PAGE, L. ELWIN. *The Philosophy of Socrates Smith*. New York, Comet Press. Pp. 187. \$3.50.

PARKER, FRANCIS H., and VEATCH, HENRY B. *Logic as a Human Instrument*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. xviii + 422.

This textbook of logic is intended as an introductory book for college students. It covers the matter traditionally treated in this field: concepts, propositions, and argument. It makes use of traditional Aristotelian views and expositions, but also of a certain amount of modern techniques and views. It is unusually well written for a textbook; the examples are well chosen and at the same time meaningful to students. The authors intend to treat logic not so much for its own sake as a highly specialized discipline but rather as an instrument of knowing, and particularly as a philosophical instrument. In this they succeed so well that the book can be thought of as a text for a combined course in logic and introduction to philosophy.

In addition, the authors deal with a number of points that are outside formal logic strictly conceived. They treat the nature of concept as sign, the nature of beings of reason, the nature of the categories, the distinction between substance and accident, the problem of universals and moderate realism. Most of these points are very well done. In dealing with the proposition, they begin with a brief

treatment of the distinction between essence and existence, and deal with the difficult matter of *suppositio* in terms of "designation." These points also are well done. In the third part, they show the connection between argumentation and causality among beings, the objections to both induction and deduction, and hypothesis. Here the treatment is less satisfactory. The inductive origin of first principles is not clearly differentiated from scientific induction; the latter is said to be based on real natures. The function of deduction *within* scientific induction is not seen, because it seems that the authors too closely assimilate scientific induction to the abstraction of natures in concepts. Hypothesis, too, is assimilated to induction thus understood. Hence, the indirect, structural character of scientific theory is entirely overshadowed by the reflections on its truth-value. But these faults leave the merits of the book undiminished.

PARKER, THOMAS HENRY LOUIS. *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.* (Rev. ed.) Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 136. \$3.00.

PATTERSON, CECIL HOLDEN. *Counseling and Psychotherapy.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 334. \$6.00.

PEARSON, DONALD STUART. *Creative Image.* State College, Pa.: Author, P. O. Box 413, 1959. Pp. 111. \$2.75.

PETERFREUND, SHELDON P. *Introduction to American Philosophy.* New York: Odyssey Press, 1959. \$3.50.

PETERSON, HOUSTON, and BAYLEY, JAMES (eds.). *Essays in Philosophy. From David Hume to Bertrand Russell.* New York: Pocket Books, 1959. Pp. 522. Paper, 50¢

† PIAGET, JEAN. *The Language and Thought of the Child.* [3d ed.] New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 312. \$5.00.

PLANCK, MAX. *The New Science.* Trans. from the German. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 352. \$5.00.

[PLATO.] *Plato—Republic and Dialogues.* Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

———. *Plato's Phaedo.* Trans. R. S. Bluck. New York: Liberal Arts Press; August, 1959. \$1.25.

———. *Plato's Theaetetus: Theory of Knowledge.* Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; June, 1959. \$1.00.

———. *Plato's Timaeus.* Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; August, 1959. 80¢

POINCARÉ, HENRI. *The Value of Science.* Trans. George Bruce Halsted. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. iii + 147. Paper, \$1.35.

This reprint of representative essays by Poincaré is based on G. B. Halsted's authorized translation, which first appeared in 1913. It contains an author's and a translator's introduction.

† POLANYI, MICHAEL. *The Study of Man.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 102. \$1.75.

This set of three lectures (being the "Lindsay Memorial Lectures" for 1958) is both an introduction to, and a carrying further of, the author's recent volume, *Personal Knowledge*. The first two lectures of this series recapitulate the major theme of the earlier work. In the first, the author shows that knowledge is not an objective proposition or a material to be put on book or tape but an activity of a knowing person; that, though language and other symbolic expression is the major tool of clarification, it so presupposes personal activity as to be empty and meaningless without it. In the second lecture, the author shows that man, having developed "intellectual passions," should follow them (and thereby unify his pursuit of truth and good, of fact and value) rather than deny or reduce them.

In the third lecture, the author shows how history is concerned with the *actions* of men, which cannot be understood merely mechanically or objectively.

POPPER, KARL RAIMUND. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. Trans. from the German by the author. New York: Basic Books. 1959. Pp. 479. \$7.50.

POUND, ROSCOE. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 209. Paper, 95¢.

POYNTER, F. N. L. *The History and Philosophy of Knowledge of the Brain and Its Functions*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 284. \$5.50.

Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought. Ed. John D. Sutherland. New York: Grove Press, 1959. Pp. 149. \$5.00; paper, \$2.95.

QUETIF, J., and ECHARD, J. *Scriptores Ordinis Predicatorum Recensiti, Notisque Historicis et Criticis Illustrati*. "Burt Franklin Bibliographical and Reference Series," No. 16. New York, Burt Franklin. 4 vols. Set, \$200.00; prepub., \$175.00.

QUINE, WILLARD VAN ORMAN. *Methods of Logic*. (Rev. ed.) New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 291. \$4.75.

RANK, OTTO. *Beyond Psychology*. New York: Dover Pubns, 1959. Pp. 291. Paper, \$1.75.

First published in 1941, this work was the last production of a man who, though he is not in the first order of the founders of modern psychiatry, is still an original and forceful thinker who has made many important contributions. In this work, he contends that psychology, being a rational science, cannot adequately explain human life. As a basis for this claim he points out various non-rational factors, such as the kinds of love, social interaction, sexual differentiation.

RAVEN, CHARLES EARLE. *Science, Medicine and Morals*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 189. \$3.50.

REESE, WILLIAM. *The Ascent from Below*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959. Pp. 490. \$5.00.

REGIS, L. M., o.p. *Epistemology*. Trans. Imelda Choquette Byrne. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 549. \$6.50.

This third volume in the "Christian Wisdom Series" is a textbook, or, perhaps better, a monograph. It consists of four parts. The first part explains what a problem is, what the epistemological problem properly is, and engages in a penetrating and lively criticism of contemporary "Scholastic" epistemologies; it concludes with a full account of St. Thomas's method. The second part is the longest; it deals with the nature of knowledge. It begins by insisting that there are many kinds of knowledge and finds in them the presence of other things; it concludes with an examination of the object as term of knowledge. The third part considers truth; it considers the judgment as the perfect act of knowing and as the locus of truth. The fourth part deals with infallible truth: the nature of infallibility, the first principles, and infallible knowledge of mediate truth. There are copious notes and an index.

This book is first and foremost a text in Thomistic *epistemology*; that is, it is concerned mainly with those modes of knowledge that St. Thomas called *scientia* or *episteme*. In explaining what philosophical knowledge is, the author has a tool for distinguishing such knowledge from science (in its contemporary sense). But since the latter is not treated for its own sake, it is not given a complete analysis.

[†] REICHENBACH, HANS. *Modern Philosophy of Science. Selected Essays.* Ed. and trans. by Maria Reichenbach. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. ix + 214. \$5.50.

This volume contains eight essays, only one of which has appeared in English before. None of them deals with particular detailed topics. The first two discuss theories of relativity and of motion; the third, causality and probability. The fourth is the author's summary of the content of a philosophy of nature. The fifth returns to the principle of causality and the question of its empirical confirmation. The sixth discusses rationalism and empiricism (and was published in English). The seventh and eighth have not previously been published; they were left unfinished and were completed by the editor. The seventh deals with the freedom of the will; the eighth with the nature of ethical statements.

There is a bibliography of Reichenbach's works and an index to the present volume.

REILLY, WILLIAM J. *In Search of a Working Philosophy of Life.* New York: Harper & Bros.; July, 1959. \$2.95.

—. *The Philosophy of Space and Time.* Trans. from the German by Maria Reichenbach and John Freund. New York, Dover Pubns. Pp. 311. Paper, \$2.45.

RICE, EUGENE F. *The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 229. \$4.75.

RIEFF, PHILIP. *Freud.* New York, Viking Press. Pp. 413. \$6.00.

ROBERTS, DAVID E. *Existentialism and Religious Beliefs.* New York: Oxford Book Co.; September, 1959. \$1.75.

ROSE, H. J. *Religion in Greece and Rome.* New York: Harper & Bros.; September, 1959. \$1.60.

ROSS, ALF. *On Law and Justice.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959. Pp. 394. \$6.00.

ROSS, WILLIAM DAVID. *Aristotle.* New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 320. Paper, \$1.45.

ROTAND, JEAN. *Can Man Be Modified?* Trans. from the French by Jonathan Griffin. New York: Basic Books, 1959. Pp. 105. \$3.00.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Dictionary of Thought.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 152. \$5.00.

This is a collection of short statements, definitions, and remarks about a large number of terms used in philosophy, politics, and common life. The author's strong point is his skill in aphorism and epigram. This is a style that frustrates the reviewer and does not encourage continuous reading. Yet every reader will find remarks that make him smile and others that make him think.

—. *Pictorial History of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., August, 1959. \$15.00.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *My Philosophical Development.* New York: Simon & Schuster; July, 1959. \$3.50.

—. *The Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 167. Paper, \$1.25.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND, and BURROUGHS, JOHN. *Two Modern Essays on Religion.* Hanover, N.H.: Westholm Pubns.; September, 1959. \$5.00.

RYLE, GILBERT. *The Concept of Mind.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959. Pp. vi + 334. Paper, \$2.25.

One of the earliest products of a particular kind of philosophical analysis was Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*, first published in 1949. Later works have not come up to the sparkle and impact of this book. It is, as is well known, an attack on Cartesian dualism and the theory of sense data. Part of its success lay in its assumption that these

theories were adequate examples of all philosophical psychology and epistemology, an assumption whose dubious validity has been pointed out repeatedly.

The present reprint is well printed and well bound (sewed rather than merely glued). But the price seems high if one considers what other publishers have been able to do with their quality paperback lines.

‡ SAMBURSKY, S. *Physics of the Stoics*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. xi + 153. \$3.50.

This study is richly documented and, in addition, offers thirty pages of texts in translation, features which the modern student will be very grateful for. The author maintains that the most important physical notion of the Stoics was that of continuity, and so his first chapter studies it in detail. He then takes up the notions of pneuma and force, causality and determinism, and the relation between the whole and its parts, especially in connection with the Stoic idea of the cosmos. Throughout, the author wishes to show the similarity between these conceptions and those of modern science, and to show that Stoic thought was superior in this respect to other varieties of Greek thought. Perhaps it is this concern which leads the author to interpretations that seem to be historically inaccurate (for example, of the notion of free will and of the Aristotelian four causes).

SAYERS, EPHRAIM VERN, and MADDEN, WARD ELLIS. *Education and the Democratic Faith*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959. Pp. 484. \$4.25.

SCHILPP, PAUL ARTHUR. *Albert Einstein*. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Bros.; September, 1959. \$1.95 ea.

SCHIPPER, EDITH W., and SCHUH, EDWARD W. *A First Course in Modern Logic*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 416. \$4.50.

SCHUSCHNIGG, KURT VON. *An Introduction to the Law of Peace*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. \$9.50.

SELEKMAN. *Moral Philosophy for Management*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; May, 1959.

[SENECA.] *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*. Trans. and ed. Moses Hadas. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 261. \$3.00.

SHINN, ROGER L. *The Existentialist Posture*. New York: Association Press, 1959. Pp. 128. Paper, 50¢

SMITH, BEN DAY. *Man and Science*. New York: Exposition Press, 1959. Pp. 126. \$3.00.

[SPINOZA.] *Living Thoughts of Spinoza*. Com. by Arnold Zweig. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Pubns.; June, 1959. Paper, 50¢

—. *Philosophy of Spinoza*. Lincoln: Nebraska Book Co., 1959.

—. *Spinoza's Earlier Philosophical Writings*. Trans. Frank A. Hayes. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959.

STEBBING, LIZZIE SUSAN. *Philosophy and the Physicists*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. 211. Paper, \$1.65.

SUTHERLAND, JOHN DERG (ed.). *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought*. Introd. by Sylvia Payne. New York: Grove Press, 1959. Pp. 149. Paper, \$1.45.

TAMOSAITIS, ANICETUS, S.J. *Church and State in Maritain's Thought*. Chicago: 2345 West 56th Street, 1959. Pp. 125. Paper, \$1.25.

This is a dissertation presented to the Gregorian University, Rome. After an introductory discussion of the present situation of Christendom and a biographical sketch of Maritain, the author investigates "what Maritain says and what he does not say on Church and State." He states the basic principles of Maritain's political philosophy, as well as his views on human history. Next he outlines the problem of

Church-state relationship and analyzes Maritain's application of his basic principles to the problem in its contemporary historical situation. The author adds a few critical comments; he regards Maritain's work in this area as highly valuable but in many respects still exploratory and tentative. There is a good bibliography of Maritain's writings and criticisms of Maritain's writings on the Church-state relationship.

TAUBER, EDWARD S., and GREEN, MAURICE R. *Prelogical Experience*. New York, Basic Books. Pp. 207. \$3.75.

TAYLOR, HENRY OSBORN. *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*. 2nd rev. ed. New York: F. Ungar, 1959. Pp. 432. \$9.00.

† TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE, s.j. *The Phenomenon of Man*. Trans. Bernard Wall. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. \$5.00. *Theories of History*. Ed. Patrick Gardiner. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. \$8.50.

The Thomist Reader. Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1958. Pp. 136. \$1.75.

THORPE, EARL E. *The Deserion of Man*. Foreword by Crane Brinton. Baton Rouge, Harrington Pubns. Pp. 207. \$4.00.

TILLICH, PAUL JOHANNES. *The Courage to Be*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 206. Paper, 95¢

—. *Theology of Culture*. New York: Oxford Book Co.; May, 1959. \$4.00.

TOS, ALDO J. *A Critical Study of Modern American Views on Academic Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 75. Paper, 75¢

TRESMONTANT, CLAUDE. *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*. Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1959. \$3.00.

VALLON, MICHEL A. *Apostle of Freedom*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; September, 1959. \$6.00.

VANN, GERALD, O.P. *The Paradise Tree. On Living the Symbols of the Church*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. 320. \$4.00.

Though this book is almost entirely an attempt to elucidate for the present generation the meaning of the symbols of the sacraments and the Mass, the introductory chapter deals with the function of symbols in general. The problem is not adequately solved here, but at least its importance is recognized.

VINE, MARGARET WILSON. *An Introduction to Sociological Theory*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959. Pp. 367. \$4.50.

WADDELL, HELEN. *Peter Abélard*. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 277. \$3.25.

WALTZ, KENNETH N. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; September, 1959. \$5.00.

WARNER, W. LLOYD. *The Living and the Dead. A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 528. \$7.50.

The study of symbols has been undertaken by historians of religion, theologians, literary critics, psychologists, but only rarely by philosophers. Yet a metaphysics and a theory of knowledge are implied by almost any approach to symbolism; and these implications are not always realized by the investigators, even when the study is undertaken in a spirit of open inquiry.

The present study could be called a study in social psychology, or anthropology. Its locale is "Yankee City," the fictionalized locale of four previous books on the life of a modern community. The book is divided into five parts. In the first, the symbols of politics are examined, centering around a political hero. In the second part, the

symbols of history are studied. In the third, the symbols studied are both secular and sacred: associations, parades and memorials, and especially cemeteries. The fourth part studies sacred symbol systems, especially Catholic and Protestant religious symbols. The fifth part is a statement of the theory and method underlying the book.

The book is an important contribution but needs serious, detailed criticism.

WEBER, MAX. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Foreword by R. H. Tawney. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 292. \$3.50.

WEISS, PAUL. *Our Public Life*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.

This book is a study of the nature of society and the state and man's role within them. Successive chapters examine the kinds of classes which would constitute an ideal society, the basic rights of man, the state as a law-making and law-enforcing body, the natural law, the limitations of the state, and the functions of culture and religion within civilization. A final chapter discusses the prospects of civilization and offers suggestions for narrowing the gap between the ideal human society and our present world.

WEITZ, MORRIS. *Problems in Aesthetics*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 697. \$6.90.

WENDER, HERBERT. *The Growth of Modern Thought and Culture*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 215. \$3.75.

WERTHEIMER, MAX. *Productive Thinking*. Rev. by Michael Wertheimer. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. \$4.50.

WEST, PAUL. *The Fossils of Piety*. New York: Vantage Press, 1959. Pp. 85. \$2.75.

This essay on the humanist tradition examines it in a series of instances. The cases chosen are: Malroux (as an echo of Arnold and Pater); Sartre, Pavese, Camus; Hemingway and Jünger; and Santayana, Weil, Trilling. In each case, the author points out the insufficiency, the self-defeating movement of the attempt to escape both facts and ideals. It is his contention that humanism is trying to be a religion without any corresponding whole-hearted dedication (paradoxically most evident in those who talk most about commitment).

† WETTER, GUSTAV A., s.j. *Dialectical Materialism*. Trans. from the German by Peter Heath. New York: Praeger, 1959. Pp. 621. \$10.00.

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. *A Critical Introduction to Ethics* [3d ed.]. New York, Odyssey Press. \$4.25.

WHITE, MORTON GABRIEL. *Religion, Politics and the Higher Learning*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 150. \$3.50.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Aims of Education and Other Essays*. New York: Macmillan Co.; June, 1959. \$4.00.

—. *Modes of Thought*. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons. Pp. 249. Paper, \$1.15.

—. *Symbolism*. "Barbour-Page Lectures," University of Virginia, 1927. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1959. Pp. 96. Paper, 95¢.

WHITTAKER, SIR EDMUND TAYLOR. *From Euclid to Eddington*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. 221. Paper, \$1.35.

WINN, RALPH B. *Dictionary of Existentialism*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; September, 1959. \$4.75.

ZARCHY, HARRY. *What Does a Scientist Do?* New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.; September, 1959. \$2.50.

ZIMMERMANN, PAUL (ed.). *Darwin, Evolution and Creation*. St. Louis: Concordia Pub. Co.; August, 1959. \$3.50.

HEGEL, HUSSERL, AND REASON TODAY

JEAN LADRIÈRE received his doctorate
and his maître agrégé
from the University of Louvain.

He is the author of the book,
Les limitations internes des formalismes,
and has previously written for Philosophical Studies
and *La revue philosophique de Louvain*.
He is currently professor of philosophy
at the University of Louvain.

This article reproduces the substance of a lecture
delivered at Duquesne University in May, 1958.
Gratitude is here expressed to Dr. Alden Fisher,
of Saint Louis University,
who revised the English version of this article,
which was originally written in French.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL REASON AND THE CRISIS OF REASON

Philosophy, the work of reason, must be, at the same time, an ever-reviewed inquiry into the possibility of reason and the destiny of reason. What characterizes it, indeed, is its radicality: the ideal to which it corresponds consists in a knowledge which has become perfectly critical; that is, which is capable of justifying itself completely. Therefore reason, which is at work in philosophy, not only provides the justification of this or that particular knowledge but also the justification of itself. This means that philosophy, inasmuch as it is a knowing which aims at radicality, must call itself into question and give to itself its own justification as radical knowing. Thus it is always and at the same time both a using of reason in an endeavor to understand experience and reality rationally and in a radical manner, and a calling into question of reason in an effort to understand this attempt itself, to found its possibility and justify its validity.

But this calling into question of reason which occurs in philosophy cannot be made once and for all. On the contrary it must be undertaken again and again, and each historical epoch undertakes it after its own manner, according to its proper cultural horizon. In our

epoch, the problem of reason must necessarily be posed in the context of a culture which is profoundly marked by the development and success of positive science. We must wonder whether, in such a universe, there is still a place for a philosophy, whether science is not today the only possible expression of the ideal of rationality, whether it has not taken over for its own purposes, and according to its own methods, all that was actually rational in traditional philosophy.

We have seen the manifestation in contemporary culture of two apparently contradictory trends: on the one hand, a trend which has exalted reason under the exclusive form of scientific reason; on the other hand, a trend which has rejected reason in the name of the unconscious, of instinct, of intuition, of life, of bare existence, of fate. In reality, these two trends, far from being contradictorily opposed, are complementary to each other. If science is made the only field of activity for reason, if the scientific method is identified with rationality, everything which does not depend upon this method becomes necessarily irrelevant for reason. And then it will be easy to divide human existence into two parts: on one side will be all that can be analyzed and explained with the aid of scientific method; on the other, all that is out of reach of this method. But where scientific method is no longer valid, there are no longer any criteria; there is no longer any possibility for a universal agreement; there is no longer any truth; there are no longer any rules which can be justified; there remains only unconditional affirmation, the free play of forces which give vent to themselves by their own virtue, without control or justification. Irrationalism is the necessary consequence of positivism. In such a context, moreover, irrationalism comes in the end to dominate the sphere of science itself. Because a science which claims to exhaust the possibilities of reason renders itself incapable of founding itself; and, in particular, it is unable to justify this very claim in the name of which it sets itself up as the absolute expression of reason. Thus, paradoxically, it becomes devoid of justification, of foundation, and is itself established on the ground of unreason. And so appears the danger of a general darkening of reason, of meaning, and of truth; that is to say, the danger of nihilism. This is what may be called the crisis of reason.

From the point of view of this crisis of reason, the philosophy of Hegel might appear as the last great philosophy, as the last effort to

build a rational knowing which would be really radical and able to illuminate its own foundations. And, as is known, this philosophy was precisely characterized by its all-embracing pretension. With Hegel we have an endeavor to recuperate in the discourse of reason the totality of reality and of experience. This is what is expressed in the famous principle (which appears in the preface of Hegel's *Principles of the Philosophy of Law*), "Everything which is real is rational, and everything which is rational is real." If the philosophy of Hegel actually was the last one, it was so under the form of an accomplishment of the philosophical project; and Hegel very likely thought of it in such a manner. But we also find in Hegel's philosophy certain ideas which allowed for a renewal, on other grounds, of the effort of philosophical rationality and which made possible an overcoming of the crisis of reason in the form of a broadening of rationalism and the establishing of a new rationalism, fully adapted to the characteristics of the culture of our age and particularly to the situation created by the domination of positive science. It is in the work of Husserl, it would seem, that the construction of this new rationalism begins, a new rationalism which, to tell the truth, is simply the continuation of the philosophical tradition in its most authentic aspects. In what follows we should like to show what has been the meaning of Husserl's philosophy from the point of view of the crisis of reason and its overcoming and what appears to be the destiny of reason in Western philosophy after Husserl.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL AS LAST PHILOSOPHY

Hegel announced in his philosophy the end of history; he regarded his own philosophy as the thinking of the end of history and thus as the last philosophy. For him, indeed, philosophy is the translation into discourse of what manifests itself in experience. In a certain sense, there is thus dependence of philosophy upon experience—"in a certain sense" only because a moment must come when philosophy and experience rejoin each other perfectly; at that point dependence is completely out of consideration. Experience, however, does not give all its content immediately. In the interior of itself it admits of a movement, a movement which is not simply a purely external

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

concatenation of moments but is the progressive revelation of the spirit to itself and thus of the total reality (because, for Hegel, the total reality, or the absolute, is Spirit). The movement which inhabits experience is therefore the very same movement which inhabits philosophy. If there is movement in experience, it is because experience after all is nothing other than the very life of the Absolute Spirit; and its different moments are nothing other than the different moments of the return of the Absolute Spirit toward itself, or, in other words, of the reflection by which the Absolute Spirit makes itself

¹"This dialectical movement which consciousness executes on itself—on its knowledge as well as on its object—in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is termed 'experience'" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie [2nd ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931], introd.). [Passages quoted from Hegel in the author's original text were taken from the French translation of *Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes* by Jean Hypolite (Paris: Aubier, 1939). For this version the texts from Hegel are from the English translation by Baillie. However, when understanding of the author's interpretation is hampered by the Baillie translation, the latter has been modified to bring it more into line with the French translation—EDITOR.]

This text indicates clearly that if there is movement it is because reality is, after all, spirit, or consciousness. When consciousness finds itself in front of an object it tends toward this object in itself and at the same time it has a knowledge of this object. But the two moments do not correspond to each other. Consciousness modifies its knowing in order to make it adequate to the object. But this modification of the knowing modifies the object itself, because it belonged essentially to this knowing. This movement leads finally to an adequation: this is absolute knowing. At this moment, the knowing becomes adequate to the object and discovers that this object is nothing other than itself, in the articulated totality of its constitutive moments. It is only with respect to the ultimate step of absolute knowing that the dialectic takes on all its meaning.

²"In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it liberates itself from appearance, the appearance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as another; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, the presentation of experience coincides with the authentic science of the spirit. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself" (*ibid.*, p. 145).

The ultimate term of the movement is therefore indeed a point where science and experience rejoin each other; science, that is to say here, philosophy—discovers that it was immanent to experience; and experience shows itself as being nothing other than the very content of knowing as absolute knowing—that is, as absolute Spirit. Consciousness discovers fully what it is; it reaches its true being. And what manifests itself to consciousness no longer manifests itself according to appearance as something external, but indeed as a constitutive moment of consciousness itself (inasmuch as fully revealed to itself in absolute knowing). We are therefore beyond the phenomenon, the pure appearing; we have rejoined the essence, the intimate nature of both consciousness and reality, by discovering that reality and consciousness become identical with each other in the absolute Spirit. Since this moment of coincidence involves the reflexive grasp of itself, it has the nature of a knowing, a knowing of the total reality and a knowing of oneself: this is the absolute knowing.

present to itself, thus constituting itself. Philosophy for its part is only the expression of this reflection in an articulated discourse.

What Hegel calls the dialectic is precisely this movement which runs through experience.¹ And the term of this movement is the full constitution of the absolute knowing, the moment when experience has totally unfolded itself and becomes aware of itself in the totality of its unfolding; or, in other words, the moment when interior and exterior, consciousness and its object, come into coincidence in the fully accomplished reflection which, by understanding itself perfectly, understands that reality is nothing other than the very movement of reflection; that is to say, Spirit.²

History is only the external translation in time of the becoming which is immanent to experience. It represents under the form of the succession of different epochs what logic shows to us under the form of the generating of concepts. And this, not after the manner of an image or of a projection. It is the same movement which animates logic and history, because the concept is time or, inversely, because time is nothing other than the becoming which is immanent to the concept. If philosophy is a seizing in discourse of what experience makes visible, philosophy can only say of the real what experience—the experience which shows itself in history—has already made apparent. Each philosopher says what already accomplished history has brought to maturity at the moment when he expresses himself.

However, a moment comes—and Hegel believes himself to be at this moment—when we enter into the end of history; that is to say, when all the content of reality has fully manifested itself, or, in other words, when the phenomenon has entirely passed into the essence. The “end of history” is therefore not an end in the sense of a term beyond which there would be nothing more; it is an end in the sense of a completed maturation, of a manifestation which has become plenary. There is “end of history” at the moment when the becoming of reality has made fully apparent the essential content of reality; that is to say, its intelligible structure, its rational stuff. Men will evidently be able to continue living after the “end of history” as before, but it will no longer be in exactly the same manner. It will be in a life fully penetrated by the rational and apt to understand itself adequately in its rational nature. But the concrete form under which this end of

history must present itself can only be philosophy. For if this end is the full manifestation of the essence of reality, it can only be a manifestation in which reality reveals itself for what it is; that is to say, as spirit. And this grasping of reality itself as spirit is the reflection which recuperates all the moments of the becoming as its proper constituent moments. This reflection expresses the full manifestation of the essence of reality in the absolute discourse which is philosophy.

The sign by which we can recognize that we are at the end of history cannot, therefore, be an external sign, like an event or a historical situation; such a sign can be found only in philosophy. What warns us that we are at the end of history is that we have become able to think a philosophy in which reason or spirit expresses itself completely. For this would not be possible—reflection being only able to follow real becoming—if reason had not already made itself fully manifest in historical reality. What allows us to see that reason expresses itself completely in our philosophy is that this philosophy takes on the character of a total reflection. It not only unfolds a system of categories, but it shows that this system is complete because it arrives precisely at Spirit as infinite reflection of itself in itself, at Spirit which retakes everything into itself and which consequently retakes itself (inasmuch as supreme moment of the dialectic) into itself (inasmuch as absolute reflection).³ If Hegel believed himself able to announce the end of history, it is precisely because he had elaborated a philosophy of absolute reflection. This philosophy, at the same time manifestation and thought of the end of history, could only be for him the last philosophy. From the moment when the content of reality has fully revealed itself as the totality of the figures of the manifestation of the Spirit, and when the content of the Spirit has fully manifested itself in the discourse of philosophy, the task of reflection

³"The goal, however, is fixed for knowledge just as necessarily as the succession in the process. The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the concept corresponds with the object and the object with the concept" (*ibid.*, pp. 137-38).

Inasmuch as it is a progression, the knowing which expresses itself in

philosophy tends towards a term which is its end. And this term corresponds to the moment of the total reflection of knowing in itself, to the moment where knowing recovers itself fully. In this reflection, the object and the concept rejoin each other, consciousness and reality become identical with each other, interior and exterior come into coincidence with one another.

is fulfilled. There remains nothing to do henceforth but to live in the comprehensive possession of totally accomplished truth.

If Hegelian philosophy appeared to its creator as the last philosophy, it was both in the sense of a recapitulation and in the sense of an accomplishment—recapitulation because, being the expression of the absolute reflection, it had necessarily to retake into itself all the successive moments of the reflection, such as they had expressed themselves in the different philosophies of history; and accomplishment, because, retaking all the philosophies of the past in the perspective of the absolute reflection, it made apparent their real meaning and showed their truth. The truth of each one of those anterior philosophies was precisely to be a moment in the constituting of the absolute reflection and therefore a moment in the constituting of this ultimate philosophy, in which this absolute reflection came to its own expression.

III. THE END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A RENEWAL OF REASON

The manner in which Hegel considered his own philosophy might seem to be only a vain intellectualistic pretension. Reality mocks the systems; history gives rise to ever new situations and meanings; reason has not finished exploring its own domain. And yet, when we look at Hegelian philosophy from the crisis-situation which has marked reason in the contemporary epoch, we are strongly tempted to think that this philosophy really was the last one and that it was the last in the sense of revealing the failure of philosophy. Its too perfect success makes its truth doubtful. And through it, the entire philosophical undertaking becomes subject to question. The Tarpeian rock is near the Capitol! The moment of what is apparently the greatest triumph is also the moment of ruin. It could be that Hegelian philosophy has been like the last glittering of philosophical reason and that, with it, the inanity of philosophical understanding has appeared in a definitive light.

In a certain sense, we can say that now the time of the philosophers is over. It is over now because we are returning to the most ancient times, to the time of the poets, the heroes, the demons but also the time of men without name, without face, without word, to the anonymous men of the technological societies—the engineers, the

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

physicists, the economists, the men of the atom and of the rockets, the psychoanalysts, the mathematicians, the statisticians, and the strategists with all their pomps and works, voiceless phantoms of a world become desert, a world from which meaning has withdrawn, from which—as Hölderlin says—the gods have fled; a world of scrap-iron and nightmare reigns over the shapeless universality of pure absence.

But the crisis of reason in which we are can also mean a new birth of reason. Perhaps the strength of Logos is not at all exhausted by the trials of the present times. Perhaps, as Hegel thought, the patience and the suffering of the negative are needed in order that Logos reveal itself better to itself.⁴ Perhaps meaning is born only in the apparent destruction of meaning. Perhaps positivity is enveloped in negativity and intimately mixed with it.

It is precisely the greatness of Hegel to have given elements in his philosophy which enable us to go beyond his philosophy. There was, in Hegel, the extraordinary ambition to give to the rationalist ideal its most achieved expression under the form of a total discourse. And

⁴"Spirit only conquers its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder . . . spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it" (*ibid.*, p. 93).

For Hegel, the moment of opposition, of negation, is intrinsic to spirit itself; and spirit can recover itself only by going through this moment and by recognizing it as intrinsic to itself.

⁵"It is not surprising that we already find in *Descartes* the idea of a universal mathematics. . . . From then on the world and philosophy acquire correlatively an entirely new face. The world must be in itself a rational world, in the new sense of rationality, which has been borrowed from mathematics and from mathematized nature and, correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the world, must be constructed as a unitary rational theory '*more geometrico*' " (*Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*. Husserliana, Band VI [The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff], p. 62).

⁶"In geometrical and physical mathematization, we adapt to the lived world—to the world which is continuously

given to us as real in our concrete everyday life, in the open infinity of possible experiences—an adequate *dress of ideas*, the one of the so-called objective scientific truths; in other terms, according to a method which must be followed (according to what we hope from it) really and to details and which maintains itself in a stable manner; we first construct determined numerical indices for the real and possible sensible qualities of the intuitive concrete objects of the lived world; thereby we become capable of foreseeing the concrete events of the world which are not yet or which are no longer given in a real manner and which nevertheless belong to the intuition of the lived world; this kind of prevision infinitely surpasses the prevision of everyday life" (*ibid.*, p. 51).

It is by analyzing the modern conception of physics, as it has been elaborated in the Galilean physics, that Husserl arrives at this conception of science as an ideal substitute for the lived world. The mathematization of nature realized by modern physics has precisely the significance of substituting ideal forms for intuitive data.

this seems to us to be excessive. But there was also a sort of heroic intrepidity about a philosophy in which thought determines to remain faithful to itself through every trial and to save, notwithstanding every obstacle, the ideal of an apodictic and fully self-conscious knowledge. There was also the recognition of the link which exists between explicit reason and what is not yet reason. Nature is not the absolute contrary of Logos. Nature already envelops rationality in itself, and the internal movement of the life of the Absolute Spirit is the revelation of this hidden rationality. But those two ideas can receive an interpretation which is very different from the one they receive in the general context of the Hegelian system.

IV. HUSSERL AND THE RETURN TO THE "LEBENSWELT" AS A KEY FOR A NEW CONCEPTION OF REASON

In this century a philosopher has appeared who has tried, along different ways, to give a new philosophical expression to those two ideas: Edmund Husserl. In the work of Husserl we find an imposing and heroic endeavor to reconquer in its purity and its truth the old idea of Logos and to save reason from the crisis which threatened it. For Husserl, this crisis concerns not reason itself, but rationalism; that is, the narrow conception of reason which was born from a bad interpretation of the meaning of science.

Physico-mathematical science describes the world for us by means of an apparatus of ideal representations which enables us to obtain a precise and rigorous knowledge, a knowledge which, in its turn, enables us to make predictions which experience comes to confirm. As a result, physico-mathematical science has been interpreted as describing the objective world and has been taken as a model for every valid knowledge of reality. Rationalism, the bad rationalism which is responsible for the crisis of reason, is the philosophical conception which pretends to make of scientific knowledge, in the sense of physico-mathematical science, the pre-eminent archetype and the paradigm of all rational knowing.⁵

But we must notice in meditating upon the conditions of science itself and upon the origins of the contemporary crisis of reason, that science describes to us only a constructed universe which is not the true world, which is an ideal world substituted for the true world.⁶

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

Science presupposes necessarily an experience which is prescientific and ante-predicative, and in which the real world is given to us. It is this experience, the experience of the lived world, of the *Lebenswelt*, which is really the root of science, as well as of every form of rational activity.⁷ Science describes to us as being the "real world" a world which is made of idealized particles, of fields, of vibrations; and it "explains" everything which we perceive, the whole universe of sensible qualities, by means of purely quantitative modifications which find their expression in mathematical models. But there is an experience in which we really perceive tones, colors, odors, flavors; in which we really feel the cold and the warm, the dry and the wet, the hard and the soft, the heavy and the light.⁸ And it is this experience which is the absolute ground of every experience, of every truth and all meaning.

Philosophy itself, being a reflection upon experience in general and in its totality, must try to describe and to understand the *Lebenswelt*; and it is with this aim in mind that Husserl proposed his famous transcendental reduction, his famous placing in parentheses, his *époque*, or suspension. This reduction must enable us to return to the pure subject of the natural experience of the *Lebenswelt* and to see how this experience constitutes itself for us.⁹ From there, philosophy will have

"The so-called evidences of science are not primary. Science itself implies certain presuppositions. Science is essentially idealization. It aims at the world which is given in experience through ideal forms. By analyzing the meaning of those ideal forms, it is possible to recover what is aimed at through them; we are then in the presence of what is already there prior to science, of what must necessarily be already there in order that science be possible—the lived world. It is in this world that all the evidences are finally founded. The evidences of science are therefore not primary; they are derived; they are relative to the primitive evidences of the lived world."

"Coming back rapidly to our preceding considerations, let us recall the fact which has been made conspicuous, namely that science is a product of the human mind which, as well in its historical becoming as for every one of those who study it, presupposes, as a

starting point, the surrounding lived world *Lebensumwelt*, given in advance in intuition as being the common world and as the common world—but which presupposes also continuously, in its unfolding and its progression, this same surrounding world, after the manner in which it gives itself again and again to the scientists" (*ibid.*, p. 123).

The lived world "is given in advance to us all, as persons living within the horizon of the human community and therefore in every actual relation which we have with the others, as 'the world', the world common to all. And thus, as we have explained in detail, it is the permanent foundation of every validity, an ever ready source of evidences to which we make appeal quite naturally, be it as practical men or as scientists" (*ibid.*, p. 124).

⁷"What we experience in pre-scientific life as colors, tones, warmth, and weight of things themselves, what we perceive in a causal manner as

to show how the other strata of our total experience and, in particular, scientific experience constitute themselves from the starting point of the *Lebenswelt*.

Thus the idea of reduction is really the key to a new conception of reason. Thanks to it, philosophy once more finds a meaning and a

calorific radiation of a body which warms the surrounding bodies and so on, all of this indicates naturally, 'from the point of view of physics', acoustical vibrations, calorific vibrations, as pure processes of the world of forms" (*ibid.*, p. 35).

And yet, all these scientific constructions presuppose necessarily more fundamental certitudes. "It belongs to the evidences which are at the bottom of all scientific thinking and of all philosophical calling into question, that the world is, is always there, and that every correction of an opinion, of an opinion of experience or of all other opinion, presupposes already the world which is; namely, as an ever unquestionable horizon of being-validity, and, within this horizon, some permanence of something known and certain in an indubitable manner, and with respect to which that which has been deprived of value, possibly as nothingness, is in contradiction" (*ibid.*, pp. 112-13).

⁹The reflexive return to the lived world, as source of meaning and truth, is evidently completely different from (nonreflexive) life in the lived world. This return implies a rupture with the natural attitude and the establishment of a transcendental attitude: this is precisely the meaning of the *épochè*.

"But how can the pre-given character of the lived world become a proper and universal theme? Manifestly it can become so only in virtue of a *total modification* of the natural attitude, a modification in which we no longer live, as before, as men of natural existence, in the permanent value-accomplishment of the pre-given world. On the contrary, there must be this total modification of the natural attitude in

which we constantly avoid this accomplishment. It is only in this manner that we can reach the new and modified theme, 'the pre-giving of the world as such'—the pure world, quite exclusively, according as it has meaning and being-value and according to the manner in which it has meaning and being-value and in which it acquires meaning and being-value in ever new forms, in the center of our conscious life. It is only in this manner that we can study what the world is as foundational validity of the natural life, in every one of its projects and possessions, and, correlative, what the natural life and its subjectivity are; ultimately that is, what it is in a pure manner as that subjectivity which operates there as accomplishing the validity. The life which constitutes the mundane validity of the natural, mundane life cannot be studied in the attitude of the natural, mundane life. This study demands therefore a *total reversing*, a universal *épochè* of a quite singular nature" (*ibid.*, p. 151).

The unveiling of the lived world as such is, ipso facto, the unveiling of the subjectivity which operates in the experience of the lived world. This subjectivity is not a substance-subject, it is a pure function, a pure pole. What the *épochè* makes visible is that the fundamental structure of the primitive experience of the lived world is the transcendental correlation of consciousness and the world. In this correlation, consciousness appears as the pure correlate of the world—*ego cogito cogitata*; that is, as transcendental subject. This explains how the *épochè* which unveils the lived world is a transcendental reduction.

Thanks to the *épochè*, says Husserl,
Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

justification; the transcendental life, discovered and revealed by the *époque*, opens up for thought a boundless field of research and gives philosophy its proper object. And thus the project of philosophical knowledge is taken up again in a radical and definitive manner. It must lead to the establishment of a superior knowing, of a science in the highest sense of the term, really universal and really radical, covering the whole field of experience and supplying itself with its own foundation.¹⁰ Philosophy is indeed the accomplishment of reason; at the same time it is the discovery that the internal meaning of experience is rational, that experience in its totality is reason—and reason's understanding of itself by itself. The reflection upon experience is identically the self-reflection of reason upon itself; because reflection upon experience is possible only through the reduction to the pure subject, the transcendental ego, for whom there is experience (*ego cogito cogitata*). Consequently, reflection upon experience is reflection upon the ego.¹¹ By reflecting upon itself the ego understands itself,

the eyes of the philosopher are liberated from what, in the natural attitude, bind them to the evidence of the world as pre-given. "In and with this deliverance is given the discovery of the universal and absolutely original correlation, closed in itself in an absolute manner, of the world itself and of consciousness of the world. . . . And finally becomes visible what must be seized as the ultimate datum: the absolute correlation of every being, whatever its nature may be, and of every meaning on the one hand and of absolute subjectivity on the other hand, inasmuch as it constitutes all meaning and all being-validity in this ultimate mode" (*ibid.*, p. 154).

The reduction to the lived world leads us therefore to the discovery of the transcendental subject; consequently it is a transcendental reduction. The texts of the *Krisis* thus enable us, inversely, to interpret the reduction to the transcendental Ego which appears in the anterior works from the point of view of the reduction to the lived world.

Thus, in the *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, Husserl raised the problem of the ultimate foundation of logic and, through logic, of science in general. He found this foundation in

transcendental subjectivity, conceived as the "intentional pole of experience" and presented as the "only being existing in an absolute manner."

"Every existing being [in contradistinction to the false ideal of a being existing in an absolute manner and having an absolute truth] is finally relative and, along with all that is relative in any current sense, is relative to the transcendental subjectivity. But the transcendental subjectivity alone is in itself and for itself and this even in a hierarchical order corresponding to the constitution which leads to the different levels of the transcendental intersubjectivity" (*Formal and Transcendental Logic*. After the French trans. of S. Bachelard [Paris, Presses Universitaires de France], p. 362).

Such a text runs the risk of being misinterpreted in an idealistic sense. The texts of the *Krisis* on the lived world are the ones which explain to us the true meaning of the transcendental subject. Moreover, Husserl himself compares the procedure of the *Krisis* with that of the *Ideen* [*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*]. The way followed in the *Ideen* has the disadvantage, he says, of leading us too quickly to the

understands itself as being capable of understanding itself and as open to an infinite life of the understanding; that is, the ego understands itself as reason. But since the description of the structures of the ego is nothing other than the description of the structures of experience and therefore of the world such as it is given to us, of the world as system of the phenomena, the self-understanding of the ego, which consists in the description of its essential structures, is at the same time discovery of reason in itself by itself and discovery of the rationality of experience and thus of the world as it is given to us.¹²

Ego and of putting us in front of a subjectivity which is apparently void of any content (*Die Krisis*, p. 158). This text of Husserl explicitly authorizes us to connect the reduction to the transcendental Ego which appears in the anterior works with the *époque* which is analyzed in the *Krisis*.

¹⁰"The reason which is now in question is nothing other than the really universal and the really radical self-understanding of spirit in the form of a universal and responsible science, in which a thoroughly new mode of the scientific ideal is made effective, in which every conceivable question—questions about being and questions about norms, questions about what is called existence—finds its place" (*Die Krisis*, p. 346).

¹¹"*Phenomenology in its entirety* is nothing more than the *becoming-conscious by itself of the transcendental subjectivity*, a scientific becoming-conscious which first operates in an immediate manner, with a certain naïveté, but which then considers in a critical manner its own *logos*. . . . Every objective being, every truth has its being-foundation and its knowledge-foundation in the transcendental subjectivity; and if the truth in question is a truth which concerns the transcendental subjectivity itself, then it has its foundation precisely in this subjectivity itself" (*Logic*, pp. 363-64).

Philosophy is a radical endeavor to understand experience in its totality. But experience can only be understood radically by a return to the lived

world; and this return itself can be performed only by an unveiling of the transcendental life, of the primitive transcendental correlation of the Ego and world. The task of philosophy, under the form of transcendental phenomenology, is therefore to make explicit the transcendental life, the life of the transcendental Ego. But to make this life explicit is to make explicit the Ego in all its correlations and in all its transcendental functions. Since the Ego is simply the "intentional pole of experience," to analyze the structures of the Ego is, *ipso facto*, to analyze the transcendental, constitutive structures of experience and thereby to supply experience in its totality with a radical foundation.

¹²The philosophical life, as Husserl understands it, is the life of absolute reason becoming conscious of itself; it is life in the transcendental intersubjectivity (of Ego's inasmuch as transcendental and as transcendently open to each other); it retakes the non-philosophical life in its truth (life in the natural attitude, scientific life, and so on); it is also a life in which man, by trying to reach the foundations of his experiences and of his being, makes himself fully responsible for himself as reason; it is a life which unfolds itself in the perspective of apodicticity, of a certitude which is really founded and which provides itself with its own foundation; it is a life which, as life in reason, is a blessed life; it is a life, finally, which is open to an infinite task,

V. HUSSERLIAN CONCEPTION OF REASON, THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

This means that we have with Husserl a considerable broadening of the concept of reason. The rational is no longer just what is repre-

which is going towards the *telos* of an absolute science, of the absolute self-apodicity of reason.

We must cite here the entire last sentence of the *Krisis*, in which Husserl describes the task of philosophy and makes the philosophical life be seen as the vocation and the duty of man as bearer of reason.

"Thus begins a philosophy of the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as bearer of absolute reason coming towards itself, of this reason as implying in its apodicitic being-for-itself its co-objects and all the possible co-philosophers. Thus begins the discovery of the absolute intersubjectivity (objectivated in the world as the whole of mankind) as the one in which reason is in indefinite progress in darkening, in clearing up, and in the movement of luminous self-understanding; thus begins the discovery of the necessary concrete mode of being of the absolute subjectivity in the final analysis, of the transcendental subjectivity in a transcendental life of continuous "world-constitution" and, at the same time correlatively, the new discovery of the world which is, the meaning of the being of which, as transcendently constituted, gives a new meaning to what, on former levels, was called world, world-truth, and world-knowledge. But this new discovery by the very fact also gives a new meaning to human existence, to the existence of man in the spatio-temporal pre-given world as self-objectivation of the transcendental subjectivity, its being, and its constituting life; thus begins further the ultimate self-understanding of man as responsible for his proper human being, his *self-understanding as being in a being-called to a life in apodiciticity* —not only developing an abstract science, apodicitic in the ordinary sense

—but a self-understanding which realizes its whole concrete being in an apodicitic liberty for an apodicitic life, active in everybody, a life of reason, in which this life is humanity. Thus begins, as has been said, a life which understands itself as reasonable, which understands that it is reasonable in a willing to be reasonable, that this means an infinity of life and of striving towards reason, that reason signifies precisely that towards which man as man in his most intimate being strives, that which alone can satisfy him and make him 'blessed'; a life which understands further that reason will tolerate no distinction between 'theoretical,' 'practical,' 'aesthetic,' and so on, that the being of man is a teleological being and a being which is subject to obligation, and that this teleology is present in every activity and project coming from the ego; a life which understands that the apodicitic *telos* can be recognized in every action and project through self-understanding, and that this knowledge of final self-understanding has no other form than a self-understanding according to a-priori principles, than a self-understanding in the form of philosophy" (*Die Krisis*, pp. 275-76).

¹³"The world, as lived world, already has in a prescientific way the 'same' structures as those structures which the objective sciences—in accordance with their implicit acceptation (which with the tradition of the centuries has become an evidence) of an underlying world, existing 'in itself' and determined according to 'self-evident truths'—presuppose as aprioristic structures and which they develop systematically in aprioristic sciences, sciences of the Logos, universal methodical norms to which every knowledge of the existing world, 'objective in itself,' must be submitted" (*ibid.*, p. 142).

sentable in a physico-mathematical knowledge, but the rational is coextensive with the self-explicitation of the ego by itself; that is, of experience by itself. It is reason, the rational within experience itself, that makes it open to a limitless self-explicitation. This conception rejoins, then, the first perspective of Hegel—confidence in reason as the essential armature of human existence.

On the other hand, as we see, this broadening of reason shows us that the rational activity of philosophical reflection is only the explicitation of what is contained in the fundamental experience of the *Lebenswelt*. This explains why this experience, although not clear to itself in itself and not explicitated, although opaque to itself, so to speak, is nevertheless inhabited by a meaning; this explains why meaning can be revealed by philosophical reflection. In particular, the type of rationality which is proper to the positive sciences is explained as founded in the structures of the lived world.¹³ Scientific rationality is already traced, as in a mold, in the lived world. For example, geometrical space is already precontained in lived space. In a general way, everything which belongs to the sphere of explicitation and thus of predication is already present in the ante-predicative sphere of the nonexplicitated. Much more, it is not the ego as constituting subjectivity which produces the rationality of experience or even which discovers the immanent rationality of the lived world. It is the lived world itself which produces, so to speak, rational experience, which reveals itself and explicitates itself as revealable and capable of being rendered explicit; that is to say, as rational. And this corresponds to the second perspective of Hegel. Spirit is already present in nature, and alienation is not only an obstacle; it is, on the contrary, the active production of the spirit. The suffering of the negative is the suffering of childbirth. It is not the spirit which, from the height of absolute reflection, discovers nature as one of its moments; it is the internal movement, present in nature itself, which goes beyond the opacity of nature and discovers itself progressively as, first, capable of self-explicitation; then, in the realization of this self-explicitation, as spirit; and, finally, in the adequate and total accomplishment of this self-explicitation, as absolute spirit.

This philosophical perspective shows itself to be capable of integrating the new results of the sciences of man. If the human reality is

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

reason, it is not so in the sense of a pure presence to oneself or of a clear and distinct reason. There is a hidden reason in what is called the unconscious; there is a reason of dream and of illness, of customs and of speech. And this reason is the true root of what appears in the explicitated region of meaning. This reason is truly productive. And

¹⁴The *Lebenswelt* is the ultimate foundation whereupon are built the different levels of human experience. No truth would be possible, no value would be accessible, if there were not somewhere a domain of first, fundamental evidence.

What characterizes evidence is that it is a mode of knowledge in which "the thing itself" is given. Perception is the most original form of it. However, "fundamental evidence" does not mean "absolute evidence." When the "thing itself" gives itself to us, it is with the permanent possibility of modification, of correction, of retaking; it gives itself, not in an exhaustive manner, but as the theme of an open experience which can always be renewed and enriched; to put it briefly, it gives itself in an infinite "horizon" of possible experiences.

Husserl had already approached the problem of the *Lebenswelt* in *Formale und transzendentale Logik* in form of a critique of evidence.

"Evidence means . . . the intentional accomplishment of the giving of the things themselves. . . . However, we must here indicate immediately that evidence has diverse modes of originality. The primitive mode of giving of the things themselves is perception" (*Logic*, pp. 214-15).

"Experience means here . . . giving of the thing itself, evidence in general . . . it is absolutely obvious to anyone, unless he is lost in philosophy, that the thing perceived in perception is *the thing itself* in its being-present which is proper to it, and that when perceptions are delusive, this means that they are in conflict with new perceptions which show with certitude what is actually *in the place* of what was only illusion. What are the other questions which must be raised here? In any case they must be raised with respect to the experiences under consid-

eration; and it is through the intentional analysis of these experiences and in an essential generality that one can understand how an experience in itself can give, as thing seized by it, an existing being itself and how, nevertheless, this existing being can be cancelled; how, by virtue of its very essence, such an experience indicates, in its horizon, other possible experiences which confirm it, but how also, by virtue of its very essence, it leaves open the possibility that other experiences could manifest themselves which would be in conflict with it and which would lead to corrections under the form of determination-modifications or of complete canceling (in the case of an appearance)" (*ibid.*, pp. 272-73).

We find the same theory of perception, characterized by a structure of horizon, in the *Krisis* (pp. 160-61): "If I remain in perception, I already have nevertheless the full awareness of the thing, such as I see it already at first glance as this thing. Looking at it, I 'aim' continuously at it with all its facets, which are not at all given to me, not even under the form of intuitive pre-presentifications. Perception therefore always has, 'according to the mode of consciousness which is proper to it' a *horizon* which already belongs to its object (to this object which is aimed at in it)."

We have access to truth, but not to a truth in itself which should be given to us somewhere in an exhaustive manner. This results from the very structure of our experience, such as the phenomenological analysis reveals it to us.

"But what have we to think about all the experiences which we have of the world, about what is given to us with certitude in an immediate manner as being spatio-temporal? This is given to us with certainty, but this certitude can be modalized, can become dubious;

this is absolutely essential. For empirical rationalism, consciousness is pure receptivity; there is an outside and an inside; and the inside is the mere reflection, the mere reproduction of the outside. For idealistic rationalism, the opposite is true. Consciousness is pure activity. There are external data; but it is the subject, as supreme synthetic form, which produces the unity of those data and gives them meaning. For contemporary rationalism, for phenomenological rationalism in any case, the subject is neither pure passivity nor pure activity. This is because the subject is complex. As consciousness, that is, as bearer of a system of explicitated meanings, it is immersed in a field which is not consciousness, which is not explicit presence of a meaning or presence to oneself, but which nevertheless is inhabited by meaning and is the producer of meaning. It is therefore non-explicitated experience which bears within itself the destiny of reason and of meaning; and the reflection of reason upon itself must be reflection upon this inchoative and immanent presence of reason in that which is not yet itself but in which reason is nevertheless already present entirely.

VI. THE LIMITS OF THE HUSSERLIAN RATIONALISM, FINITE SUBJECTIVITY AND TELEOLOGY OF REASON

However, if it is true that the Husserlian perspective rejoins in a double manner the Hegelian perspective, there is nevertheless an absolutely fundamental difference between the Hegelian conception and the Husserlian conception of reason. For Hegel, reason is the self-accomplishment of itself under the form of total reflection, expressed in the total system of absolute Knowing. For Husserl, on the contrary, there is nothing which resembles a total reflection. And, moreover, this is a necessary consequence of his conception of the *Lebenswelt* as the absolute ground of experience. For him, the life of reason is not indeed the infinite movement of reflection; it is the self-explicitation of the *Lebenswelt* itself. But the fundamental type of experience belonging to the *Lebenswelt* is perception; and what characterizes perception is that it gives us the thing itself, but in an infinite multiplicity of possible givings.¹⁴ Thus there is indeed presence of the thing in itself—it is not just an appearance or a representation

which we perceive—but this presence is not, is never, an exhaustive presence. Experience is therefore an ever-open concatenation of presentations.

And this refers us back to the structure of the subject itself, which is temporal, which is, much more, temporalization. The life of the subject is thus the never-ceasing movement of the passage of the future into the past; it is therefore a succession of presences which are constituted by a pure passing. There is therefore no pure and full presence but only presences which are as if corroded from the interior by the fall into the past, which withdraws them from our control and,

it can, in the course of the evolution of experience, dissolve itself into mere illusion. No immediate experience-proposition gives me a being for what it is in itself; experience never gives anything but a term which is aimed at with certitude, a term which must find its confirmation in the becoming of my living experience. But simple confirmation, which lies in the consistency of real experience, does not preserve me from the possibility of illusion" (*Die Krisis*, pp. 269-70).

Therefore we have to do only with relative truths. And yet we are sustained by the idea of absolute truth. Philosophy will be the effort of reason to live according to this idea. From this follows the teleological conception of reason which we find in Husserl.

"How can thought reach something other than relative truths? Yet the man of everyday life is not without reason . . . but has the complete idea, 'truth in itself,' a meaning for him? Is not this idea, and correlatively the idea of being in itself, a philosophical invention? And yet it is not a question here of a fiction, of an invention without significance and which would be dispensable, but of an invention which raises man to a new degree of being, which is called to raise him in a new historicity of human life, whose entelechy is this new idea and the corresponding philosophical and scientific praxis, the methodology of a scientific thinking of a new type" (*ibid.*, pp. 270-71).

¹⁵"The actual Ego performs thus an accomplishment wherein it constitutes as being (under the mode of the past) a form of modification of itself. From this one can understand how the actual Ego, the Ego which is present in a permanent flux, constitutes itself in its self-temporalization as lasting through its past states. In the same way the actual Ego, the already lasting Ego of the primordial sphere of duration, constitutes in itself another as other. The self-temporalization which occurs, so to speak, by depresentification (by reminiscence) has its analogue in the alienation of the Ego (*Einfühlung* as a de-presentification of a higher level—that of the fundamental presence of the Ego in a simply presentified fundamental presence)" (*ibid.*, p. 189).

Husserl establishes here a connection between the problem of temporality and the problem of presence to others. The present is not pure present; it is a present which is temporalizing, which constitutes itself as being at the same time presence and absence (under the form of the past and of the future). Presence to others, implies, analogously, a going out of oneself; it occurs in a fundamental presence (presence of myself to myself) which is open in the interior of itself to another-than-myself. There is moreover not only analogy but fundamental linking between those two problems; it is the fundamental structure of the Ego, such as it manifests itself in temporality, which makes possible openness to others.

¹⁶See, for this, the conclusion of the *Krisis*, cited in n. 12.

by the announcement of the future, introduces into them an inescapable modification. It is for this reason that reflection itself is inexhaustible; it is always open, as is the very experiences which it must explicitate, because it is the reflection of a subject linked with time and consequently not entirely present to itself. The presentification which accomplishes itself in the present is accompanied by the depresentification which is correlative with the past and with the future and which means that we are given to ourselves, that we do not make ourselves; in one word, that we are finite.¹⁵

Under these conditions, reason must be conceived as an infinite task, as a duty, a guiding idea, a horizon. It cannot be conceived as a pure actuality. The life of reason in us is this infinite march towards an absolute apodicticity which we shall never be able to reach but which nevertheless has a meaning and a reality for us, not as a present datum or a finite determination, but as a demand, an inspiration, an appeal—let us dare to say, a vocation.¹⁶

We are concerned, then, with a doctrine of finite subjectivity. This philosophy does not present itself as a metaphysic, if by metaphysic we must understand a doctrine of the absolute. But perhaps the metaphysical question must also be finally encountered in this perspective. If I am open transcendentally as a reasonable being to an infinite task, what is the meaning of this openness itself? Must we not consider the openness as openness? But this would lead us toward a very different perspective. We should then have to understand Logos not only as an accomplishment which gives significance to our life—thus in a purely anthropological perspective—but as the reverberation in us of that by virtue of which there is meaning and speech, the reverberation in us of originary truth. We should then be obliged—and this is what we find in the philosophy of Heidegger—to understand the very being of man as openness within the transcendental openness of Being and to see in man, inasmuch as inhabited by a Logos, the shepherd of the Being.

VII. REASON AS AN INFINITE TASK,
LIFE OF THEORETICAL REASON IN THE HORIZON OF TRUTH,
LIFE OF PRACTICAL REASON IN THE HORIZON OF MORALITY

But we shall limit ourselves here to evoking these perspectives in order to come back to our theme on the broadening of reason. What was able to make us doubt for a moment the possibilities of philosophy was, on the one hand, as was indicated above, the place which has been taken by positive science and the interpretations which have been given of this latter under the form of positivism. But it was also, on the other hand, the spectacle of historical becoming, which, far from conforming itself to rational insights, has shown on the contrary all the strength of irrational factors and has led us to reactivate the category of fate. If we want to give back to philosophy its vigor and justify its undertaking, we must meet this double difficulty. We must, on the one hand, show that scientific rationality does not exhaust the domain of reason, that it must be founded in a superior rationality, and that philosophy precisely is able to illuminate what science gives us to perceive without giving us the means to understand it in a really radical manner. And we must, on the other hand, reinterpret historical action in such a manner as to take control, from the point of view of the demands of philosophical understanding, over fate itself. The new philosophical conception of reason enables us, to be sure, to integrate the results of the new sciences of man. But do they enable us to understand the failures of history and the tragedy of historical existence? Yes, if we understand reason as an infinite task. The life according to reason is not only explication in discourse; it is also the explication of human existence and interhuman relationships according to norms; that is, in conformity with the demands of reason itself. To will oneself as reason is to will the universal advent of reason in all and in each one; it is thus to will not only a universal apodictic knowing but also a universal society of absolute reciprocity.

We cannot actually build this universal science or this universal society. There is something which acts as a screen, so to speak, between our endeavors and our aims. But negativity itself is productive, and there is a subterranean advance of reason in history. What we can do is try to make explicit this advance everywhere where this is

¹⁷See, *Les aventures de la dialectique* (Paris, Gallimard) but chiefly the work which remains so far the fundamental

work of Merleau-Ponty, *La phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris, Gallimard).

possible; the reasonable policy consists in moving in the direction of what matures in history and thus in refusing useless violence as well as sterile opposition. But what counts is what sustains the effort. We cannot dream of a society of universal reconciliation for the day after tomorrow; we cannot even dream of it as something realizable. But we must pursue its realization as an ideal.

There is therefore a horizon of truth, as apodictic absolute science, and a horizon of morality, as society of absolute reciprocity. It is this double horizon which characterizes the life of reason. Thus, according to this perspective, reason is the hope of reason; that is to say, the hope of significance, which is the hope of truth and of morality. It is this hope which gives a present meaning to each of our steps, in the measure that they are inspired by the perspective of the reasonable life—and this is the case, whether it be steps of knowledge, in science or in philosophy, or steps of action, in the historical and political life. To live in this hope is perhaps difficult. The life of reason is a life which is not at all easy, and many prefer to it the simplicity of the immediate life of sensibility, of feeling, or of passion. The life of reason often demands courage and sometimes heroism. But the greatness of human life is at this price.

VIII. THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTICS AND THE CONCEPT OF "KAIROS" AS EXPRESSIONS OF THE NEW CONCEPTION OF REASON

Husserl, to be sure, is not the last word of contemporary philosophy. He has opened up a perspective and has had the merit of giving a new form to the ideal of rationalism, great rationalism, the one of the reasonable life of Logos. But in his language, Husserl has perhaps not always succeeded in adequately expressing his fundamental inspiration. It is not certain, for example, that the philosophy of the transcendental ego is the best expression of this inspiration, and we can even suspect that it is as a screen which dissimulates what is essential in this inspiration. This inspiration is much better represented by the notion of *Lebenswelt*. And we could, with Merleau-Ponty, reintroduce a classical Hegelian concept, the concept of dialectic, in order to express more adequately the real content of this broadened conception of reason.¹⁷

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

Consciousness, we have seen, is neither purely receptive nor purely productive. It is neither pure passivity nor pure activity—neither purely submissive to things nor purely constitutive (and the theory of the transcendental ego is full of misunderstandings because it describes the ego as constituting). On the other hand, the world—that is, the content of our experience, what is given—is neither totally opaque nor totally transparent. In our interchange with the world we give and receive, we make and are made. Latent meanings inhabit this world and it is our behavior, the lived movement of our existence, which, by going toward things, reveals this significance and constitutes it as a meaning for us. Our life is, as it were, inscribed in stipple drawing in the middle of things; but on the other hand our action effectively transforms the world by revealing what it contained in itself. The dialectic is this never-ceasing interchange by which we make ourselves in making the world and by which the world makes itself in making us. We have had such or such behavior; the result of this behavior has passed into the things of the world, in the form of words, institutions, social or historical actions. In their turn, those things propose new actions, induce in us certain attitudes and certain types of behavior. But there is always an indetermination in the things. The significance which they carry is a significance which is not yet entirely fixed, so that the same thing is capable of carrying many diverse meanings according to what we are going to do with them. And we ourselves, for our part, are at the same time both undetermined and over-determined. It is only through the encounter with the things of the world that we reveal ourselves to ourselves, that our liberty takes on a concrete shape and our life an effective outline. The body is the locus of this never-ceasing going-over of consciousness into the world and of the world into the consciousness. The body is the place, the *topos* of the dialectic. A philosophy of a broadened reason must be a philosophy of the body, a philosophy of incarnation.

But there is another concept which would enable us perhaps—as Max Müller suggests¹⁸—to say the same thing more profoundly yet: the concept of *kairos*. The *kairos*, for the Greeks, is the favorable moment, this moment, marked by destiny, when our life must accomplish itself. We are not pure liberty and we cannot give to our life an arbitrary content. But on the other hand we are not submitted to a

¹⁸Max Müller, *Crise de la métaphysique. Situation de la philosophie au xx^e siècle.* (Paris, Desclée-de Brouwer.)

blind destiny. What happens is not purely accidental, not simply the fruit of an accidental encounter. What happens is something which happens for us, but we must be able to recognize it and seize what is presented to us. Liberty is placed at the meeting-point of an internal act and of an external situation; something is proposed to us, but we must recognize the situation and assume it. The world makes us and we make the world. We are made and make ourselves. The reason which is in us is also in things. The meaning of our life does not come entirely from a pure reflection or from an internal dream. The significance of our life is suggested to us by the encounters which we have. But those encounters are according to our measure. The generous man encounters great circumstances, and the shabby man encounters circumstances which are devoid of exaltation. Everything is full of significance, but man is the being by which significance must be revealed; liberty is the revelation of meaning. To believe that there is meaning and that it belongs to us only to reveal it, this is the hope of reason. This hope perhaps is a choice but a choice which is itself reasonable. It opens up, in the humility of daily life, an imposing perspective. It is great to search for truth and justice; it is greater to search for them in the name of the hope of their absolute accomplishment.

IX. REASON AND ITS "OTHER," INROOTEDNESS OF REASON IN THE UNDIFFERENTIATED LIFE, OVERCOMING OF REASON IN THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

We must, however, after having evoked this perspective of a broadened reason, try to show what is the place of this reason in the whole of human existence. Because, if we can no longer identify the rational and the real, like Hegel, we must still indicate precisely how reason meets its "other," how it nourishes itself upon it, how also it goes beyond itself in this "other." In the reflection which reason has accomplished upon itself in order to overcome the crisis of contemporary nihilism, a way has been opened up and now must be followed. This way led, in Husserl, to the *Lebenswelt*. From there Husserl described a vast program for a reconstruction of a philosophy of reason. But now we have become conscious at the same time both of the strength of reason—Husserl is an admirable example of this—

Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today
Jean Ladrière

and also of its limitations. We know better now that reason is not the first moment or the last of human existence. On the one hand, it comes from something which is more ancient, more primitive, more elementary, also richer, deeper, more extended. And, on the other hand, it is not the ultimate accomplishment of human existence.

Below, or at the side of reason, there is the primitive, undifferentiated life, where everything is precontained but where the original separation has not yet been effectuated between true and false, being and nothingness, knowing and opinion, reasonable and not-reasonable. Now we must come back to this undifferentiated life in order to try to find again the ground from which our tradition has constituted itself—but not in the sense of a sort of irrationalism. It is precisely a question of coming back to a point prior to the opposition of rationalism and irrationalism, of coming back to what is not yet differentiated, because we feel that now the experience of reason has reached its culminating point and that something new is preparing itself. Technological civilization, founded upon physico-mathematical science, has now revealed what was contained in it and will produce nothing more which is essential. Contemporary philosophy is at the same time last and first: last because it is the interpretation of philosophical endeavor in the context of this civilization, and first because it is the remote announcing of another form of experience. What must come cannot yet be said; it must first be lived. And perhaps it is only in the nonexplicit language of painting, music, and poetry that this world will first announce itself. In any case, we must come back to a point before speech in order to be only listening. It is in the silence of the heart that truth grows and matures. This does not mean the destruction of reason (we have already virtually overcome nihilism) but the approach of an internal transformation of reason.

On the other hand, above or beyond reason, there is spiritual experience. This is not yet religious experience. But, of course, if religious experience is possible, it is based upon spiritual experience, not upon the experience of the rational. This experience is already anticipated in the rational discourse of philosophy, and again it is the greatness of Hegel to have tried to integrate this experience into the totality of rational discourse. But what we must retain from the reflection of Husserl is that the experience of reason has its limits and cannot integrate everything. In other words, in human existence there are ruptures and discontinuities. We can evoke spiritual experience.

We cannot transform it into discourse because it is beyond discourse. It is the pure movement of presence or of coexistence, in the sense which Claudel explained of *co-naissance*. It is the discovery of the self as present to the totality and the discovery of the totality as present to the intimacy of the self. Or, again, it is the experience of the open as such; it is the discovery of the coincidence of the finite ego and infinite reality; it is therefore the overcoming of finitude and temporality; it is also the overcoming of the experience of dereliction. It is a life *sub specie aeternitatis*, and it culminates in the experience of joy. Under its practical aspect—because it is not pure contemplation—it is generosity; that is, limitless confidence in others, the world, and being.

Philosophy cannot adequately describe the life of the spirit because it is itself the life of Logos. But it must suggest it, as being its limit from above. In the same way it cannot adequately describe the undifferentiated life, but it must evoke it as being its limit from below. The concrete movement of existence is the articulation of insistence (undifferentiated life) and transcendence under the double form of Logos and of Pneuma. And the concrete movement of discourse, the place of Logos, is the assumption of insistence into speech which is openness for the pure experience of presence.

The destiny of reason is to think itself in this double articulation, as a retaking and as a preparation, as assumption and as an openness, as coming from that in which all existence is rooted, and as going towards that in which existence consummates itself.

Chronicle

TWO NEW QUARTERLIES have appeared on the philosophical scene. The first number of the *Heythrop Journal*, published by the Jesuit Fathers of the Faculties of Philosophy and Theology, Heythrop College, Oxon, England, was issued in January, 1960, and regular issues will follow each quarter in April, July, and October. Subjects treated will include philosophy and theology, scripture exegesis, biblical theology, canon law, ecumenism and Church relations, missiology and pastoral psychology. A current "Quarterly Book List" of English publications will appear at the request, and with the co-operation, of the Association of British Philosophical and Theological Libraries. The other new quarterly review is *World Justice*, devoted to the study of international social justice. The best talent in the world will be mobilized to clarify what is still doubtful in the field of the social sciences. The journal is published by the Louvain University Research Center for International Social Justice.

THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL THOMISTIC CONGRESS will be held at Rome, from September 13 to 17, 1960, under the sponsorship of the Pontifical Roman Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. This Congress will deal with moral problems and will treat the following three themes: the foundation and helps of morality, the rights of truth and liberty, and the true concept of labor. The Congress is held at Rome every five years.

SAINT JOHN'S UNIVERSITY continued its Institute in the Philosophy of Science, on February 6, 1960. The Institute includes four special lectures by distinguished scholars. On February 27, Reverend Dr. Gerald B. Phelan, Professor of Philosophy at St. Michael's College, Toronto, discussed "The Two Types of Science concerning Nature." On March 26, April 9, and May 14, respectively, lectures will be delivered by Dr. Charles de Koninck, Professor of Philosophy at Laval Institute, Quebec, on "Experimental Science: A Continuation of Philosophy"; by Dr. Karl F. Herzfeld, Professor of Physics at Catholic University, on "The Structure of the Atom in the Light of Contemporary Physics"; and by Reverend Dr. Benedict M. Ashley, o.p., Professor of the History of Science at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, on "Does Natural Science Attain Nature or Only the Phenomena?" Dr. Vincent E. Smith is the director of the Institute and course lecturer. The course will be in the philosophy of physics. Dr. Smith, editor of the *New Scholasticism*, formerly taught at Catholic University and the University of Notre Dame. The Philosophy of

(Continued on p. 233)

BERKELEY ON THE IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOUL

—Continued

II

My suggestion thus far has been that far from ignoring the question of the immortality of the soul, Berkeley's radical elimination of extension was prompted by this very issue. Berkeley, I have suggested, took up his role as a defender of Christian orthodoxy and refuter of skepticism in large part as a result of the unsatisfactory status that the soul's immortality had been left in, particularly by the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy and more generally by the entire Cartesian tradition. That Berkeley was concerned with the preservation of a self which could be a candidate for immortality becomes evident, I think, when one examines (a) his "solutions" to several of the philosophical problems that occur in the third *Dialogue* and (b) his later contributions to philosophy; for example, *Alciphron* and *Siris*. The discussions I have in mind are those involving the questions of identity as well as perceptual error and illusion.

In these "solutions" Berkeley falls back on an inferential theory of perception, often given expression in his use of the language metaphor, which he first advanced in the *New Theory of Vision*. But in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*, Berkeley sought also to refute skepticism; and his refutation was based on his realization that so long as a correspondence between perceptions and realities must be sought, criteria are required, and hence skeptical problems persist. However, what is especially interesting is that in the end Berkeley is willing to turn his back on the common-sense or direct realism of his refutation of skepticism and thereby run the almost certain risk of re-introducing it by making the inferential theory carry a philosophical burden. And apparently it was no afterthought, for the theory and the sign-language metaphor remained in his later works. What is even more interesting is the evolution of that metaphor.

As originally stated in the *New Theory of Vision*, Berkeley held visible ideas to be signs of tangible ones:

These signs are constant and universal, their connexion with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance into the world . . . (§ 144). We cannot open our eyes but the ideas of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by them. So swift and sudden and unperceived is the transition from visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate object of vision (§ 145).

A major change occurred in the *Principles*. For while Berkeley still speaks of ideas as signs, he realized that the *New Theory of Vision* account, which made visual ideas signs of tangible ones, contained the “vulgar error” (*Principles* §§ 44-5) that the extended, tangible objects existed independently of minds (cf. *New Theory of Knowledge* § 55). The error was corrected by immaterializing the tangible world by following Bayle’s hint and treating extension as sensation in accordance with *esse* is *percipi*. Thus purged of error, Berkeley restates his position in *Principles* § 65:

. . . the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a mark or *sign* with the thing *signified*. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it . . . the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together: and to the end their use must be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by *rule*, and with *wise contrivance*. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such ideas: which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

But having caught so “vulgar” an error in his theory, Berkeley seems to have been loath to do more than give this statement of its amended form, for very little use is made in the *Principles* of the analogy between ideas and signs, and it all but drops from view in the *Dialogues*. Rather, he is intent on spelling out the implications of his New Principle, *esse* is *percipi*: the *real* things are the *perceived* things, and “ideas of sense” and “things in the world” are but two names for the same thing. Even towards the beginning of the third *Dialogue* we find Philonous saying:

I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. . . . And as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence (*Works*, II, 229-30).

Later, however, in that same *Dialogue*, we read, “Strictly speaking . . . we do not see the same object we feel . . .” (*Works*, II, 245). In fact, Jessop gives us an editor’s note at that point referring us to the *New Theory of Vision* § 49, which in turn we find reads: “But if we take a close and accurate view of things, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object.” Thus Berkeley’s regression to his earlier account is here evident; but to see it in application, note Philonous’s comments on the case of the man who judges that an oar, partially in water, is crooked:

He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. . . . But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

connected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances . . . (*Works*, II, 238).

It now appears that we no longer have an account of perception which "we Irish men" (cf. *Philosophical Commentaries*, 392 ff.) could accept, for our perceptual judgments are no longer strictly about what is immediately perceived but rather about what, on their basis, we expect to perceive in the future. A theoretical statement of this account of perception had, as we have seen, been given in *Principles* § 65. Fortunately, there had been no need to employ the theory. It had proved helpful enough throughout the *New Theory of Vision*, for on the basis of ideas we could infer the existence of things—unfortunately, however, of the wrong sort.

Nevertheless, when in the third *Dialogue* Berkeley is faced with a series of difficulties—and we have only cited one, error and illusion—he falls back on his old inferential theory of perception. But no longer can the visual idea be the sign of—that is, the basis for an inference to—a tangible thing. It is now apparently the basis for an inference to the basis of an inference. Put into the language metaphor, there is now virtually nothing for the signs to signify but other signs. There simply is no possibility, as of course there most assuredly was in the *New Theory of Vision*, of the "sudden transition" from an idea to a judgment about a body. One is stopped at the level of ideas and stays there.

My contention is that Berkeley's very uneasiness with this inferential theory itself stems from his ironclad determination *not* to discuss the object of knowledge, the thing-signified, in traditional conceptual terms or, for that matter, in any way which might bring extension back as something other than a sensation. Thus Berkeley's problem can now be stated, indeed the problem responsible for the inadequacies of the "solutions" of the third *Dialogue*, as the attempt to find something which signs can signify but which will not ruin his account of the immortality of the soul. He has, as I have tried to indicate, seen the fatal attraction of extension, and at whatever price he has banished it to sensation. And so when, for the first time in either the *Principles* or *Three Dialogues*, he tries to make his account of ideas as

⁴⁵The *Works of Thomas Reid*, ed. Sir Edinburgh, 1895). See Vol. I, p. 258.
William Hamilton (8th ed. 2 vols.

grounds for perceptual judgments (that is, as signs) carry a real philosophical burden, he seems to realize that to fill out his argument he ought to have something for the signs to signify. But while he does not complete his discussion on those lines, he does manage to give us several clues.

There are a variety of ways of accounting for the thing-signified, and I shall give two that I hold to be implicit in Berkeley's own test. A third—and, one may be tempted to say, the obvious—way out was taken by Thomas Reid. Not committed to the radical elimination of extension, Reid could allow the basic theory of the *New Theory of Knowledge* to develop along other lines. Although Reid frankly credits his account of sensation to Berkeley, he holds that Berkeley erroneously took sensation to be the only ingredient in our knowledge of the external world. Perception, Reid holds, involves a “conception or notion of the object perceived” and an immediate belief, not the effect of reasoning, in the object's present existence.⁴⁵

Certainly Sir William Hamilton's editorial footnote to the section of Reid's *Inquiry* entitled “Of Natural Signs” comes as no surprise to a reader familiar with Berkeley.

This whole doctrine of *natural signs*, on which his philosophy is in a great measure established, was borrowed by Reid, in principle, and even in expression, from Berkeley. Compare “Minute Philosopher,” Dial. IV, §§ 7, 11, 12; “New Theory of Vision,” §§ 144, 147; “Theory of Vision Vindicated,” §§ 38-43 (*Works*. I, 122, n.).

Reid himself praises Berkeley on occasion; for example, “The ‘Theory of Vision,’ however, taken by itself, and without relation to the main branch of his system, contains very important discoveries, and marks of great genius” (*ibid.*, 281). But it is the *Theory of Vision* which seems most to appeal to him—for the simple reason that at that time Berkeley was “granting, or at least not denying, that there is a tangible world, which is really external, and which exists whether we perceive it or not.” Or as Reid put it in the *Inquiry*:

It is therefore a just and important observation of the Bishop of Cloyne, That the visible appearance of objects is a kind of

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

language used by nature, to inform us of their distance, magnitude, and figure (*ibid.*, 135 [The context indicates Reid has the *New Theory of Vision* in mind.]).

Reid went on to expand the fruitful suggestions Berkeley had offered into a complete account of our knowledge of external objects.

Why didn't Berkeley? The answer, I submit, is simply that he saw no way of moving in the direction Reid was later to take which would not be a return to the "way of concepts" of, for example, Malebranche—for any such return would mean the resuscitation of all the old problems over thought and extension as well as the collapse of his own novel account of the soul's immortality. In the *New Theory of Vision* ideas were signs, but the account of the things-signified contained, as we have seen, the "vulgar error." When in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* Berkeley felt required to employ the sign-language metaphor, he was not really prepared to introduce the things-signified it required. Actually, this may not be quite accurate. It may indeed be that because Berkeley was aware that if he used the language metaphor in the third *Dialogue* he ought to say explicitly what the signs mean, that he tried to circumvent this obligation by utilizing the theory without the metaphor. Thus, while we find precisely the same accounts of "connexions" and of ideas as bases for inferences that were entwined with the language metaphor in the *New Theory of Vision* and in the theoretical statement in *Principles* § 65, the actual metaphor itself is conspicuously absent from those accounts in the third *Dialogue*.

More important, one can find hints of two closely related theories, or at least of alternative expressions of the same theory, in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*, for Reid's "way out" is not the only way. Perhaps Berkeley meant his account of "connexions" to fill the gap of "meanings" in his language metaphor. This seems to me a plausible interpretation to maintain as implicit in Berkeley's text. When one knows certain patterns of connexions of ideas one knows, as Berkeley states in both *Principles* § 65 and in the third *Dialogue*, the nature of a thing. This could be taken to mean that one knows certain dispositional powers that a thing may have. Put another way, a sense idea may lead one to infer that certain other sense ideas will be per-

⁴⁶See my "Berkeley's Realisms," *Philosophical Quarterly*, VIII (1958), 41-53.

ceived, but what one knows which entitles one to draw that inference is not itself an idea or anything like one. What one then knows is presumably an aspect of the divine will—and as such, it can only be known notionally. That Berkeley had not himself clearly decided to interpret “connexions” in this fashion would seem to follow from his silence with respect to any such increased role for notional knowledge.

There is a second and similar line that might also be taken to be implicit in the third *Dialogue*, although it is a possibility I first advanced in an attempt to show the unsatisfactoriness of holding with Luce and Jessop that Berkeley’s “ideas of sense” are “sensa” or “sense-data,” and also that these ideas “persist” in some realist sense.⁴⁶ Taking Berkeley in the latter part of the third *Dialogue* as coming nearest to holding that “ideas of sense” are “sensa,” I sought to discover what ontological status one could possibly give these ideas in a Berkeleian framework. Now, of course, regardless of whether ideas of sense are “sensa” or simply physical objects, solving the problem of error along inferential lines may lead to a reintroduction of an appearance-reality distinction, with the embarrassing (for Berkeley) result that the object *perceived* is no longer necessarily the *real* object. But more immediately to the point is the perplexing problem that arises in the light of Philonous’s admission that God does not know via sensation. This very admission, though clearly striking a blow at the view that sensa qua sensa might persist, led me to think that Berkeley might have been hinting that the sense in which sensa persist is simply as *powers* in the mind of God to produce sensa. It also happens, as we have already observed, that on occasion Berkeley holds that all our perceptual knowledge is inferential—it is about what one will perceive if one does so and so. In other words, it is about possible sensa; but possible sensa exist as powers in the mind of God, and accordingly all our perceptual knowledge turns out to be about divine powers—and as such must be notional. I suggested at the time that giving such unlimited scope to notional knowledge, while hardly what Luce and Jessop were seeking to maintain, would not have dismayed the Bishop of Cloyne. (See *Philosophical Commentaries*, 52.)

I still think that giving such an expanded role to notional knowledge is one way, within the Berkeleian spirit, of dealing with Luce’s and

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

Jessop's problem of the persistence of sensa; and I still think that it is a way which both philosophers would prefer to avoid since it plays havoc with the spirit-idea dichotomy. But I now think that this conclusion is what Berkeley is struggling with in the third *Dialogue*. For whether one starts worrying about what Berkeley means by knowing "connexions" or in what sense God perceives the "tree in the quad" when we do not, it seems to me clear that Berkeley wants something for his "ideas" to signify. In either case "knowing" turns out to be different from an awareness of ideas—namely, that which we know when we make inferences, that which ideas as signs signify, is a notionally known power in God's mind. Thus the sensation of color signifies a thing—or rather a notion or concept; in terms of the language metaphor, God's "meanings" rather than the orthography of His "words." Since the object of knowledge is thus *not* an idea of sense at all, there is no problem of that object's ontological status with respect to persistence or fear that ideas (signs) may be confused with what they lead us to infer (mean). But these are both genuine worries so long as one tries to interpret those peculiar "solutions" offered in the third *Dialogue* in terms of (a) the apparent analysis of ideas which precedes them there and in the *Principles*, and (b) the ontological implications, especially for God, of *esse* is *percipi*.

If I am correct in thinking that Berkeley took his proof for the immortality of the soul seriously and that he refused to tolerate any solution to philosophical difficulties that on his analysis might jeopardize that proof, then it might be worth looking at Berkeley's later writings. What we find, I think, is that in both *Alciphron* and *Siris* Berkeley has found a way of dealing with the real object of knowledge (with things-signified) without introducing the "evil" concept of extension—that entity which had seemed essential to a theory of our knowledge of the world, but an entity which when known seemed invariably to taint the spirituality of the knower, whether God or man. Berkeley now seems willing to accept the consequences of the language metaphor and deal explicitly with God's meanings. Note these comments from *Alciphron*:

It may be also worth while to observe that signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, but only in their relative capacity, and for the sake of those things whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind often overlooks them,

so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we run over the characters with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Hence it is frequent for men to say, they see words, and notions, and things in reading of a book; whereas in strictness they see only the characters which suggest words, notions, and things. And, by parity of reason, may we not suppose that men, not resting in, but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of sight, as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention onward to the very thing signified, and talk as if they saw the secondary objects? which, in truth and strictness, are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen (IV, 12).

and from *Siris*:

252. There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things . . .

253. We know a thing when we understand it; and we understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. Strictly, the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight; but we are not therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, the phenomena of nature are alike visible to all; but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them. . . . 254. As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse (Sect. 152), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause. This is agreeable to the philosophy of Plato . . . [see also §§ 258, 264, 290, 295, and 305 ff.]

Thanks to the language metaphor we can move on to the “things” signified by the signs. No longer need we fear that Berkeley’s signs

Harry M. Bracken
Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul

merely signify other signs, for the sense signs are now taken as visual “letters” that God addresses to us. When we understand the “letters” and their formation into “words,” we are on our way to learning the rules for their use (recall *Principles* § 65); that is, we shall know what He means. Berkeley can hardly be said to have been expansive in discussing this problem; but surveying all his comments, it seems, to take simply the sense of vision, that he thought of the various colors on a par with letters. Thus one could presumably focus one’s attention on a particular “letter” in a particular “word.” To know that a mark is a “letter” involves knowing rules, even though they differ from the rules for “words” not only in complexity but also because it is something less than obvious that the meaning of, for example, *man* can be found by an analysis of its constitutive letters. Berkeley seems satisfied simply to note that a few letters can form many words and then to turn this attention to the “meanings” of the “words.” A wise man is better off than a child because he has learned God’s sense language (cf. the third *Dialogue* [*Works*, II, 245]), for although they may see the same “words,” the wise man, having learned the rules implicit in His use of a given “word” will know something about what next to expect, and so on.

Even in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* Berkeley, as we have already seen, seemed to be holding that to know the meaning of the signs was different from merely “having” them. He seems to have held implicitly then, and explicitly later, that to know the meaning of God’s “words” would, in effect, be to grasp a “nature,” an “essence”; or at least one would know a series of powers, an aspect of God—a divine meaning which He articulates in sense signs.

As Luce has pointed out, this divine language theory is “an essential part of the final Berkeleian philosophy” (*Works*, I, 152). It is also a part, admittedly subordinate, even of the *Principles*, as our citation from Section 65 revealed. My own suspicion is that the language metaphor was, subsequent to the *New Theory of Vision*, seen by Berkeley as a way of capitalizing on Malebranche’s insight of “seeing all things in God,” without at the same time bringing extension into God, and a way of getting the work of concepts done—without formally admitting them. Thus God could speak to us; and while our particular sense signs would differ from person to person, the meanings would be constant both for us and for God—which was in effect part of what Malebranche had hoped to achieve within his system with his

own metaphor. Furthermore, both Berkeley and Malebranche were alert to the entire issue of representationism. Malebranche had learned from Descartes that the merest hint of a representative theory of knowledge left one eternally seeking criteria for determining whether a knower's ideas stood in a relation of correspondance with the divine ideas. For Malebranche, the vision in God served not only to dispose of the innate idea solution to the Meno problem, but also it prevented the generation of the representation problem at the same stroke. Berkeley, for his part, had seen similar difficulties arise in theories of sense perception where subjective appearances were distinguished from objective realities.

Thus Berkeley tried to avoid a linguistic variant of the representation problem such as might be involved in giving an account of the relation between signs and meanings. Sense signs themselves are not the objects of knowledge, nor are they in any way "like" objects of knowledge, nor are they connected with those "objects" by any tie or correspondence which we can discern. When God says, for example, "tree," I know what He means if I have learned his "language"—and in fact the transition to what He means is so rapid that I may, as Reid later noted, have difficulty directing my attention to the "orthographic marks" (that is, the signs) themselves. To call the meanings archetypes would suggest that the transition was by no means so straightforward; hence Berkeley's reluctance to discuss archetypes with Johnson (*Works*, II, 267 f.). If, on the other hand, I have not learned His language, looking (so to speak) at *t-r-e-e* will hardly take me very far towards His meaning. Berkeley simply relegates the relation between signs and meanings to the "linguistic" learning process and bows before the infinite wonder of God (Malebranche had spoken of the relation between sensations and Ideas as being encompassed by the wondrous but unknown laws of conjunction of soul and body), apparently in full accord with the dictum, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

Not only can "linguistic Malebranchianism's" account of things-signified as being (not really passive things at all, but) divine meanings offer some help on the problem of the ontological status of the (unperceived) tree in the quad; one can restate Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas, arguments which, as Jessop has pointed out, Berkeley

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

never retracted. Seen "linguistically," what Berkeley is suggesting is that abstraction from sense signs is simply ridiculous (Malebranche would have agreed). One may know what God means when He places "triangle" before me, but what can one possibly abstract from the letters themselves? Within the metaphor, that was what Locke, in Berkeley's eyes, was attempting. This obvious disparity between a string of letters and their meaning was accordingly seen by Berkeley, especially in *Siris*, as a (metaphorical) way of stating the point of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas while at the same time avoiding those terms, such as "resemble," "participate," and "represent," which had caused so much misunderstanding in the history of philosophy. Indeed, Berkeley may even have taken "learning a rule" as a grammatical formulation of recollection as a solution to the Meno problem; and thus while this account of meaning may be "agreeable to the philosophy of Plato," it is certainly Platonism with a difference.

It seems, then, that something approximating *esse* is *concipi* has been implicit in *esse* is *percipi* from the very outset. And yet, having eliminated ideas as mediating representative entities between mind and matter, Berkeley was hardly anxious to utilize language about concepts which might serve to reintroduce the very entity he had dismissed as both superfluous and productive of skepticism. (Note

⁴⁷If, as G. A. Johnston has suggested, Berkeley derived his doctrine of notions from John Sergeant, then notions are not representative in the Lockean sense. Nor are they for Digby or for Burthogge (where one finds them equated with "meanings"). The sources, however, for Berkeley's doctrine of notions—and for that matter of signs—still seems to me highly problematic, given the joint role they have played in philosophy at least since the Stoics. Peter Geach wonders whether St. Augustine's *notiones* may not be the source of Berkeley's notions (*Mental Acts* [London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958] p. 108 n.). This indeed may be part of the story, but the brilliant attack on abstractionism offered by Geach, which he takes to be in accord with St. Thomas, is, so far as I understand it, of the same pattern as much of Berkeley's. Partisans of Digby and Sergeant can of course retort that Berkeley could well have gotten his

"Thomism" from those two Roman Catholic philosophers—if, that is, they would grant that Geach has correctly interpreted St. Thomas.

⁴⁸Reid used several ingredients drawn from Berkeley's philosophy, but, less cautious, he talked of "concepts" as well. Despite the fact that he went to great lengths in discussing the dangers of being misled by "analogical expressions" in connection with conception (Reid's *Works*, I, 360 f., esp. 373-74), he was accused, largely on the very basis of "concepts," of implicitly holding to Lockean representationism. I have not, however, made any attempt to explore the lines a latter-day Arnauld might have taken against Berkeley's "linguistic Malebranchianism," although surely the question of the philosophical adequacy of Berkeley's version is still open in a sense in which Malebranche's original is not.

the caution he employs even in the *Principles* in connection with "notion" and how infrequently the term occurs in his later works.)

Thus when Berkeley felt the need for some organizational principles, he appealed not to concepts but to knowing the meaning of signs. And to know the meaning of a sign is to know the rules governing its use. That he should have found "rule" and "meaning" less problematic than "concept" may strike us as odd or perverse or both, but it nevertheless does seem plausible to say that the language metaphor has the advantage of calling our attention to the radical difference between hearing a language one understands and hearing a language that one doesn't; that is, of calling our attention to the mental activity of understanding (regardless of how one may wish ultimately to characterize it) that the former involves.

While "concept" and "notion" have been used to signify the mental capacities that we employ in understanding, there has been a tendency, especially in segments of the Aristotelian tradition, to think of them as objects of a sort that, in Berkeley's system, would be undistinguishable from his ideas.⁴⁷ Berkeley, however, has no intention of introducing concept-things along with concept-acts, for in the *Principles* he makes it clear that spirits and acts are "things" very different from his ideas. Accordingly, the language metaphor, by giving us an intuitive grasp of the radical difference between signs (ideas) and what they mean, may help prevent us from postulating mediating entities (as some had tried with "concepts") to bridge the unbridgeable.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the suggestion that we think of possessing knowledge as like having learned a language hints at the a-temporality of knowledge in a way Berkeley had been unable to characterize satisfactorily so long as he was looking to "words" (ideas) as the objects of knowledge. "Words" as "orthographic marks" may come and go, but their "meanings" (like Platonic Ideas?) do not—or at least not in the same way. And most important, "knowing a rule" is a power possessed by a spirit; but it is possessed in a way that does not compromise the immateriality of the soul. Thus the very metaphor that had originally led Berkeley into the "vulgar error" is found by him ultimately to yield a solution to philosophical difficulties which is commensurate with his transcendent concern with the immateriality, and hence immortality, of the soul. Finally, it is interesting to note that where

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

other philosophers may have been led into metaphysics by language, Berkeley gives every appearance of having been led into language by metaphysics. Instead of looking for metaphysical entities "in" God for our language *really* to name, Berkeley seeks to avoid metaphysical entities by looking to God for His language.

Let me, however, recapitulate the points that I have tried to make. I started out by suggesting that Berkeley's stated concern over the immortality of the soul might be worth taking seriously and not as a mere deistic sop to orthodoxy. I suggested further that the immortality issue might throw some light on several strictly philosophical issues, especially in the third *Dialogue*, as well as on the question of Platonism in Berkeley's later work. Thus by reference to the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy, I tried to show (a) that an important feature of that controversy concerned the soul's immortality and (b) that a theologically acceptable account of spiritual substance did not seem to issue from Locke's "way of ideas," for not only might matter think, but substances were a "something, I know not what."

On the other hand, in Malebranche's immaterialism, stimulating as it seems to have been to Berkeley, the account of a substantial self rested ultimately on the intelligibility of intelligible extension. Unfortunately for Malebranche, his arguments were not given the interpretations he intended, and he spent his later years attempting to ward off charges of Spinozism. Finally, Bayle offered a clue—treat extension as a sensation. The world would thus consist of but two sorts of entities: ideas and the spirits which have them. As for spirits, they are the active things in which ideas necessarily inhere. No matter, no intelligible matter, no concept of extension, remains. Neither ideas nor spirits being material, no threat to the immortality of the soul remains. Ideas are not merely passive; they must be "in" something—"in" a substance, and that substance is accordingly a thinking thing; that is, a spirit. (Berkeley would, I think, have found Hume's account of the self as unintelligible as Hume himself subsequently found it).

Nevertheless, when Berkeley set about his philosophical tasks, he quickly ran into difficulties. The *New Theory of Vision* account of perception failed at the crucial juncture. The taint of materialism was still present. No such "error" corrupts the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*. He has there stated his immaterialism. He has fulfilled the Cartesian dream and revealed a pure spirit, free from any blemish

of matter or extension, a spirit which at long last was found to have no philosophical disqualifications as a candidate for immortality.

But in the third *Dialogue*, faced with the problem of perceptual error, Berkeley attempts to extricate himself by way of variations on the *New Theory of Vision* account. The history of philosophy is cluttered with “solutions” to the problem of perceptual error that end by denying perceptual truth, and Berkeley was clearly hoping to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis; but the sign-language metaphor as stated failed him. What troubled Berkeley, I believe, was that while he realized the need to explain error, he also realized that he had offered a coherent, if ingenious, account of a substantial self. The *New Theory of Vision* had taught Berkeley the dangers of the language metaphor, and recent history had taught him the dangers of extension; and he did not propose to throw over his doctrine of spirits in order to accommodate a metaphor.

Precisely because Berkeley was aware of the theologically catastrophic attempts that had been made to deal with both matter and extension, he refused to take what to Reid, Hamilton, and perhaps ourselves, may seem the obvious step in completing his theory of perceptual signs. It was not an epistemological catastrophe that Berkeley feared; indeed he was willing to risk that in the third *Dialogue*. It was the religious catastrophe of making “soul” unintelligible by reintroducing into his theologically antiseptic system those entities which, rightly or wrongly, had adulterated Cartesianism—matter and extension.

I have, however, suggested that one can find implicit in the third *Dialogue* the view that the thing signified by the sense sign is a divine power. The tree in the quad that God perceives while we are asleep is not a sensed tree, since God does not know via sensation. What persists are powers, and our knowledge consists of them. In the language metaphor this amounts to saying that we learn God’s language. For Berkeley, having once learned (in the *New Theory of Vision*) the dangers from the referent (matter) side in the sign-thing signified duality, remained extremely careful on the other (the conceptual) side to avoid “giving offense” by hypostatizing meaning. Content to speak of how God uses His “words” and of His “rules,” Berkeley successfully avoided elaborating an account of archetypes, perhaps because he sensed problems about which we have heard a

Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul
Harry M. Bracken

good deal in recent years. It is this line, shrouded in mystery as it may at times seem to be, that Berkeley takes in his later writings and which has apparently led commentators to think that *Alciphron*, and especially *Siris*, mark a radical change in Berkeley's position. In discussing the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* I have tried to show that no such change occurred. Berkeley is simply filling out his sign theory in the only way that seems to have occurred to him as compatible with the utter and complete elimination of matter and extension required by his proof of the immortality of the soul.

LIFE AND LIVING BEINGS

THE REVEREND JAMES E. ROYCE, S.J., is an associate professor at Seattle University.

He received his M.A. from Gonzaga University, Spokane, and divided his graduate program between philosophy and psychology for his Ph. D. from Loyola University, Chicago.

His Personality and Mental Health is now in its third printing, and McGraw-Hill will publish his text on the philosophy of man in 1960.

He reviews books regularly in America and elsewhere.

How do Aristotle and St. Thomas define life? Specifically, is immanent action the hallmark of life for them? The motion of the particles within the atom is also immanent, for it "remains within" the atom. This constitutes a problem for some Scholastic philosophers in defining life.

We rightly resent the unjust accusation that Scholastics tend to claim Aristotle and Aquinas as their leaders without actually bothering to read them. But perhaps it is not too rash to suggest that some of the difficulties connected with the definition of life could be solved if we read the masters carefully on this point.

This paper cannot pretend to treat with any completeness the notion of life in itself, nor can it be expected to deal with the concept as found in the sciences of biology and psychology; and it would be most impertinent to presume to go very far into the life of God Himself, the contemplation of whose life we will not exhaust through all eternity. The aim is simply to examine the basic notion of life in the writings of St. Thomas, see if we can discover in what sense we may call God "living" and even "life," and perhaps solve some of the apparent difficulties that arise in the use of these terms as transcendental and analogous. No great attempt has been made to take account of the vast literature devoted to the subject by the later Scholastics; the attempt is merely to examine the writings of St. Thomas himself—with, of course, some reference to Aristotle, without which Aquinas is never fully intelligible.

Most modern Scholastics define life as immanent activity or at least the capacity for immanent activity. As a typical example among many, Sheen in his *God and Intelligence*¹ states on page 242 that "life is activity" and on page 243 he makes the definition of life to consist in immanent activity. There are two difficulties here: first, making life consist in activity or operation, the *actus secundus* of the Scholastics; secondly, making the *essential* note of vital activity consist in its immanence.

The first difficulty is fairly easily disposed of. In fact, it was immediately subjoined to the first statement in the above paragraph "or at least the capacity for immanent activity" because many authors do provide for this question by some such modified formula. And rightly, for the mind of Aquinas on this point is quite clear. He devotes a whole article to the question, "utrum vita sit quaedam operatio," and of course the answer is in the negative, except that it may be called such in a strictly secondary and improper sense. Thus the last sentence of the body of the article:

Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.²

He is quite definite on this particular point in innumerable other passages, but since he cites Aristotle in the above quoted excerpt it should be mentioned that in the *De Anima*, and in St. Thomas's commentary on it, this position is also maintained.³ Incidentally, it may well be remarked that the expression "capacity for immanent action"

¹Fulton J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* (New York, 1938). Examples could be multiplied. Cf. Michael Maher, s.j., *Psychology, Empirical and Rational* (9th ed. London, 1933), p. 551.

²"Quandoque tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit Philosophus [*Ethic.* IX, 9, 1170a19] quod vivere principaliter est sentire, vel intelligere" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 2).

³Cf. *In I De An.*, lect. 14 (Pirotta

No. 209); also *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1, etc.

⁴Aristotle, *De An.* ii. 1. 412a14-15; *ibid.* 2. 413a 23—413b2, etc. (The expression does occur in the *Metaphysics*, ix, in another context.)

⁵*In II De An.*, lect. 1 (Pirotta No. 219).

⁶*ST*, I, q. 18, a. 2.

⁷*Ibid.*, a. 1.

⁸*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 8.

⁹*CG*, I, cap. 97-98.

¹⁰*ST*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1.

is not perfectly representative of the mind of Aquinas, since, as we shall see later, his thought is centered not on any capacity but on the very *being* of living things. This is brought out clearly in the two places just referred to, to which we shall return in due time.

The second difficulty, the note of immanence, is the more troublesome, especially from the standpoint of reconciling such a definition of life with the intra-atomic activity of what everyone admits are non-living beings. Let us see whether St. Thomas ever defines life in terms of immanent activity.

To begin with, it would be a strong indication if we could find the phrase in Aristotle, upon whom Aquinas draws so heavily in these and similar matters. Yet the Greek equivalent of "immanent activity" does not even appear in the entire text of the *De Anima*; and though the present writer cannot assert the same of his other psychological and biological works categorically, such would seem to be the case. At least it is certain that in those passages where we would most expect it—namely, where Aristotle is laying down the essential distinction between living and nonliving things—he does not do so in terms of immanent activity at all.⁴ This is basic to an approach to St. Thomas's position; and it should further be noted at once that he will hold with Aristotle's first book of the *Physics* that *every* natural body has within itself an internal principle of motion.

Coming to St. Thomas himself, an examination of the pertinent passages may be divided into two tasks: first, to see if he departs from Aristotle by introducing the notion of immanent activity into his definition of life when laying down the distinction between living and non-living things; secondly, to examine those passages in which he does distinguish immanent and transient activity to see whether he does so with any view to the notion of vital action as such. The answer to the first task is a decided negative. Some of the passages investigated in this connection are his commentary on the *De Anima*, II "Propria ratio vitae . . .";⁵ his basic article in the *Summa Theologiae* defining life;⁶ and the article applying the distinction to living and nonliving things;⁷ in the *De Veritate*;⁸ in the *Contra Gentiles* where he defines life and applies it to God;⁹ and where he applies the notion of life to the distinction between the active and contemplative life.¹⁰ The second task, that of inquiring into those numerous passages where he does introduce

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, S.J.

the terminology of immanent and transient action, reveals this curious fact for certain modern Scholastics to puzzle over: not only does St. Thomas not define life in terms of immanent action, as we have just seen, but in all the places in which the notion of immanence is introduced he never once refers this term to a distinction between vital and nonvital action. He often divides action into immanent and transient,¹¹ but he is always talking of vital activity and of *viventia* as the subject of *both* of these motions. This is true even when he is speaking of God, for here, too, both the immanent and transient actions are vital actions.

So much for what might be termed the negative side of this study; namely, the clearing away of some false notions (or at least some badly misplaced emphasis) prevalent among textbook writers and the realization that it would be wise to take our notion of life directly from Aristotle and St. Thomas themselves.

II

The next step will be to determine just how St. Thomas does define life, if not as immanent activity. To begin with, life is an abstract term, as St. Thomas often notes. He prefers to deal with the concrete, contrary to the notion of those who imagine that "metaphysical" is somehow synonymous with "abstract." He usually goes at once to the activities of living things: nutrition, growth, reproduction of kind, knowledge, appetite, and so on; and in these he finds adequate grounds for distinguishing living from nonliving things—even such

¹¹For example, *ibid.*, I, q. 14, prologue and a. 2; *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1; *ibid.*, q. 23, a. 2 ad 1; *ibid.*, q. 27, a. 3; *ibid.*, q. 54, a. 2; q. 56, a. 1.

¹²"Sic ergo dicendum est de vita. Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quadam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movens seipsum; non tamen est impossitum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandum substantiam cui convenit secundum naturam suam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc vivere nihil aliud est quam esse in tali natura; et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen *cursus* significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 2 ad fin.).

¹³"Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione signatum; sicut cursus, secundum rem, non est aliud quam currere. Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum [*De Anima*, II, 415b13] . . oportet quod vivere nihil aliud sit quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens" (*CG*, I, cap. 98).

¹⁴"Ad secundum dicendum, quod vita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, sicut essentia ad esse, sed sicut cursus ad currere; quorum unum significat actum in abstracto, aliud in concreto. Unde non sequitur, si vivere sit esse, quod vita sit essentia" (*ST*, I, q. 54, a. 1 ad 2).

¹⁵God is His life in the same sense, and precisely because, He is His existence—which of course is not true of other things.

as have motion within them, be they Aristotle's fire or the modern physicist's atom. But he does recognize the validity of the abstract term and assigns its meaning in such passages as these:

The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word *running* denotes *to run* in the abstract. Hence *living* is not an accidental but an essential predicate.¹²

For *life* in a living being is the same as *to live* expressed in the abstract; just as running is in reality the same as to run. Now *in living things to live is to be*, as the Philosopher declares (*2 De Anima*) . . . to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form.¹³

Life, then, is nothing more or less than the abstract term for the very being of living things. It is not a thing, an essence, as St. Thomas says:

The relation between *life* and *to live* is not the same as that between *essence* and *to be*; but rather as that between *a race* and *to run*, one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if *to live* is *to be*, that *life* is *essence*.¹⁴

Of course what is insisted on in the last sentence will be seen to apply only to created living things, for in God His life is identified with His essence. St. Thomas merely asserts here that it does not necessarily follow of *all* things. That it can be so about God is only because of the unique way in which abstract things can be predicated of God's essence, thanks to His infinite perfection and absolute simplicity.¹⁵ The parallel terms, then, would seem to run something like this:

vivens — ens
vivere — esse
vita — existentia
vitalitas — entitas
quod vivit — quod est

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, S.J.

Life, therefore, for St. Thomas and the Stagirite denotes not an activity or an accident or a mere capacity but something as intimately connected with the nature of a thing as existence itself: "vivere est esse viventium." It is the kind of *being* which characterizes living things. Now what is meant by "*being*"? For the Scholastic philosopher (as indeed for everyone) "res dicit essentiam cum connotatione τοῦ esse"¹⁶—"a transcendental relation to existence," which Aristotle expresses when he says of *is* that its "most fundamental and proper sense is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is an actuality."¹⁷ We should expect, then, that the definition of life given by St. Thomas would involve the notion of some special perfection of being, some high degree of reality or actuality, some plenitude of being, or, if we may transfer to metaphysics the poetical connotation of the word, something in a being which involves a power of "realization." Let us examine the pertinent texts.

The proper essence of life is this, that something is naturally such as to move itself, taking motion in a large sense, inasmuch as even intellectual activity is called a kind of motion. For, we

¹⁶Cf. A. Marc, "L'Idée de l'être," *Archives de Philosophie*, X (1933), 87-90.

¹⁷Aristotle, *De An.*, ii. 1. 412b9 (translation my own).

¹⁸"Propria autem ratio vitae est hoc, quod aliquid est natum movere seipsum, large accipiendo motum, prout etiam intellectualis operatio motus quidam dicitur. Ea enim sine vita esse dicimus, quae ab exteriori tantum principio moveri possunt" (*In II De An.*, lect. 1 [Pirotta No. 219]).

¹⁹"... sciendum quod vivere proprie est eorum quae habent motum et operationem ex seipsis, sine hoc quod moveantur ab aliis" (*In I De An.*, lect. 14 [Pirotta No. 209]).

²⁰"Illud enim proprie vivere dicimus quod in se ipso habet motus, vel operationes quascumque; ex hoc enim sunt dicta primo aliqua vivere, quia visa sunt in se ipsis habere aliquid ea movens secundum quemcumque motum. Et hinc processit nomen vitae ad omnia quae in se ipsis habent operationis propriæ principium. Unde et ex hoc quod aliquae intelligent, vel sentiunt, vel volunt, vivere dicuntur, non solum ex

hoc quod secundum locum moventur, vel secundum augmentum. Illud ergo esse quod habet res prout est movens se ipsum ad operationem aliquam, dicitur proprie vita rei, quia vivere viventis est esse, ut in II de Anima dicitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 8).

²¹"Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando incipit ex se motum habere, et tamdiu judicamus animal vivere, quamdiu talis motus in eo appareret; quando vero jam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed moveatur tantum ab alio, tunc dicitur animal mortuum per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia quae se ipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent..." (ST, I, q. 18, a. 1).

²²"Adhuc, vivere secundum hoc aliquibus attributum est, quod visa sunt per se, non ab alio, moveri... alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori movent..." (CG, I, cap. 97).

²³"... vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota" (ST, I, q. 18, a. 3).

²⁴"... ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum, vel operationem aliquam" (*ibid.*, a. 1).

say that those things are without life which can be moved only by an external principle.¹⁸

. . . we must know that to live properly belongs to those things which have motion and activity from themselves without being moved by others.¹⁹

For that we properly say lives which has in itself motion or any kind of operation. For from this things were first said to live because they were observed as having in themselves something moving them according to some kind of motion. And from this the name life was applied to all things which in themselves have a principle of their own proper operation. Consequently from this that some things understand or sense or will they are said to live, not only from this that they are moved in place or increase in size. Consequently the being which a thing has insofar as it moves itself to some operation is properly called the life of the thing, because "to live in a living thing is being," as it said in the *De Anima*, II.²⁰

We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long is it considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement . . .²¹

Again. Life is ascribed to certain things inasmuch as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another . . . while all others are moved by some other thing . . .²²

. . . a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another . . .²³

Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind . . .²⁴

What conclusions can we gather from these texts and from the similar pertinent ones from Aristotle cited earlier? First, that there is no mention of immanence as the hallmark of life, as has already been

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, s.j.

pointed out. Secondly, that what does characterize vital activity—and that whether immanent or transient—is the feature of being self-initiating ("incipit *ex se* motum habere"), self-perfective ("δι' εαυτοῦ"), or self-actualizing ("se agunt *ad* motum"). In a word, the living thing contains more actuality (being in act) within itself and is consequently less dependent on things outside itself ("alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori principio") for its activity, whether immanent or transient. These statements sum up, in terms of self-contained actualization, or perfection of being, the notion of life in St. Thomas much better than any reference to immanence.

At this point the objection suggests itself that the average modern Scholastic does not fail to attach to the word "immanent" as used in his definition of life much or all of the notion of "self-activating" or "self-perfected" which has been expounded here, and that thus there is little point to this phase of our discussion. The answer is (*a*) that this is due to what might be termed a historical accident in the development of terminology and (*b*) that this meandering is the result and also the cause of confusion which could have been avoided had the language of St. Thomas never been abandoned. The first, (*a*), means simply that the textbook writers got away from the definition of St. Thomas probably without even knowing it and fastened upon the word "immanens" which appears so often in his writings without realizing that they were putting it to a use which this study shows he never gave it; then later on, when confronted with certain difficulties, they amplified their meaning of the word "immanens" until after a number of centuries they were using it to express a Thomistic idea which we have seen is never so expressed in St. Thomas. The second, (*b*), implies that once the word "immanens" had been adopted but its original use in St. Thomas lost sight of, confusion was bound to result. Then, when it became necessary to clarify its meaning in terms of real difficulties, a host of meanings were imposed on the word which it does not bear either in the speech of St. Thomas or of ordinary men. Such an abuse of language is not only inexcusable in itself but tends to masquerade as philosophical difficulty.

Surely *immanent* comes from *in* and *manere*, and is defined by

²⁵⁴"... duplex est actio. Una quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare. Alia quae manet in agente; ut intelligere, sentire, et velle. Quarum haec est differentia: quia prima

actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis" (*ibid.*, a. 3 ad 1).

both Aquinas and your modern Webster as "remaining within"—to say that it means self-perfected or self-activating is a poor excuse for not going back to Aristotle and St. Thomas when faced with a difficulty. It is warping words instead of clarifying thought. A typical passage responsible for the historical situation might be the following:

. . . action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense, and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.²⁵

Now, here St. Thomas uses the notions of immanent and transient; moreover, the examples he gives of immanent activity are vital actions, those of transient are not. But what is important to note is that he does not make the difference consist in the fact that in the one case the action remains in the agent. He assigns the difference in terms of self-perfection. This is important not only for understanding his position but also in the light of modern knowledge. If we hold the definition of life given by St. Thomas, then the present writer sees no great difficulty in saying that both vital and nonvital activities can be either immanent or transient. St. Thomas certainly says over and over again that the activities of God and man are both, and implies as much for the elements in his adoption of the Aristotelian definition of a *nature* as having a principle of motion within itself, as shall be discussed shortly. In this case there would be nothing amiss in saying that, for instance, the motion of the electrons around the nucleus is immanent action, while the giving off of heat or gamma rays is transient, just as in my lifting a rock there is both immanent and transient action. In addition, it might be noted that a return to the true Thomistic definition of life would neatly circumvent most of the pertinent implications of the Suarezian-Thomistic controversies as to whether "actio est in passo" and whether immanent action is in the predicament of "actio" or of quality.

III

The next step is to apply this generic notion of life to the various things we call living, with a view to seeing if it is verified in them and also if it distinguishes them from nonliving things.

One reason for insisting on a definition of life in terms of the *being* of the living thing, aside from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas ("vivere est esse viventium" occurs with almost wearying frequency in both), is that only by going to something as fundamental as being itself can we be sure that we are talking sense when we attempt to apply the definition to everything from God to a carrot. St. Thomas recognizes in life a wide sweep of transcendentality second only to being and its attributes;²⁶ and when he himself is discussing the applicability of the term to its various inferiors (including what the Scholastics call "primo diversa") he very frequently reminds us that such a term *must* be analogical.²⁷ And to safeguard what is to follow shortly it may be well to remind ourselves here that analogous terms are *equivocal* ("a consilio") and characterized by diversity or dissimilarity. The analogy, we can easily suspect, will be one of proper proportionality; here it will not be a proportion of an essence to its existence as in the analogy of being, but a proportion of an essence to a certain degree of self-perfectiveness (or independence of exterior principles) in its operation.

Two things especially must be kept in mind in working out the applications of the analogy. First, excessive preoccupation with the Aristotelian categories tends to stratify our philosophical thinking into that form of "block universe" of which Henri Bergson has accused us. The corrective for this is in the influence which Neoplatonism exercised on the mind of Aquinas, tending to ease the sharpness of our distinction of things into a graded hierarchy of continuity from the lowest to the highest. This is brought out in such quotations from the Pseudo-Dionysius as this:

²⁶*Ibid.*, q. 103, a. 2.

²⁷Cf. *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 et ad 1, 2, 3.

²⁸"Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquit ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori; supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut patet per Dionysium, in vii cap. *De Div. Nom.* [3, PG 3,

872] (*ibid.*, q. 78, a. 2 [italics mine]).

²⁹"Illud autem maxime convenit aliui per seipsum quod est proprium ei, et ad quod maxime inclinatur; et ideo unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione sibi maxime propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur . . ." (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1).

³⁰*Ibid.*, I, q. 18, a. 3.

³¹CG, IV, cap. 11.

Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* vii.).²⁸

Consequently, we should expect that, as an example of a pointed application of this principle, a molecule is much more like a plant than the plant is like God, in spite of the fact that God and the plant fall under the same predicate "living," whereas the molecule and the plant do not.

The second principle useful in this matter is put quite clearly by the Angelic Doctor himself thus:

That most belongs to a thing by itself which is proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Therefore every living thing is shown to live from an operation which is most proper to it to which it is most inclined.²⁹

Hence, we must not expect to find a univocal similarity in the kind of motion or operation to which the various classes of living things *se agunt*, but rather such operation as is proportioned to their nature. Now, we have seen in Part II of this paper that what characterizes living things is a certain self-contained perfection, an independence of activity. But what is proper to God is absolute independence and the total plenitude of being within Himself; and what is proper to creatures is utter dependence and varying degrees of lack of being. Therefore it is only natural to conclude that we shall see the implications of these statements in the hierarchy of living things. In fact, with such a foundation the remainder of this study should flow easily from what has been laid down.

St. Thomas works out the analogy for all orders of living things very beautifully and fully at least once in the *Summa Theologiae*³⁰ and once in the *Contra Gentiles*.³¹ These passages are too long to quote here but are readily understandable in the light of the principles already discussed. We shall examine only those two cases which cause the greatest difficulty; namely, (a) the distinction of intra-

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, s.j.

atomic activity from vital activity and (b) the application of the term "life" to God. For these two instances should be the acid test of whether our definition of life is adequate and accurate.

Those who find that intra-atomic activity theory presents a new difficulty in the definition of life should forget immanence and read very carefully the answers St. Thomas gives to the three objections with which he opens his discussion of life in the *Summa Theologiae*.³² Granted that he knew nothing of the orbital movement of electrons, it still seems that his principles there are adequate. Since he was not bothered, as we have seen, with the modern Scholastic's preoccupation with immanence, he simply points out that no matter what activity the nonliving body may have, it is not characterized by any self-initiation. Following the conclusion of the first book of the *Physics*, any and every natural body has within itself a principle of motion, for that is what a nature means for Aristotle. What differentiates them? In Book VIII of the *Physics* Aristotle points out that, of the natural bodies that are not alive, some, like a lever, receive a given motion which is "unnatural," while others, like fire, have a motion that is "natural"; but in either case the motion is received from an external principle, not self-initiated, and is thus distinct from the living thing which does not receive its motion from outside, either here and now (the lever) or when its nature was constituted (the fire).³³ And St. Thomas interprets the mind of his forerunner in the same sense commenting on another place:

It is to be known that the philosopher says the soul is the first act . . . also to distinguish it from the forms of elements, *which always have their operation . . .*³⁴

This is confirmed by the texts quoted from St. Thomas in Part Two above on the nature of life, for whatever else one may say for the atom, it certainly does not "incipit a se motum habere" nor "se agere ad motum" but rather it "semper habet suam actionem"; and since it is not self-subsistent like God, it must have received this natural

³²ST, q. 18, a. 1.

³³*Physics*, viii. 4. 254b7-256a3. And cf. ST, I, q. 18, a. 1 ad 2.

³⁴"Sciendum autem quod Philosophus dicit animam esse actum primum . . . etiam ut distinguat eam a formis ele-
mentorum, quae semper habent suam

actionem . . ." (*In II De An.*, lect. 1 [Pirotta No. 229]. Italics mine.)

³⁵ST, I, q. 18, a. 3 ad fin.

³⁶CG, I, cap. 98.

³⁷*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 8 (Cathala-
Spiazzi No. 2544).

motion, along with its being, "ab exteriori principio." And valence and chemical affinity would seem to fit quite nicely into the Aristotelian conception of the "natural" motion of an element.

IV

Our final task is to examine how what has been said can be utilized in our application of the predicates "life" and "living" to the divine nature, and then in a concluding section we may consider briefly the notion of life as realized in the entire hierarchy of living things.

First, since God is His existence or *esse*, there is no difficulty in saying that He is also life or *vivere*—"vivere est esse viventium" again. The notion appears whenever St. Thomas is discussing God's life, for example in the *Summa Theologiae*,³⁵ in the *Contra Gentiles*,³⁶ and in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³⁷ God is certainly a being who contains within Himself the source of His own actuality and perfection, independently of any external principle. His activities are certainly all self-initiated. The only apparent difficulty would seem to lie in the word "source" as implying somehow that God is the *cause* of those activities which are identified with His own divine nature; in other words, as if the expressions "perfecting" or "moving" implied some change in God. The answer at first is simple and has already been given in the principles laid down for the application of the notion of life to its inferiors: these notions must be understood analogically, and (most important) they cannot be understood apart from the kind of activity which is proper to each being, as St. Thomas told us in the above passage from the *Summa* (n. 29). In other words, the life of God is obviously going to contain certain infinite perfections proper only to Him who is pure act, uncaused, immutable, and so on. But it is a little more subtle to elaborate an explanation of how this is compatible with the notions of motion and perfecting.

Much light is thrown on the matter if we return to the philosophy of Aristotle to see what he thinks of the activity most typical of God; namely, understanding. In many places he concerns himself with the question of how this can be considered motion.

The problem might be suggested: if thinking is a passive affection, then if mind is simple and impassible and has nothing

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, S.J.

in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how can it come to think at all? For interaction between two factors is held to require a precedent community of nature between the two factors.³⁸

What is bothering him here, among other things, is that motion as he defined it in the *Physics* seems to involve an imperfection and the corruption of a contrary. Neither of these could be admitted in God, of course. But the answer is that understanding is a perfect motion rather than an imperfect one and does not involve the corruption of a contrary but at most an ἐπιθεσίς, a realization of the fullness of the being of the knower, which is somehow all things.

This implies a third meaning of “a knower,” one who is already realizing his knowledge—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g., this is A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by a change of quality, i.e., repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise. The two kinds of transition are distinct.

Also the expression “to be acted upon” has more than one meaning: it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, with such likeness as is compatible with one’s being actual and the other potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes

³⁸Aristotle, *De An.* iii. 4. 429b23-26.

³⁹*Ibid.* ii. 5. 417a28-b9. Note that the words in the parentheses are Aristotle’s own.

⁴⁰*Ethic.* *Nich.* i. 8. 1099a14.

⁴¹*In II De An.*, lect. 11 (Pirotta Nos. 365-69).

⁴²“Et quia motus, qui est in rebus corporalibus, de quo determinatum est in libro Physicorum, est de contrario in contrarium, manifestum est quod sentire, si dicatur motus, est alia species motus ab ea de qua determinatum est in libro Physicorum; ille enim motus est actus existentis in potentia, quia videlicet recedens ab uno contrario, quamdiu movetur, non attingit alterum contrarium, quod est terminus motus,

sed est in potentia. Et quia omne quod est in potentia, in quantum hujusmodi, est imperfectum, ideo ille motus est actus imperfecti. Sed iste motus est actus perfecti; est enim operatio sensus jam facti in actu, per suam speciem. Non enim sentire convenit sensui nisi in actu existenti; et ideo simpliciter est alter a motu physico. Et hujusmodi motus dicitur proprie operatio, ut sentire et intelligere et velle” (*In III De An.*, lect. 12 [Pirotta No. 766]). Cf. also No. 160.

⁴³“. . . moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce, secundum quod intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur” (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 2 ad 2).

an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense from the usual meaning.

Hence it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being "altered" when he uses his wisdom . . .³⁹

Aristotle utilizes this notion of *epidosis* in the *Ethics*⁴⁰ when speaking of the virtuous actions of the good, and St. Thomas uses it often in explaining how such acts as *intelligere* can be called *motus* in a loose sense and without implying imperfection. Thus he expands at some length in his commentary on the passage just quoted,⁴¹ and in another shorter passage speaks in the same vein:

And because motion which is found in bodily things (which is dealt with in the book of the *Physics*) is from one contrary to another, it is clear that sensing, if it is called motion, is a different species of motion from that which is treated in the book of the *Physics*. For that motion is the act of a thing existing in potency, because, that is, going away from one of the contraries, as long as it is moved, it does not reach the other contrary which is the term of the motion, but is in potency to it. Because every thing which is in potency as such, is imperfect; therefore that motion is the act of an imperfect being. But this motion is the act of a perfect thing; for it is the operation of a sense already put into act, by its species. For sensing does not pertain to the sense except as the latter is in act and therefore it is simply other than physical motion. And this kind of motion is properly called operation, as sensing and understanding and willing.⁴²

Consequently we find him telling us in the *Summa* that "movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in *De Anima* iii";⁴³ that is, when we apply to spiritual operations as such the terms passion and motion, we turn those terms from their original meaning. We do it in marking off living things in general,

whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, s.j.

movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect thing, i.e., of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind.⁴⁴

We do it also in delineating the intellectual activity proper to man:

. . . in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive.⁴⁵

Even the activity of the contemplative life is *motus* in a sense:

. . . contemplation has indeed a rest from external motion; nevertheless the act of contemplating itself is a certain motion of the intellect in the sense that any operation is called motion, in the way in which the Philosopher says that sensing and

⁴⁴"Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, id est existentis in potentia, sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout etiam actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicuntur moveri, ut dicitur; ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 1).

⁴⁵". . . dicitur aliquis pati communiter ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiciatur; secundum quem motum omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati" (*ibid.*, q. 79, a. 2).

⁴⁶". . . contemplatio habet quidem quietem ab exterioribus motibus; nihilominus tamen ipsum contemplari est quidam motus intellectus, prout quaelibet operatio dicitur motus, secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus qui-

dam, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1 ad 3).

⁴⁷"Si autem semper eam actu habeat [i.e., species intelligibilis], nihilominus per eam cognoscere potest, absque aliqua mutatione vel receptione praecedenti. Ex quo patet quod moveri ab objecto non est de ratione cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens, sed in quantum est potentia cognoscens" (*ibid.*, I, q. 56, a. 1).

⁴⁸"Unde quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda actio, in quantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus ejus ex hac similitudine, quod sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita hujusmodi actio est actio agentis; licet motus sit imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, hujusmodi autem actio sit actus perfecti, id est, existentis in actu. . . Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit dicitur se mouere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1).

understanding are a certain motion in the sense that motion is called the act of a perfect being.⁴⁶

Going still farther up the scale of perfection, where we find still greater independence of external principle of motion and less imperfection implied in the (analogical) motion itself, we find St. Thomas saying of an angel that if it

. . . always actually possesses [the intelligible species], it can nonetheless know through it without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality.⁴⁷

In the last sentence just quoted St. Thomas has really laid down the basic principle we need to see how God's intellectual activity is truly such without entailing any change or potency in God, but the series of steps is illuminating. And so, by removing the imperfection of creatures ("via negationis") he arrives at a legitimate application of the definition of life to God:

Hence, because movement [i.e., transient activity] is an act of the thing moved, the latter action [i.e., immanent activity], in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.⁴⁸

Moreover life is to be said of God in the very highest and most perfect sense of the term ("via eminentiae"):

Wherefore that being whose act or understanding is its very nature, and who, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. And so the Philos-

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, S.J.

opher (*Metaph.* xii. 51), having shown that God is intelligent, concludes that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.⁴⁹

V

There is some reason to hope that an investigation of the various grades of living beings might throw some additional light on the hierarchical application of the concept of vital activity, as well as on the degree to which immanence can be said to constitute a perfection of life.

First, as to the notion of life developed from Aristotle and Aquinas in this study, it is obvious that the hierarchy must be in terms of various degrees of self-activation. This really involves two things: independence of the influence of other agents ("non determinatur ab alio," said St. Thomas in the last passage cited) and the possession of more actuality within oneself. These characteristics are easily seen to increase as we ascend the Dionysian scale of being. The lowly element, whether Aristotelian or modern, is utterly dependent upon the actions of those outside itself. Whatever motion it has it received from its Maker or from something else. It cannot perfect itself; indeed, it cannot act upon another without losing some of its perfection if not its very identity in chemical composition. It possesses little enough of reality and has no means of acquiring more. Plants, on the contrary, have the ability to acquire the matter of other things without loss of their own form but rather to their increase and prosperity. The plant acts upon other things, changing them and possessing them in a material way while perfecting itself, and thus asserts a certain independence of, and domination over, other portions of reality. In animal life we find a still higher degree of these same perfections, as is obvious. Animals can initiate their own local motion and determine the form, if not the end, of their activity.⁵⁰ Not only are they more

⁴⁹"*Illud igitur, cuius sua natura est ipsum ejus intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter habet non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde Philosophus, ostendo quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia intel-*

lectus ejus est perfectissimus et semper in actu" (*ibid.*)

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, I, q. 84, a. 2.

⁵²"*Unumquodque tendens in suam perfectionem, tendit in Divinam similitudinem,*" St. Thomas often says, and this is the theme of the whole of Chap. 21 of *Contra Gentiles*, III.

⁵³*ST*, I, q. 78, a. 1.

independent in their activity; but they can, in the language familiar to all students of St. Thomas, possess more of reality within themselves than the plants because they can not merely ingest the matter of other beings as the plants can but can possess them in a quasi-immaterial way; namely, through sense cognition by which they possess the forms of other things without their matter, though along with the conditions of matter.⁵¹ But as we find creatures more perfect, we find them more Godlike.⁵² Hence man, the most perfect in the visible world, imitates the divine nature in being able to possess (*intentionaliter*) all things—that is, all of reality—by his intellect and to assert by his free choices an independence of others, not only as to execution and form of his activities, like the brute, but also as to their end. Angels are, of course, still more independent of the limitations of the material universe and possessed of a greater portion of reality in fact. Lastly, God is both absolutely independent of all external principles of movement and at the same time fully possessed of all the perfections of reality.

But we can discern, in addition to these, other finer distinctions in the beings of these various levels, according to the principle of continuity already quoted from Pseudo-Dionysius that “infimum superioris attingitur a supremo inferioris.” We have seen that whereas God can operate on things outside Himself without change or loss, the element cannot; He receives no motion from outside Himself; the atom must receive all its motion. But within these two extremes are many degrees of receptivity and independence besides those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which stand out in everyone’s thinking because of early gymnastics on the Porphyrean tree.

Thus, for instance, among things devoid of cognition there is a certain variety of degrees of receptivity of forms. We saw that the plant can be distinguished from the nonliving substance by its ability to receive another substance without losing its own from, although what is received does lose its form. But whereas in chemical composition both elements lose their form, even there the received forms are in the compound *virtute*, and thus the compound possesses something more of formal being than the element. Again, among the brutes, some, like the shellfish,⁵³ possess no locomotion; others are able by their own activity to free themselves from their material surroundings and move about. Likewise, some animals, like the oyster, are blessed only with

Life and Living Beings
James E. Royce, S.J.

the sense of touch, most material of all sensory cognitive powers; others have touch and smell, and so on up the scale to those blessed with vision, which has the widest range of receptivity of other beings' forms. Moreover, this distinction of the varying grades of sense cognition also illustrates another of our criteria; namely, that whereas in touch there is the greatest dependence on the activity of the stimulus and the most change in the recipient, in vision the independence of matter and exalted nature of the change leads St. Thomas to call the process "spiritual" immutation.⁵⁴ And in the realm of intellectual beings, we find not only the stereotyped division between angels and men but within the latter a variety ranging from those unfortunates whose intellectual processes barely surpass the more subtle material manipulations of the internal senses of a higher brute up to those minds whose intuitive soarings merit such titles as *Angelic Doctor*. Lastly, from faith we can add one further refinement to the graded hierarchy; namely, the tremendous possession of Being Itself granted us in the beatific vision.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, a. 3.

(Continued from p. 196)

Science Institute, which was inaugurated at St. John's a year ago and which is fully integrated with the regular curriculum, has a four-fold objective: "to provide philosophers with a frame of reference for evaluating the methods and results of modern science; to provide natural scientists with a philosophical perspective for evaluating their own methods and results; to show the unity of man's knowledge of nature and to cultivate scholars who are philosophers and scientists at the same time; and finally to relate man's knowledge of nature to metaphysics and thus to prepare the way for the incorporation of natural science into the synthesis of sacred theology."

PROFESSOR JACQUES MARITAIN delivered a series of three lectures last November at Hunter College. The subject of the lectures was "Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity."

LAST SEPTEMBER the editorial staff of the Thomist Press initiated, as a complimentary service, a circular of timely topics entitled, "Current Quodlibetales." Its purpose is to discuss, more personally and informally than can be done in a review, current trends, needs, and areas of development in philosophy and theology. Future circulars will contain such items as notes on articles, books, lectures, and so on, which might stimulate further research; notes on latest meetings of philosophical and theological associations; and a letter forum for individuals to express their ideas and suggestions. Among others, the circular will be sent to all members of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and the Metaphysical Society of America.

THE DOMINICAN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION was formed on April 2, 1959. Reverend Augustine Rock, O.P., was the initiator of the movement. The 1960 meeting of the Association will be held in conjunction with the National Catholic Educational Association sessions in Chicago. "The general purpose of the Dominican Educational Association would be to provide a channel for the promotion of educational principles and practices for Dominican educators."

THE ASSOCIATION FOR REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY held its fall meeting at the University of Connecticut last October. Professor John Wild read a paper on "Realism and the Problem of Human Freedom." Francis Parker delivered a paper on "Realism and Falsity," and Richard Robin on "C. S. Peirce and Some Medieval Forerunners."

Chronicle

THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION held its twelfth annual meeting on October 16 and 17, 1959, at Rockhurst College, Kansas City. On the first day, independent papers were read by Professor Eugene Conover, of Lindenwood College, on "The Problem of Truth in Religion"; by Professor A. William Levi, of Washington University, on "Philosophy of Literature"; and by Professor W. Donald Oliver, of the University of Missouri, on "Presuppositions of Systems." On the second day a symposium was held on "The Philosophy of Science." Its panelists were: A. C. Benjamin, University of Missouri; Peter Caws, Kansas University; Alden L. Fisher, Saint Louis University; and Solomon E. Levy, University of Kansas City. The presidential address was delivered by Dr. Leonard Eslick, of Saint Louis University. Dr. Eslick delineated two antithetical concepts of freedom as suggested by Isaiah Berlin and then traced some minimal metaphysical conditions for personal freedom. Eugene Conover was elected president for the coming year, and James Reagan, of Saint Louis University, was re-elected secretary-treasurer.

W. NORRIS CLARKE, S.J., *Fordham University*

L'Être et l'esprit. By André Marc, S.J. Paris-Louvain: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 197. Fr. b. 132.

Father Marc is well known among contemporary Thomists for his remarkable series of volumes, *Psychologie réflexive* (2 vols.), *Dialectique de l'affirmation*, and *Dialectique de l'agir*, one of the outstanding examples of personal reconstruction of basic Thomistic philosophy in our time. In them he has consistently applied his method of "reflexive analysis" to construct a tightly knit system of philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and general ethics, inspired fundamentally by St. Thomas but integrating many positive contributions of method and content from modern philosophy (especially from Kant on to the modern French *philosophie de l'esprit*). The characteristic of his method is that it begins with a rich concrete experience involving and manifesting the human subject as profoundly as possible, then subjects this experience first to a careful phenomenological description to disengage its essential traits, and finally to reflexive analysis in depth through a dialectic of antithetical notions implied in the original experience. The latter phase is metaphysical analysis proper, whose goal is to uncover the ultimate metaphysical foundations or necessary conditions of intelligibility of the experience itself.

After the completion of this massive work, the fruit of a lifetime of reteaching and reflection, the author now steps back in the present comparatively brief concluding volume to take a kind of airplane survey of the whole sweep of his thought and draw out with greater explicitness the most significant conclusions resulting from it. To achieve this he focuses his full attention on the analysis of the two great central notions that dominate all philosophy and his own thought in particular; namely, mind and being in their mutual relationships.

In a rapid but clear condensation of his previous more detailed analyses, he takes off from the basic human act of communication through word or gesture and shows how this act is a synthesis of interiority and exteriority, spirit and matter, achieved by the unifying light of spiritual self-consciousness, which transcends in itself the multiplicity and dispersion of space and time. The opposition of subject and object is now transcended in turn by the discovery of the all-embracing unity of being itself, within which subject and object appear as two complementary poles. The reflexive

analysis next moves in quick strides through the basic moments of metaphysics up to God, the source of all being and hence the ultimate synthesis of subject and object, intellect and being. The author takes pains to show how mind and being are correlative at every step, and how the objective intelligible unity imbedded in the concrete order of being is brought to self-conscious spiritual ratification and fulfillment by the free communion of all persons in their common witness to being and its meaning. A chapter follows on the fruitfulness of these ideas for a fuller understanding of the meaning of sickness, death, and Christ as incarnate Word of God.

Along the way the author takes time out in a couple of chapters to sketch in broad strokes the development of the contrary movement of thought which stresses the conflict rather than the harmony between mind and being, and ends up in the two closely related extremes of idealism and empiricism. Here again, as throughout all his work, it is evident that the principal foil and stimulus to Father Marc's own thought have been the great dialectical idealists of the post-Kantian period rather than contemporary existentialist currents, which receive only passing attention.

It is difficult to evaluate or appreciate a work of synthesis and condensation of this kind apart from the four volumes which precede and support it, since certain of the metaphysical analyses and the criticisms of other philosophers are too summarily outlined here to be fully satisfying by themselves. But the central message of the irreducibly correlative character of mind and being, together with the necessary role of a community of persons within being in order to fulfill the full meaning and finality of being itself, emerges clearly and eloquently. A rich little book but not an easy one, since its thought moves consistently on the austere heights of an interiorized metaphysical reflection not too frequently practiced on this side of the water.

MICHAEL MONTAGUE S.J., *West Baden College*

Epistemology. By L. M. Régis, O.P. Trans. I. C. Byrne. New York:
Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 549. \$6.50.

Father Régis's previous work in the field of epistemology—notably his study of opinion in Aristotle and his Aquinas lecture in 1946—gave promise that this latest in the "Christian Wisdom Series" would be no ordinary textbook in epistemology. And indeed it is not. While intended for undergraduate students, it is primarily a long, interpretative commentary on the epistemological texts and thought of St. Thomas Aquinas regarding philosophical knowledge. The structure of the book, though unusual, is

clear; and frequent prologues, summaries, and conclusions allow one to locate himself easily as he works through the four parts and 476 pages of the text. Part I poses the Thomistic epistemological problem; Parts II, III, and IV examine Aquinas's answer to that problem in terms of the nature, the truth, and the infallibility of human knowledge.

Since the epistemological problem is only one particular problem, Father Régis prefaces his epistemological considerations with an account of the genesis and nature of a philosophical problem in general. Arising from contradictory accounts of the same data, a problem gives rise to the emotion of wonder that is the principle of the process of inquiry. The inquiry will first attempt a harmonious compromise between the conflicting accounts. If conciliation is impossible, the duality will be overcome by suppressing one of the two divergent accounts; if this fails, doubt is the dead-end of discovery, which, by turning permanently on the inability of the intellect to discover truth, hardens into skepticism.

Against this background of problem, wonder, and inquiry, Father Régis takes up in turn the modern epistemological problem in its classical formulations by Descartes and Kant, in its contemporary phase of the new learning in quantum and relativity theory, and in the Neo-Scholastic epistemologies of Noël and Maréchal. All of these are found wanting, and Father Régis returns to Aquinas.

The problem that Aquinas faced arose from the conflict between the Augustinian and Aristotelian views of the universe. Their root difference was not due to the presence or absence of faith in a Christian revelation but to a difference in methods. While the Platonism of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure proceeds from the intelligible to the sensible, Aristotle starts from the sensible to reach the intelligible. Aquinas clearly chose the Aristotelian method but felt full freedom regarding the contents of Platonism and Aristotelianism. This Aristotelian method consisted not only in plotting the general movement from the sensible to the intelligible but also in lining up the series of successive questions relevant to scientific or philosophic knowledge: *An est? quid est? quia ita est? propter quid est?*

The application to knowledge of this series of ordered questions provides the framework for a Thomistic epistemology. The existence of knowledge is the immediately evident starting point that gives rise to the questions, What is knowledge? what are its properties? why does knowledge have these properties? Descartes and Kant, in violating the order of these questions, began by identifying knowledge with truth and truth with certitude. The inevitable procedure in a Thomistic epistemology must be from man to knowledge, to truth, to certainty or probability.

The 150 pages of Part II analyze the nature of knowledge in a detail that

is usually reserved for the treatment of knowledge in a philosophy of man. By contrasting the vital activity of knowledge with physical movement, Father Régis discusses the immanence, perfection, and self-construction of knowledge as grounded in the immaterial soul of man as in an ultimate principle. But if the soul explains the unity in human knowledge, it is the powers as proximate principles that account for the diversity of these immanent activities. Not only are the operations immanent to the powers, which are immanent to one another and to the soul that is their principle and end, but the operations themselves are immanent to one another in the synthesis that is an act of knowledge.

Knowledge, however, is not merely an operation immanent to a knowing subject; it is also essentially a knowledge of an object. The notion of object as the thing in its relationship to the soul is central to Thomistic epistemology. In human knowledge this fundamental relationship is causal. As the sensible is the cause of sensation, the intelligible is the cause of intellection. All the powers are active in the order of exercise; in the order of specification, they are either active or passive, depending on whether their correlative objects are passive or active. The sense powers are passive only in the order of formal causality; they must receive a specific determination from the object. The physical action of the object on the body by means of qualitative and local movement is only the condition of sensory knowledge; the intentional action is the cause. This latter activity of "spiritual immutation" is in the line of exemplary causality, according to the relation of measure to measured. The effect of this quasi-exemplary causality of the sensible existent is the sensible species, which is an image or specific likeness of the thing and caused by the thing.

The transition from sensation to intellection occurs through the activity of the agent intellect. Its causality is described as an abstraction and illumination that results in the intelligible species. Father Régis adopts the theory of John of St. Thomas in explaining the interlocking causalities of the agent intellect and phantasm: the agent intellect is the sole efficient cause of the intelligible species; the phantasm exercises the objective causality of measure to measured. The resultant intelligible species is consequently composed of a formal element which is the actual intelligibility, due to the efficient causality of the agent intellect, and a material element that is defined by its likeness to the phantasms from which it is drawn.

But how can an activity that is entirely immanent terminate in an external thing? The solution lies in the distinction between exercise and specification. The immanence of knowledge is explained through the fact that the subject exercises the act of knowledge; the objective exteriority of knowledge through the fact that the object specifies the act. From the side of the exercise of knowledge, the knower is both the cause and the perfected

term of knowledge; from the side of the specification of knowledge, the external thing is the cause and term of knowledge. With the advance in immanence from the external senses through the internal senses to the intellect, there is a parallel growth in the objective grasp of external reality. After a lengthy analysis of the various stages in external and internal sense knowledge, Father Régis outlines the moments in the intellect's deepening penetration of the real. First, there is the indistinct knowledge of *quod est*, physical being in its actual becoming. A second moment seeks a knowledge of the nature of the *quod est*; this is to know being as quiddity or *res*. The third stage of intellectual penetration reveals external things as unified wholes of substance and accidents. A still further specification of human knowledge brings the intellect to the stage of distinguishing the act of existence by which a being is from the initial act of motion or the acts of substantial and accidental forms. In grasping the act of existence as the act of being, one also considers each thing in its existential unity with other things, thereby forming a distinctive totality expressed by the concept of being as being. As the *quod* of the *quod est* gradually becomes more determinate in our knowledge, the meaning of *est* becomes more indeterminate. But this indetermination of being is not due to imperfection in the content of knowledge as in the knowledge of a genus or an individual but to the medium of knowledge. The apprehension of being as being constitutes man's most universal and perfect knowledge, and is the path to God, who is being by essence.

The analysis of the nature of knowledge leads into the question of the truth of knowledge in Part III. Up to this point, there has been no discussion of judgment. Even in speaking of man's knowledge of being as being, Father Régis used the language of apprehension. The purpose of judgment is not to grasp an aspect of reality, either quiddity or existence, that apprehension fails to grasp, but to bring unity into the concepts of apprehension. Under the drive of the intellect's natural appetite for being and the perfect possession of being, the judgment regroups and correlates the noun-concepts and verb-concepts of apprehension to form one synthetic intelligibility. The direct object of the act of judgment is not the extra-mental real but our knowledge of the real, the composition of concepts that were previously apprehended. Three proofs are offered to substantiate this position: judgments of identity do not focus on real existence; secondly, the natural act of existence of a being is substantial, while the *is* of judgment is an accidental predicate; lastly, judgments that have God as their object obviously cannot touch the actual existence of God but only the truth of the proposition that God exists. The immanent term of judgment is the enunciation with its quantitative and qualitative properties. The enunciation is a likeness of what Aquinas calls the *ipsum esse rei*,

which Father Régis holds is not the act of existence alone but the existential mode of the real in its totality as essence and existence, substance and accidents. Such is the measuring object of the enunciation. The constructed unity in the enunciation allows it to agree or disagree with the unified complexity of the thing's mode of existence. An agreement is truth; a disagreement is falsity. Truth is, therefore, a characteristic of the enunciation considered as the immanent term of the judgment, expressive of and measured by the complex unity of the thing. The intellect knows the truth by reflecting upon itself and its immanent operation of judgment. The starting point of this reflection is the enunciation that terminates judgment. Following the outline of the moments of reflection as set down by Aquinas in *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9, Father Régis insists that this reflection cannot stop with the grasp of the intellect's nature and passivity in the face of the real but must continue until one understands the actual dependence of concepts on phantasms. Among the various truths of knowledge, there is a hierarchy determined by the different complex unities that measure the constructed unities of the enunciation.

Part IV deals with the immediate and mediate truths that the intellect knows infallibly. There are four groups of universal, immediately evident judgments: the principle of noncontradiction, of identity, of causality, of finality. Each of these first principles is analyzed in its ontological and epistemological aspects. The act by which the intellect judges the value of these truths and their hierarchized relations to one another is the act of *assent*. The object of assent is truth as infallibly possessed by the intellect. Thus assent is not identified with the act of judgment. Assent proceeds from a reflection upon a direct judgment of the intellect and registers in a reflex and modal judgment the approval of the truths already known. This results in certitude as a repose of the intellect in its possession of infallible truth. The "kinds" of certitude are the absolute intellectual certitude by which the intellect reposes in its infallible grasp of first principles; the scientific certitude in the grasp of a conclusion as proceeding from the truth of first principles; the certitude of faith that stems from a volitional determination; and lastly, the experiential certitude produced by sensible evidence that perdures only for the length of the sensation itself.

But the grasp of immediate principles is far from the whole of man's philosophical knowledge. Such principles are in the order of discovery the starting point for the reasoning process and in the order of judgment the point of resolutory return. The immanent exercise of reason in its passage from the known to the unknown is essentially intermediary between two judgments that it unifies or opposes. The field within which reason

operates is that of the real relations of cause and effect, means and end, concomitance and succession, and so on. It is this causal order that measures mediate truth, as the *ipsum esse rei* serves as the measure of immediate truth. If the necessary causal links cannot be known through processes of analysis and synthesis, then philosophical knowledge gives way to the techniques of modern science.

Such an impoverishing summary are the major topics treated in this ambitious work. And judgment on the book must look at it in two ways, as a study of the thought of Aquinas on the problems of philosophical knowledge and as an undergraduate textbook in epistemology.

Frankly, I am not certain about its teachability to American undergraduates. Certainly we are at a point where the class manuals in philosophy are no longer a catechism of correct answers to be memorized for apologetic purposes. But as an undergraduate manual, the book is at times extraordinarily full and detailed. However, this very fullness might increase its readability for an undergraduate. The book supposes a good working knowledge of metaphysics; that is fair enough. But the abstract, technical analyses could have been made more meaningful if they had been prefaced by a phenomenological and psychological description of knowledge as present in one's actual awareness. The book cannot stand as an independent investigation and reflection on knowledge; it is rather an instrument for finding out what St. Thomas thought about the nature and properties of philosophical knowledge. Furthermore, a continuous reading of the book (quite obviously a translation from the French) makes one aware of the annoying frequency of extended and mixed metaphors, untranslated Latin terms and phrases, long, crowded sentences, and unnecessary transient eulogies of St. Thomas.

If the book is regarded as an exploration of the epistemological thought of St. Thomas—and the importance of the book lies here—Father Régis is to be commended for cutting through many of the issues that have befogged Scholastic epistemologies in their unsuccessful attempts to accommodate themselves to the problems and terminology of non-Scholastic philosophers. The ground-clearing action of Part I leaves the Thomistic analysis in the remaining sections free from polemics. Our summary account of the contents indicates that several topics usually treated in a course in epistemology do not appear: the nature of evidence, the "problem" of universals, the type of induction, and so on. The unfortunate division of certitude into metaphysical, physical, and moral is happily absent. Several of the interpretations and positions taken by the author are debatable; Father Régis clearly recognizes this. Further discussion has not been closed on such points as the causalities of the object, senses, and intellect in the acts of sensation and understanding; the causalities

of the agent intellect and phantasm in the production of the intelligible species; the function and object of the act of judgment; the role of reflection in judgment; the relation between judgment and assent; the process of reaching a knowledge of being as being (especially the role of negative judgments of separation—an omission particularly surprising in the light of some of Father Régis's earlier writings). One misses most, perhaps, an examination of the philosophical problem of nonphilosophical types of human knowledge, especially of scientific knowledge in the modern sense of the term "science." The fact that this cannot be derived from an analysis of the texts of Aquinas should not exclude it from a present-day epistemology that in any way pretends to be complete. The question of the nature of scientific knowledge (and its relations to prephilosophical and philosophical knowledge) is, in fact, the key issue in contemporary epistemology.

But Father Régis has clearly limited his study to an examination of the epistemological thought of St. Thomas. In this area, Father Régis has put us all in his debt by this first-rate study by a first-rate scholar.

GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHEMANN, *Southern Illinois University*

An Introduction to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus." By G. E. M. Anscombe. London: Hutchison Univ. Lib., 1959. University Library, Philosophy Series. Pp. 179.

Something rather similar to Aristotle's distinction between things more intelligible in their own right and things more familiar to us might well be applied to books. At bottom, the great original texts—the *Republic*, the first *Critique*, *Process and Reality*, and *perhaps* we may count here the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* too—are more knowable than are the hosts of introductions, exegeses, and criticisms written after them. But without the latter, those others would remain obscure through their very newness, scope, inciseness, and power. Miss Anscombe's book does not pretend to be a new vision of philosophic problems—or a new cure for headaches—but it sticks so closely to Wittgenstein's text that if his text contains truths, then her book must also. Miss Anscombe talks about a philosophy that talks about the problems of logic and language, but in a way more familiar, more persuasive, than the model she has chosen to interpret. Her close study of the *Tractatus* has afforded her solutions to some of its difficulties, though she has refrained from raising many of the larger questions about its exciting approach. Be that as it may, important work in philosophy is frequently done at one remove from the things or symbols which directly furnish the problems; and Miss Anscombe's book has in this second way enunciated valuable propositions about the world.

Oddly enough, most of the more thorough expositions of the *Tractatus* have been written by Americans or Italians, not Britishers, though this is doubtless a coincidence, with no essential causes. Alexander Maslow's dissertation (still unpublished), Julius Weinberg's *An Examination of Logical Positivism*, and James K. Feibleman's reflections, *Inside the Great Mirror*, are demonstrably not written in any British tradition of philosophizing; and although they are based only upon study of Wittgenstein's published text, each contains insights of real worth. Miss Anscombe's book is of a different order not only because she has had access to much ancillary material up to now hidden but also because she has been associated with a "school," so that her understanding is based neither upon happy chance nor upon remote deductions but upon breathing a philosophic atmosphere created largely by the heady effluvia of Wittgenstein's own work, early and late. Had Wittgenstein never existed, some historian would certainly be finding it necessary to invent him, so similar have been the problems and doctrines of writers in Britain during the last thirty years.

The criticism already heard in certain quarters, that Miss Anscombe's book is much too difficult for inclusion in a home university series, is a little beside the point, for the *Introduction* has its own virtues, regardless of its neighbors in a library. It is meant to be read as a companion to the *Tractatus*; and that is a work which, like so many others, can be read first or fiftieth but is so different from the rest that it will remain obscure unless the reader "does philosophy" with a little of the boldness of its tortured and quite incredible author.

The principal trouble with previous commentators and critics has been that they have started by saying that the *Tractatus* is profound, oracular, and difficult, and then have taken the most obvious lines of interpretation of points for which they feel a sympathy. Russell, Urmson, and Popper have made out the lessons of the *Tractatus* to be so plain that one wonders why the book should ever have been considered subtle, indeed anything but a primer of some hackneyed dogma. Ramsey was the first, and Miss Anscombe is the best, in the attempt to unify the philosophy of the *Tractatus* with the logic. Feibleman, whose book is otherwise helpful, shrugs off passage after passage dealing with what he calls "notation"; but just here Miss Anscombe plunges bravely in, rightly convinced, I believe, that Wittgenstein's purpose is not only to frame a general theory of language but also to make the best possible use of existing and new symbols to insure that a given language, with the help of these clarified symbols, would be exactly adequate. I would go on to say that accomplishment of his purpose involved a very careful identification of language with the world, in certain respects, and just as careful a separation of it, in others. Whether Miss Anscombe would wish to say just this I hesitate to opine,

though there is nothing in her *Introduction* definitely precluding that view. At any rate, she tackles one "theme" in the *Tractatus* after another, not relinquishing any until her interpretation has been made to yield a good measure of plausibility. It is a pity that a short review cannot take up more than a handful of the twenty or so topics that she expounds so earnestly.

Now to business. Miss Anscombe expends much labor on the picture theory of language, which Wittgenstein thought of as resting on an essential likeness of the elements of a proposition (its names) to the structure of an integrated set of facts (*Introd.*, p. 100; *Tract.*, 2.1, 2.161, 4.04, and so on). If the world's facts do not hang together, then speaking about them and mirroring them in signs would be impossible. If they do hang together, then their structure is shared by propositions; but the coherence and the existence of facts are two different things; hence from the structure of a proposition which carries its own sense (that is, is not derived from some other proposition) you cannot immediately decide whether that proposition is true or false (*Tract.*, 2.225). The structure shared by fact and proposition is partly spatial, partly not. Miss Anscombe is able to show how Wittgenstein moves little by little from physical space to logical space in his conception (*Introd.*, pp. 70-74; *Tract.*, 2.182) and still keeps the physical space fundamental by his insistence upon models (*ibid.*, p. 100; *Tract.*, 3.143).

The ideal imaging proposition is one no part of which mirrors anything but a factual structure among simple things; and this is called by Wittgenstein an elementary proposition (*Tract.*, 4.21) both because it is first and all others are built with its help, and also because in essence it is easiest to grasp—impossible, indeed, not to grasp. The only trouble is that in the *Tractatus* there is no list, no description, no samples of elementary propositions; and even those who, like Russell, knew Wittgenstein in the years when the book was taking shape, were quite baffled. All Miss Anscombe says here is

And "Red patch here" would seem to be a candidate for being a simple or elementary observation statement. . . . This suggests that the elementary propositions are not merely observation statements, but sense-datum statements; as, indeed, they were taken to be both by many members of the Vienna Circle [this is one of the few places where she makes any concession to that group!] and for many years in Cambridge discussions. And I think it is quite possible that Wittgenstein had roughly this sort of thing rather vaguely in mind (*Introd.*, pp. 26-27).

I count five hesitations in the last sentence. The question appears to be open to much more discussion, including some on the point whether all ele-

mentary propositions have to be of the same kind, varying only in the individual names fitted into them. Certainly this is not generated by Wittgenstein's desire to achieve Heracleitean obscurity but rather by his awareness that when we try to clarify propositions and purge them of all unclear materials, so that they attach immediately to the world, we find that our successes are very few. So said Plato, so Aristotle, so Spinoza; and it is quite futile to believe with Russell that "Socrates is wise" is elementary just because it contains no logical connectives. Otherwise the proposition p , which can be simply marked with the truth-values T or F, could be distinguished once and for all from the peculiar compounded proposition p, q , TFTF (p , and q or not-- q), simply in respect to connectives. It is not that easy, because these two propositions "carry the same information, yet one is loaded with logical constants, the other not."

Miss Anscombe's account of truth-functions is unusually careful in hitching this conception of Wittgenstein's to cognate ones in mathematicians and especially to Frege, but it contains little that is out of the ordinary; so I pass on to her discussion of Wittgenstein's general form of proposition, a doctrine of which, to judge by the remarks with which he frames it round, he was highly proud. He did not, of course, make the error of assuming that the total number of elementary propositions was finite; but he did treat the problem as if we could tell offhand by using a formula just what any term in a series of compound propositions would be, were we to start, say, with just two elementary propositions (*Tract.*, 6., 6.001 ff.). What Miss Anscombe shows, contrary to Russell's explanation, is that Wittgenstein's well-known formula $[\overline{\rho}, \overline{\xi}, N(\overline{\xi})]$ is not something to be applied mechanically to propositions strung out in a row, as we might say that $2 + 1 = 3, 3 + 1 = 4$, and so on, but rather that it requires careful scanning of the results of each successive operation to determine just what elements are to be selected for the next.

Only in a secondary way is Miss Anscombe's a revolutionary book, because it should at last effectively put a stop to much nonsense about Wittgenstein's alleged theory of verification and to some of the mistakes that have arisen from neglecting the very sharp distinctions (such as that between *sinnlos* and *unsinnig*) which one finds, by using a little care, in the *Tractatus*. Ogden's translation was good only in a very general way; it got the book before a much wider public. But in place after place Miss Anscombe has gone about the task of improving upon it. My complaint about her book is one which grows out of its virtues. She stands very close to the *Tractatus* and to the succeeding documents and publications; and although she makes clear her dissent from a number of doctrines, one feels that her companion-book is so like the original in its principal viewpoints and selection of problems that the oppositions are not stark

enough to reveal the deepest structure of the text. To reveal this, one would have to step back from the *Tractatus*, being careful not to lose contact with it altogether, and attempt to see it whole, perhaps by turning its formulations on different sides. But whoever was not greatly helped by *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* could never be that perceptive new commentator.

JOSEPH F. COLLINS, S.J., *St. Mary's College (Kansas)*

Determinism and Freedom. Ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York Univ. Press. Pp. 237. \$5.00.

This book consists of a series of papers delivered at the New York University Institute of Philosophy, with criticism and comment appended in the fourth part. The contents divide into four parts: first, "Determinism in Philosophy"; second, "Determinism in Modern Science"; third, "Determinism and Responsibility in Law and Ethics"; fourth, "Discussion."

Many factors are at work converging upon a great and widespread interest in the subject matter here considered. Foremost among these one might list the notion of indeterminacy, emanating from quantum mechanics, and the tendency among some segments of psychoanalytic thought to consider all human activity as causally derived from subliminal and prenatal stimuli, along with hereditary characteristics. Determinists are by nature "reductionist" in outlook; it is clear why they should be deeply troubled by antideterministic developments at the very heart of matter. It is no less clear why their bosom friends, the rationalists, are set back a pace by Heisenberg's principle and its corollary, Bohr's principle of complementarity, both of which are direct blows at the all-embracing self-sufficiency of human mental ability.

In the twenty-five-odd contributions, several—perhaps eight or ten—are outstanding. There is hardly place here to list them all. But a further reason favoring silence is the hope that everyone who even glances at this review will be led to the book itself. And, let us emphasize, the book is not one to be glanced at. It must be read several times, and this with pencil in hand; and this holds even for the third part, which is surely the least satisfactory and the most inconclusive, though by no means of minor importance.

The most important issue of the volume is twofold: What effect does the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle have upon philosophical determinism? What effect does this all have upon the facts and theories of human freedom? During the development of the argument the point mentioned at the beginning stands out in bold relief. The theories of

modern physics are so closely tied up with epistemological presuppositions, perhaps so dependent upon them, that it becomes increasingly difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins. And, in like vein, it is becoming harder to tell where and when the "distorting" effect of the knowing subject contacts the pure primary data of sense. We are, of course, convinced that Kant ultimately was wrong and that positivism is self-destructive. We are also convinced that a thorough analysis of the facts and the arguments in *Determinism and Freedom* must enter deeply into the structure of an epistemology which is to live in the twentieth century, not in the thirteenth.

The volume is timely. It is important for what it says, even more important for what it sometimes leaves unsaid. We sense in the background that vague imponderable, the *Zeitgeist*; we feel that the temper of the times is changing rapidly, that human thought is at one of the great crises of its development. The forces of disunion are on the wane; the attempts to patch up the segmented mess that man has made of human thought are in the ascendancy.

Of course, it seems to us that not all of the book is up to high caliber. Under the circumstances this would be almost impossible. There are intermittent forays which we cannot classify as this or that. There are still, much too often, the attempts to semanticize, to play with words as the child plays with his blocks. There are at times those logical vagaries to which the mind of man is prone: hidden assumptions, slightly circular reasonings, conclusions which jump a little wide of their premises, and the like. Fortunately most of these defects are brought out into the open in the discussion section at the end of the volume.

What else does the volume bring to mind? The very great difficulties which go along with that particular type of interpersonal relation known as the art of communication. In the first place, there is at times definite evidence that one of the writers has failed to give a clear account of his meaning—a fact mentioned several times in the various criticisms. In such circumstances the reader must do the best he can to extract the most probable meaning, and there are usually sufficient adjuncts to make this rather simple. But supposing the difficulties in communication lie not with the writer but with the potential reader who has a philosophic predisposition in some direction or other? What is to be done then? Finally, suppose that a philosopher who is sufficiently competent, interested, and objective to assimilate the fundamental notions of the book into his own mental structure of perennial truths finds his own thought-content much enriched and finds much that he can contribute to the development of the issues at stake—what can he do to gear his own mode of communication to the situation and needs of his potential auditors?

NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS

Acte et être. By Michele-F. Sciacca. Trans. Francis Authier. Paris: Aubier, 1958. Pp. 226. Paper.

Though in the view of its author this volume is only a part of his "philosophy of integrality," it is an important one. From some points of view, it is the easiest place to discover some of the author's distinctive positions. Sciacca is one of the leaders of what is known as "Christian spiritualism" in Italy; and this movement has many similarities to the French "philosophies of spirit," "of the person," "of subjectivity." In this present work, Sciacca distinguishes clearly between being, act, the real, and existence. To him, the identification of reality and existence, and of being and reality is "a vulgar prejudice" (p. 104); the Idea and value are equally, if not more, important. The present work also takes up the notions of potency, essence, the dialectic, participation, form, the world, the nature of love. In an appendix (pp. 179-224), Sciacca distinguishes his view of "act" from that of "actualism," especially as the latter is explained by Gentile.

The translation seems adequate, and it will be of advantage to many students.

Approches phénoménologiques de l'idée d'être. By Stanislas Breton. Lyon: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 254. Paper, Fr. 2,100.

The author explains that this work is not a metaphysical study of being but an introduction; it should be added that it will serve as such only to readers who have some acquaintance with contemporary phenomenological terminology and technique. The author approaches his subject from three levels. At the level of perception, the author deals with the "world" which the phenomenologists have elaborated and considers it as horizon, as unity, and as the whole. In developing the distinction between the biological environment (*Umwelt*) and the world (*Welt*) the author points out the significance of the human *vis cogitativa* in contrast to the animal estimative. At the level of imagination, the subject is the idea of matter. He digresses briefly to point out the relation of metaphysics to the imagination and to suggest that different types of imagery may be correlated with different kinds of philosophies. He also suggests that the "four temperaments" of ancient physiology are related to the four elements of ancient

cosmology and that perhaps both have a kind of mythical validity. He discusses in particular the element of earth and the feeling of reality, and the element of air and the notion of transcendence. In this connection, also, he discusses the relation between a datum and form, between act and form, and the idea of being as a dynamic scheme. Next he considers the idea of being in itself, as an idea. He begins by insisting that the idea of being is not a concept or a representation. In particular, it is not a thing but rather a condition of the possibility of things. He considers the idea of being as formal object, as presence, as absolute horizon, as pure relation.

The task which the author has attempted here is indeed a very important one. And it is also true that bringing different philosophies together face to face cannot but correct and enrich them. But it is not clear that phenomenological approaches, in the sense in which they have been exploited by Husserl, Sartre, or Heidegger, can lead to a metaphysics of being. In other words, historical phenomenologies are not necessarily a pure phenomenology of experience; they are sometimes modified (distorted?) by prephilosophical decisions and unconscious prejudgments. True, the author does sometimes point out particular limitations of a given phenomenological analysis, but there seems room for further critical evaluation.

Arystotelesowska i Tomistyczna. Teoria Przyczyny Sprawczej na tle Pojęcia Bytu. By Marian Jaworski. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniw. Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 135. Paper, 25 zl.

This is a comparative study of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The author begins with a brief review of the meanings of substance, matter, and form in both philosophers, and spends a bit more time on the meaning of being, emphasizing St. Thomas's explicit recognition of the act of existing. Next he takes up the general doctrine of change and causality in both Aristotle and St. Thomas, and shows that from many points of view their analysis is the same. But when he takes up more detailed analyses, especially the functions of form and efficient cause, he shows that St. Thomas's explanation is influenced by his position on the act of existing. Finally, he takes up the doctrines of the First Mover, the notion of creation and of eternity, and the question of the infinity of the First Principle. Here, obviously, St. Thomas and Aristotle do differ, and the author shows how these differences cohere with the differing views of being and causality. In a brief conclusion, the author points out that St. Thomas was not a mere commentator but that he produced an original synthesis.

There is a bibliography of works consulted which naturally includes many Polish writings which are otherwise difficult to find out about.

Aux sources de l'existentialisme chrétien: Kierkegaard. By Régis Jolivet.
Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1958. Pp. 287. Paper, 900 f.

Though the publishers of this volume add the expression "nouvelle édition" on the title page, they do not mention of which work it is a new edition. On the outside and in their description of the work, it is described as if it were new; and, stranger still, in a list of the works "du même auteur," the original edition, *Introduction à Kierkegaard* (Saint-Wandrille: Fontenelle, 1946) is omitted. Monsignor Jolivet's *Kierkegaard* is widely known and considered to be among the better general studies; it has been translated into English long since. The "newness" of this new edition seems to consist in the omission of most of the footnotes and of a slight rearrangement of chapter headings. Though a new generation of students will be glad to be able to purchase this book, the present publisher's handling of it is reprehensible.

Die Bedeutung des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von Aquin: Capreolus, Silvester von Ferrara, Cajetan. By Johannes Hegyi, S.J. "Pullacher philosophische Forschungen," Band IV. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1959. Pp. vii + 176. Paper.

This is a richly documented historical and textual study. All the certainly known facts about the three Commentators are given at the beginning of the section dealing with their doctrine on being. In his study of Capreolus, he begins with the threefold meaning of *esse* (essence, act of essence or being, the true) and examines the distinction between essence and *esse*, as well as its relation to form. He concludes that, though Capreolus's terminology was influenced by his contemporaries, he is faithful to St. Thomas's thought. After this, he considers Capreolus's doctrine of personality, taking first the various interpretations given to this doctrine (the one with the best textual foundation being that *esse* is the formal element of suppositality); he concludes that *esse* in this case also means "the act of being or essence." (In the course of this treatment, he maintains that St. Thomas changed his meaning of *esse* from "mere existence" to "the fullness of actuality" [pp. 32-35].)

Next Francis Silvester of Ferrara is studied. The author first examines the texts dealing directly with *esse* to discover his explicit meaning and the relation of this to St. Thomas's thought. In another he examines

Silvester's use of being in the problems of essence and existence, existence and form, the nature of the person, and the analogy of being. (Silvester holds that analogy principally means proportionality but that the latter always implies proportion and rests on it.) The author concludes that Silvester is in many respects a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas but that in others he verges toward an essentialistic notion of being.

The doctrine of Cajetan is examined in much the same way—in the texts directly expressing the meaning of *esse* and in the use of *esse* in the discussion of being itself, analogy, and the constitution of the person. He finds that *esse* for Cajetan is "mere existence," as it were, almost "facticity"; that he interprets analogy as proportionality without basing it on proportion and so is primarily concerned with analogy in terms of essence; and finally that at least in his latest formulation of the problem he finds the formal element of personality to be not *esse* but a substantial mode. The author therefore concludes that though Cajetan upholds many basic theses of his master and in his direct statements often seems entirely faithful, in the basic insight into being and in some major points he has departed from St. Thomas.

There is a good bibliography, an index of names, and a rather brief index of subjects.

La cité de Dieu. By St. Augustine. French trans. G. Combès; general introd. and notes by G. Bardy. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1959. Vol. I, pp. 870.

This volume is No. 33 in the complete edition of the works of St. Augustine and the first of five containing the *City of God*. The merit, convenience, and general excellence of this series have often been praised in the highest terms, and the present volume maintains the same high standards. The series, as is well known, presents the Latin text and the French translation on facing pages.

The present volume contains a general introduction to the entire work, (pp. 9-144) and a special introduction to Books I-V (pp. 175-85), with a general detailed and classified bibliography (pp. 145-63); these sections, together with the notes, for the most part (pp. 767-834), were written by G. Bardy three years before his death. These sections have been edited and completed by F.-J. Thonnard, A. C. de Veer, and G. Folliet; notes added by the editors are signed. In addition, tables of references to Sacred Scripture, to St. Augustine's other works, and to other authors quoted by him, and a detailed general index are provided.

The Latin text is that of the fourth Teubner edition, established by G. Dombart and A. Kalb; the principal variants of the edition by Migne

and of the *Corpus Christianorum* were collated and added by F.-J. Thonnard and M. A. Devynck.

Topics treated in the general introduction are: the occasion for writing the *City of God*, the steps of its composition, its plan, the origins of the notion of "city," the "two cities," the sources of St. Augustine, his language and style. The final section deals with the manuscripts, editions, and translations.

This edition is clearly one of the most valuable for all purposes.

***El Comienzo del Mundo.* By José M. Riaza, S.J. Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1959. Pp. xxxvi + 703 (+ xx plates). 105 ptas.**

Father Riaza is a professor of natural sciences in the Pontifical University of Comillas and on the Faculty of Philosophy of Loyola, in Spain. This present work, just as the author's previous book, *Ciencia Moderna y Filosofía* (see THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIV [March, 1957], 204), is also planned primarily as a textbook, or rather a reading book, for the course of scientific questions required for the ecclesiastical degree in philosophy.

Without the laconic style of a manual, it provides a readable account of modern scientific findings in geology and astronomy. Topics like Carbon 14 dating, evolution of a star, expansion of the universe, and many others are presented accurately and in their historical setting and in a manner capable of being understood by educated people who lack specialized training in science. The large bibliography and good indices give the work value also as a reference book. [Gonzalo Madurga, s.j.]

***L'Esprit absorbant de l'enfant.* By Maria Montessori. Trans. Georgette J.-J. Bernard. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1959. Pp. 244. Paper, 145 fr. b.**

The present volume is one of the more speculative writings of the noted Italian educator and educational theorist. The author emphasizes the self-guided development of the infant in his earliest years, contending that if the child is merely left to his natural instincts, he will acquire all the necessary skills. Yet there is a great deal of experience that is referred to, and there are some insights into human nature and the learning process which other psychologists could well pay attention to.

The translation is very good.

***Ethica Generalis.* By Joseph de Finance, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 336. Paper.**

This textbook of general ethics is divided into three parts: first, the nature, norm, and ontological foundation of moral value; second, the objective moral order (law and right) and the subjective moral order (specification of moral acts, conscience, and the moral life, especially the virtues); third, the relation between morality and happiness (tendency, sanction, and the nature of happiness).

The treatment throughout is generally detailed, and considerable notice is taken of differing theories and explanations. In presenting and discussing these various opinions there is a notable objectivity and calmness. The completeness of the coverage will make the work very desirable for teachers and advanced students.

Notable features include the excellent discussion of the nature of moral behavior considered in its full phenomenological uniqueness. Where Scholastic textbooks hastily accept the Aristotelian eudemonism or a simple teleology (and accept the reduction of obligation to hypothetical necessity, albeit in the *modus ponens*), Father de Finance takes the moral imperative as absolute. The moral imperative, he holds, is a necessity of practical reason. Distinctive also—but perhaps a less successful feature—is the almost complete replacement of the term “good” by the term “value.” Finally, traditional materials are used as well as the insights of some of the most recent philosophers, and this not merely in factual juxtaposition but in integrated harmony.

***Etudes sur la valeur.* Vol. II, *Le règne des fins.* By Jean Pucelle. Preface by Jean Nabert. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 460. Paper, 2,500 f.**

By the term *fin* the author means a concrete end attained by action and leading in turn to further action as it has been achieved by prior means. By the term *valeur* he means a transcendental worth which confers goodness upon the concrete goods. He considers that the “kingdom of ends” is culture and civilization. He examines a multitude of data from anthropology, social psychology, child psychology, and philosophy of history. By means of a phenomenological analysis he tries to find the essence of civilization in its pure state (which turns out to be pretty similar to the nature of intentionality as the phenomenologists describe it) and to isolate “the act which creates civilization,” which is suspiciously like the act of cognition. It is an interesting and stimulating book.

Evidenza dell'Uomo nel Lavoro. By Fausto M. Bongioanni. Milan: Marzorati, 1958. Pp. 228. Paper, L. 1,800.

This is more a sociological and psychological study of work than a philosophical one—as indeed most writing on “the philosophy of work” tends to be. The author begins with psychological and sociological remarks about “the human potential.” He deals with problems of management and organization, communication, personnel and placement problems, efficiency and justice, education and work, and the psychological relevance of a religious outlook. Though there are many references to American customs and writings, the author’s point of view remains Continental.

Le Fa Yen. Le catéchisme philosophique. By Yang-Hiong-tsé. French trans. with introd. by Bruno Belpaire. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Occident, 1959. Pp. 113. Paper.

The *Fa Yen* is believed to have been written between the years 1 and 6 A.D.; its author is one of the lesser lights among the ancient Chinese philosophers. The purpose of the author is to represent and make available to his disciples the moral ideas of Confucius, which he does by means of a question and answer method in ten books. Typically, there is no logical structure to the whole nor to the parts. Often enough, the answers are enigmatic comments, little stories, or rhetorical questions. “Clarity of teaching” is extolled by the writer, but the only thing he is clear on are the concrete moral precepts he wishes to inculcate. The reader looks in vain for the meaning of basic ideas like justice, virtue, faith.

The translation is relatively easy reading, given the rather incoherent original text. The introduction views the ideas of Yang-tsé from the point of view of systematic philosophy; the translator notes that there are a few vague cosmological, metaphysical, and psychological ideas, but no clearly perceptible systematic background. In treating of the ethical content, the introduction compares it to Christian morality and finds that certain basic notions (such as charity and belief in immortality) are altogether lacking, while the ideas that are taken up are handled entirely in this-worldly terms.

[To be continued.]

BOOKS RECEIVED

BAWDEN, FREDERICK C.; VAN MELSEN, ANDREW G.; LANG, GOTTFRIED O., and VOLLERT, CYRIL, S.J. *Symposium on Evolution*. Introd. by Bernard J. Boelen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 119. \$3.00.

BRIDGMAN, PERCY WILLIAMS. *The Way Things Are*. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 343. \$5.75.

BROUSSE, JACQUES. *The Lives of Ange de Joyeuse and Benet Canfield*. Ed. from Robert Rookwood's translation of 1623 by Anthony Birrell. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. xxxii + 183. \$4.50.

BURTON, KATHERINE. *Faith Is the Substance*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. x + 260. \$4.50.

CAJETAN, THOMAS DE VIO, CARDINAL. *The Analogy of Names and The Concept of Being*. [2d ed.] Trans. Edward A. Bushinski, c.s.sp. and Henry J. Koren, c.s.sp. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1959. \$2.25.

CARACCIOLO, ALBERTO. *Studi Jaspersiani*. Milano: Marzorati, 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, L. 1,700.

DIRKSEN, ALOY, C.P.P.S. *Elementary Patrology*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. 314. \$4.00.

FRIEDRICH, CARL J. *Community: Nomos II*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. 293. \$5.00.

GAY, ROBERT M. *Vocation et discernement des esprits*. Montréal: Editions Fides, 1959. Pp. 255. Paper, \$3.00.

GURR, JOHN EDWIN, S.J. *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900*. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 308. \$6.00.

HAGMAIER, GEORGE, C.S.P., and GLEASON, ROBERT W., S.J. *Counselling the Catholic*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. xiv + 301. \$4.50.

HILDEBRANDT, KURT. *Platon*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 396.

JAWORSKI, MARIAN. *Arystotelesowska I Tomistyczna*. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 135. Paper.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment?* Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xxv + 92. Paper, 80¢.

KORVIN-KRASINSKI, CYRILL VON, O.S.B. *Über die Krisis des modernen Sonder-eigentumsbegriffes*. Freiburg, Schweiz: Paulusverlag, 1958. Pp. 36. Paper, Fr. 3.30.

LEFÈBRE, EUGÈNE, C.S.S.R. *Ste. Anne de Beaupré: Its Shrine—Its Spirit*. Quebec: Basilica of Ste. Anne, 1959. Pp. 80. Paper, \$2.00.

LORENZEN, PAUL. *Formale Logik*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 164. Paper, DM 4.80.

MARX, KARL, and ENGELS, FRIEDRICH. *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. Ed. Lewis S. Feuer. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Pp. 518. Paper, \$1.45.

MAZIERSKI, STANISLAW, Ks. *Pojecie Konieczności w Filozofii Sw. Tomasza z Akwinu*. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 119. Paper.

The McAuley Lectures, 1958. Contemporary Developments in Theology.
Carthagena, Ohio: Messenger Press, 1959. Pp. 252-293. Paper, \$1.00.

Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum. Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1958. Vol. II, Pp. 29. Vol. III, Pp. 26. Paper.

[MILL, JOHN STUART.] *Nature and Utility of Religion.* Ed. with introd. by George Nakhnikian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxx + 80. Paper, 75¢

MINKIEL, STEPHEN J., C.M. *The General Ethics of John Dewey in the Light of Thomism.* Rome: Angelicum, 1959. Pp. 146. Paper.

Mysticism and the Modern Mind. Ed. Alfred P. Stiernotte. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 206. \$4.50.

PIERSOL, WESLEY. *La valeur dans la philosophie de Louis Lavelle.* Lyon, Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1959. Pp. 191. Paper.

PLOCHMANN, GEORGE KIMBALL. *The Ordeal of Southern Illinois University.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 662. \$5.75.

PUCELLE, JEAN. *Le règne des fins.* Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 455. Paper, 2500 f.

QUIRING, HENRICH. *Heraklit.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 164.

ROUSSIN, MARCEL. *Le Canada et le système interaméricain.* Ottawa: Editions de l'Univ. d'Ottawa, 1959. Pp. ix + 286. Paper, \$4.25.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Pictorial History of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 406. \$15.00.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *Folkways.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. 692. Paper, \$2.49.

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE, S.J. *The Phenomenon of Man.* Trans. Bernard Wall. Introd. by Sir Julian Huxley. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. \$5.00.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Symbolism.* New York: Putnam's Sons, 1959.

WOOD, ERNEST. *Yoga.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Pp. 272. Paper, 95¢

A PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONCRETED AND THE CONCRETE

*The Constitution of Creatures
according to Gilbert de la Porrée*

MR. RICHARD J. WESTLEY received his M.A. and Ph.D.
from the University of Toronto.

*He is the author of an experimental textbook,
An Introduction to Philosophical and Theological Reasoning.*

*He has previously written for the Serran
and is now associate professor of philosophy
at Barat College (Lake Forest, Illinois).*

There is good reason for the perfunctory way in which Gilbert de la Porrée¹ is treated in most of the currently popular histories of medieval philosophy.² The best from among them must of necessity be preponderantly the result of options which their authors make according to the subject matter, their own interests and training, as well as the ever-present limitations of time and space. I personally think Gilbert is a powerful metaphysical spirit, but I do not mean to imply by this that he ranks with such intellectual giants as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham, or Suarez. But if we speak only of contributions made in the order of the philosophical as opposed to the theological, it seems certain that the recently published critical editions of some of Gilbert's works³ place him in the company of such noted thinkers as Boethius, Scotus Erigena, St. Anselm, Abelard, and St. Bonaventure. The profound perspicacity of his commentaries evidences both his originality and his ability to interpret the text of his *auctor*—Boethius. So true is this that one cannot be sure he has truly grasped Boethius's meaning if he has not read Gilbert. Therefore Gilbert's works issue in a double benefit for the student of the history of medieval philosophy. Apart from giving him an understanding of Gilbert's own thought, they help him sharpen his judgment regarding the doctrine of Boethius; and second they delineate for him something of the state of twelfth-century thought

apart from the context of the problem of universals. They thus establish a metaphysical (not merely logical) continuity between Gilbert's age and philosophers of succeeding centuries.⁴

But if all this is true of Gilbert, there must be some reason why

¹Gilbert de la Porrée was born about 1076 A.D., in the city of Poitier, to which he was destined later to return as holder of the episcopal see. His first studies were conducted in Poitier under a certain Hilary. Then he went to Chartres, where he studied under Bernard of Chartres, who was to be for all time the master for Gilbert. It was under Bernard, one of the most celebrated teachers of the twelfth century, that Gilbert began his studies in the trivium. After he completed his studies with Bernard, Gilbert was attracted by the fame of the Cathedral School of Notre Dame in Paris and studied under William of Champeaux. He remained there until William's forced retirement in 1108, after which he studied at the school of St. Geneviève under Peter Abelard, whose attacks had ended William's academic career.

Gilbert did his theological studies under Anselm of Laon and completed them the year of Anselm's demise, 1117. In 1124 Gilbert is listed as a canon at the Cathedral School of Chartres, and in the following year he became a professor on the faculty of that school. Gilbert became chancellor at Chartres in 1126, filling the vacancy left by his one-time master Bernard. He held this position as late as 1137, after which he returned to Paris, where he held a chair of dialectic and theology, remaining there until 1140. In 1141 at the command of his bishop, Gilbert returned to his native city of Poitier as Master of the School of St. Hilary. In 1142 he was made bishop of Poitier but continued teaching for the first years of his episcopate. About Easter, 1147, Gilbert was called before a council at Paris and, in 1148, before the Council of Rheims, which did not condemn him. He returned to the duties of his see and died on September 4, 1154.

²This of course does not preclude the

possibility of objecting to the inaccuracies which abound in most of the discussions of Gilbert's philosophy. Two of the more widespread are that Gilbert was condemned by St. Bernard at the Councils of Paris and Rheims, and that he is the author of the *Liber Sex Principiorum*. Nor does this relieve the authors of these histories from the objection that they tend to speak of Gilbert as if his writings were not extant, basing their discussions of his doctrine on the remark of John of Salisbury: "Porro alius, ut Aristotelem exprimat, cum Gilberto episcopo Pictavensi, universalitatem formis nativis attribuit, et in earum conformitate laborat" (*Metalogicus* II, 17). See E. Brehier, *Histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1947), I, Fasc. 3, 593-95; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Newman, 1952), II, 151-52; E. Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris: Payot, 1952), pp. 262-68; Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Random House, 1955), pp. 140-44; 620-21; M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (London: Nelson, 1952), pp. 205-9.

³It is interesting to note that all of Gilbert's extant works are commentaries, which is in accord with the spirit of his age. They fall into two parts, the commentaries on Holy Writ and those on the theological tractates of Boethius. His scriptural commentaries on the Psalms and the Epistles of St. Paul, which are in the process of being published critically, have never been printed heretofore. Cf. A. M. Landgräf, *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg, 1948), pp. 79-80.

The first printed edition of his Boethian commentaries appeared in the Boethius *Omnia Opera* (Basel, 1570) 1128-1273. It was this very text which Migne reprinted in 1861 in *PL*, LXIV, cols. 1247-1412 and on which all Gilbertian scholarship had to depend

this is not reflected in the treatment he has received at the hands of historians of medieval philosophy. And indeed there is. It is that Gilbert has been considered vague, obscure, and in places even contradictory by many historians. There is a twofold reason for this. Gilbert chose to comment on Boethius by incorporating the whole of the Boethian text grammatically into his own commentary—and this even when he was disagreeing with him. Until an edition of Gilbert's commentaries was available which clearly distinguished the words of Gilbert from those of Boethius, it was not possible to eliminate these seeming contradictions. The text, besides running Gilbert's words and those of Boethius together, contained many mistakes which had the effect of making Gilbert seem obscure. The appearance of Father Haring's critical editions of *In De Hebdomadibus*, *In De Duabus Naturis*, and *In De Trinitate* has eliminated both sources of trouble. Gilbert

until the appearance of the critical edition of the Reverend Nicholas M. Haring, S.A.C., of the faculty of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Father Haring is the foremost Gilbertian scholar, and his brilliant defense of Gilbert's theology has removed much of the stigma previously connected with Gilbert's teaching on the Trinity. Cf. "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 1-40.

Because all of the Gilbertian scholarship prior to the appearance of the critical edition employed the Migne numberings, we feel it was a mistake to eliminate them completely from the new editions. Therefore though we quote the text established by Father Haring, we shall give the cross-references to the Migne numbering.

For the three works critically done, see "The Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius' 'De Hebdomadibus,'" *Traditio*, IX (1953), 177-221 (hereafter referred to as *In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*); "The Commentary of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, on Boethius' *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 1954, pp. 241-357 (hereafter referred to as *In De Duab.*, *Arch.*);

"The Commentaries of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154) on the Two Boethian *Opuscula Sacra* on the Holy Trinity," *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers*, ed. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B. ("Studies and Texts," I. Toronto, 1925), pp. 23-98 (hereafter referred to as *In De Trin.*, *S. and T.*). The Migne edition was used for the fourth opusculum, *Gilberti Porretae Commentaria in Librum De Praedicatione Trium Personarum* (*PL*, LXIV, cols. 1301-10).

⁴"Gilbert's doctrine is more elaborate than that of Bernard of Chartres, and its technical solidity has insured its influence. . . . This influence is recognizable by the persistence, up to the thirteenth century and beyond it, of a certain tendency to reduce real beings to their intelligible essences, which are their forms, and to think of them in this abstract way. There is in this a certain 'formalism' of thought . . . which, reinforced by Avicenna's influence, will come into full bloom in the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Gilbert of la Porrée himself had inherited it from Boethius, whose theological opuscules he annotated" (Gilson, *Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 142).

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

writes excellent, if intricate, Latin and is neither contradictory nor obscure. Thanks to Father Haring's efforts, a more accurate appraisal of Gilbert's philosophy is now possible, but no one seems to be interested. There has been only one work devoted solely to the *philosophy* of Gilbert, a monograph dating back to 1892. Now, some four or five years after the appearance of a text in which historians can have complete con-


⁵A. Berthaud, *Gilbert de la Porrée et sa philosophie* (Poitiers, 1892). It is true that since the appearance of the new text a monograph on Gilbert has appeared, but though it contains much of Gilbert's philosophy it is concerned primarily with his theology. Cf. M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinität* (Basel, 1956).

⁶The *Physics* and *Metaphysics* were most certainly unknown to Gilbert so he could not know the division of science contained in them. Cf. *Metaphys.* 6. 1. 1026a; *Physics* ii. 2. 193b23 ff. Cf. Fléchier et Martin, *Histoire de l'église*, XIII, 183.

⁷Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* (Loeb ed.), pp. 8, 10. In Migne cf. *PL*, LXIV, 1250A-B.

⁸"Scientiae multorum sunt generum. Aliae namque sunt theoricae id est speculativae . . . Aliae vero sunt practicae id est activae . . . Ut autem de practicis taceamus, speculativae ex his quae per ipsas inspicimus contrahunt appellacionem: et vocantur aliae quidem physicae id est naturales, aliae vero ethicae id est morales, aliae autem logicae id est rationales. Et (ut item morales atque rationales praetereamus) illarum, quae uno nomine 'naturales' dicuntur quae etiam usu maiore 'speculativae' vocantur, TRES PARTES SUNT: una quae universali omnium nomine specialiter dicitur 'naturalis', alia quae 'mathematica', tertia quae 'theologica'" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1265 B-C). (Note that in these texts the capital letters within Gilbert's texts indicate the very words of Boethius which he has incorporated into his commentary.)

The text can be diagrammed as follows:



If one considers Gilbert's division of speculative philosophy into ethical, physical, and logical, it seems obvious that "physical sciences" in this context refers to those speculative sciences which treat of extramental reality. "Physical" here should be taken in its etymological sense.

¹⁰On this matter see J. M. Parent, o.p., *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Vrin, 1938), pp. 20-22; and in this same work, "An Anonymous Commentary on the *De Trinitate*" (Paris BN Lat. MSS 14489), pp. 180-82. See also Wilhelm Jansen, *Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), pp. 27, 35, 40; and in this same work, "Librum Hunc of Thierry of Chartres," pp. 3*, 4*, 8*, 9*.

¹¹"Schon Boethius zeigt die Tendenz, die drei 'Teile der Wissenschaft' nicht in einer dreifachen Hierarchie übereinander aufzubauen, sondern in ihnen göttliches und geschaffenes Sein, Erkenntnis Gottes und Erkenntnis der Kreatur antithetisch einander gegenüberstehen zu lassen" (M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinität*, p. 179).

¹²"Ait ergo: NATURALIS dicitur quae est IN MOTU atque INABSTRACTA quod graece dicitur ANHYPEXAIRETOS, hoc est inseparabilis. Et quare inabstracta vel inseparabilis, supponit: CONSIDERAT ENIM CORPORUM FORMAS CUM MATERIA, QUAE formae A CORPORIBUS SEPARARI NON POSSUNT non dico ratione sed ACTU" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1265D).

¹³"Cum enim nativa sicut sunt (id est concreta et inabstracta) considerat, ex sua quidem propria potestate, qua humano animo datum est ex sensuum atque imaginationum praeuentibus adminiculis reri sensilia, 'ratio' dicitur" (*ibid.*, p. 48, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1267A). "Ac per hoc IN NATURALIBUS quae,

fidence, this monograph still remains the only such work, and this despite the fact that it is considered inadequate by present-day standards.⁵ It would be a bit presumptuous for me to think that I could make up for so long-standing a lack. However, perhaps a somewhat detailed sketch of Gilbert's philosophy of the constitution of creatures will serve to augment the necessarily truncated treatments of Gilbert in our histories.

Gilbert, as might be expected from the fact that he comments on Boethius, is heir to the Aristotelian division of sciences⁶ as it was transmitted to the early Middle Ages in Boethius's *De Trinitate*.⁷ That science or philosophy which seeks to know whether things are, what they are, of what sort they are, and why, is speculative; while that science or philosophy which seeks knowledge for the sake of activity is practical. Like Boethius before him, Gilbert passes over the division of practical philosophy and turns to the task of distinguishing the speculative sciences. In a very personal way Gilbert then distinguishes three kinds of speculative science according to their different objects—the physical sciences, the ethical or moral sciences, and the logical or rational sciences. The traditional division of speculative science is then made a subdivision of physical science. For the physical sciences are either natural, mathematical, or theological.⁸ And so it would be possible according to Gilbert's terminology to call theology and the mathematical science "physical."⁹ And it should further be noted that Gilbert must also be classified with those who maintain that logic and ethics are speculative sciences.¹⁰

Gilbert's threefold division of physical science is not based on a threefold division of reality but on a distinction between the created and the divine.¹¹ Natural science considers the forms of bodies along with their matter and, consequently, as they are in matter and unable to be separated from it actually.¹² In the natural sciences one must proceed *ratiabiliter*, which means in such a way as to grasp the form of a thing with its matter; that is, with the help of sense perception and imagination.¹³ Now, the forms of material things cannot actually

sicut sunt, percipi debent, scilicet concreta et inabstracta, OPOREBIT philosophum VERSARI RATIONABILITER ut . . . ea vi mentis, qua concreta reri debet, diligenter attendat: quid proprie

sibi vel quod est vel quo est concretionis consortio exigat, et quid caeterarum speculationum locis communicet" (*ibid.*, p. 49, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1628B).

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

(*actu*) be separated from their matter, but this in no way prevents their being separated from matter by the mind (*ratione*).¹⁴ For although the forms of sensible things are inabstract and are involved in change, they can be considered abstractly without motion or change by a kind of imitation of things which are truly abstract.¹⁵ When we consider the forms of sensible things other than as they really are—that is, other than as being in matter and in motion—we are involved in mathematical speculation.¹⁶ It would therefore be inaccurate to limit mathematical speculation for Gilbert to arithmetic, geometry, music, and the like. For mathematical speculation concerns itself not only with number, quantity, figure, and proportion but with any and every attempt of the human mind to conceive the form of a sensible

¹⁴Cf. n. 12 above.

¹⁵"Formae vero sensilium, quamvis inabstractae indeoque motum habentes, si tamen abstractim attendantur, hac vere abstractorum imitatione sine motu esse dicuntur. Non enim tantum sicuti sunt verum etiam aliter quam sint, res aliquae saepe vere concipiuntur" (*ibid.*, p. 48, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1266D).

¹⁶"Alia vero speculatio, quae nativorum inabstractas formas aliter quam sint id est abstractim considerat, ex fine quo illud facit graece quidem MATHEMATICA, latine vero disciplinalis vocatur" (*ibid.*, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1267C).

¹⁷Both William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres held this same doctrine. See Parent, *Doctrine de la création*, p. 22.

¹⁸"Tertia vero speculatio, quae omnia nativa transcendens in ipso eorum quolibet principio (scilicet vel Opifice, quo auctore sunt, vel idea, a qua tamquam exemplari deducta sunt, vel hyle, in qua locata sunt) figit intuitum per excellentiam 'intellectualis' vocatur" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 49, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1267D).

One problem which is difficult to solve on the basis of Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius (perhaps help will come from his published scriptural commentaries) is whether or not the "ideas" which he lists as principles of things (cf. *ibid.*, p. 72, no. 3; *PL*, LXIV, 1287A) are divine ideas and hence identical with God. I personally feel that one can say that Gilbert holds for only two principles of beings—God and

matter, since the ideas are God. Cf. *In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 261, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1360D-61A. See in this matter "Chalcidii Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum," Sec. 305 in Mullach's *Fragments Philosophorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1867), II, 246.

¹⁹"IN DIVINIS QUOQUE, quae non modo disciplina verum etiam re ipsa abstracta sunt, INTELLECTUALITER VERSARI OPORTEBIT id est propriis theologicorum rationibus illa concipere et non ex naturaliter concretorum aut disciplinaliter abstractorum proprietatis judicare" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 49, no. 14; *PL*, LXIV, 2268C).

It was the failure of his opponents to see that Gilbert faithfully adhered to this principle that led to his trouble with his brother bishops in 1147 and 1148. On this theological controversy and the complete misunderstanding of Gilbert's doctrine—a misunderstanding which has persisted from the time of St. Bernard to the present—see M. A. Schmidt, *Gottheit und Trinität* (Basel, 1956); M. E. Williams, "The Teaching of Gilbert Porretta on the Trinity," *Analecta Gregoriana*, 1951. For the finest treatment, as we have said, see N. M. Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitier," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 1-40.

²⁰Jansen, *Kommentar des Clarendon*, pp. 29* ff. For Gilbert's idea of theology see "Theologie," *DTC*, XV, cols. 369-370.

²¹*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 62, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1278D.

thing apart from its matter. This very broad view of mathematical speculation seems to have been the common teaching at Chartres.¹⁷

The forms of sensible things give rise to two kinds of science, the natural and the mathematical; but there is a third type of speculation which treats of extramental reality. It treats of those things which transcend the sensible world and which may be called its principles; that is, God, ideas and prime matter.¹⁸ So the theological or divine science treats things which are actually abstract, and not so merely by consideration of the human mind. Consequently it must judge of its objects in a way proper to things which actually and completely transcend the sensible, and not use the principles of the natural or mathematical sciences except analogically.¹⁹ It must be kept in mind that Gilbert is talking here of that theology which is a part of philosophy or science. In his commentaries on Boethius, Gilbert seems to use the term "theology" in this Aristotelian sense, which was characterized by Clarenbaldus of Arras as *philosophare de Deo*.²⁰

These three kinds of physical science, and indeed all sciences, must proceed according to their own proper *rationes*. If we turn to Gilbert's philosophy, its most important first principle may be stated as follows: "In naturalibus enim aliud est *quod est*, aliud *quo est*."²¹ And as is the case with principles, Gilbert offers it as self-evident. To ask him to prove this principle would indicate that one had not grasped the significance of its being a fundamental self-evident assumption on which natural philosophy rests. One can and should ask for a clarification or explanation of just what Gilbert is assuming by this principle, but after the explanation the only option is to accept or reject it.

What does Gilbert mean by this principle? In reality there are individual existents; that is, things which are (*ea quae sunt*). A single one of these individual existents would be a thing which is—in short, an *id quod est*. But every *id quod* exists and is the kind of thing it is because of some intrinsic cause. This cause is not itself an individual existent; rather it is that *in* an individual existent which accounts for the fact that it exists or that it is the kind of thing it is or both. Since it is *that by means of which a thing is* and is the kind of thing it is, it is called an *id quo est*. Consequently, when Gilbert says that the *id quod* is other than the *id quo* in the natural order, he means to say

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

that an existent substance is not the same naturally as the "by whichers" which make it an existent, a substance, and the kind of thing it is.²²

This principle, which is so fundamental in the philosophy of sensible reality, is equally important in Gilbert's doctrine of knowledge and in his division of the sciences. This very principle is equally important in Gilbert's theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation, where it is

²²I can think of no philosopher who treats of an extramental world for whom this principle does not have some meaning.

²³On the theological use of this principle see the authors cited in n. 19 above.

²⁴See Priscian, *Institutio de Arte Grammatica*, II, 5, 25; ed. M. Hertz (Leipzig, 1855), p. 58; Remigius of Auxerre, *In Artem Donati Minorem Commentum*, ed. W. Fox (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 8 ff.; St. Anselm, *Quomodo Grammaticus Sit Substantia et Qualitas*, Vol. I of *Obras Completas* (B.A.C., 1952), pp. 462 ff.; Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic* (Sheed and Ward, 1946), p. 62.

²⁵"Omnem vero nomen diversa significat, substantiam videlicet et qualitatem: ut album id, quod appellatur 'album' (quod est substantia nominis), et id, quo appellatur 'album' (quod est ejusdem nominis qualitas)" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 302, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1382D).

²⁶"Quos hic ipse error patenter ostendit omnino nescire hujus nominis, quod est 'substantia', multiplicem in naturalibus usum: videlicet non modo id, quod est, verum etiam id, quo est, hoc nomine nuncupari . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 63, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1279D).

²⁷"QUAE quantum ad subsistentias, queae horum nominum sunt qualitates, VEL GENERA SUNT ut *animal*, *lapis*, *lignum*; VEL SPECIES ut *homo*" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 279, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1370D).

²⁸"A cursory glance at Gilbert's system of sciences will reveal how the originally grammatical rule was transformed from a logical principle of speech and 'law of philosophical disputation' into a formula expressing what may be

called the metaphysical constitution of 'concrete', composite beings, both material and spiritual" (Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 5).

²⁹"In their study of grammar, the students were told that a *nomen* signifies both substance and quality. . . . Rigorously applied, this grammatical rule would have forced theology into silence. Abelard refused to submit to the 'rules of Donat' and Hugh of Rouen declared that he would still speak of God 'against the laws of philosophical disputation', while Robert Pulleyn was clearly at a loss as to how to cope with the objection. We learn from John of Salisbury that Gilbert acknowledged the principle as laid down in *rationalia facultate* (logic) and defended the right to follow it in theology. It seems that his teacher, Bernard of Chartres, had already transformed its meaning and raised it to a higher level of philosophical speculation" (*ibid.*).

See also M. D. Chenu, "Grammaire et théologie aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.*, X-XI (1935-6), 5-28. There can be little doubt that all the authors listed by Father Haring learned the principle spoken of in grammar and logic first, and it was this that led them to talk as they did about it. But does this necessarily mean that the principle as such is primarily a grammatical principle? I think not. It means rather that the thinkers of the twelfth century came to know this principle, which is fundamentally a principle of being, under its grammatical and logical form. Obviously the only reason the principle holds true in logic and grammar is that it is a true principle of being. At least this is true for a man like Gilbert.

used analogously.²³ Passing over its use in theology, let us see its use in Gilbert's doctrine of knowledge and then in the division of the sciences.

It was a well-known grammatical principle that every name signifies both a substance and a quality.²⁴ Gilbert accepts this principle of grammar underlining the fact that a *nomen* signifies substance in one way and quality in another.²⁵ He indicates further that in signifying substance a *nomen* signifies an *id quod*, and in signifying a quality it signifies that *id quo* by means of which the *id quod* gets its name.²⁶ For example the term "white" signifies simultaneously the substance or *id quod*—for example, a swan or a piece of paper—and the quality or *id quo* by which the swan or paper is white; that is, whiteness. But we should not infer from this that the *qualitas nominis* is necessarily related to the category of quality.²⁷ For the term "man" signifies both the human substance or human *id quod* and the human quality or human *id quo*; that is, humanity, which is not an accident at all. Thus every name which we impose on a substance will do more than merely signify the substance; it will signify that *id quo* in the substance which allows us to call the substance by the name in question. The *id quo* need not be an accident, for the name may well be imposed on a substance because of some essential perfection within it, and the *id quo* would then itself be essential.

Some hold that this grammatical principle is the central principle in twelfth-century philosophical and theological thought, and that it is likewise the primary principle for Gilbert.²⁸ Historically speaking, there is much to recommend this interpretation.²⁹ However, it has the effect of making Gilbert's principle of the otherness of the *id quod* and *id quo* in the natural order dependent on, and a derivation from, the grammatical principle of the twofold signification of names. The unity of his thought, however, seems to demand that, for Gilbert at least, the grammatical principle was valid because it was in its turn dependent on, and derived from, a natural self-evidence.³⁰ To avoid

²³Gilbert himself expressly states that "tria quippe sunt, res, et intellectus, et sermo. Res intellectu concipiatur, sermone significatur." This seems to indicate the fundamental priority of the real over the logical and grammatical.

It seems to be against Gilbert's philosophical realism to give priority to a grammatical principle. No one would have tried to use a solely grammatical or logical principle in theology. The principle had a basis in the natural

misunderstanding, let it be noted that both the grammatical and natural principles are of the first order of importance for Gilbert; it is solely a question of their proper order.

The principle of the otherness of the *id quod* and the *id quo* is also important in explaining intellectual knowledge of sensible substances. For according to Gilbert, it is not possible for a man to form a concept of a sensible reality unless he in some way grasps the *id quo* which causes it to be as it is and hence intelligible to us.³¹ For example, the human mind cannot really conceive what it is to be a body, white, or extended unless it grasps what corporality, whiteness, and extension are, and can truly distinguish these *id quo*'s from one another as well as from the *id quod* in which they are found.³² Consequently, our very ability to form concepts of the world about us is based on the principle that in that world no *id quod* is identical with the *id quo*'s which account for its being and its nature. And so we might infer from all this that not only scientific knowledge but all truly intellectual knowledge is, for Gilbert, in some way through causes.

All of this has profound ramifications in Gilbert's distinction of the

order of *res*, and this is what allowed its proper analogical use in theology; and this too is what allowed the few to succumb to the temptation of using such a principle improperly. In fact Gilbert says that it is the natural (as opposed to the logical and the grammatical) order which is prior when it comes to the use of analogies and of transferring principles from one faculty to another. Cf. *In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 65, no. 1; *PL*, LXIV, 1218A. And further, Gilbert accuses the Arians and Sabellians not of using a grammatical principle in theology but a natural one. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 35, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1255D. I would think therefore that it is more proper to say that Gilbert's logic depends on his philosophy rather than that his philosophy depends on his logic.

³¹"Nativa namque per aliquam sui vel efficientem vel efficiendi proprietatem concipiuntur: ut album per albedinem et albedo per naturam faciendi album. Nihil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nihil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potestatem concipi potest" (*In De Duab.*, Arch., p. 260, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1360B).

³²"Verbi gratia: non perpendit ratio, quid sit esse corpus, et esse coloratum et esse latum, nisi disciplina quid sit corporalitas, quid color, quid latitudo cognoscat. Quod fieri non potest, nisi haec inabstracta atque concreta et ab eo, in quo sunt, et a se invicem abstracta et discernant" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 48, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1267C).

³³See *ibid.*, p. 45, nos. 14-15, and p. 36, nos. 6-7; *PL*, LXIV, 1265A-B and 1257A.

³⁴"A thorough study of the *id quo* and *quod* with all its ramifications in Gilbert's writings is as vital as a proper understanding of act and potency in the works of St. Thomas . . . Gilbert constantly leads the solution of a problem to an *id quo*" (Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 8).

³⁵How else to explain the atoms of the early Greek atomists, the sensible world of Plato, the matter and form of Aristotle, the essence and *actus essendi* of St. Thomas, the Monads of Leibniz, and even the *elan vital* of Bergson? For all such philosophers it is true in some sense that there is more to reality than beings.

various kinds of speculative science. An adequate intellectual and scientific knowledge of the external sensible world will require not only knowledge of the sensible *id quod* but also of its *id quo's*. Since an *id quod* cannot be known in the same way as an *id quo*, it follows that two types of science will be required for complete scientific knowledge of reality. One type, the natural sciences, will treat of reality as sensible *id quod's*. This is by its very nature an imperfect kind of knowledge, since it is not knowledge of the causes which make the *id quod's* as they are. This knowledge must then be complemented by another type, the mathematical sciences, which treat the *id quo's* which make the *id quod's* of reality what they are. The theological sciences are not held to this rule because of their subject matter; and the *id quod*—*id quo* distinction can only be used in them by a kind of proportionality.³³

From these few introductory remarks it must already be apparent that one cannot understand Gilbert's thought without a thorough understanding of his doctrine of *id quod* and *id quo*.³⁴ Since a cause is naturally, if not temporally, prior to its effect we shall consider the *id quo* first and then the *id quod*.

GILBERT'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE *ID QUO*

Now, it should be said at the very start that *id quo's* are not beings; that is, they are not beings in the sense of existent things, for all such are *id quod's*. And if there is anything clear at this point about Gilbert's thought it is the fact that in the natural order no *id quo* is an *id quod*. To say that *id quo's* are not beings is not to relegate them to the order of nonbeing; rather it is to assert that there is more to reality than beings. Such an assertion must be made by all who wish to explain beings.³⁵ The reason is obvious. If I wish to explain the constitution of beings and can do so only in terms of realities which are themselves beings, I shall be involved in an infinite regress. I will be explaining beings in terms of beings, and these in terms of still other beings. No matter when I stop—beings will go unexplained. Consequently, either the constitution of beings is inexplicable, since the only explanation is in terms of other beings, a possible but hardly philosophical solution; or the explanation must of necessity be in terms

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

of realities which are not themselves beings but are in some way the very constitution of beings. Philosophers have always been uneasy in the presence of such realities, not because they have not understood them but because, having understood them, they are forced to speak of them in language which is geared to the discussion of being.³⁶

Being in the hylomorphic tradition of Plato and Aristotle as transmitted to the twelfth century through the works of Boethius, Porphyry, and Chalcidius, Gilbert speaks of two such realities within beings. They are of course prime matter and form.³⁷ Neither as such is a being, yet each is in some way a constituent of sensible beings.

³⁶Nor does Gilbert escape this difficulty in speaking of *id quo's*. He constantly makes qualifications to prevent a misunderstanding. For example: "Subsistentia vero est substantia, non cui quid nitatur quo ipsa aliquid sit, sed qua solum subsistens est ALIQUID . . ." "DIVERSUM EST ESSE, id est subsistentia quae est in subsistente, ET ID QUOD EST, id est subsistens in quo est subsistentia . . ."

³⁷"Hic dicendum quod materia multiplex nomen est et forma similiter. Origo namque sive initium rerum, quod Plato vocat necessitatem et fraudem et receptaculum et nutriculam et gremium et matrem et sinum et locum totius generationis, auditores vero ejus appellant hylem id est silvam, ipse Plato nominat primam materiam eo quod in ea formantur quaecunque recipiuntur ab ea, cum tamen ipsa nullam ex eis contrahat formam" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 46, no. 3; *PL*, LXIV, 1265D).

³⁸"Generaliter ENIM OMNE CORPUS, QUOD vere secundum omnia quae in ipso sunt, SUBSISTIT, IN GENERATIONE ET secundum aliqua IN CORRUPTIONE VIDETUR HABERE et habet revera COMMUNEM MATERIAM: non modo hylem quam Plato silvam nominat (quae quidem secundum philosophos est, sed non est aliquid) . . ." (*In De Duab.*, Arch., p. 333, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1399C).

³⁹Quae vero sunt subsistentium esse, sicut jam dictum est . . . 'formae' . . . nuncupantur . . . et cetera, quae in subsistentibus eorumdem esse sequuntur, 'formae' . . . cognominantur" (*In De*

Trin., S. and T., p. 47, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1266D).

⁴⁰This division is not found as such explicitly in Gilbert, and it must be admitted that it is a simplification of his total theory of *id quo's*. For we shall not discuss God and exemplars as *id quo's*, since we are involved in a discussion on the natural level. Also we shall omit what could be called transcendental *id quo's*—such as *unitas*, which accompanies every other *id quo*.

⁴¹"Quoniam tamen harum [naturae] accessione subsistens, in quo habent fieri, generatur et decessione corruptitur, non tam participatione quam substantia (sicut genera ipsa quibus adsunt vel species de quibus sunt) subsistenti inesse dicuntur" (*In De Heb.*, Trad., p. 198, no. 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B).

⁴²"Verbi gratia: quoniam corporalitas, quae est esse corporis in quo est et qua ipsum est aliquid naturaliter id est corpus . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 47, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1266A).

⁴³"SUBSISTIT ENIM illud et quadam ratione est per se, QUOD NON INDIGET ACCIDENTIBUS, UT ESSE POSSIT. Immo accidentia eo, quod hac ratione subsistere et per se esse dicitur, adeo indigent quod, nisi illa adsint, nulli inesse possunt. Omne etenim accidens aliquius subsistentiae addictum est potestati" (*In De Duab.*, Arch., p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B-C).

⁴⁴"Subsistit enim homo, quoniam subsistentia, qua est et qua dicitur 'homo', id est humanitas, nulli homini, in quo est, tanquam accidens adest" (*ibid.*, p. 294, no. 32; *PL*, LXIV, 1378A).

Philosophically speaking, matter, for Gilbert, can only be said to exist; it has no nature or perfection which make it to be this or that kind of thing.³⁸ It simply exists having no parts and being the receptacle of forms. Those constituents within a being which are not themselves beings, which are received in matter causing beings to be and to be of this or that sort, are forms.³⁹ But to speak of "forms" or *id quo's* is to speak generically. Such expressions tell us little more than that we are not dealing with beings but rather with a cause of being. There are different kinds of forms or *id quo's* according to the different effects which they produce in the order of being. For convenience' sake, they may be divided into substantial and accidental *id quo's*.⁴⁰

SUBSTANTIAL *ID QUO'S*

How does one determine whether an *id quo* is substantial? The first criterion to be employed is this. Does the removal of this form bring about the corruption of the substance (*id quod*)? If it does and if the coming of this form brings about the generation of the substance, then the *id quo* in question is substantial.⁴¹ And because the presence of this form accounts for the fact that its subject exists, Gilbert calls such an *id quo* the very being (that is, *esse*) of its subject. For example, humanity is the very being (*esse*) of man, and corporality the very being (*esse*) of body.⁴²

The second criterion is this: Does the *id quo* in question cause the substance to subsist? Put another way we might ask whether this form gives its subject existence independently of any accidents it may have. If it does, then the form is substantial; and because it causes its subject to subsist it is called the subject's subsistence (*subsistentia*).⁴³ Consequently, the reason man (the *id quod*) subsists is that the very being (*esse*) which makes him exist and be a man—that is, humanity—is a form which never depends on any other form in its subject for its own existence.⁴⁴ Therefore, if one were to speak most formally, the humanity of a given man would be called his being (*esse*) if one wanted to stress the fact that it caused him to exist; and it would be called his subsistence (*subsistentia*) if one wanted to stress the fact that it caused him to subsist—that is, to exist independently of any accidental perfections he might have. One and the same form is both

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

the being and the subsistence of its subject. Gilbert, one of the remarkably few thinkers who always speaks most formally, does not press this distinction and will use "being" and "subsistence" interchangeably. Therefore in what follows whatever is said of subsistences should be understood also of being (*esse*).

Gilbert speaks of three different kinds of being (*esse*) or subsistence, the special or specific subsistence, which is made up of the general or

⁴⁵" . . . item subsistentiae generales et differentiales, quae partes sunt specialium subsistentiarum . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 309, no. 42; *PL*, LXIV, 1386B).

⁴⁶"Diligerenter tamen attendendum est quod, quoniam specifica differentia cum genere constituit speciem, cuiuslibet specialis subsistentia simplex esse non potest" (*ibid.*, p. 274, no. 48; *PL*, LXIV, 1368A).

The relationship of the differential subsistence to the generic subsistence is sometimes described by Gilbert in terms which make the differential subsistence a quasi-accident of the generic subsistence. "Tales sunt omnes differentiae . . . Hae omnes non modo habitu illo quo *inherent* subsistenti, verum etiam illo, quo generibus ejus praedicta potestate atque proprietate *adhaerent* dicuntur 'haberi'. Ac per hoc duplci ratione participantur" (*ibid.*, p. 198, no. 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B). However, it would seem prudent to say that for Gilbert differential subsistences are related to their generic subsistences in a way analogous to the way in which accidental forms are related to substantial forms. The word to stress is "analogous."

⁴⁷"Quotiens enim subsistens ex subsistentibus conjunctum est, necesse est ejus totum esse (id est illam, qua ipsum perfectum est, subsistentiam) ex omnium partium suarum omnibus subsistentiis esse conjunctam" (*In De Praedicatione*, *PL*, LXIV, 1305D).

"Cuiuslibet enim subsistentis tota forma substantiae non simplex est . . . ut de aliquo homine tota forma substantiae, qua ipse perfectus homo, et omne genus omnisque differentia, ex quibus est ipsa composita . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 52, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1270 A).

"Item: quidquid est alicujus esse, aut est tota substantia illius, cuius dicitur esse, aut pars ejus, quod est tota substantia. Et tota quidem substantia species, quae de eo dicitur, est" (*ibid.*, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1271A).

⁴⁸"Semper enim totum genus est illius, cuius genus est esse. Sed nunquam est totum esse, quoniam ejusdem generis plures divisivae potentiae (immo omnes, quae cum ipso genere speciem componunt) ejus, cuius et ipsum genus, sunt esse" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 200, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1325C).

⁴⁹"Et tota quidem substantia species, quae de eo dicitur, est. Pars vero ejus, quod est totum esse, genus est aut differentia quae speciem ipsam constituit" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., pp. 52-53, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1271A).

⁵⁰Bittle calls Gilbert a conceptualist; cf. *Reality and the Mind* (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 237. Prantl and Clerval, however, consider him to be an extreme realist. See Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (Leipzig, 1927), II, 223; and Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartre au moyen âge* (Paris, 1895), p. 262.

⁵¹"Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. ITAQUE GENERA ET SPECIES id est generales et speciales subsistentiae SUBSISTUNT . . ." (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

⁵²"Genus vero nihil aliud putandum est, nisi subsistentiarum secundum totam earum proprietatem ex rebus secundum species suas differentibus similitudine comparata collectio. Qua similitudinis comparatione omnes illae subsistentiae dicuntur unum universale, unum dividuum, unum commune, unum genus, una eademque natura" (*ibid.*, p. 315, no. 62; *PL*, LXIV, 1389D).

generic, and the differential subsistences.⁴⁵ Thus the specific subsistence whereby a man is and is a man, humanity, cannot be simple because it is composed of two parts—the generic subsistence, animality, and the differential subsistence, rationality.⁴⁶ Since the specific subsistence is made up of parts, it is a certain kind of whole; and therefore Gilbert will sometimes refer to it as the “whole being” (*totum esse*), the “whole form” (*tota forma*), or the “whole substance” (*tota substantia*) of its subject.⁴⁷ Conversely, although the generic or differential subsistences may be called the being (*esse*) of their subject, they are never its whole being (*totum esse*).⁴⁸ Thus we may conclude that whatever is the being (*esse*) of a thing either is its whole substance (*tota substantia*) or part of its whole substance (*tota substantia*). If it is the whole substance, it is the species of its subject; if it is part of the whole substance, it will be either the genus or difference which constitute the species.⁴⁹

Some people have taken this to mean that Gilbert was an exaggerated realist with regard to the problem of universals.⁵⁰ This erroneous interpretation of Gilbert is due in part to a failure to distinguish the universals of genus, difference, and species from their foundation in reality—the generic, differential, and specific subsistences which are the very being (*esse*) of existents. On at least one occasion Gilbert corrects Boethius when he calls the forms within a subsistent genus and species. Gilbert prefers to call them generic and specific subsistences.⁵¹ Let it suffice for now that universals which express the genus, difference, and species of some substance are, for Gilbert, the result of an act of the intellect. It is an act whereby the intellect abstracts or collects the common properties of the subsistences of things and whereby, in an act of comparison, it forms the common concept or universal.⁵² The universals thus formed by this act of comparison on the part of the intellect are posterior to, and dependent on, the particular subsistences which are their ground. Consequently it is simply wrong to think of these substantial *id quo's* or subsistences as universals in Gilbert's philosophy.

Since a subsistence is an *id quo*, it must of necessity produce some effect in the order of beings; as we have seen, it causes its subject to

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

exist and to subsist.⁵³ But philosophically speaking it is proper to say that a subsistence causes its subject both "to be" (*esse*) and "to be something substantially" (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).⁵⁴ For example, John is said to exist because of his being (*esse*), humanity, but this

⁵³Theologians have a different explanation, since they look at everything in its relation to God. A theologian, according to Gilbert, would say that a thing exists because of an extrinsic denomination from its principle, God. Consequently, for the theologian the subsistence merely causes its subject to be the kind of thing it is. "Cum enim dicimus 'corpus est' vel, 'homo est' vel hujusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligent quadam extrinseca denominatione ab essentia sed Principii. Non enim dicunt corporalitate corpus *esse* sed *esse aliquid*; nec humanitate hominem *esse* sed *esse aliquid*" (*In De Hebd., Arch.*, p. 188, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1318A).

Philosophers do not explain things by reference to God; so for Gilbert they fall into two groups—those who say that by the same *id quo*'s a thing is and is the kind of thing it is, and those who say that by substantial *id quo*'s a thing is and by accidental *id quo*'s is the kind of thing it is. "Ilorum vero philosophorum . . . alii quaelibet illa orationum surarum themata, *id est* materias de quibus locuntur, eodem quo dicunt *esse esse* dicunt *esse aliquid*. . . . Alii vero dividunt et ea quae subsistunt dicunt *esse subsistentia* et *esse aliquid* his quae subsistentias comitantur . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 188-89; *PL*, LXIV, 1318A).

We feel that philosophically Gilbert would endorse the first position and we say this on the basis of note no. 55 and no. 56 below.

⁵⁴"ILLIC ENIM, *id est* cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod non potest addi: 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR *esse ACCIDENS* *id quo ita esse aliquid* dicitur (ut quod opus, dicitur *esse triangulum*). HIC vero, *id est* cum de quolibet dicitur 'est aliquid' ita quod potest addi 'in eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR *esse SUBSTANTIA*, hoc est subsistentia, *id quo ita esse aliquid* dici-

tur . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319D).

⁵⁵"Sicut praediximus: ea, quae subsistunt, quidam philosophorum dicunt *esse* solis subsistentiis et *esse aliquid* quibusdam, quae alia sunt a subsistentiis, videlicet solis accidentibus. Secundum hunc usum hoc loco solum subsistens solis accidentibus *esse aliquid* dicitur. Dicimus etiam quoniam id, quod est aliquid, quandoque dicitur *esse aliquid in eo quod est* (et hoc quoque duobus modis), quandoque vero ita simpliciter *esse aliquid* quod nullo modo in *eo quod est*. Verbi gratia: aliquod opus, et aereum dicitur et humanum et triangulum: sed *aereum* atque *humanum in eo quod est* (diversa tamen ratione), *triangulum* vero nulla ratione in *eo quod est* sed *tantum triangulum*" (*ibid.*, p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319B).

⁵⁶"SED IPSUM ESSE, *id est* subsistentia quae inest subsistenti, NULLO MODO PARTICIPAT ALIUO. Quippe quod in se non habet esse, quo sit, nullo modo cum esse potest habere in se, quo quale vel quantum sit. . . . Itaque, cum esse non possit in se habere quo sit, nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit" (*ibid.*, p. 190, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1318D-1319A). "Mathematica vero, etsi nec re nec proportione dicuntur habere in se quo sint vel aliquid sint . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

⁵⁷"Nativa namque per aliquam sui vel efficientem vel efficiendi proprietatem concipiuntur: ut album per albedinem et albedo per naturam faciendi album. Nihil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nihil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potentiam concipi potest" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 260, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1360B).

⁵⁸"Quia namque et esse et *id*, quod est, cujusdam consortii ratione sine se esse non possunt (ut corporalitas et corpus. Actu namque corporalitas nihil est, nisi sit in corpore. Et corpus non est, quod vocatur, nisi in ipso sit corporalitas, quae est ejus esse) . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 287, no. 16; *PL*, LXIV, 1374D).

same humanity also accounts for the fact that John is a man. Obviously, this humanity cannot be said to explain why John is tall or white; but it does explain why he is human, animal, and rational. All of which are substantial perfections. And as we shall see, this is what distinguishes subsistences from accidental forms. For accidental *id quo*'s cause their subject simply to be something (*simpliciter esse aliquid*), whereas subsistences cause their subject to be something substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).⁵⁵

From what we have seen, we can conclude that an *id quod* or a subsistent is, and it is the kind of thing it is because of its subsistences. In fact, this causality is so important that one cannot truly know an *id quod* intellectually unless he somehow grasps its subsistences. If an *id quod* is as it is because of *id quo*'s, what accounts for the fact that an *id quod* is the kind of thing it is? In other words, what accounts for the fact that corporality causes its subject to be a body, whereas animality causes its subject to be animal and not vice versa? It cannot be a subsistence within corporality and animality, for then they would not be *id quo*'s but *id quod*'s—since subsistences (substantial *id quo*'s) cause their subjects to subsist and hence to be *id quod*'s.⁵⁶ It cannot be an accidental *id quo* within corporality or animality which causes them to produce their proper effects, since it is no accident that corporality causes a body and animality causes an animal. In fact, the reason why corporality and animality are the kinds of subsistences they are cannot be due to an *id quo* at all. For if Gilbert were to posit an *id quo* within a subsistence which accounted for its being the kind of subsistence it is, he would be involved in another infinite regress. For if one *id quo* requires another to be what it is as an *id quo*, then there is no explanation of *id quo*'s. The answer is that every *id quo* is a cause, and as such it has a certain power with respect to its effect. Or better, to be a form, substantial or accidental, is precisely to be a real dynamic power (*potestas efficiendi*) within a being producing there its proper effect.⁵⁷ And when Gilbert says that the forms of things are actually nothing apart from their subjects,⁵⁸ he means among other things that a form, apart from actually exercising its power of producing an effect, is nothing. So we can say that for Gilbert not only is every form a dynamic power (*potestas efficiendi*) within a being; it

is that power in act.⁵⁹ Consequently it would seem to be a simplification to say that all philosophies of form deprive being of its proper dynamism.

Summarily, then, the substantial *id quo's* are said to be the very being (*esse*) or the subsistences of their subjects. This is because they cause their subjects to exist and to subsist. The specific subsistence, made up as it is of the generic and differential subsistences, can alone be called the whole being (*totum esse*) of its subject. Subsistences also cause their subjects to be something substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*); and they are able to do this because each is a form, and a form is nothing more than the dynamic power of producing an effect in a subject. Subsistences as substantial forms produce a substantial effect.

⁵⁹We are speaking here of the forms of material things. Gilbert really says that "forms" taken most accurately are never in matter. He would have us therefore distinguish between exemplar-forms, which are forms in the truest sense of the word, and image-forms, which are not forms most properly. Cf. *In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 57, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1274C.

⁶⁰"Quamvis enim accidentia et nativa sint et aliquorum sint . . . quia tamen non sunt subsistentium esse et ideo illorum nec accessu generatio nec abscessu corruptio fieri potest . . ." (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 271, no. 40; *PL*, LXIV, 1366D).

⁶¹"Sed praeter has alia quaedam esse disciplinalis scientia mathematicorum attendit, quae logici graece 'symbebeka', Latine 'accidentia' vocant, quae scilicet (sicut differentiae) non modo generum sed etiam differentiarum et specierum potestati proprietate addicta sunt et nec species subsistentium nec specierum partes esse possunt" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 198, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1324B).

⁶²"Et dicimus quod non corporalitas colorem aut lineam sed color et linea corporalitatem sequuntur. Non enim haec corporalitatis sed horum corporalitas causa est" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 67, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1283B).

⁶³"Omne etenim accidens alicujus subsistentiae addictum est potestati. Et ideo 'accidens' vocatur, quondam illi adest, cum alicui subsistentium inest:

ut color adest corporalitati, ut insit corpori" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

⁶⁴" . . . ut cum speciali subsistentiae, qua homines sumus, adesse dicantur in nobis color, sanitas atque scientia, ideo utique haec dicuntur, quoniam ejus partibus proprietatis ratione (color scilicet corporalitati, sanitas sensibilitati, scientia rationalitati) convenientur" (*ibid.*, p. 270, no. 35; *PL*, LXIV, 1365C).

⁶⁵" . . . (sicut in homine ejusdem subsistentiis adsunt diversorum generum accidentia) . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 295, no. 34; *PL*, LXIV, 1378D).

⁶⁶" . . . homo nunc hoc nunc illo situ vel loco vel habitu vel relatione vel tempore vel actione vel passione statuitur et, idem permanens, secundum extrinsecus sibi accidentia variatur" (*ibid.*, p. 322, no. 6; *PL*, LXIV, 1393A).

⁶⁷"ILLA vero QUAE id de quo dicuntur id est subsistens DESIGNANT, non aliis e regione sed seipsis praedicatis, ESSE ALIQUID, VOCANTUR PRAEDICATIONES SECUNDUM REM. QUAE secundum rem praedicationes CUM DICUNTUR DE REBUS causa subsistentiarum suarum quibus in illis adsunt, sibi SUBJECTIS, VOCANTUR quidem ACCIDENTIA, eo quod rerum illarum subsistentiis adsunt, sed tamen SECUNDUM REM eo quod ipsis subsistentibus ipsa quoque insunt et eadem esse aliquid faciunt" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 78, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1291C).

Accidental *id quo*'s have a twofold characteristic. First, their coming and going does not bring about the generation or the corruption of the subject.⁶⁰ And it is for this reason that no accidental *id quo* can be called the being (*esse*) of any substance. So a white man's being (*esse*) will be the humanity whereby he is and is human, and not the whiteness whereby he is white.⁶¹ Secondly, accidental *id quo*'s not only cannot cause their subjects to subsist; that is, to exist independently of any other forms they may have; but they themselves are dependent for existence not only on their subjects but on the subsistences of their subjects. So true is this for Gilbert that the subsistences of the subject, as well as the subject itself, can be called the causes of accidents.⁶² In fact, Gilbert says that these *id quo*'s are called "accidents" not because of some relation to their subject but because they befall (*accidit*), adhere to, or are added to some subsistence in order to inhere in a subject.⁶³ But a given accident cannot just adhere to any subsistence; it must adhere to that subsistence which is its cause and which has the power to cause it. Thus the accidents of color, health, and knowledge should not properly be attributed to the whole being (*totum esse*) of man; that is, humanity. Rather, color should be attributed to corporality, health to sensibility, and knowledge to rationality, all of which subsistences are parts of humanity.⁶⁴ Gilbert also makes it clear that one and the same subsistence can cause, or have within its power to produce, many accidents of different kinds. For example, both the color and the length of a body are due to accidental *id quo*'s which adhere to, and are caused by, the same corporality.⁶⁵

Accidents are divided by Gilbert into two groups. Quantity and quality constitute the first group, which is characterized by the fact that accidents of this group actually inhere in a subject. Relation, action, passion, time, place, position, and habit constitute the second group, which is characterized by the fact that its accidents do not inhere in a subject but are added to it extrinsically.⁶⁶ Both types of accidents can be truly predicated of their subject; but only those of the first group can be predicated, as Gilbert says, *secundum rem*. This means in such a way as to indicate that the subject possesses a perfection within itself.⁶⁷ The accidents of the second group are truly predicated of their

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

subject but *extrinsecus*, which indicates that the subject is not endowed by their presence with any intrinsic perfection. Rather, by the presence of such accidents a subject already constituted from certain substantial and accidental *id quo*'s is placed in a certain relationship to something else. Although not conferring an intrinsic perfection on their subjects, such accidents give them a certain *status*—that is, the *status* of being clothed, armed, in the forum, seated, and other things of this sort.⁶⁸ Therefore, speaking most formally, it would be proper, according to Gilbert's thought, to refer to quantity and quality as accidents and the remaining accidental categories as the states or circumstances of subject.⁶⁹ This is particularly true when one recalls that for Gilbert the word "accident" refers to those *id quo*'s which befall (*accidunt*) a subsistence in order to inhere in a subject.⁷⁰

Accidents, as opposed to circumstances or states, actually cause their

⁶⁸"Hae vero sunt substantiales formae et, quae illis in ipso subsistente adsunt, qualitates et intervallares mensurae. Caetera vero, quae de ipso naturaliter dicuntur, quidam ejus 'status' vocantur, eo quod nunc sic nunc vero aliter . . . statuantur. . . . Idem enim est homo sedendo quod stando, et extra domum quod intra, et inermis quod armatus . . ." (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 321-2, nos. 6-7; *PL*, LXIV, 1393A).

⁶⁹"Loca, tempora, actiones, passiones, habitus, situs recte vocat *rei circumstan-*
tias quoniam, quamvis esse in loco vel in tempore non sit esse aliquid, tamen nihil est in loco vel in tempore, nisi ipsum sit aliquid. Similiter quamvis agere vel pati vel habere vel sisti non sit esse aliquid, tamen quidquid agit vel patitur vel habet vel situm est, est aliquid" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 77, no. 9; *PL*, LXIV, 1291B).

⁷⁰See n. 63 above.

⁷¹"Unde manifestum est quod DIVER-
SUM est 'ESSE ALIQUID TANTUM', id est cui, cum praedicatur esse aliquid,
non potest addi: in eo quod est, ET
'ESSE ALIQUID IN EO QUOD EST', id est
cui, cum dicatur esse aliquid, potest
addi: in eo quod est. Vere. ILLIC
ENIM, id est cum de quolibet dicitur
'est aliquid' ita quod non potest addi 'in
eo quod est', SIGNIFICATUR ACCIDENTS
id quo ita esse aliquid dicitur (ut quod
opus dicitur esse triangulum). HIC

vero, id est cum de quolibet dicitur 'est
aliquid' ita quod potest addi 'in eo quod
est', SIGNIFICATUR SUBSTANTIA, hoc
est subsistentia . . ." (*In De Hebd.*,
Trad., p. 191, no. 10; *PL*, LXIV, 1319D).

⁷²"Accidentia vero de illis quidem
substantiis, quae ex esse sunt aliquid,
dicuntur (sive in eis creata sive extrin-
secus affixa sint) sed eis tantum, quae
esse sunt, accidentia, quia illis recte non
'inesse' sed 'adesse' dicuntur" (*In De
Trin.*, S. and T., p. 67, no. 8; *PL*,
LXIV, 1282D). Cf. n. 63 above.

⁷³"Omne etenim accidentia alicujus
subsistentiae addictum est potestati. Et
ideo 'accidens' vocatur, quoniam illi
adest, cum alicui subsistentium inest:
ut color adest corporalitati, ut insit cor-
pori" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 288,
no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

⁷⁴"Qua ratione illa corporis est esse,
haec vero in eodem corpore illi adsunt.
Ideo primum illa, deinde quod ea cor-
pus est, vera ratione est horum substan-
tia: haec vero primum corporalitatis et
per eam corporis accidentia. His enim
vere substat et corporalitas, cui adsunt,
et corpus cui insunt" (*In De Trin.*,
S. and T., p. 67, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV,
1283B).

⁷⁵"FORMAE VERO SUBJECTAE ESSE
NON POSSUNT id est juxte aliquam,
quam in se habeant, subsistentiam nullum
accidens in se suscipiunt" (*ibid.*,
p. 56, no. 22; *PL*, LXIV, 1273D).

subjects to be beings of this or that sort (*esse aliquid*). That is, they actually endow their subjects with a certain attribute or perfection. In this accidents are like subsistences, since the perfection caused by each is actually in the subject. However, they differ because the accidents do not cause their subjects to be anything substantially (*esse aliquid in eo quod est*).⁷¹ Nor can accidents directly inhere (*insunt*) in their subjects as subsistences do. Prior (in nature, not in time) to inhering in their subjects, accidents must adhere to (*adsunt*) some subsistence or being (*esse*) within their subject.⁷² Accidents, then, cannot inhere in any subject unless they also adhere to, befall, are added to, or are caused by some subsistence. For an accident is added to the power of some subsistence, and it is accidental to this subsistence because it adheres to it. For color adheres to corporality in order that it might inhere in a body.⁷³ Thus one and the same body is a body, is colored and delineated; but the *id quo*'s by which the body in question is each of these things are distinct. Corporality, color, and line account for these different aspects of the same body; but corporality is more fundamental, as the other *id quo*'s follow upon it and not vice versa. For color and line do not cause corporality; rather, corporality is their cause. Thus color and line adhere to corporality which is the being (*esse*) of the body. So in some way accidents may be said to be supported by both the body and its being (*esse*), for they adhere to corporality in order to inhere in body.⁷⁴ One can see here how careful Gilbert is to avoid speaking of accidents as if they were "in" subsistences, for *id quo*'s can only be said to be "in" *id quod*'s and as we have already noted; *id quo*'s do not have other *id quo*'s within themselves. In short, then, no form can be the subject of other forms.⁷⁵ When Gilbert speaks of accidents as adhering to, befalling, or being added to subsistences, he is trying to explain how accidental and substantial *id quo*'s are joined, since the mode of union cannot be inherence. For if an accident inhered in a subsistence, then the subsistence would be the subject of that accident rather than the *id quod*. And it would further follow that corporality would be white instead of the body. It should be noted that because this adherence of which Gilbert speaks is a relationship between *id quo*'s it is itself a mathematical concept.

Summarily, then, accidental *id quo*'s never cause their subject to be;

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

hence they can never be the being (*esse*) or subsistence of a subject. They cannot cause their subjects to subsist; and in fact the very existence of accidental *id quo*'s themselves is dependent on the subsistences of their subject as well as on their subject. Every accident will be added to a given subsistence within its subject; namely, to that subsistence of which it is the proper effect. Thus a certain propriety is maintained so that corporality, not rationality, will be the cause of, say, color. Further, an accident is said to adhere to, to befall, to be added to, and to be caused by its own proper subsistence. Consequently, though accidents and subsistences are intimately related, the accidents are never said to be "in" their proper subsistences, for no effect is said to be actually in its cause. Accidents adhere to subsistences and inhere in subsistents. There are two kinds of inhering accidents—quantities and qualities. There are other accidental *id quo*'s which are extrinsically added to their subject—and these would be more properly called the circumstances of a thing rather than its accidents. If one insists on calling them accidents, they should be called *extrinsic* accidents. Intrinsic accidents produce an accidental perfection in their subject in such a way that their subject may be really (*secundum rem*) said to be this or that, but not substantially. Extrinsic accidents may be truly predicated of their subject but not really (*secundum rem*); that is, not in such a way as to posit a perfection *in* their subject.

⁷⁶"OMNE QUOD EST, scilicet omne subsistens, PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST 'ejus' ESSE, non quidem ut eo sit aliquid, sed ad hoc tantum UT eo SIT" (*In De Hebd., Trad.*, p. 192, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1320A).

Speaking theologically, Gilbert would demand many precisions; see n. 53 above. *Est* is said in the natural order primarily of subsistents, but we do not mean to deny that *id quo*'s can be said to exist secondarily and indirectly. Nor do we mean to imply that *est* is said primarily of natural subsistents to the detriment of God. For God is not merely said to be, He is also said to be being itself; that is, *essentia*. *Est* is said of Him essentially. "Essentia est illa res, QUAE EST IPSUM ESSE id est quae non ab alio hanc mutuat dictiōnē ET EX QUA EST ESSE id est quae caeteris omnibus eandem quadam extrinseca par-

ticipacione communicat. Non enim de quolibet suae essentiae proprietate dicitur 'est'. Sed ab eo, qui non aliena sed sua essentia proprie est, ad illud quod creata ab ipso forma aliquid est et ad ipsam creatam formam et denique ad omnia quae de ipsis vere dicuntur (quoniam ex eo tamquam ex principio sunt) dictio ista transumitur, ut de unoquoque divinae formae participatione recte dicitur 'est'" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 50, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1269A).

⁷⁷"Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget" (*In De Duab., Arch.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

⁷⁸"SUBSTAT AUTEM ID, QUOD ALIIS id est ACCIDENTIBUS QUODDAM SUBJECTUM, UT ESSE POSSINT, SUBMINISTRAT: ut corpus colori" (*ibid.*, p. 288, no. 18; *PL*, LXIV, 1375B).

GILBERT'S PHILOSOPHY OF *ID QUOD*
THE *ID QUOD* ITSELF

Quite properly Gilbert never questions the fact that the world in which he lives is made up of individual existents, which he describes as *ea quae sunt* ("things which exist"). This truth is itself part of the first principle that in natural things (as opposed to supernatural) an existent is other than that by which it exists. It is equally as self-evident, then, that there are existents in the world as that these existents are distinct from, and other than, the realities which cause them to be and to be what they are. These beings (*id quod's*) are such that existence can be truly said of them: "this stone exists," "this tree exists," "this dog exists," and "John exists." *Est* is said philosophically of such existents properly and primarily because each has its own being (*eius esse*) by which it exists.⁷⁶ *Est* cannot be properly and primarily said of any *id quo* since, as we have seen, no *id quo* has a being (*esse*) within itself. This is the most fundamental difference between *id quod's* and *id quo's* (namely, that the former is primarily and properly the subject of existence, and the latter is not), and it accounts for other secondary differences.

Id quod's are said to subsist and to substand. The key to understanding Gilbert on this point is to accept his definitions of what it is "to subsist" and "to substand." Following Boethius, he defines both subsisting and substanding in terms of accidents which neither subsist nor substand. For that is said to subsist which does not require accidents in order that it be.⁷⁷ And that is said to substand which furnishes (*subministrat*) accidents with their proper subject.⁷⁸ One must be very careful to understand Gilbert correctly here. That subsists which does not require accidents in order to be, but the question to be answered is, Do only existents (*id quod's*) subsist? If one interprets this to mean do only subsistents exist as *id quod's*, then the answer is affirmative; but this is not what Gilbert has in mind. By "to subsist" he means "to be independent of accidents"; and from all we have said it should be obvious that both *id quod's* and substantial *id quo's* are independent of accidents. So for Gilbert, unlike St. Thomas, *id quo's*

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

as well as subsistents are said to subsist.⁷⁹ Thus we can see that it would be wrong to say that for Gilbert *id quod*'s subsist and *id quo*'s do not. The real difference between them, as we have noted above, is that *id quod*'s are the primary subjects of existence and *id quo*'s are not.

A completely similar situation obtains with respect to substanding. Since Gilbert defines substanding in terms other than those of existing *in se et non in alio*, there is no reason why substanding should be the

⁷⁹Subsistit quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. ITAQUE GENERA ET SPECIES id est generales et speciales subsistentiae SUBSISTUNT TANTUM. . . Non enim ipsa genera species indigent accidentibus, ut sint. INDIVIDUA VERO SUBSISTUNT quidem. Vere. NAM NEQUE IPSA individua sicut nec genera nec species INDIGENT ACCIDENTIBUS, UT SINT" (*ibid.*, p. 288, no. 19; *PL*, LXIV, 1375C).

For St. Thomas, that subsists which exists *in se non in alio* (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 2); but in Gilbert's frame of reference that which exists *in se non in alio* (in the sense of having its own *esse*) is an *id quod*. Consequently we must be careful to use *subsistere* here only in the Gilbertian sense, for he expressly says that subsistences which exist in an *id quod* also subsist.

⁸⁰"Non enim subsistens tantum sed etiam subsistentia appellatur 'substantia' eo quod utraque accidentibus, diversis tamen rationibus, substant. Subsistens igitur est substantia non qua aliqua rerum est aliquid (nihil enim subsistente est aliquid), sed est illa substantia, quae est aliquid. Subsistentia vero est substantia, non cui quid nitatur quo ipsa aliquid sit, sed qua solum subsistens est ALIQUID . . ." (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 76, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1290B).

⁸¹"Quos hic ipse error patenter ostendit omnino nescire hujus nominis, quod est 'substantia' multiplicem in naturalibus usum: videlicet non modo id, quod est, verum etiam id, quo est, hoc nomine nuncupari . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 63, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1279D).

⁸²"Quoniam tamen omnium (id est et corporalium et incorporalium) subsistentium . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 65, no. 4; *PL*, LXIV, 1281D).

"Ex hujus igitur loci universitate omnibus etiam hominibus naturaliter cognita venit haec conceptio sive enuntiatio *naturalis* qua dicitur: Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse. Locus enim, et quo locale et quo locatum aliquid vere intelligitur, solis corporibus accedit" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 187, no. 5; *PL*, LXIV, 1317C).

⁸³"Corporibus et incorporalibus nulla est communis materia. Vere utique, quoniam nulla omnino est incorporeorum materia. Quod ait ita: OMNIS ENIM NATURA INCORPOREAE SUBSTANTIAE talis est, quod NULLO FUNDAMENTO MATERIAE nititur. Nam nec etiam hyle potest eorum esse materia. NULLUM VERO CORPUS EST, CUI (hoc est: cuius naturae) NON SIT SUBJECTA MATERIA. Nam hyle quidem corporibus, corporum vero naturis caeteris a prima subsistentia ipsa corpora" (*In De Duab.*, *Arch.*, p. 335, no. 26; *PL*, LXIV, 1400A).

⁸⁴"Nam omnia naturalia non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

⁸⁵A discussion of God is beyond the scope of our present endeavor. On the simplicity of God cf. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, XIII (1951), 17; and Gilbert, *In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, pp. 192-94, nos. 12-13; *PL*, LXIV, 1320D-21A).

⁸⁶"Duobus modis composito accipitur. Unus est, quo subsistens aliquod ex subsistentiis inter se diversis et a quibus compositum ipsum aliud est dicitur esse compositum ut homo, qui ex carnis atque ossibus vel ex corpore et spiritu compositus est" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 193, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1321A).

exclusive prerogative of *id quod*'s. In fact, since he defines substance in terms of affording a certain substrate for accidents and since he has consistently taught that every accident must adhere to a subsistence in order to inhere in its proper subject, it follows quite logically that substantial *id quo*'s or subsistences be included as the substrates for accidents. But again it cannot be said that both the subsistent and its subsistence substand accidents in the same way. In fact, Gilbert calls the former the *substantia quae* and the latter *substantia qua*.⁸⁰ And it is only because of subsistences within it which are the proper causes of its various accidents that an *id quod* or *substantia quae* substands these accidents. And conversely it is only because these subsistences are within a subject that they are, and are able to cause, accidents. This intimate interdependence of the subsistence and the subsistent in substanding accidents allows Gilbert to give to each the name "substance," but not so as to indicate that they substand accidents in the same way. For subsistents substand accidents as their *id quod* or subject, while subsistences substand accidents as the *id quo*'s which are their causes and to which they are added or adhere within their subject.⁸¹ Gilbert speaks of two main kinds of subsistents, those which are corporeal and in place and those which are incorporeal and are not in place.⁸² The main differences between them is, of course, that the *id quo*'s of corporeal things are in matter, while the *id quo*'s of incorporeal beings are not.⁸³ But it is an interesting note to Gilbert's philosophy that both corporeal and incorporeal subsistents, with the exception of God, can be said to be concrete.⁸⁴ So "concretion" in Gilbert's philosophy does not necessarily concern itself with matter, as we shall see.

Apart from a consideration of God, who is the only truly simple subsistent,⁸⁵ no subsistent is simple. For every subsistent will be either a *subsistens ex subsistentibus* or a *subsistens ex subsistentiis*. Consequently there are two modes of composition. The first is that according to which a subsistent is composed of other subsistents (*subsistens ex subsistentibus*) which are diverse from each other as well as from the composite; for example, as a man is constituted of flesh and bones, or of body and soul.⁸⁶ The second mode of composition is such that a subsistent is not composed of other subsistents, for in this respect it can be said to be simple, but that a subsistent is

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

constituted from subsistences and their proper accidents (*subsistens ex subsistentiis*)—as the human soul is said to be simple because it is not composed of other subsistents but is said to be composite in the second way, since it is constituted from many subsistences and the accidents which adhere to them.⁸⁷ From this we can see that it is proper to say that the soul is relatively simple, if by this we mean that it is not composed of other subsistents; but this is only a relative, secondary, and creaturely simplicity. For the soul is not unqualifiedly simple; it is constituted from many forms, substantial and accidental, which cause it to be and to be as it is.

This second type of composition requires some further clarification. If we say, with Gilbert, that a subsistent is constituted from subsistences (*ex subsistentiis*), we must also add with Gilbert that subsistences and accidental forms *are not* to be considered as parts of the *id quod* which is their subject. Gilbert feels that a part must agree in some genus or *ratio* with the whole of which it is a part, but he also maintains that no subsistence or being (*esse*) agrees in any way with the subsistent of which it is the being (*esse*), which means that they are not related as part to whole.⁸⁸ Nothing prevents a generic subsistence from being parts of a *tota* or specific subsistence.⁸⁹ For this is a case of a complex *id quo* constituted from its parts which are also *id quo*'s. Gilbert is merely saying that no *id quo* is a part of an *id quod*, since the

⁸⁷"Alius vero compositionis est modus, quo non quidem subsistens ex subsistentiis—nam quantum ad hoc simplex est sed et multis, quorum unoquoque est, et multis, quorum unoquoque aliquid est, ejus constat proprietas ut hominis spiritus qui—unus et simplex quantum ad hoc quod non ex diversis subsistentiis constat—et multis subsistentiis est et multis earum accidentibus aliquid est, ideoque compositus nec ipsum quod est" (*ibid.*, p. 194, no. 13; *PL*, LXIV, 1321B).

⁸⁸"Nihil enim est esse ejus, cuius pars est. Esse namque et id, quod eo est, nullo prorsus convenient genere. Pars autem et id, cuius est pars, multis generibus etiam singulariter unum sunt" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 52, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1270D).

⁸⁹Cf. nn. 45-49 above.

⁹⁰"In quo diligenter est attendendum quod, etsi quandoque non ejusdem sint

generis, quae sibi in compositionibus conjunguntur, semper tamen in aliquo sunt ejusdem rationis. Quamvis enim corpus et spiritus diversi generis sint, in hoc tamen sunt ejusdem rationis, quod utraque his, quae praedicanter, supposita sunt. Ipsa vero impossibile est praedicari. Nunquam enim id, quod est, praedicatur" (*In De Duab.*, Arch., p. 300, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1381A).

⁹¹"Sic igitur anima, quae hominis est pars constitutiva . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 281, no. 2; *PL*, LXIV, 1371D).

⁹²"Secundum hanc definitionem humana anima videtur esse persona. Non enim sicut quidam dixerunt, est *entelechia*, hoc est forma, sed potius *substantia*, id est subsistens, habens in se formas et diversorum generum accidentia. Est et *naturae rationalis*" (*ibid.*).

⁹³Cf. n. 88 above.

parts of an *id quod* are themselves *id quod*'s.⁹⁰ And so we can see why Gilbert can truly say, if secondarily, that the soul is simple; it must be so since it has no parts. However, it is not simply simple, because of the multiplicity of *id quo*'s within it. It follows from this that the soul is a subsistent with many *id quo*'s, that the soul is a constitutive part of man.⁹¹ Thus the soul as part of a subsistent cannot be itself a form and must be a subsistent.⁹²

Summarily, then, *id quod*'s are beings; that is to say, *est* is said of them properly and primarily because of the being (*esse*) within them. They are said to subsist because they exist independently of their accidents, while they are said to substand because they furnish these accidents with a substrate. This is said of *id quod*'s because of the subsistences, which also may be said to subsist and substand as *id quo*'s, within them. Subsistents are either material or immaterial, yet all created subsistents are concrete. Because they are concrete all subsistents are complex either because they are made up of other subsistents, called their parts; or because they possess within themselves many subsistences and accidents, which never are parts of their subjects. In order to safeguard the immortality of the human soul Gilbert considers it solely as a subsistent and a part of man, and denies it is a form or subsistence.

GILBERT ON THE RELATION OF *ID QUO* 'S AND *ID QUOD* 'S

Having seen Gilbert's teaching on *id quo*'s and *id quod*'s, we may conclude with his doctrine of their relationship to one another. The difficulty involved in describing this relationship is immediately evident if one but recalls that we speak here not of a relationship between beings (*id quod*'s) but between beings and those realities within beings which are necessary to ultimately explain them. However we describe this relationship, it cannot be said to be the relation of parts to a whole, for Gilbert has already stated that *id quo*'s are not parts of subsistents.⁹³ I suspect that a philosopher can say little more than that these realities are within beings, but it is interesting to note the terminology he may use to say this. Gilbert chooses a term with a long philosophical history to explain this relationship between *id quo*'s and *id quod*'s. It is "participation." We should not let its history

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

cause us to misinterpret Gilbert's use of the word. For Gilbert says that when a subsistent has something within itself—for example, a nature by which it is or is the kind of thing it is—one can say that the subsistent participates in that nature. Conversely, a nature is said to be participated in by the subsistent in which it inheres.⁹⁴ It is well to note here that for Gilbert participation is the relation between an *id quod* and its own *id quo*'s, and not between an *id quod* and some transcendent exemplar.⁹⁵ In view of this definition of participation, *id quo*'s cannot participate in anything because they do not have within themselves realities by which they are and are the kinds of things they are.⁹⁶ Thus for example, John is a man because he participates in that specific subsistence which is his own being (*esse*); that is,

⁹⁴"Cum enim subsistens in se aliquid (ut naturam qua sit vel aliquid sit) habet, dicitur quod ipsum eā naturā participat. Natura vero quae, quoniam inest subsistenti, dicitur ab eo participari. . ." (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 198, no. 21; *PL*, LXIV, 1324A).

⁹⁵This is not to deny that a relation exists between a natural subsistent and the exemplars; it is to deny that such a relationship is called, by Gilbert, participation. He speaks in other terms of this relationship, for example: "AT VERO id QUOD EST, ACCEPTA in se FORMA ESSENDI, id est eā quam abstractum intellectus concipit subsistētiā (Quae acceptio dicitur 'generatio') EST ATQUE materiae (quae 'hyle' dicitur) formaeque hujus, quae Graece 'usyosis' vocatur, concursu—opifice illa forma (quae nominatur 'usya') juxta exemplar illius quae dicitur 'ydea'—ycon (hoc est illius exemplaris exemplum et imago) CONSISTIT ut corpus, eo quod ut esse corporalitatem habet est corpus; et homo eo quod humanitatem" (*ibid.*, p. 189, no. 7; *PL*, LXIV, 1318C). "EX HIS ENIM FORMIS, QUAE SUNT PRAETER MATERIAM . . . ISTAE FORMAE, QUAE SUNT IN MATERIA ET ei, quod est esse materiae, advenientes CORPUS EFFICIUNT quadam exempli ab exemplari suo conformativa deductione VENERUNT" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 57, no. 24; *PL*, LXIV, 1274C).

⁹⁶"SED IPSUM ESSE, id est subsistentia quae inest subsistenti, NULLO MODO PARTICIPAT ALIUO. Quippe

quod in se non habet esse, quo sit, nullo modo cum esse potest habere in se, quo quale vel quantum sit. . . . Itaque cum esse non possit in se habere quo sit, nec participatione aliud aliquid in se habebit" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 190, no. 8; *PL*, LXIV, 1318D-1319A). Cf. nn. 56-58 above.

⁹⁷"OMNE QUOD EST, scilicet omne subsistens, PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST ejus ESSE, non quidem ut eo sit aliquid, sed ac hoc tantum UT eo SIT. Cum eodem vero idem subsistens quodam ALIO PARTICIPAT, UT eo SIT ALIQUID. Sed illa participatio, qua eo quod est esse participat, naturā prior est; altera vero posterior. Unde infert: AC PER HOC. Quasi: quia videlicet non potest esse aliquid, nisi prius naturaliter sit, ID QUOD EST (sicut dictum est) PARTICIPAT EO QUOD EST ESSE, UT SIT. EST VERO naturaliter prius, UT deinde PARTICIPET ALIO QUOLIBET quo aliquid sit" (*ibid.*, p. 192, no. 11; *PL*, LXIV, 1320A).

⁹⁸"Concretio vero eidem subsistentiae naturas posterioris rationis accommodat ut, cui cum illa insunt, simplex non sit" (*In De Trin.*, S. and T., p. 48, no. 9; *PL*, LXIV, 1267B).

⁹⁹"Creatio namque subsistentiam inesse facit ut, cui inest, ab ea aliquid sit" (*ibid.*, p. 47; *PL*, LXIV, 1267A).

¹⁰⁰"Nam omnia naturalia non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt" (*In De Hebd.*, *Trad.*, p. 192, no. 12; *PL*, LXIV, 1320B).

¹⁰¹Cf. n. 18 above.

his own humanity; but this subsistence which is John's being (*esse*) cannot itself be said to participate in anything, since it has nothing within itself and is not itself an *id quod*.

There are two kinds of participation, since there are two kinds of natures to be participated in. Every subsistent first participates in its being (*esse*) in order that it exist, and only then does the subsistent participate in those *id quo*'s which follow upon being. Thus a subsistent participates in its being (*esse*) by a prior (in nature, not in time) participation; and it participates in its accidental perfections by a posterior participation.⁹⁷ Since, as we have seen, subsistences inhere only while accidental *id quo*'s adhere to their proper subsistences in order to inhere, we could very well call the prior participation "direct participation" and the posterior participation "indirect participation."

This twofold participation on the part of every created subsistent brings about a situation whereby many forms are simultaneously present to, or inhering in, an *id quod*. This multiplicity of forms is not a disordered aggregate, but rather each form is in its subject according to fixed relations to all the other forms in its subject. This accommodation of forms to each other within the same subsistent is called by Gilbert "concretion." For concretion accommodates natures to one another, and especially those which are posterior to those which are prior.⁹⁸ By means of creation a subsistence with its concomitant accidental adjuncts is made to inhere in a subject.⁹⁹ But because a multiplicity of forms is created in a subsistent, every subsistent is not only created but also concreted.¹⁰⁰ It matters not whether the subsistent be material or immaterial; if there are many *id quo*'s within it they must be properly related to one another. Hence every created subsistent may be called "concrete."

Summarily, then, God creates natural subsistents, both corporeal and incorporeal. And this creative act produces its effect of making the subsistent be and be the kind of thing it is through the forms which God places in it. These forms are produced in their subject so that we can say that the subject participates in each form. And the forms themselves are the images or icons of the exemplars, which probably are ultimately for Gilbert the divine ideas.¹⁰¹ Gilbert speaks of this creative act which produces forms which are images of exemplars as

A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete
Richard J. Westley

a certain "conformative deduction."¹⁰² The multiplicity of forms in a given subsistent are ordered to one another by concretion, which allows us to call each subsistent "concrete" and to say of each form within it that it is "concreted." All created forms are concreted and therefore can never actually (*actu*) exist apart from the complex of forms to which they are accommodated or apart from the subsistent which participates in them.¹⁰³ And all created subsistents have the perfections we attribute to them because of some *id quo* in which they participate, be it substantial or accidental.¹⁰⁴

Granting, then, that Gilbert's philosophy can be called a formalism,¹⁰⁵ it would seem that we do him no disservice by saying that his entire philosophy is a philosophy of the concrete and the concreted. That is to say, it is a philosophy which attempts to explain reality in terms of concreted forms within concrete subsistents. Under the present limitations one could not expect to do full justice to such a philosophy. The ramifications of such an approach to reality must be left for another time; we have attempted merely to outline Gilbert's approach to the real. But even in outlining the general direction of Gilbert's philosophical speculation, one cannot but admire so vital a metaphysical mind. It is a mystery why so brilliant a metaphysician has for so long been of importance only in theology. Of course, until we are willing to take Gilbert seriously as a philosopher, we shall never see him in his true light. We shall continue to speak of him in the terms and phrases of his contemporaries, which were not always accurate or flattering. We shall fail to see his strong metaphysical speculation as a valid, and therefore important, moment in the history of philosophy. One who has been judged by Professor Gilson to be the most powerful metaphysician of the twelfth century¹⁰⁶ deserves better from our hands.

¹⁰²Cf. n. 95 above.

¹⁰³Cf. n. 58 above.

¹⁰⁴"Quicquid enim naturaliter de subsistente dicitur, aut ejus substantia aut ejus accidentis recte intelligitur. Praeter haec tamen de ipso extra naturalium facultatem plurima dicuntur, inter quae illa etiam sunt quae de eodem denominative praedicantur" (*In*

De Hebd., Trad., p. 205, no. 35; *PL*, LXIV, 1328D-1329A).

¹⁰⁵Cf. n. 4 above.

¹⁰⁶"Gilbert est, avec Abélard, le plus puissant spéculatif esprit du xii^e siècle, et si Abélard l'emporte sur le terrain de la logique, Gilbert dépasse de loin Abélard comme métaphysicien" (Gilson, *Philosophie au moyen âge*, 262).

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE FACT

THE REVEREND REMY C. KWANT, O.S.A., is professor of philosophy at the Augustinian Seminary in Eindhoven, The Netherlands.

*He had previously taught at Duquesne University.
He received his doctorate at the Angelicum, Rome,
and then studied at the Sorbonne
and the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain.*

*He is the author of several books, including
Idealism and Christianity, The Labor World, Philosophy of Encounter,
and Philosophy of Labor. He has written
articles for Divus Thomas (Piacenza), Tijdschrift voor
Philosophie, and other periodicals.*

INTRODUCTION

A few years ago the text of a lecture given by William Bevan, Jr., in the Scandinavian countries¹ was published in Copenhagen and Oslo.

There is every reason to speak here of this remarkable paper by an American professor. His lecture can be divided into two parts: the first part can be considered as an attack on the traditional (American) psychology; the second part contains some suggestions about further research.

Bevan starts from the thesis that it is impossible to establish facts without disposing of a certain theory. When establishing facts we cannot get rid of all possible conceptions and theories.² In general, too little allowance is made for this by psychologists; and consequently the theory, on the basis of which facts are established, remains concealed.³

Bevan makes an attempt to clear up, to a certain extent, the notional conceptions connected with the observation of facts. To begin with, these conceptions are rigid and stubborn; and it is extremely difficult to blot them out or to put them right.⁴ Moreover, the function of the conception is not elucidated; that is, is it descriptive or explanatory? Finally, the conceptions used originate in physics and physiology.

Psychology, therefore, is partly built on a complex of conceptual

views of a simplistic, inadequate, and insufficient nature, which, in addition, have been derived from a quite different sphere of thinking. It stands to reason that, as a consequence of the above, progress in psychology is greatly hampered.⁵

In the second part of his discourse Bevan tries to find a way out. Since conceptions are indispensable, we must try to build up adequate ones. Taking into consideration the present state of affairs in the field of scientific research, this is not yet possible. In spite of this, Bevan is of the opinion that he can give some suggestions. In the first place, more attention has to be paid to the interaction of the factors because the relationships between surroundings and behavior are bilateral, not unilateral.⁶ Therefore, the stimulus-response scheme is insufficient. Furthermore, we have to start from more flexible designs⁷ and accept the divergent character of the physical and perceptive world. Finally, the pragmatic value of our conceptions has to be envisaged.⁸

At the beginning of this essay we spoke of a remarkable feature of the lecture, and we had indeed good reasons to do so. Let us recall here the criticism passed on the traditional psychology by phenomenology in general—and more in particular that put forward by Buytendijk and Merleau-Ponty. We find here, on the part of an American professor, a recognition of a conceptual moment in establishing facts, a recognition of the "scientificistic" sphere of thinking, a reduction to the perceptual

¹"Modern Psychologists: Scientific Wozzeck Hunters? An Opinion in Outline" (Einar Munksgaards Forlag, Copenhagen).

²"But facts, even observations, also depend upon the conceptual orientation of scientist and his competent colleagues . . . All that is factual, observed Goethe, is already theory" (*ibid.*, pp. 6-7).

³"Yet many psychologists are inclined to conceive of facts as 'real' bricks out of which theories are built, independent of the theory and independent of the builder. Concepts, facts and framework are man-made devices" (*ibid.*, p. 7).

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵This covers Buytendijk's and Merleau-Ponty's criticism of scientificistic psychology

⁶"Single-factor design is built on the presumption that the relationships between variables designated for manipulation and behavior are unilateral" (*ibid.*, p. 21).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸"The most profound weakness of neurologizing, however, is one of regarding acquired habits of thinking as peremptory descriptions of 'Nature', that is of caching in the back of one's mind the expectation that our model is 'something that exists' and is perhaps something that is even eventually observable—and this even by some of our nimblest minds" (*ibid.*, p. 24).

⁹Fernand Alquié, "Une philosophie de l'ambiguité," *Fontaine*, No. 59.

¹⁰Alphonse de Waelhens, *Une philosophie de l'ambiguité, l'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Louvain, 1951).

world and a recognition of the dialectical relation between stimulus and behavior.

Here we can speak of an attack on the basic principles of those sciences, which want to abandon all theories and base themselves exclusively on the facts, since they see the fact as a firm, unambiguous basis. At the same time it is shown here, however, how dangerous it is to build on a dubious philosophic basis; for Bevan, being under the influence of pragmatism, only attaches a pragmatic value to the concept. If we accept that the establishing of facts is unimaginable without conceptions and that the latter have only a pragmatic value, all sciences only have a pragmatic value.

We deem it necessary to reflect upon the relation between fact and conception. This is not at all an easy task. We would like to elucidate in this article some aspects of this relationship, on the basis of which we will prove that in more than one respect the fact is ambiguous. First of all, we will examine what is meant by ambiguity; next, we will see what has to be understood by a fact; and finally we will prove that the fact is ambiguous.

Our findings will undoubtedly be of some use in connection with discussions between representatives of the traditional and the new phenomenological psychology, a subject with which we will deal in the conclusion of this article.

I. WHAT IS AMBIGUITY?

Alquié⁹ and de Waelhens¹⁰ use the word "ambiguity" to define the character of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. In phenomenological literature in general it plays an important part. Something is ambiguous when it has more than one meaning. Ambiguity is a form of having a meaning. A meaning or a plurality of meanings is present both in our intentional act and in its correlate. So, if our intentional acts have more than one meaning, the same applies also to the correlate.

May we convert the proposition and assert that every plurality of meanings is always ambiguity? By no means. If something has several meanings, it might be possible that one individual meaning applies to one individual case, and another meaning to another case; so it is with analogous concepts. If something is ambiguous, all the

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, o.s.a.

meanings are applicable in one and the same instance;¹¹ none of them is applied in an absolute way. The individual meanings can only be understood in their mutual relation. The truth does not lie properly in a separate meaning but in the commingling of all of them. Properly speaking, it is impossible to fully enunciate in a rational work the exact signification of the ambiguous, for in such a work the various meanings are analyzed and put side by side. In analysis, however, the proper reality of the ambiguous gets lost, for it consists in the unity of all the meanings.

Do we not understand the ambiguous in its totality? We do indeed. Experience has taught us that we have a "comprehension" of the ambiguous; we realize the ambiguity of humor, of a witty remark, and of an evasive answer. In a rational exposition, however, their proper sense is lost.¹² The exposition occasions the comprehension but never causes it. There is only question of a seeing-at-once.

Ambiguity, therefore, shows the following features. (a) In one phenomenon several meanings are applicable simultaneously. (b) Each meaning is coherent with the others; therefore, none of them is applicable absolutely. (c) Properly speaking, the ambiguous can only be attained in an understanding-at-once. In phenomenology, we speak of "phenomenological comprehension," which refers to a mutual implication of meanings. (d) The exposition is of an inadequate nature. It depends on "phenomenological comprehension" and can, in turn, only be its occasion, never its cause. Ambiguity, therefore, is closely bound up with dialectical unity, with the unity of mutual implication, which was found by Merleau-Ponty when he made a thorough analysis of the *Gestalt*. It constitutes the central viewpoint of his philosophy.

¹¹Jean Wahl defines ambiguity as follows: "La condition humaine est telle que les mêmes phénomènes peuvent être envisagés dans des contextes différents" (*Les philosophies de l'existence* [Paris: Collin, 1954], p. 130).

¹²Furthermore Jean Wahl remarks that in the sphere of ambiguity existential thinking is difficult. "Sans doute, en allant de l'idée de paradoxe à l'idée d'ambiguité, la pensée existentielle perd une partie de son acuité;

mais d'autre part, elle gagne peut-être en ampleur" (*ibid.*).

¹³H. Robbers, "Is History Found in Infra-human Reality?" ("Heeft het infrahumane geschiedenis?"), *Tijdschrift voor philosophie*, XVI (No. 1, 1954), 39-40.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 39-40.

¹⁶"The fact essentially implies a relation to a finite human notion and this human notion itself also is a fact" (*ibid.*, 42).

II. WHAT IS A FACT?

The word "fact" has a special meaning. Granted this, we have two possibilities: either we have in view a special part of reality, or we approach reality with a special attitude.

Is it true that we have in mind a special part of reality when speaking of facts? Robbers is of the opinion that this is the case.¹³ According to him, facts are only found in the field of contingent reality and historical happenings, for the fact is nascent and comes into existence.¹⁴ Therefore, neither the existence of God nor the creation of the world can be considered as a fact, since they are the foundation of all facts.¹⁵ We think, however, that Robbers intends to speak about the historical fact, which can be gathered from the very heading of his article ("Is History Found in Infra-human Reality?"), and from the article's identifying *fact* and *event*, an identification which undoubtedly holds good for historical fact but not for fact in its broadest meaning.

We are of the opinion that without any objection we may say, "The existence of God is an incontestable fact" or "It is a fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees." Eternal and immutable reality, too, can be looked upon as a fact. We can establish facts with regard to everything that exists—about the visible world, the world of dreams and imagination, the reign of eternal truth; in short, about everything.

In case we do not use the word "fact" to indicate a special part of reality but do want to express a special meaning, the second possibility mentioned above has to be chosen; that is, we express reality as it is approached by us with a special attitude. Or, to speak in phenomenological terms, the fact is to be considered as the correlate of a special human attitude. Do not think that herewith we enter the idealistic sphere of thinking. Man is an intentional being; he really enters a real world. Our human existence is a dialogue of question and answer with the world. The world replies to our questions in a way that is consistent with our attitude toward the world; the intentional correlate lies in the world and not in the sphere of our immanent life. It lies in the world with which we are confronted.¹⁶

Therefore, if we want to explore the meaning of the word "fact," we will have to analyze the attitude in correlation with which a thing

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, O.S.A.

presents itself as a fact. It will be impossible, however, to analyze this attitude without taking into consideration its intentional correlate. Both of them constitute a dialectical unity and can only be understood in relation to each other.

Robbers points out that the fact "rises," "stands out" against an undetermined background.¹⁷ Although he speaks about the historical fact, the same can be said of the fact in general, provided these terms are interpreted in the gnoseological and not in the realistic sense of the word. The fact catches the eye. The fact is a lightening point in a field, which is only present in an undetermined way. If we approach a thing in order to establish facts, we take it in its concrete presence—either in the real world, the world of imagination, the world of faith, or wherever it may be. As long as we analyze an abstract meaning, we do not establish facts. A fact is a concrete presence.

This last sentence, however, is not convertible. It is possible to experience things as being present without viewing them as facts. When admiring the beauty of a thing, when being engaged in a conversation, when being in love with a person, we indeed experience a presence, but we do not establish facts. If we want to establish facts, we enter into contact with concrete things, without living together with them. The establishing of facts implies to a certain extent a setting apart. It is not the same thing to feel annoyed and to establish this annoyance as a fact. In this connection we refer to the findings of Heidegger regarding the *Als-Struktur*.¹⁸ We always approach things in a certain attitude. We are not in the first place a "surveying eye." The human eye is situated in the world. Things exist for us in an *Als-Struktur*. Heidegger distinguishes between the "existential-hermeneutical as" and the "apophantical as";¹⁹ the former indicates the way in which things exist for us when we are living together with them; the latter indicates them as the object of a proposition. Heidegger points out that he indicates the two extremities, between which, of course, a transition is possible. The observation, which at the same time is a setting apart, tends towards an enunciation but does not necessarily come so far. As long as we live together with things ("existential-hermeneutical as"), we do not establish facts. Something will become a fact when we abstract the "as-moment" (this is

¹⁷Ibid., 40, 43.

¹⁸Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*

(Tübingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949), p. 149.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 158.

always a meaning) from the concrete thing in such a way that we see it as an aspect of the real thing. This process culminates in the singular judgment. If we pronounce such a judgment, we abstract a meaning from the concrete thing and attach it again. Something is considered as a fact in the full sense of the word when we seize it as an "apophantical as." Therefore, two elements are essential: abstraction and conjunction. The fact supposes both our analyzing and our synthesizing attitude. It is obvious that the meaning exists for us before it is made the predicate of a judgment and therefore before it formally is a fact. It exists in our experience, but this experience is not yet the establishing of facts.

The establishing of facts is always realized according to the following scheme. It is a fact that a concrete thing exists or that it exists in this way or another. In both cases a meaning (either the existence or a manner of existence) is taken from the concrete thing and attributed to it. With this scheme as a basis, we arrive at the important conclusion that it is impossible to establish facts without having notions. The "as-element" of concrete experience is taken from the concrete thing. What does this mean but an elementary abstraction, the establishing of notions? Here we agree with Bevan's way of thinking: it is impossible to establish facts without establishing notions. Both things go hand in hand without one being prior to the other. We cannot possibly put aside all notions and purely accept facts, as some scientists want to do. The establishing of facts implies the establishing of notions. If our notions are poor, our knowledge of facts is poor too. If our notions are defective, this will have its repercussion in our establishing of facts, as becomes evident in the reading of Merleau-Ponty's works. Merleau-Ponty has not organized new psychological experiments personally. He takes other people's experiments as a basis for discovering new facts which had remained concealed from other psychologists. How is this possible? Because Merleau-Ponty approaches the same experiments with new, richer concepts. This enables him to put new questions; therefore the old experiment gives him a new answer.

It would be wrong to think that by attaching a function to the concept when we establish facts we want to reduce the latter to a mere speculation. On the contrary, if we establish facts, we approach con-

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, o.s.a.

crete things, but in conceptions. The establishing of facts is the meeting point of abstraction and contact with concrete things, of conception and reality. If we are working with notions, there are two alternatives: either we see the notion as a qualification of a thing, in which case we establish a fact; or we analyze the notion itself, in which case we enter the field of abstract speculation.

Does the same apply if we establish the simple fact of a thing's existence? If, for example, we say that Peter is there or that God exists? Yes. There is a difference, too, between being aware of a person's presence and establishing this presence as a fact. The latter implies a notion of existence, as becomes evident if we remember that a realist and an idealist differ in their opinion about the value of existence. This difference is closely bound up with the difference of their notion of existence.

It is deceiving, therefore, to eliminate the question of the value of our notions by making an appeal to the facts, the value of our establishing facts being indissolubly linked with the value of our notions. We can dismiss the problem of the value of our notions, but in doing so we leave obscure the value of our establishing of facts. It would be interesting to examine how the relative value of the old-time psychological schools corresponds to the inadequate character of their notions. We sometimes wonder how they could be blind to certain facts. It was quite impossible for them, however, to establish certain facts because their conceptions were insufficient. The fact that psychologists became receptive to new facts is connected with an enrichment of their conceptions. We cannot say that the one thing occasions the other; both go hand in hand and constitute a dialectical unity, a unity of mutual implication. We approach here two aspects of one and the same phenomenon.

The above clearly shows once again the correspondence between philosophy and psychology, or between philosophy and science. Philosophy looks to our conceptions in order to determine their value. Philosophy, consequently, determines the value of our establishing facts.

III. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE FACT

The above analysis of the fact is far from complete and leaves untouched many questions, which exceed the scope of an article. It will do, however, to establish that in many respects the fact is ambiguous. In the first place, each establishing of a fact is both absolute and

relative, and these two imply each other. We saw already that when establishing a fact we note that something exists or that it exists in this way or that. We can easily reduce these two to one. If we note that something exists in this way, we have indeed in view a way of being, but we approach it in its concrete presence. Each establishing of a fact, therefore, has in view something present, either a presence as such (the existence) or a qualified presence. In this respect the fact is absolute. In case we establish a fact, we note a presence, which holds good for everybody and which calls for everybody's admission. This holds not only for a presence in the real world but also for a presence in the world of imagination. If I tell somebody that I see a head in the flames, I ask him to recognize this "being-so" in my imaginary world. Each establishing of a fact has an absolute meaning, within the sphere of existence of the fact. As long as this absolute meaning is nonexistent, there is no question of facts.

On the other hand, however, when establishing facts, we make use of notions. These notions are necessarily human ones; they are even *my* notions. I cannot abandon my notions in order to compare them with the things noted.

Here we are confronted with a first ambiguity of the fact. Each establishing of a fact has an absolute meaning because I note a presence. At the same time, however, each establishing of a fact is relative inasmuch as I view this presence in human notions, in my own notions. Each establishing of a fact has a universal meaning, since it is a grip on a *real presence*; and still it is particular, because I seize it in my notions. There is an absolute intention in relative notions. If, for example, we should think away one of these two moments, we think away the fact itself; if we think away one of the two moments, we violate the other. When conceiving a fact, we have a grip on a *presence*; if we deny it, we deny the proper intention of our conception. If, on the other hand, we overlook our *conception*, we deny the medium, our grip, by which we realize the intention. Both the absolute moment and the relative moment are undeniable, but nevertheless they permeate and make each other indeterminate. We can understand the absolute character of the fact only in the light of the relative conception, and vice versa. The absolute and the relative character, the universal and the particular character, the everlasting

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, o.s.A.

value of facts and the historical value of our notions permeate each other. We find here ambiguity in the fullest sense of the word. It would be very useful to examine how this ambiguity plays an important part in the various theories about scientific knowledge. Here the absolute moment, there the moment of relativity is emphasized too much. We must recognize both moments, however, in their mutual relationship and interdetermination. It is very dangerous to describe one of the two moments without taking into account the other one, for in that case we can no longer understand it in its proper character.

It is the business of existential phenomenology to throw a strong light upon the moment of relativity, but this involves a great danger. According to Merleau-Ponty, metaphysics dies if it is brought into contact with the absolute being.²⁰ Indeed, metaphysics, any human science, would be unimaginable if, to speak in Merleau-Ponty's terms, we should not be at a distance from their objects, if we should not approach them by means of relative notions, by means of our creative word (*parole parlante*). On the other hand, however, our notions are meaningless unless they are notions of something; the creative word should have an object. We could equally well say, therefore, that our notions, our words, shrivel up if we deny the absolute character of our establishing facts. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, the philosophy of ambiguity, recognizes insufficiently this fundamental ambiguity.

This interpenetration of the absolute and the relative character of our knowledge is felt by everybody in his conversation with other people. If the absolute moment should be nonexistent, we would not communicate our views to other people; if our knowledge should not be relative, we would not be interested in their opinion. Only those who experience both moments in a well-balanced way can be good conversation partners. A phenomenology of human conversation should not lose sight of these points of view.

There is still another ambiguous character which is inherent in the fact, more particularly in the psychical fact. We saw already that only if we retire from coexistence with things can we establish facts. For this reason, facts are nonexistent for animals, which, so to speak, cling to things without any distance. It goes without saying that the way in which we coexist with things implies already the possibility of withdrawing. Therefore our attitude towards things differs from the

²⁰Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sens et non-sens* (Paris : Nagel, 1948), p. 191.

way in which animals stand towards them. It is not our intention, though, to go further into these problems. In any case, our establishing of facts supposes our coexistence with things. Therefore the world of facts is not our most original world but is an expression of it, and each expression necessarily is of a partial nature. If we establish a fact, we abstract a meaning from a totality. It goes without saying that the meaning can only be understood in the light of this totality. The meaning of one and the same fact is dependent on this context. Two boys feel annoyed during a lesson: the one, because his intelligence is insufficient to get through the subject being taught; the other, because the pace at which the lesson is given does not match his intelligence. One single fact is insignificant. It has to be seen in the light of other facts and finally in the light of the totality of meaning expressed in the different facts. Therefore the meaning of a fact is not fully independent. The facts mutually determine one another and can only be understood in their interdependency. Here we are confronted with a new ambiguity. The facts which apply to one and the same totality do not have an independent meaning. Each new fact which is established alters the meaning of the facts which were already known. The proper truth of the facts lies in the commingling of all of them.

We noted already that the world of facts is not our most original world. We approach a thing, a person, as a totality of meaning prior to expressing this totality in a multitude of facts. Could we not retire, therefore, to the original totality in order to judge the facts from that angle? Not at all. Neither here nor elsewhere is expression merely a disclosure of things which were already existent to us. In the expression something comes into existence in a new way. The expression originates a new form of truth. The light of original experience and its expression are not equivalent, and therefore we cannot abandon all facts and retire to the original totality of meaning because the latter only becomes clear in the establishing of facts. On the one hand we cannot overloop the expression; on the other hand, however, the expression should not be looked upon as the most original source of light. We solve this problem by looking upon the fact as just a partial expression of a preceding meaning-totality. This implies, however, a recognition of the ambiguity of the fact and involves our

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, o.s.A.

recognizing the interdetermination of the different facts and our accepting the coherence of all of them. We have to admit that the sense of an "established" fact can undergo a change by facts still to be discovered. So we hardly can call a fact definitely established.

There is still another ambiguity, which more in particular refers to the psychical fact. We saw already that when establishing a fact we have in mind a real presence, but what is the meaning of "presence" in the field of the human psyche? One of the basic principles of Sartre is that man never is what he is and that he is what he is not. For man is at a distance from himself. He is always ahead of himself. Merleau-Ponty is of the same opinion when he characterizes man as always transcending himself (*mouvement de transcendance*). We think this is not entirely true. Indeed, our life is always a being-on-the-way to meaning, but isn't it also a being-in-meaning? In our moving towards a future we exist, and in our existing we move towards a future. In any case, it is evident that in the field of the human psyche "presence" is ambiguous, and this ambiguity penetrates into any psychical fact.

We have established that the fact is ambiguous in a triple way. It would be possible to indicate additional forms of ambiguity, but the foregoing clearly shows that the fact is ambiguous.

CONCLUSION

It will be clear from the above that scientism—that is, the implicit philosophy which, during a certain period, dominated the way of thinking of scientists and which is still existent in some quarters—is untenable. Scientism looks upon the fact as the most original datum and the only sufficient basis for science. According to scientism, philosophic speculation is made superfluous by an appeal to the facts. Scientism explicitly rejects all forms of philosophical thinking, but in spite of this it is a philosophy in itself; namely, a very simplistic philosophy about the fact and about our knowledge thereof. After closer reflection upon the fact, it has become evident to us that the establishing of facts implies the use of notions and that the world of facts supposes a more original world; namely, the world of concrete experience. As a consequence thereof we must admit that metaphysics and phenomenology have indeed reason to exist, and even more than

that. The sense of our knowledge of facts is demonstrated only in a metaphysical and phenomenological reflection.

Metaphysical reflection contributes to our penetrating into the meaning of the fact. We saw that each establishing of a fact views a presence, either the mere existence or a qualified presence. The absolute value of the fact is closely bound up with this. Metaphysics is a reflection upon the presence and our knowledge of it. It is up to metaphysics, therefore, to unfold the deepest value of our knowledge of facts. This is shown in Bevan's essay mentioned earlier in this article. He looks upon our notions as purely pragmatic work schedules. This is a philosophical view, not a scientific one. Both the recognition of metaphysics and the negation of it represent a metaphysical judgment. Consequently, psychology and science in general are really underestimated by Bevan because, according to him, they do not indicate the way to penetrate into the very nature of reality but only constitute a means to predict what will happen. It is necessary, therefore, to reflect upon the value of our notions in order to discover the real value of science. It goes without saying that we can leave these questions unanswered, but in that case we leave out of consideration the value of science.

Is it true that philosophical reflection upon the nature, the function, the value of our notions is of any importance for the intrinsic development of science? One might think that philosophical reflection is necessary to judge the over-all value of the sciences but does not contribute to their intrinsic development. It is doubtful, however, whether this opinion is right. We saw that the enrichment of our world of notions makes us receptive to facts. If the establishing of facts depends on our notions, the enrichment of notional knowledge and the greater openness for facts will go hand in hand. In our opinion Bevan has clearly proved this. It is obvious, therefore, that philosophical reflection upon the notions of a science is important for its intrinsic development.

We think we may conclude from the above that, for the development of science, phenomenology is of prime importance and that we cannot reject it by making an appeal on the facts. The world of facts is an expression of the world in which we exist. Phenomenology is aware of this and wants to see the facts in the light of the original meaning-

The Ambiguity of the Fact
Remy C. Kwant, o.s.A.

totality. This is not only useful but absolutely necessary, in particular in psychology. It is of great and decisive value to see facts as an expression of an original world, even if this world only becomes clear to us in the expression, even if we cannot neglect each form of expression and withdraw to the original world. Phenomenology made us more conscious of the ambiguous character of the fact.

THE PLOTINIAN *LOGOS* DOCTRINE

MR. DONALD GELPI, S.J., received his M.A.
from Saint Louis University
and is now teaching at Jesuit High School (New Orleans).
He has previously written for THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

Let us, then, explain once again what logos is and why it is reasonable for it to be such. This, then, is logos—the attempt should be made, if perhaps we might hit on it . . .—ENNEADS, III, 2, 16, 10-13.

The philosophical problem of the *logos* as a cosmological force in Plotinus is enough to discourage even a scholar of robust constitution. To begin with, treatments of the problem are limited to a few magazine and journal articles and chance references in studies of other related problems in philosophy. These meager secondary sources seem to be incapable of deciding upon a consistent definition of *logos* as a cosmological principle.¹ Moreover, the texts of Plotinus only increase the confusion. Apparently Plotinus himself had difficulty in explaining the meaning of his *logos* doctrine to his own disciples, with whom he had personal contact.² That this is so is not surprising, for as one proceeds through the pertinent texts, the word *logos* shifts meanings with the dexterity of a Proteus. Even when the word is used in the sense of a cosmological *logos*, one finds to one's dismay that there is not one *logos* only but a multiplicity of *logoi* of different sorts. One meets with a universal *logos*,³ particular *logoi*,⁴ seminal *logoi*,⁵ and *logoi synthetoi*.⁶

Any intelligent approach to the problem of *logos* as a cosmological principle in Plotinus must determine with accuracy the nature and function of these various *logoi* as well as their relation to the hypostases of the Plotinian universe. This is the double problem which we propose to solve in this article. As we proceed, the reader will, I believe, become more and more aware of the fact that the doctrine of *logos* is key in understanding Plotinus's universe and in coming to grips with the central problems of his metaphysic.

When one steps from a Christian world into the emanationist universe of Plotinus, one experiences the same bewilderment that Alice felt when she stepped through the looking glass.

The first principle of the Plotinian universe, the One, unlike the Christian God, possesses a chilly transcendence and shares no perfections in common with the universe which flows from it.⁷ The *Nous*,

¹W. R. Inge's definition suffers from a certain imprecision. He defines the cosmological *logos* as "that which, proceeding from Spirit, either directly or through the medium of the World Soul, and identical in its nature with Soul, conveys the energy of Spirit and Soul into Matter" (*The Philosophy of Plotinus* [2 vols. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929], I, 125). This definition states inaccurately the relation of *logos* and the World Soul and is inapplicable to *logos* as found in *Nous*; cf. *Enn.*, V, 9, 3. On the other hand, H. Leisgang regards the *logos* as the binding force between the One, the *Nous*, and Soul; cf. "Logos," *Real-Encyclopädie*, ed. A. F. von Pauly, Vol. XIII (1927), cols. 1059-61. M. Heinze looks upon the *logos* as the source of universal harmony; cf. *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie* (Oldenburg: F. Schmidt, 1872), pp. 326-27. He regards the Plotinian *logos* doctrine, however, as a mere repetition of earlier Stoic teachings (*ibid.*, p. 329). This conciliatory function of the *logos* is also noted by B. A. G. Fuller; cf. *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1912), p. 210. J. Guittot presents a definition which is accurate as far as it goes but limited in its viewpoint and incomplete: "Dans l'univers de Plotin le *logos* va prendre encore une signification nouvelle: il illustre surtout, croyons-nous, la loi qui oblige tout à être passé de l'éternel au temps à s'invertir" (*Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin* [Paris: Boivin & Co., 1933], p. 47). R. E. Witt defines *logos* thus: "Logos for Plotinus is a spiritual activity due both as created and as creator to the desire for contemplation" ("The Plotinian Logos and

Its Stoic Basis," *Classical Quarterly*, XXV [1931], 103). This definition apart from the unfortunate words "created" and "creator" misreads the Greek word *energeia* to mean "activity"; see *infra*, n. 57. P. V. Pistorius, in spite of *Enn.*, II, 3, 17, defines *logos* as an "immanent concept"; cf. *Plotinus and Neo-Platonism* (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952), pp. 70-71. A. H. Armstrong suggests that *logos* is a "formative force proceeding from a higher principle which expresses and represents that principle on a lower plane of being" (*Plotinus* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1953], p. 35). These definitions are all either too limited in their point of view and hence distort the true meaning of *logos*, or they incorrectly assume that when Plotinus uses the words "*logos* of matter" and "*logos* of the One or of *Nous*" he uses the word *logos* univocally. Another tendency of these writers is to extend the term "seminal *logos*" beyond its natural bounds.

²Cf. *Enn.*, III, 2, 16, 10-13.

³Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 1, 1-4.

⁴*Ibid.*, 4-8.

⁵Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 1, 8-14.

⁶Cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 5-9.

⁷Cf. *ibid.*, V, 2, 1, 1-11.

⁸Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 12.

⁹Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 12, 1-8; IV, 3, 18.

¹⁰Cf. *ibid.*, II, 9, 7; 2, 3, 1-6; IV, 3, 9.

¹¹Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 2, 22.

¹²Cf. *ibid.*, III, 9, 3; VI, 4, 16.

¹³Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 5; I, 8, 7 and 14.

¹⁴Cf. *ibid.*, III, 3, 18; 4, 2.

¹⁵Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 15, 20-22; IV, 7, 3, 26-32; III, 1, 3, 1-6.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, VI, 4, 11, 15-17.

¹⁷Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 35, 8-14.

the second hypostasis of Plotinus, is the eternal exemplar of a fluctuating, temporal world of sensation.⁸ The third and most complex hypostasis, the Soul, possesses three "levels."

At its highest "level," Soul remains in the *Nous* and shares in the higher unity of the *Nous*.⁹ Its second "level," the World-Soul, contains, governs, as well as transcends, the sensible universe. As the life principle of the sense world, the World-Soul contains all the perfections of the sensible universe and draws them into a single vital unity.¹⁰ The third "level" of Soul, particular Soul, participates in the divine Soul in the *Nous*¹¹ but is the most scattered manifestation of Soul. It is Soul dividing itself in order to impart itself to the images of particular sensible things.¹² At their lowest levels of sensation and vegetation, particular Souls become enmeshed in and corrupted by matter. Matter terminates the Plotinian emanation and vitiates any form which attempts to fill its emptiness.¹³ The sensible universe results from the mixture of Soul and matter.¹⁴

Within this world of waning perfection, the universal *logos* has a specific function to perform.

THE UNIVERSAL LOGOS

Because it is a principle of extreme diversity, the universal *logos* is a principle of the sensible universe and is bound to the lower realms of being.¹⁵ The job which the universal *logos* must perform within this universe of diverse sensible perfections is extremely complex. In the earliest texts, we find the universal *logos* conceived as a principle of unification and reconciliation of the multiplicity of perfection found in the sensible universe. This notion is never retracted by Plotinus. "The diversity [of the universe] is indeed simple, and everything is one, for there is a *logos* which is both one and many, and everything that exists is one."¹⁶ This task of reconciliation and unification the universal *logos* accomplishes by subsuming the diversity and multiplicity of the sense world into a single universal life process. Hence, as a result of the activity of the universal *logos*, the sensible universe is in fact a single living being.¹⁷

More concretely, the task of the universal *logos* involves the following points. The unifying activity of the universal *logos* establishes a

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

hierarchy among the beings of the universe by organizing particular Souls according to a predetermined pattern and by directing the generation and corruption of particular beings within the sensible universe through the timely insertion and withdrawal of particular Souls within the sense order.¹⁸

In addition, the universal *logos* assumes under its jurisdiction whatever in the sense universe could not be ascribed to the activity of particular and seminal *logoi*.

¹⁸Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 8, 16-22; also *ibid.*, 10, 38-42. Here Plotinus speaks of the World-Soul as supplying the *logos* of life to material things, which in turn supplies them with the forms whose *logoi* it has. See also *ibid.*, 12, 12-19; V, 7, 3, 14-19.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, IV, 4, 39, 1-13.

²⁰Cf. *ibid.*, III, 1, 8, 1-7.

²¹Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

²²Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 9, 3, 17-18.

²³In the text quoted, Plotinus in fact cites three sources of frustration of the activity of the seminal *logoi*: (1) "things" which take place in opposition to the seminal *logoi*; (2) "things" which proceed from matter; and (3) the actions and passions of the universe.

Opposition to the seminal logoi: In *Nous*, the perfections of the universe are contained in a primal unity. Hence, in *Nous* there is no possibility of the opposition of one perfection to another. Opposition is therefore restricted to the lower levels of being, where perfections are scattered and multiplied. This scattering of the perfections of *Nous* is in some sense the work of the universal *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-57; VI, 7, 15, 20-22; VI, 7, 12; III, 2, 16, 41-47.

"Things" which proceed from matter: *Logos* produces the physical body by its approach to matter; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25. Of itself matter is formless and indeterminate; cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 4, 17-20. *Logos*, then, is related to matter as a formative and illuminative principle; *logos*, however, is dimmed by an admixture with the darkness of matter; cf. *ibid.*, 5, 6-12. Although matter is intractable to their formative influence, matter is the true receptacle of form

and of *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, I, 6, 2, 13-28. The result of this recalcitrance on the part of matter to the influence of *logos* is the presence of privation in the subject and of that which is contrary to nature; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

Action and passion: Action and passion are either natural or artificial; natural action implies the action of the whole upon the part or of the part upon the part. Artificial action and passion result in the production of some artefact, as, for instance, when an artist acts upon the bronze to produce a statue. Natural action and passion take place within the normal processes of nature and involve the passage of influence from the universal life principle to some part of the universe; for example, the universe acting upon its parts to dispose them according to the universal order. Action and passion between particular things, says Plotinus, are a matter of our daily experience; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 3, 1-15.

Action and passion especially in this last sense demand some higher ordering principle; for even when indulging in their own proper activities, the individual things in the universe of our experience frequently frustrate the natural drive of the *logoi* within them from attaining the object of those *logoi*; cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 5, 9-15; IV, 4, 33, 1-11. Since, however, a principle of growth cannot contain within itself the explanation of the frustration of its own proper activity, this frustration must be accounted for at a higher level of activity than that of the particular *logoi*; hence, both the particular *logoi* together with their activities and their privations must be reduced to some universal and overriding *logos*.

Events in the universe do not take place according to seminal *logoi*, but according to *logoi* which are more comprehensive and which belong to things which are prior to what is proper to the *logoi* of the seeds; for in the seminal *logoi* there is nothing of those things which take place in opposition to the seminal *logoi* themselves nor of those things which proceed from matter which work together for the good of the whole nor of those things which are done to one another by the things which come to be. But the *logos* of the universe is more like a reason [*logos*] which puts order and law into a city, because it knows what the citizens will do and why they do it and so makes laws for all these exigencies and weaves together in its laws all their passions and deeds including what is honorable in those deeds as well as what is dishonorable, with everything by a kind of automatic process proceeding to a harmony.¹⁹

The particular beings of the sensible universe take their origin in seeds.²⁰ Each seed, however, contains *logoi* within it which are of their nature disposed to bring the seed to full and mature growth.²¹ Thus, in every seed, there is a complex of powers gathered into a unity.²²

These powers, however, are not unlimited in their efficacy. Often enough in guiding the progress of the seed, the *logos* will encounter an opposing force which it is too weak to overcome. The result is the mutilation of the perfection which the *logos* was seeking to produce. This thwarting of the activity of the seminal *logos* results in phenomena such as lameness.²³

From this it is clear to Plotinus that if the universe is not to be reduced to a primal chaos, there must be an overriding *logos* whose function is the reconciliation of the frustrations of these seminal *logoi* into some sort of predetermined order and pattern.

The example of a lawmaker which Plotinus employs here is enlightening, for it reveals the function of the universal *logos* as being essentially one of compromise. The good lawmaker does not govern his city in the abstract, says Plotinus, but seeks rather to achieve a proper balance and proportion between the bad and good elements of the commonwealth in order to achieve the ultimate good of the city

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

as a whole. So too the universal *logos*, by embracing in itself both subsidiary *logoi* and those evils which fall outside the jurisdiction of these subsidiary *logoi*, achieves from out of this general mélange a balanced proportion of the elements that work ultimately for the good of the universe.

The transferal of the activity of the particular *logoi* "to another sequence and to another order,"²⁴ that of the universal *logos*, in no way impairs the autonomous activity of these lesser *logoi*. Plotinus does not wish to say that the universal *logos* by its own power produces the effects which we ascribe to particular *logoi*. Such a doctrine would, in effect, deny the necessity of the existence of particular *logoi*.

Nevertheless, if both particular *logoi* and the universal *logos* are simultaneously active in the generation and corruption of everything in the sensible universe, some method must be discovered to ensure the autonomous activity of each of these *logoi*. Plotinus gives his solution to this problem in a passage of the sixth *Ennead*.²⁵

In this text, the problem of protecting the autonomy of both the universal *logos* and the particular *logoi* is solved by carefully circumscribing the activity of these different *logoi* within the sense world. The activity of the universal *logos* is limited to providing an incomplete schematization to matter which must be filled in ultimately by the proper activity of the particular *logoi*. Hence, the universal *logos* cannot be correctly said to bring sensible things into being. This, strictly speaking, is the function of the particular *logoi*. Rather, the universal *logos* embraces all things and is present to them without directly causing them.²⁶

The ultimate noetic basis for positing the existence of a universal

²⁴Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 5, 9-15.

²⁵*Ibid.*, VI, 7, 7, 8-16; particular *logoi* are significantly referred to in this text as "psychic powers" and "particular Souls." See also *ibid.*, III, 2, 17, 1-41; 54-67; 74-83.

²⁶Cf. *ibid.*, III, 3, 1, 1-4; 5, 46-54.

²⁷The "someone" is Epicurus. See *Plotini Enneades (I-III)*, ed. Henry and Schwyzer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951), I, 274.

²⁸*Enn.*, III, 2, 4, 26-33.

²⁹Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-57.

³⁰Noncausal in the sense that the universal *logos* in no way compromises the autonomy of the particular *logoi*,

even though the particular *logoi* flow from the universal *logos* and are part of it; cf. *ibid.*, 41-57.

³¹"And the powers of the seeds furnish us with a comparison of what we are talking about: for in the whole seed everything is present in a state of indivision, and the *logoi* are, so to speak, at a single center; and there is a *logos* for the eye, and one for the hands, each of the *logoi* being recognized as distinct through the sensible part which comes to be because of it. Now, each of the powers in the seeds is a single, complete *logos* together with the parts of the sensible being which are contained in

logos is the Plotinian axiom of the priority of order over disorder and of intelligibility over unintelligibility.

Order does not exist by reason of disorder, nor does regularity exist by reason of irregularity, as someone^[27] has thought. This would result in higher things coming to be by reason of lower things and in higher things coming to be in such a way as to be seen. Rather order comes to be through the introduction of order; because there is order, because there is regularity and *logos*, disorder exists; because there is *logos* there is irregularity and unintelligibility, not that the nobler things have caused the deficiencies of those less noble; but rather those things which aspire to receive higher perfections are impotent to receive them either by their nature or by reason of circumstance or because of the hindrance of others.²⁸

Thus, the primacy of perfection over imperfection necessarily demands the corresponding primacy of order and *logos* over disorder.

Because the universal *logos* is the *logos* of the entire universe it is a step closer to the primal unity from which all multiplicity flows than are the particular *logoi*. By containing them within itself, the universal *logos* subsumes them into its higher unity. But its link with multiplicity remains strong—so strong, in fact, that the universal *logos* is a perfect *logos* when it pushes multiplicity to such an extreme that contradictory beings result from it. In this sense, the universal *logos* is the origin of strife and conflict within the universe; but by containing within its higher unity the conflict of opposites it is able to reconcile this conflict into a harmony.²⁹

The function of the universal *logos*, then, may be summarized as this: to blend by a non-causal³⁰ presence the diverse and conflicting elements of the sensible universe into the harmonious life-process of the unique animal which is the universe.

PARTICULAR LOGOI : SEMINAL LOGOI

The seminal *logoi* are powers of that part of Soul which are operative in the seed of a corporeal being and which guide that being in its proper development. As such, they are formative³¹ (*eidos*) with regard

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

to what is corporeal and must mediate form from the intellectual realm to the realm of sense.³² Present in the seed before development, they contain in a state of indivision those perfections, like eyes or hands, which will later separate into the various parts of the body. The

the *logos*. The *logos* has something corporeal as its matter—for example, that which is liquid—but it itself is altogether form (*eidos*), the *logos* being proper to the sort of Soul which is generative; and that Soul is itself an image of another more powerful Soul. Some call this Soul in the seeds nature, which arises from above, from forces anterior to it, like light from a fire, and has changed and informed matter, without being compelled mechanically nor by employing the famous levers but by imparting *logoi*" (*ibid.*, V, 9, 6, 10-24).

One should be wary of taking *eidos* in too literal a sense, since neither *eidos* nor *hyle* are being used here in a strictly literal sense but only to establish a proper dichotomy between that which is formed and that which is formative. The diversification of sensible perfections caused by the *logoi* is also due in part to matter. The "more powerful Soul" of which particular Souls are "images" is, of course, the universal Soul from which particular Souls proceed; cf. *ibid.*, II, 9, 7.

³²Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 10, 1-6.

³³For parallel references to the seminal *logoi*, see *ibid.*, IV, 9, 3, 17-18; II, 6, 1, 7-12; IV, 3, 10, 10-13; III, 7, 11, 20-35.

³⁴*Ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 5-9.

³⁵The term "nature" is applied to the seminal *logoi* in their formation of a portion of a corporeal being; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 6, 10-24. The term, however, is also broadened in other texts to include the World-Soul; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 11.

³⁶In the passage immediately preceding this text Plotinus had been discussing our attitude toward the indetermination we find in things. Indetermination, he says, is not to be held in low esteem if it is such as we find in the Soul; for Soul is conceptually indeterminate with regard to its prior hypostasis. Soul, however, presents itself willingly as an apt receptacle of

the determination of *Nous*; cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 3, 1-5. For Soul proceeds from *Nous* in a state of indetermination and becomes determined and full only by looking back upon *Nous* and contemplating it; cf. *ibid.*, V, 2, 1. We are able, then, to distinguish conceptually something in Soul which corresponds to matter and to form; cf. *ibid.*, 9, 3, 11-37; II, 9, 5. Soul is an intelligible composite. Since, however, the composite elements of Soul are only conceptually separable, Soul is less composite than the composites in the sensible order. In the text we are discussing, Plotinus introduces the composite *logoi* as a contrast to the intelligible composites like Soul; for the composite *logoi* make nature to be something actually composite, inasmuch as bodies result from the entrance of a *logos* into matter, although the *logos* which enters matter is itself distinct from matter; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25; V, 9, 3, 1-6. For an excellent and most scholarly treatment of this and related problems in Plotinian metaphysics, see Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), 531-35.

³⁷Cf. *Enn.*, III, 8, 2, 22-34.

³⁸Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25; see also *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15; III, 3, 1, 1-8.

³⁹Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17; see also *ibid.*, 2, 17-20. In commenting on this tractate, Brehier correctly remarks that Plotinus wishes to point out in his argument that the Stoic difficulties with his doctrine of individuality come from a misunderstanding of the nature of *logos*. The *logos* which produces one individual does not exclude from the particular Soul all the other *logoi* which are present in every other individual. It merely predominates over those other *logoi*. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, ed. and trans. E. Brehier (7 vols. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1938), V, 121. See also *Enn.*, VI, 7, 6, 21-23; VI, 7, 7, 1-31; V, 7, 3, 14-19.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, III, 8, 2, 23-24.

powers (*logoi*) are themselves all concentrated, as it were, at a single central point within the seed, from which point the diverse perfections which they produce will proceed.³³

PARTICULAR LOGOI : *LOGOI SYNTHETOI*

There is only one clear reference to *logos synthetos* in the *Enneads*.

Among the intelligibles, composites are different and not like corporeals, since there are *logoi* which are composite (*synthetoi*) and these make nature, which is striving toward form, to be actually composite.³⁴

In this text, since the *logoi* of the sense world of becoming are referred to in the plural, they are certainly particular *logoi*, not the universal *logos* considered under some special aspect. Nevertheless, a careful reading of this text will reveal that the *logos synthetos*, or composite *logos*, is assigned no special function in the production of the corporeal being. Instead, the *logos* is denominated *synthetos*, or composite, because it enters into composition with something distinct from itself—namely, matter—with the result that nature, the sense world under the vitalizing influence of Soul,³⁵ here represented as being in a constant state of becoming because it is “striving toward form,” becomes actually composite.³⁶

PARTICULAR LOGOI

In addition to seminal *logoi* and composite *logoi*, Plotinus speaks of several distinct types of particular *logoi*. There is a *logos* of life in each particular living being, which in turn gives rise to lower *logoi* whose function it is to produce a sensible form within the being.³⁷ Then there is a *logos* of corporeity, which constitutes a body as either an element or a compound.³⁸ Finally, there are individual *logoi* which correspond numerically to each particular existent which comes to be.³⁹

The *logos* of life is endowed with a twofold function. It is the vivifying principle of the particular plant or animal; it is also the source of the lower *logoi* of sensible form. These *logoi* of sensible form, because they are “inert” (that is, unproductive of a subsequent *logos*), are also “final” (that is, the last of the series of emanating *logoi*).⁴⁰

The *logos* of corporeity has as its specific function the constitution

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

of an element or of a compound.⁴¹ The *logoi* of a compound body employ the elements as their matter, inasmuch as the elements with their *logoi* cannot account for the complex organization of a compound.⁴²

The individual *logoi* are never conceived by Plotinus as producing individuality as such. Instead, the philosopher merely insists that since one and the same thing cannot possibly be reduplicated within the same world cycle, it is necessary to have a numerically and specifically different *logos* for every individual thing that comes to be. To speak, then, of individual *logoi* tells one much about the numerical correspondence of a given *logos* with a given sensible effect; it reveals nothing about the function of the individual *logos* within the existent. "Individual *logos*" becomes, therefore, a blanket term not unlike *logos synthetos*, inasmuch as it designates the particular *logos* by some accidental property extrinsic to its nature.⁴³

⁴¹Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 2, 21-25.

⁴²Cf. *ibid.*, 5, 1-7; V, 9, 6, 10-24.

⁴³See *supra*, n. 39.

⁴⁴There are three reasons for including the seminal *logoi* exclusively under the *logos* of corporeal compounds. (1) Whenever the seminal *logos* appears in Plotinus, it is referred to as forming a portion of a compound being. There is never a question of the seminal *logoi* constituting the elements; cf. *Enn.*, VI, 7, 14, 3-18; V, 9, 10, 1-6; 3, 9-18. (2) The seminal *logoi* are formative only after the *logoi* of the elements have been imparted to matter; cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 3, 24-30. (3) A *logos* of an element can contain no subordinate *logoi*, because an element, being simple, permits only a single *logos* for its perfect constitution; cf. *ibid.*, IV, 7, 5, 2-7.

⁴⁵Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 3, 14-19; see also *ibid.*, IV, 3, 12, 12-19; III, 6, 16, 29-30; 17, 15-26; IV, 3, 9, 48-51.

⁴⁶Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17; 2, 17-20.


⁴⁷In *ibid.*, 8, 3, 1-10, Plotinus appears to say that *logos* cannot be predicated of the *Nous* at all. The best interpretation of this difficult text is, we suggest, the following one. (1) The *logos* "in nature" referred to in the text is *logos* as found in Soul. (2) The *logos* "more beautiful than the *logos* in nature" is *logos* which is in *Nous* and identical

with the *Nous*; cf. *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15. (3) The *logos* prior to Soul, which Soul comprehends and which is "not yet innate nor in something distinct from itself, but which is in itself" and hence is "not even a *logos*, but the maker of the first *logos* of the beauty which is in besouled matter" is the One. For the One can be called *logos* only in the same equivocal sense in which it is said to be all things; namely, that it is the equivocal cause of all things. Cf. *ibid.*, V, 1, 7, 21-26; V, 6, 4, 8-15; V, 2, 1, 1-12; 9, 1-17; VI, 8, 15, 30-38. That the One can be said to be "in itself" is clear from *ibid.*, VI, 9, 3, 49-51; the phrase "in itself" merely implies transcendence. (4) The "first *logos*" produced by the One is the *Nous*, the eternal pattern of the *logoi* of Soul. (5) The pronoun *autos* in line ten of the Greek text refers, not to the One, which is the "maker" of the "first *logos*," but to the "first *logos*" itself, which is eternal *Nous*. (6) *Logos* as in the *Nous* is said to be "innate"; *logos* as in Soul is said to be "in something distinct from itself." For *logos* is innate in *Nous*, since its prior principle is not *logos* but only the equivocal cause of *logos*, whereas *logos* in the Soul is clearly in something distinct from itself; namely, in sensible matter.

Moreover, since corporeity, whether simple or composite, belongs to the realm of the sensible, one can include the *logos* of corporeity under the *logoi* of sensible form.

Hence, the particular *logoi* can be reduced to two general categories. They are either *logoi* of life or *logoi* of sensible form, for the seminal *logoi*, being powers ordered to the production of some part of the particular living thing, are clearly *logoi* of sensible form included in the *logos* of a compound as a subordinate power. Moreover, as we have seen, the *logos synthetos* is not a distinct type of *logos* at all but merely those *logoi* which are found in matter. As such, the *logos synthetos* is simply identifiable with the *logos* of corporeity and with the seminal *logoi*. Since we shall later suggest that the *logos* of life is identical with particular Soul, the following diagram will show the interrelation of the different types of particular *logoi*.

LOGOI SYNTHETOI or *LOGOI OF SENSIBLE FORM*



We have already indicated the primary function of each type of particular *logos*. In addition to these primary functions, the particular *logoi* possess many secondary ones. Since the particular *logoi* supply the sensible forms to a corporeal being, the particular *logoi* are also responsible for the evolution and growth of the living body.⁴⁵ For this reason the particular *logos* is said to determine the size and duration of each particular thing—its size by regulating its quantitative growth, its duration by guiding the course of its life through time. The one-to-one correspondence of individual *logoi* with their sensible effects together with the limited number of the *logoi* necessitates the exact cyclic repetition of events in the sensible universe.⁴⁶

LOGOS, THE NOUS, AND SOUL

It remains for us to determine the relationship of *logos* to the hypostases of the Plotinian universe.

The word *logos* can be predicated of the *Nous* in a dual sense.⁴⁷

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

First of all, the *Nous* can be said to be a *logos* inasmuch as it contains within itself at a higher level of reality archetypal *logoi* corresponding to the *logoi* which exist at the level of Soul.⁴⁸ Secondly, the *Nous* is said to be a *logos* in the sense that it is a principle of unity-diversity analogous to the *logoi* of the Soul, since the *Nous* reconciles into a unity all the different types of *logoi* just as the *logoi* themselves reconcile into a unity the diversity of sensible perfections which they later produce.⁴⁹

For Plotinus, however, the *Nous* is a *logos* merely analogous to the

⁴⁸Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 5, 21-26; II, 4, 5, 6-12; 3, 11, 8-14.

⁴⁹Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 14, 4-18.

⁵⁰Cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 5, 21-26; VI, 2, 21, 27-32.

⁵¹In *ibid.*, III, 8, 3, 1-23, Plotinus explains that *logos* is itself a contemplation as well as a product of contemplation. That this would be so seems at first a contradiction because of the incompatibility of the activity of *logos* with contemplation. The text, however, goes on to explain that the lower *logoi* are contemplations only in the sense of being products of contemplation; see also *ibid.*, II, 3, 17, 1-9; III, 8, 6, 9-27; 7, 1-22. See also Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII, 531-35.

⁵²Cf. *Enn.*, VI, 1, 10, 15-24.

⁵³The dual relationship of Soul upward to *Nous* and downward to matter is implied in *ibid.*, 9, 1-15, where *logos* is called a "causal participation in form."

⁵⁴Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 10, 38-42; 7, 2, 22-25.

⁵⁵Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 5, 28-30; V, 9, 3, 21-34.

⁵⁶The genetic Soul is that lower portion of Soul which produces the sensible universe. It includes both the universal Soul and particular Souls; cf. *ibid.*, I, 1, 8, 9-18. The *logoi* of the genetic Soul are not to be conceived as thoughts of the genetic Soul but as its powers. These powers are matter-bound, powers which manipulate matter. They are the product of the *Nous* which is in Soul (cf. *ibid.*, V, 9, 3, 21-34); but as powers active at the level of matter they are neither intellections nor contemplative visions. The higher *logoi* in the

divine Soul and in *Nous* are indirectly active in the functioning of the lower *logoi* by nourishing them and giving them the power to act; cf. *ibid.*, II, 3, 17, 1-9; 4, 5, 6-12; IV, 3, 11, 8-14; V, 9, 3, 21-24.

⁵⁷To denominate *logos* as a power (*dynamis*) of Soul seems to contradict *ibid.*, VI, 2, 5, 10-14, where *logos* is said to be an act (*energeia*) of Soul, while Soul is a power (*dynamis*) of *logos*. *Energeia* and *dynamis* appear in Plotinus in the basic sense of act and potency, act being a determination of potency, potency being a passive capacity for determination; cf. *ibid.*, II, 1, 5, 1-2. *Dynamis*, however, can also be an active, causal power. Thus, the One can be said to be the *dynamis*, causal power of all things; cf. *ibid.*, V, 3, 15, 32-35. Hence, in *ibid.*, VI, 2, 5, 10-14, the *ousia* or being of the Soul should be regarded as the active power of the *logos*; that is, the power which effectively produces the *logos*. Similarly, the *logoi* are active powers of the Soul with regard to the sensible universe. Moreover, in *ibid.*, 1, 10, 15-24, we learn that *logos* cannot be said to be an active power of Soul in the sense of an accidental quality distinct from Soul. Rather the *logoi* are *energeiai*, or acts, identical with the being of Soul itself. Hence, the *logoi* are acts of Soul in the sense that they are Soul itself as entitatively constituted to produce a particular effect in the sensible universe. See also Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII, 531-35.

⁵⁸See *supra*, n. 39.

⁵⁹Cf. *Enn.*, IV, 7, 3, 13-36.

⁶⁰Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 8, 16-22.

logoi of the Soul; for the *Nous* is a transcendent *logos* which grounds the essentially temporal and possible *logoi* of the Soul in the stability and permanence of its eternity.⁵⁰ Being the prior principle of the two, the *Nous* communicates to the Soul the *logoi* which Soul possesses, through the lesser intelligence (*nous*) which is in Soul itself. For Soul becomes filled in its being only by turning back to *Nous* and contemplating the reality in *Nous*.⁵¹

Logos as found in Soul is not something distinct from Soul; it is identical with Soul itself.⁵² Yet it is not simply Soul but Soul under a dual aspect.⁵³ First of all and essentially, *logos* is Soul as matter-bound as ordered to the production of the sensible universe.⁵⁴ Here, we may distinguish three levels of *logos*. The first is the divine Soul, where the *logoi* are pure intellections and productive of no sensible effect.⁵⁵ The second is the universal *logos*, the first *logos* of the genetic Soul.⁵⁶ The third is particular *logos*, which is embraced in the universal *logos* and produced by it.

Secondly, in a universe of emanation, the lower *logos* cannot exist without a higher *logos* which gives rise to it. Hence, each *logos* of Soul must exist as bound to a higher *logos* which resembles the *logos* of Soul and transcends it. We should, however, emphasize once again that though they are powers (states, dispositions) of the Soul,⁵⁷ the *logoi* are indistinguishable from the being of the Soul itself, a fact which gives some insight into the unity of the third hypostasis.

A few words concerning the relation between the *logos* of life and Soul are necessary at this point. *Logos*, as we have pointed out, is a power of Soul, *identical* with Soul itself and ordered ultimately to the production of some effect in matter. Granted the existence of a *logos* of life,⁵⁸ then, this *logos* can be nothing else than Soul as disposed to give life to some particular being at some particular time and place in the evolution of the universe. Now, Soul as disposed to give life to some particular part of the universe is nothing else than particular Soul.⁵⁹

Once this fact of Plotinian psychology is adequately grasped, certain texts concerning *logos* may be read in a new and clearer light.

It becomes clear, for instance, how the universal *logos* can be the source of order among the Souls themselves.⁶⁰ For as a result of the identity of Soul and *logos*, the universal *logos* is identifiable with the

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

World-Soul itself, inasmuch as the universal *logos* is simply Soul in its power to animate and govern the entire universe.⁶¹ Moreover, if particular Soul is identical with the particular *logos* of life, then it becomes clear not only why a parallel is set up between the various levels of Soul and the different *logoi*,⁶² but also how particular Souls can be regulated by the universal *logos*.⁶³ For the particular Souls are simply *logoi* and parts of the universal *logos* which by guiding the life of the universe causes their ascent and descent into matter.⁶⁴

Moreover, the meaning of the assertion that the universal *logos* is a "power of the World-Soul"⁶⁵ emerges clearly, for power is here to be understood as a causal disposition identical with the very entity of the World-Soul itself.⁶⁶

Hence, we may conclude that considered as a doctrine of the entitative constitution of Soul, Plotinus's *logos* doctrine is an attempt to salvage the integrity and unity of Soul as "a single totality,"⁶⁷ entitatively disposed toward the production of a multitude of material objects. For the entitative dispositions, the powers which produce the multitude of objects, are in no way distinct from one another in the way that accidental faculties are distinct. This same notion is also transferred to the realm of *Nous*, where the *logoi* are identical with the entity of *Nous* itself.⁶⁸

Moreover, we can understand how each Soul (that is, each *logos* of life) may be said to contain all the *logoi* of the universe;⁶⁹ for each particular Soul is nothing else than a disposition, an affection, of a single totality which comprehends within itself every perfection of the universe.

⁶¹Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 17-23.

⁶²Cf. *ibid.*, I, 8, 1-7.

⁶³Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 3, 8, 16-22; 10, 38-42.

⁶⁴Cf. *ibid.*, 12, 12-19; V, 7, 3, 14-19.

⁶⁵Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 7, 8-16.

⁶⁶Cf. *ibid.*, 5, 1-8; 11-18; VI, 1, 10, 15-24.

⁶⁷Cf. *ibid.*, III, 2, 16, 28-34.

⁶⁸Cf. *ibid.*, II, 7, 3, 7-15.

⁶⁹Cf. *ibid.*, V, 7, 1, 7-17.

⁷⁰Several less happy possibilities occur to us. "Mode" is one, but it has unfortunate Spinozistic connotations; the Spinozistic modes do not possess the dynamic quality of the Plotinian *logoi*. Another alternative might be "affection." The word implies some sort of special modification which is not necessarily

accidental and is to this extent acceptable. It is, however, as undynamic as "mode" and, to that extent, equally unacceptable. "State" in the sense of some permanent condition is likewise passive and static in its connotation. "Disposition" is a bit more active in connotation, but it suffers from the considerable disadvantage of being the precise word which Plotinus uses to define *logos*; cf. *ibid.*, VI, 7, 5, 11-18. Thus the word presents insuperable difficulties of translation when the word *logos* and "disposition" appear side by side. "Habit" is another possibility; it is dynamic in connotation, but it also implies something acquired and accidental in nature and, to this extent, is unacceptable.

THE ESSENTIAL DEFINITION OF LOGOS

What, then, is the Plotinian *logos* essentially and in itself? Essentially, the Plotinian *logos* is an active power identical with the being of the hypostasis in which it exists and ordered to the production of some reality lower than itself. *Logos* is found only in *Nous* and Soul. The lower reality which it produces will always be another *logos* of an inferior nature, except in the case of the final *logoi*. The final *logoi* are the *logoi* of sensible form. Since sensible form does not produce any other being, the *logoi* of sensible form terminate the process of universal emanation.

Thus the *logos* serves two major functions in Plotinian cosmological emanation. The fact that the *logos* is found only in *Nous* and Soul restricts the *logos* to the realms of being. Because the *logos* is an active power, identical with the being of *Nous* and of Soul, the *logos* is the ultimate ontological explanation of the dynamic aspects of Plotinian being. The orientation of each manifestation of *logos* to the necessary production of a reality less perfect than itself grounds the intrinsic propensity of being to degenerate from the perfection of being, found in *Nous*, down through the various levels of psychic existence, to the final corruption of being when Soul is mingled with matter.

The search for an adequate English equivalent of the Greek word *logos* is a difficult one. In the last analysis, we suggest that the word "rule" will serve.⁷⁰ The word has several advantages: (1) it is dynamic in connotation, a fact which is congruent with the notion of *logos* as an active disposition of Soul and of *Nous*; (2) it is not entirely divorced from noetic implications, inasmuch as rules are the conceptions of a mind, and thus the word is congruent with the origin of *logos* in the Soul by way of a noetic act; (3) finally, the word is possessed of the same amount of ambiguity concerning the entitative status of *logos* as the Greek word itself.

The Plotinian Logos Doctrine
Donald Gelpi, s.j.

WILLIAM OLIVER MARTIN, *University of Rhode Island*

God in Modern Philosophy. By James Collins. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 476. \$6.50.

How does one go about writing on God in modern philosophy? There are three ways.

1) One can take the "true" philosophical position, say, Thomistic realism as a closed system, give an exposition of its philosophy of God, and then proceed to contrast it with the various modern alternatives. The approach would not be merely comparative. The aim would be to show that errors are logically possible by denying this or that truth in realism, and then to correlate with these errors the various attempts of modern philosophers to deal with the philosophy of God. If you deny this realistic truth you get Descartes; if you deny that, you get Kant; and so on.

The advantage of this method lies in its formal clarity. The disadvantage lies in its questionable psychology and pedagogy. For those who do not already have the truth—and it is really for these that the book should be written—such a procedure has a bludgeoning effect in addition to appearing question-begging. This method might be called the "dogmatic approach."

2) One can consider the philosophy of God of each man as a self-contained, atomic bit of thought. But even atoms are related, and so it would be shown how the ideas of one man "influence" the ideas of another. Since there is no metaphysical truth in any systematic form, one is confined to giving a history of the influences of ideas upon philosophers. Critically, one is limited to considering the various *Weltanschauungen* from the standpoint of formal consistency. The history of philosophy is reduced to the "history of ideas." This method may be called the "skeptical approach."

3) The third way is that which Mr. Collins takes. He gives an exposition and criticism of the thoughts about God of a selected group of modern philosophers. The truth of classical realism is assumed implicitly throughout and is made explicit in the final chapter. In this way realism is taken as an open, not closed, system. "The study of modern conceptions of God can make a positive, doctrinal contribution to the development of realistic

theism. Such an inquiry helps to identify the pressing issues, to work out some of the chief modes of explanation, to suggest new sources of evidences, and to render the main tenets more explicit, more philosophically ordered, and more relevant to the contemporary world" (p. xi).

Mr. Collins begins with the thought of Nicholas of Cues, (1401-64), and ends with "the existentialist quarrel over God." In the pre-Kantian controversy between rationalism and empiricism the former attempted to free the intellect from dependence upon the senses. And empiricism attempted to free the senses from dependence upon the intellect—which it succeeded in doing rather well. In either case the concept of God does not fare well; for it tends to become a "function," rescuing philosophers from their initial errors. In rationalism the concept of God became the "Instrumental Guarantor of the rationalistic systems" (p. 90). Of course, the empiricists could find no such God.

With Kant a new kind of functionalism is introduced. Not God, but the idea of God, becomes a postulate for moral purposes. The idea is no longer needed to shore up a rationalism, since such a metaphysical system is no longer possible. However, as a postulate God is recognized for the sake of morality, and not that the moral life is founded upon the recognition of an obligation to God.

If a pragmatic conception of God was potentially in the thought of Kant, it became actual in the thought of Mill, James, and others. "Instead of a functionalism ordained to the rationalist and idealist systems, [Mill] proposed a functional theism which would serve the purposes of a utilitarian and positivist type of empiricism" (p. 296). Without any causal and analogical basis for an inference to God, the equivocal God in the order of knowing can become only a finite God in being. The conclusion of James naturally follows. "In saying 'God exists' all I imply is that my purposes are cared for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control the drift of the universe" (p. 301). But even this is but a stage to the final conclusion. If, as with Kant, God is no longer a necessary postulate for morality but rather a convenient hypothesis for those who find it convenient, then there will be those who no longer find such a hypothesis convenient or functional. If human interests are absolute, then something called "Science" is much more useful.

Mr. Collins finally concludes with pointing out that the rise of existentialism comes about because there are those who are concerned about what the logic of modern philosophy inexorably decrees and yet who are not prepared to reject the modern errors that cause the trouble. The accumulated wisdom of realism cannot be equated with a rationalistic strain which has been part of its history. If the modern existentialist does not understand this, he then opposes the realistic synthesis in the name of

existence. "Existential knowledge about God is itself the peak of philosophical wisdom and is not instrumental to any wonder-destroying conception of the perfect system of knowledge" (p. 383).

In the final chapter Mr. Collins appraises the modern attempts at a philosophy of God and suggests the realist philosophy of God not only as a solution but as the position in terms of which one may even understand the inadequacy of alternative positions. "The causal inference terminates not in a view of the divine act of existing itself but in the humanly concluded knowledge that the proposition 'The purely actual being and first cause, God, exists' is well founded and true. The realistic proof gives knowledge *about* the existing God, but not by *using* the divine act of existing as the conclusion of the inference itself. This is the most radical level at which one can see the nonfunctional approach of realistic theism to God" (p. 399).

With the exception of the final chapter on realism, the volume should provide almost everyone with a confirmation, at least in appearance, of his position. For the fideist it demonstrates what he knew all along, that one cannot know God through reason because God *does* exist. For the naturalist, materialist, or positivist it demonstrates what he has long "known," that one cannot know God through reason because God does not exist. I say, "at least in appearance," for the catch in it all is this, that only a realist could have written such a book. No "modern," of the type the volume is about, could have produced it.

The book is an excellent one in every way. One can conceive how a work of this kind might have been written differently. But the reviewer cannot imagine how better it might have been done. The book is not for the beginner, but it should prove valuable to anyone who has had some disciplined study in philosophy.

However, no book is so perfect that something will not cause a raised eyebrow. Mr. Collins speaks of "naturalistic atheists" (p. 299). This is possible, for an atheist might also be an idealist; for example, Hegel. But Mr. Collins also speaks of a theistic form of naturalism (p. 389) and also of something called "atheistic naturalism" (pp. 153, 389). But is it not the case that almost by definition naturalism must be atheism?

WALTER E. STOKES, S.J., Saint Louis University

Modes of Being. By Paul Weiss. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1958. Pp. viii + 617. \$10.00.

Although for many years now logical positivism has been announcing the death of metaphysics, it is very much alive in Professor Paul Weiss's *Modes of Being*. In this work the author attempts to "articulate a vision

of the whole of things" (p. 3). This is to be a counteragent to the tendency toward fragmentation that marks much of contemporary thought. Even though the logical analysts at one time gave promise of fulfilling this role, they have not done so; but they in turn "turned themselves into another race of specialists, alongside the others, concentrating on the restricted task of clarifying the intent, language, usage or practice of scientific men" (p. 6). But the special sciences require the knowledge of one, coherent, exhaustive whole.

For unless one knows what it is to be a man, no co-ordinate studies of man are possible. Only if one knows what it is to be a man can one correlate the findings of doctors, biologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. To lose sight of the whole is to fail to realize that the purpose of limited investigations is to understand the real from many independent and convergent views. Thus, the special disciplines do require a comprehensive view of reality, because "if we are to engage in limited enterprises, if we are to know what they diversely seek and express, if we are to understand what contributions they can make to the enterprise of life and learning, we must somehow take account of all there is and can be known" (p. 7). Professor Weiss sets out to provide just such an account.

In the *Modes of Being* Weiss distinguishes four irreducible modes: actuality, ideality, existence, and God. He compares them to four notions in Plato—motion, rest, other, and the same; to four notions in Aristotle—efficient, final, material, and formal cause; and to four notions in Whitehead—actual occasions, eternal objects, creativity, and God. But he believes a significant difference between his modes and these notions is that "each mode has a finality of its own, and has systematic and dialectic relations to the other three modes" (p. 533). Each of the modes needs the other modes and supplies the needs of the others. This only indicates the main lines of Weiss's thought; no summary can do justice to the orderly and carefully developed presentation of this complex set of ideas in over four-hundred numbered theses.

This modal doctrine of being has its origin in Weiss's effort to resolve the paradox that "a man had obligations which he could not fulfill" (p. 13). This is based on the fact that man, who is finite, feeble, and ignorant, has the obligation to bring the good to its most complete realization. Therefore, man cannot do what he ought to do. Among actualities only man can seek to realize the good in himself or others. But the good, which is the ideal freed from exclusive reference to actualities, ought to be realized. Man as an ethical being has the task of realizing the good which ought to be realized. As an individual he cannot accomplish this; therefore, he must accept as his own whatever is done by all the rest to realize the good. And so, existence and God are needed.

The positive presentation of the doctrine of the modes and their interrelation is followed by what Professor Weiss terms "the negative route." He believes that an adequate philosophy must not only show that opposing doctrines are a subordinate part of itself but also show "how these foolish or mistaken views not only illustrate one's own principles but, as so illustrating them, inevitably urge themselves as views superior to one's own" (p. 380). The adequate system should show that the propositions counter to it are "expressions of the system's elements treated as standing away from it, and as such, because ignoring the claims of all else, necessarily maintaining that they offer the whole truth, and consequently that they ought, and do, cancel, and replace the given system" (p. 381). The aim of the negative route is to reduce the negations of the propositions of the *Modes of Being* to interrelated parts of a single whole wherein they reaffirm the theses of the system.

In the context of the problem of the one and the many, Professor Weiss discusses the togetherness of the four modes. Actuality, ideality, existence, and God constitute four sets of many, each with its own distinctive way of being together. Since each mode has a finality of its own, each presents diverse perspectives of the others. This discussion of the togetherness of the modes concludes Weiss's presentation of "those fundamental characterizations which always apply to the real" (p. 548).

In keeping with the clarity and order that reigns throughout, the author supplies a useful outline of the work in topical headings which refer back to the numbered theses of the text. Also, the graceful Attic style of this work should help shatter the myth, which has thrived ever since Kant struggled with the vernacular, that profound thought requires tangled and awkward phrases.

Only in time will a just evaluation of this work be rendered. At present, some questions can be raised concerning the paradox that has led Professor Weiss to adopt four irreducible modes. This paradox appears to be rooted in the nature of possibility as conceived by the actuality which is man. The good is the ideal freed from exclusive reference to actualities; but the ideal is considered only in terms of universals. As Weiss says, "From the standpoint of the Actual the difference between it and the possible is a difference between the individual and the universal . . ." (p. 115). In other words, Weiss declares, "Possibilities (Ideals viewed from the standpoint of other beings) are generic meanings" (p. 33). But, if man knows the existence of God as creator, then the possibles are not universals, generic meanings, but singulars in the mind of God. Then, too, the moral obligation of man is not the accomplishment of abstract good, but it is to act in conformity with the mind and will of God. However, Weiss rejects analogous knowledge of God, such as is held by Thomists,

because "analogy tells us rightly that we ought to take up the position of others if we are to understand them correctly. But it does not tell us how to do this. Instead it presupposes the achievement which it is intended to promote" (p. 523). Accordingly, analogy is "not too helpful so long as we do not occupy the position of the others but know them only from our own" (p. 523). But if one accepts an experiential and causal inference approach to God's existence, then this objection does not hold up. For Weiss, the notion of God as cause of the universe can only mean either that God had a temporal side, or that there was an occurrence in the unbroken calm of eternity. Since causality is primarily conceived as a temporal sequence, the possibility of knowing the existence of the immutable Creator of the universe through experiential knowledge of His effects in time is excluded in the modal doctrine of being. This Weiss is forced to exclude because he identifies knowledge with abstraction whereby a neutrality is attained: "It [knowledge] is the world as distorted by our being but recovered in an abstract form by our minds" (p. 533). Knowledge is "actuality as having attained the state of neutrality, as having become the togetherness of all, though at the price of an abstraction from its concreteness" (p. 533). This theory of knowledge leaves no room for a concrete judgment of existence to found a causal and experiential approach to the existence of God.

Throughout the work Weiss presents penetrating analyses of some of the major approaches to the philosophical problems that he is treating. One such remark that should alert Thomists to greater precision of thought and expression concerns the tendency to speak as though there was only the existence of God and as though creatures did not have their own proper existence: "The Thomists sometimes speak as though they meant to hold that all Existence is God, in him or from him. But it is not clear then how I can exist" (p. 191). Also, Weiss's criticism of Whitehead's actual entities as perpetually perishing is acute: "Self-maintenance, like quiescence and rest, is thus an achievement. It is not, as Whitehead supposed, an achievement which must immediately end in failure, in the perishing of being" (p. 31). These and many other such insights recommend this book to all who are interested in observing a fine philosophical mind at work and in learning from it.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

An Etienne Gilson Tribute. Presented by His North American Students.
Ed. Charles J. O'Neil. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959.
Pp. x + 347. \$7.00.

This volume honors Etienne Gilson on his seventy-fifth anniversary, and it does so in the best way at the command of philosophers and scholars—by

offering fruits of their independent labors. All the contributors were Gilson's students at some time during his generation of distinguished teaching at Toronto, and they bear witness to his great capacity for arousing the love of wisdom and then disciplining it to the ways of research and communication.

Most of the essays show that marked historical orientation which we have come to expect and respect in men trained at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Greek philosophy is represented only by Father Owens, but his study of Heraclitus is a specially fresh and vigorous offering. A critical review is made of the three main views of Heraclitus as cosmologist, metaphysician of flux, and moralist. Owens is particularly severe upon the universal-flux interpretation and the venerable Platonic contrast of Parmenides and Heraclitus. He himself regards the Heraclitean fragments as being mainly a moral treatise on the need to make constant adjustments in steering an undeviating course toward the common moral wisdom. Like Heidegger, who has a penchant for "the obscure one," Heraclitus sees the surrounding universe in the light of his conception of human conduct and its pattern of balanced tensions.

Although Gilson's interest in the rest of Greek philosophy, the Patristic period, and the early Middle Ages is not reflected in depth in this collection, there are two solid papers devoted to the *Liber De Causis* and the Victorines. Father Sweeney continues his examination of the history of infinity and allied concepts by analyzing the treatment of creation in the *Liber*. He concludes that, although there is considerable obscurity about divine freedom and transcendence, still the *Liber* does break through emanationism sufficiently to regard the first cause genuinely as a creator, a giver of being or actual existence. For his part, Father Lacroix gives a fine description of what the Victorian school regarded as the main traits required for attaining wisdom: humility, total dedication to the work itself, and a lifelong pursuit of wisdom as providing the greatest consolation.

There is a strong concentration of studies in the medieval field, from St. Thomas onward. Jean Quidort of Paris is the subject of two researches, one into his metaphysics and another into his political position. Father Heiman reports on the questions in Quidort's lectures on the *Sentences* dealing with the *esse* of creatures. This *esse* is distinct from the essence, and both are caused by the one creative act of God. In a provocative re-reading of Quidort on political authority, Professor Griesbach challenges the view of Fathers Leclercq and J. C. Murray that Quidort is working out the consequences of the Thomistic doctrine on the Church and political life. On the contrary, Quidort handles the Thomistic texts arbitrarily in order to minimize the papal power within the Church, to

release the political power from subordination to the pope, and thus to remove the Thomistic notion of the subjection of all political rulers to the pope as supreme ruler. Other essays in this area deal with extrinsic titles to interest (Professor Johnston), Thomas of Sutton's contemporary attack on the Scotistic doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being (Father Przezdziecki, who shows that Sutton's analysis of the predicaments and divine names is intended to direct attention to differences which must be expressed in the *concept* of being), and an account of a manuscript criticism of Ockham's theory of the universal (Father Synan).

Most of the remaining papers either examine aspects of St. Thomas or rethink doctrinal issues in a Thomistic spirit; as befits a book honoring Gilson, these contributions constitute the heart of the collection. Teachers who have been disturbed about facile appeals to the finality principle will welcome Father Klubertanz's careful and penetrating analysis of St. Thomas on *omne agens agit propter finem*. The validity of this proposition is established through arguments based on the determination of the efficient cause, the presence of tendency and dynamic order in existing agents, nature as a principle of activity directed toward a goal, and divine intelligent creative causality. Klubertanz reaches the following conclusion, similar to the earlier finding of Father Owens on causality:

In St. Thomas' view, therefore, the proposition, "Every agent acts for a goal," is not a self-evident principle, nor a truth known from the logical implications of prior logical principles, but a conclusion of a real proof resting on the immediate experience of nature and tendency.

Another metaphysical essay is Professor Anderson's clear and orderly presentation of St. Thomas's teaching on the sense in which we can say that God's knowledge is scientific. Not only does this study bring out the thoroughly analogical treatment of knowledge but also the readiness of St. Thomas to adapt his meanings for "scientific" to the exigencies of the particular problem at hand.

Two of the contributors address themselves to problems on man and intellectual knowledge in St. Thomas. Professor Pegis scrutinizes the text of *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 56, on whether any intellectual substance can be united to a body. Pegis agrees with Pomponazzi that St. Thomas could only propound and answer this question by transforming the Aristotelian psychology, and also that the transformation involved the influence of the Christian faith; but he rejects Pomponazzi's conclusion that therefore the result is good Christian faith but not philosophy. This then leads Pegis to maintain that the Thomistic position on the unity of man is adequate as being philosophically open to the technical data of the problem and yet

that this position is "Christian philosophy, that is to say, a philosophy that considers its openness to the influence of revelation to be nothing less than a turning to the source of its nature." Professor Robb traces out the later teaching of St. Thomas on the human soul as a form and also an individual substance, using as a guide the axiom that in all intellectual beings their *intelligere* is *esse*. He concentrates particularly on the *Quaestiones De Anima* and notes the close relation established by Aquinas between hand and human intellect, an association which Marx persuaded himself to regard as palmary evidence of the materialistic conception of man and history.

Father Gerard Smith gives an intensely reflective and terse analysis of the problem of sensibles and metaphysics. If we consider the sensibles first of all within the framework of a dialectic of multiplicity, they are reducible to passive potentials which simply are nonbeing in themselves and are found in, and related to, existential situations. Once this reduction is accepted, we can only speak about the *esse* of sensibles as *esse* by making a demonstration that they are caused to be and thus by viewing them as dependent on God. If the sensible is first approached not as a potential ingredient ordered to an existential situation but as a sensibly existing being, however, the inquirer can begin with the evidenced truth that sensible beings exist and then discover some consequences of this proposition. This is the difference between beginning with existence as a situation and beginning with the sensible beings known actually to exist. That there are some important consequences of stressing natural things as subjects of existing is brought out by Professor Schmitz, writing with special reference to the modern substitution of objects-of-human-consciousness for existing things. He defends against Husserl and Whitehead the meaning of a subject of existing, even when it is not a subject itself having consciousness.

The need to re-examine the founding judgments in metaphysics is brought out in three essays of an epistemological nature. Father Schmidt observes that even an immediate realism requires some careful reflective analysis if it seeks to be a philosophical position. He traces out three aspects of the evidence of sense perception in order to show that our judgments of existence are well grounded: the plural determinations in experience, the presentedness of concrete and unified things, and the active self-presenting character of sense things. In his critical survey of the influence of presuppositions upon various philosophical and scientific accounts of the original condition of experiencing, Father Thro concludes that we have to be on guard against an idealistic, naturalistic, and psychologic predetermining of the account. The distinction between the experiencer and the experienced existents acting upon him is a basic point

in the realist analysis of ordinary experience. That there is a common structure uncoverable through such analysis is the theme developed by Father Henle, whose paper, "A Phenomenological Approach to Realism," is one of the few detailed presentations in English of how a realist does actually go about showing to other men the philosophical grounds of his epistemology. To do so in a successful way, one must enter deeply into the modern adventure of evaluating the evidence for realism and must then work sympathetically but firmly toward restoring the perspectives which can only be called the common human ones of knowing our world and ourselves. A postulatory realism which refuses to engage in this internal discussion of the modern situation will find it difficult to flourish as a philosophically significant doctrine.

Another constructive and appreciative approach to the contemporary mind is made by Professor Bourke. He finds some valuable considerations in the procedures of metaethics which are usually cultivated by logical positivists and the analysts. In an age when everyone is working on the metaplane of reflecting on the kind of statements used within ethics and other bodies of discourse, it is fatal to trudge ahead without any regard for the problems which arise at this second level of inquiry. Among other advantages which Bourke sees in the study of metaethics by alert Thomists are: it sharpens the question of whether ethics is only a demonstrative science or also a wisdom; the emotive or noncognitivist interpretations of ethics underline the role of right appetite in ethical reasoning and suggest that a purely cognitivist view of ethics is inadequate; the attempt to compare the formal structure of Thomistic ethics with other ethical structures (not merely a comparison of one thesis in an ethics with that of another school) leads to some real difficulties of classification and eventually to a better understanding of what is unique in the ethical doctrine of St. Thomas. Professor Walton describes the theory of concept formation in Hempel, Northrop, and Korzybski, suggesting some corrective points drawn from the Thomistic theory of human knowledge. Professor Lynch gives us a careful report on the relation between being and language in Heidegger, who of all contemporaries seems to join them in the closest way.

This notable set of papers is crowned by a concluding response from Professor Gilson himself. He reminds teachers of philosophy to remain loyal to their original ideal of pursuing wisdom and to be careful to arouse the same humble and purifying love in their students, who must learn to acknowledge how far we are from having already attained a satisfactory philosophical vision. We can turn to Gilson's own life as a teacher, as well as his lecture on "The Eminence of Teaching," for further encouragement in the work of integrating our teaching activities always more closely with our personal reflections.

An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the "Parmenides." By William F. Lynch, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 255. \$6.00.

This work allows for no superficial reading and presupposes no slight acquaintance with recent Platonic scholarship. One need not agree with Father Lynch's basic interpretation to welcome it as a strong fresh breeze dissipating the smog generated by modern Neoplatonists and dutifully laid down by most textbooks.

Lynch offers not just another key to the riddle of the *Parmenides* but, through his original solution to its antinomies, a new synthesis, within limitations, for all of Plato. While giving credit to Cornford's "careful analysis" (p. 6) he questions not only Cornford's negative understanding of Hypothesis I but his multiple meanings for "One" in the other hypotheses. Lynch insists "that the meaning of the word does not change in the slightest way" (p. 15, n. 10). The result is that all the various hypotheses "are nothing less than an analysis of the constitutive elements of anything that is a true *one*, or unity, in any order of being" (p. 9). Thus any being or any one is approached, now with reference to its *intrinsic* principle which corresponds to "unity as such" (p. 64), now as a whole-of-parts. Moreover, this unambiguous (yet somehow analogous) meaning of unity suggests "any number of possible applications" (p. 15, no. 10) and makes "clear that it is the intention of the eight hypotheses to discuss as many problems in the logic, the metaphysics, and the physics of the Platonic system as is possible in their brief compass" (p. 139).

That the author unifies Plato toward a later dialogue rather than the well-worn *Republic* shows promise, but any such static unification may turn a system of organic growth into prefabricated rationalism. Moreover, he proposes as "almost a first principle of criticism to expect always that Plato is saying in the *Parmenides* what he has said or will be saying in other parts of his total work" (p. 17). But why shouldn't Plato—developing as he wrote—encounter serious *aporiai* in the *Parmenides*, only to reorientate his thinking in the *Sophist*?

That the interpretation is openly analytic is to Lynch's credit as a scholar. Thus this reviewer is not dismayed by one more historical construct, but neither is he thrilled by perfect consistency and broad scope of results. What he finds unsatisfactory is the constricted basis of interpretation. It answers neatly the problems allowed, plus a plethora of questions—listed in the table of contents—but all ultimately irrelevant when divorced from the missing issues. For the author finds no inconsistency in simple

anachronisms like developed analogy and existential questions, nor any discomfort in juxtaposing *Plato*, *Metaphysics*, and *Being*.

His familiarity with modern Platonic studies, especially little-known but very significant articles in classical and philological journals, hardly extends to Scholastics. "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," by Pegis, might itself have forestalled the easy identification of Being and One, in that "the two are convertible" (p. 11). Also Eslick's articles show that to take Aristotle at his word is not to constrict but to liberate one's appreciation of Plato's genius.

Lynch rejects Neoplatonism, but—innocent of any hypothesis in which Aristotle is neither a knave nor a fool—he remains scandalized by any mistrust of participation.

But to recognize with Aristotle the radical *chōrismos* between every being and its essence, between Being and the One, is not to join a petty pupil maligning his teacher, but to follow the master critic, an eye witness, analyzing the greatest Greek of them all—down to his tragic flaw—with pedestrian consequences for participation itself, unless liberated from its own Platonic milieu.

However, just to focus attention on being and unity is a contribution, and no Platonic scholar may safely ignore this book—perhaps for years to come.

ARNOLD J. BENEDETTI, S.J., Spring Hill College

An Introduction to Natural Theology. By Maurice R. Holloway, S.J.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., Inc., 1959. Pp. xxviii + 492.
\$4.00.

In this book Father Holloway has given us a full, leisurely, and orderly presentation of natural theology. He shows himself throughout to be a very competent guide in St Thomas's philosophy of God. The topics treated and the order followed are, for the most part, the ones traditional in natural theology, though one misses an explicit treatment of the unicity of God and of his immensity (as distinct from his omnipresence).

The author first presents his subject in the form of problems, which he carefully delineates and subdivides. Then he explains the conditions requisite for the satisfactory solution of the problems. Step by step the problems are solved, the positive doctrine proved, and the objections answered. Helpful summaries are interspersed at strategic intervals; and almost every one of the chapters concludes with a useful, stylized summary consisting of a neat statement of the thesis, explanation of terms, the adversaries (in a few cases), the proof, and a few suggested readings. Especially interesting are the six appendices which deal with such matters

as invalid proofs for the existence of God, medieval and modern agnosticism, existentialism, and atheism. The style is simple, without unusual phraseology or involved sentences. There is a very gracious foreword by Father Renard. The book, beautifully printed (despite a few typographical errors), is a worthy companion to the other textbooks written these past few years by the professors of philosophy of Saint Louis University and printed by Appleton-Century-Crofts.

The author lays no claim to originality, but his book does supply us with fuller and more-helpful-than-usual treatments of some of the major problems of natural theology; for example, the chapters on knowing and naming God. Father Holloway is steeped in the spirit, the writings, and the method of St. Thomas, so much so that even when he does not explicitly refer to texts of the Angelic Doctor the reader feels that what is said is a trustworthy paraphrase of Aquinas.

Some teachers might prefer a treatment with a proportion differing from that of the author. The opening chapters strike me as being too lengthy. On the other hand, the pages on God's infinity are much too brief, and the discussion of the problem of evil perhaps not realistic enough, certainly not developed enough. One may also prefer more freshness of style. The author explains in his preface, page xv, why he continually uses the works of St. Thomas. Still, we could wish for more personal analyses. Even the difficulties and objections have a medieval, or at least an academic, atmosphere about them (partially offset by the appendices). We should like to have seen more chapters written in the manner of the beautiful and moving final chapter, "God as the End of Man."

G E R A L D A. M C C O O L, S.J., Loyola Seminary, Shrub Oak, N.Y.

First Philosophy. By Robert J. Kreyche. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959. Pp. 328. \$4.00.

Kreyche's book is a thorough and clearly presented course in general metaphysics. Unlike many modern texts, it does not include a section devoted to natural theology. The claim on its dust jacket that the book "integrates Thomistic metaphysics with contemporary developments" is quite well justified, considering the introductory nature of the work. The results of much modern Thomistic research have been incorporated into its exposition of the traditional problems of general metaphysics. The discussion of the abstraction of being, for example, has been strongly influenced by Maritain's writings on the relation of the judgment of separation to the three degrees of abstraction; and the proof given for the necessary dependence of the finite being on its efficient cause reveals the author's debt

to Gilson and de Raeymaeker. Non-Scholastic philosophy is given adequate treatment in the historical conspectus of the individual problems, and a fine selection of modern books and articles can be found in the bibliographies of the various chapters.

Some readers may complain of repetitiousness in the author's exposition. After a proof of the triple metaphysical composition in the structure of finite material beings, a fair amount of the same ground is gone over again in a rather lengthy consideration of potency and act in relation to the problem of limitation; and it is the author's practice to reiterate the main points considered in each chapter in a series of summary sections at its conclusion. The reviewer believes, however, the repetition has been effected with sufficient variety and skill to make it genuinely helpful to the student in his personal penetration of the exacting and closely woven philosophical reflection which is required for the solution of philosophical problems.

The author is to be congratulated on the composition of a textbook which is both mature and readable. He has brought the course in general metaphysics within the grasp of the intelligent college student with no undue sacrifice of its philosophical content.

F R A N Ç O I S E V A I N, s.j., *Grand Séminaire (Ambatoroka, Madagascar)*

Enciclopedia Filosofica. By the Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale.
Venice-Rome, 1957-1958. Vol. I (A-Eq), xxvii pp. + 1958 cols.;
II (Er-Le), xix pp. + 1916 cols.; III(Li-Rei), xix pp. + 1942 cols.;
IV (Rel-Z; indices), xix pp. + 1964 cols.

The *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, recently put out by the Italian publishing house of Sansoni, deserves the widest possible diffusion. For this work is a valuable tool not only for students but also for professors of philosophy.

As the title itself indicates, this is not a dictionary but an encyclopedia. We have already in theology what is practically a whole library in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*. In philosophy, up to the present, we had only dictionaries, such as the general dictionary of A. Lalande, the *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, or the more specialized ones like the old *Thomas-Lexicon* of the German Schütz, or, more recently, the excellent American work, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*. In this Italian work, we have an encyclopedia—the difference must be stressed. Whereas a dictionary is essentially analytical, an encyclopedia is consciously synthetic. It must therefore provide not only definitions of terms but also must determine their historical and theoretical content and the ultimate relationships between connected terms.

This purpose has been excellently achieved by the *Enciclopedia Filosofica*. Published with record speed (1957-58), the fruit of ten years work, it offers

a total of 12,000 terms, divided into 5,000 theoretical and 7,000 historical terms. A detailed study decided the relative importance of these different terms. There are four groups, the first of from 1,400 to 1,000 lines; the second, of 800 to 400 lines; the third, of 200 to 80 lines; and the fourth, of 60 to 20 lines. To these there are added brief notes shorter than 20 lines. A lengthy index of fifty-three pages divided into four columns permits a rapid and intelligent use of the resources of the *Enciclopedia*.

As far as its doctrinal aspect is concerned, the collaborators must be congratulated on the orientation of their work. It was not easy to avoid making of this work a pretext or a stage for the defense of one or another system. Particularly satisfactory are the studies concerning disciplines connected with philosophy: sociology (rather briefly), political economy, law, biology, physics, mathematics, art, and literature. Without any trace of eclecticism in the derogatory sense, the *Enciclopedia* shows how a spiritualism of Christian inspiration can satisfy the most divergent demands of human reason.

In the historical aspect of the articles, the editors have been very careful not to exaggerate the classical distinction between major and minor authors. It is also a pleasure to see the refreshing openness to non-European currents of thought. Finally, a very large place is given to contemporary writers.

It would have been desirable to have more detailed, even exhaustive, bibliographies; and to see the connections between the related disciplines and philosophy more consistently observed, especially as regards sociology.

But these small reservations do not take away the very great value of the work. Congratulations are in order to the Reverend C. Giacón, s.j., who managed to join together collaborators and mechanical processes to bring to light such a great enterprise. It is to be hoped that a group of workers will soon bring out an American edition.

NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS—continued from March issue

Formale Logik. By Paul Lorenzen. “Sammlung Göschen,” Band 1176-1176a. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 165. Paper, DM 4.80.

This is a very fine but extremely brief introduction to formal logic, so brief that its sentences are sometimes as difficult and compressed as its formulae. The author, who has written technical articles in this field, is a competent guide.

The structure of the book is a pedagogical one, imitating in some respects the historical development of logic. The first part deals with Aristotelian syllogistics; the author moves rapidly from the use of German sentences to a symbolic notation. In the second section, the classical propositional logic is explained and illustrated. The third section takes up the propositional calculus very briefly. The fourth section, which the author calls the effective logic of conjunction, is developed at greater length. The fifth section is concerned with the logic of the quantifiers. The final section dealing with equality is again very brief.

The arrangement and development of topics has some advantages and is probably best suited for a reader who already knows some logic.

Gergonne'a Teoria Definicji. By Stanislaw Kaminski. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniw. Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 142. Paper, 25 zł.

This is a study of the theory of definition of J. D. Gergonne, who wrote on mathematics in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and is considered one of the precursors of mathematical logic. The author begins his study with a review of historical and contemporary notions of definition, and in this context locates the work of Gergonne himself. “Definition” can designate the action of defining, the sum of the elements of the definition, and the meaning of the definition. In any definition, the defining elements are univocal characteristics. For Gergonne, a definition concerns words, and its purpose is to enable us to use a word intelligently in its proper language. Yet he distinguishes “conventional” from “lexical” definitions by holding that the former defines words, the latter “things.” He maintains that the latter ones should be proved.

In the second part of the study, the author discusses the characteristics of

definition. It enriches language (by providing new abbreviations); it pertains only to some terms, not to all (primary terms in any system cannot be defined); it must conform to the proper semantical category and to the way of admitting that category in the language of the system. Gergonne held that a definition is an enuntiation; the author maintains that a definition as such is not a proposition in the logical sense.

Finally, the author concludes with a consideration of the rules for definition, discussing and comparing Gergonne's rules with those of other writers. He also devotes some time to the problem of "implicit" definitions.

There is a bibliography.

Henri Bergson. Quellen und Konsequenzen einer induktiven Metaphysik.

By Günther Pflug. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 393.
DM 38.

When Bergson began his philosophical career, the main currents of European philosophy were those of British and French empiricism, German apriorism, and French spiritualism. Bergson's first major step toward his own distinctive metaphysics was taken with the publication of the *Données immédiates*. This first step still contains obscurities about intuition and the notion of "the real"; it seems to be involved in a kind of Cartesian separation of matter and mind. But it broaches the problem of metaphysical method, here viewed partly as analysis, and it brings out the significance of time as lived duration and distinguishes it from space and from physical time. The next major step was taken with *Matière et mémoire*. Here Bergson developed a broader theory of reality and of knowledge, extended the scope of freedom, and enlarged on the themes of subjectivity, the biological orientation of perception, and the critique of objective science. After these major philosophical works, Bergson turned to a series of shorter psychological writings, which served on the one hand to keep him in touch with the positivistic, empirical tendencies of the scientists and empirically minded philosophers, and on the other broadened the basis of philosophy in psychological experience. He insisted that if a transcendental analysis of unity and synthesis were to be done, it could be done only at the end of philosophy, not at the beginning and as a condition. The goals of a spiritualistic psychology (and metaphysics) are to be attained by strictly empirical methods. Because of this method he contrasted his own work sharply with that of the spiritualists and the Cartesians. These efforts culminated in a critique of Kant based on the fact that there is more than one natural science, on a corresponding distinction of levels of necessity and on the distinction of levels of experience. All these finds brought their fruit in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

The next stage in Bergson's development is *Evolution créatrice*, in which

the basis for a metaphysical view of external reality is provided. This is done principally through an interpretation of time and duration in things themselves, expressed as evolution and *élan vital*. The final step was taken in the *Deux sources*, in which ethics was connected with psychology as metaphysics had been. However, the author indicates that this unification set up a new problem in the relation between sociology and ethics, which reflects in its turn the dualism of reason and intuition. The author concludes then that the last word of Bergson's brought him practically back to a view akin to that of the French spiritualists, that philosophy is reflective knowledge (that has no content of its own other than what is supplied by the positive sciences).

There is a good bibliography of secondary sources and a very detailed chronological list of Bergson's writings; there is also an index.

The study investigates the possible sources and influences on Bergson's thought in a very thorough fashion, and has the merit also of seeing the importance of some of the "minor" writings in the development of that thought. The combining of historical, analytical, and critical moments makes the book very difficult reading. In addition, the author tends to push any and every distinction to the point of a dualism.

***Heraklit. Worte tönen durch Jahrtausende.* By Heinrich Quirung.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 164.**

This is a presentation of the Greek fragments together with a literal German translation; most of the texts have longer or shorter commentaries and interpretations, and there is a lengthy introductory section.

The introductory section (pp. 9-48), entitled "Heraclitus in the Judgment of Posterity," is a tissue of references so woven together as to establish the Greek philosopher as the greatest thinker of all time, consistently right in all his basic insights, occasionally surpassed in details (such as the atomic theory), yet even then in harmony with the latest. This impression is partly due to the author's attempt to include all the judgments of later writers in such a brief treatment, but it is partly also due to the author's own exaggerated opinion. And one of the reasons for the author's high estimate is that—in his view at least—Heraclitus is the first thorough-going naturalistic materialist.

***Das Lebensproblem heute. Beitrag der Zellforschung zur Philosophie des Organischen.* By Johannes Haas. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958.
Pp. 150. Paper.**

In an introductory chapter, the author explains what he means by a problem and in what the problem of life consists; namely, in the explana-

tion of what life is. In the next two chapters he takes up functional elementary processes and morphogenesis. Here he summarizes in a non-technical way the significant biological data and then points out as precisely as possible in what these functions consist. In the fourth chapter he concludes with an over-all view of the matters covered and a philosophical analysis. In the course of his exposition, the author stresses the interrelationship and mutual complementarity of mechanistic and teleological considerations (he insists that "mechanism" need not denote a materialistic monism). From this dual aspect of the evidence, he then concludes in his final chapter to a philosophy of organism which he calls "vitalism" and which is in some respects similar to the dualistic view historically known under that name.

Materialistische Dialektik. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag. By Helmut Ogiermann.
Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 275.

The author points out that no full-scale systematic critique of materialistic dialectic as a *philosophical* method has been undertaken. In the first part of his work, he undertakes to summarize what has been said about what this method is both by non-Marxists and by the Marxists themselves. In all this, he is careful to document his presentation. In the treatment of Marxist authors, he lists these points as important: dialectic and metaphysics, dialectical contradiction, change as dialectical contradiction, the laws and tasks of dialectic, materialistic monism, matter and spirit as levels of being, and the materialism of dialectic. This first part concludes with a summary which is very well stated.

The second part is a systematic critique. The author begins with a consideration of the Marxist critique of idealism. Next he considers the meaning and function of negativity in the dialectic. Then he takes up the ontological implications of materialistic dialectic: opposition and contradiction, relation and dialectic, dialectical movement, dialectical self-movement, the dialectic of the levels of being, and the relationship between matter and being. He devotes special attention to the implications of the combination of dialectic and materialism in dialectical materialism.

This is a very useful study because of its excellent documentation and because of the clarity of the presentation and argumentation. All who are interested in understanding the philosophy of Marxism will find this book a very great help; they will find in it also a well-grounded and very sharp criticism.

Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum. Vol. II (1958), pp. 30; Vol. III (1959), pp. 27. Warsaw, Polska Akademia Nauk.

These fascicles contain accounts of work and of texts on medieval philosophy in Poland; all these accounts are written in French. There are a number of very brief notes. Among the longer articles in Fascicle II there are studies by Zofia Włodek on Armand de Belvézer (pp. 6-12), a list of manuscripts in Polish libraries containing commentaries on the *De Ente* by Władysław Seńko (pp. 13-18); and a supplement to the *Repertorium* of Stegmüller by various researchers listing additional manuscripts of commentaries on the *Sentences* (pp. 22-27).

In Fascicle III, Zofia Włodek has a note on the chronology of Richard of Middleton (pp. 3-6); Władysław Seńko lists anonymous commentaries on the *De Ente* belonging to the fifteenth century (pp. 7-16); Jerzy B. Korolec comments on the commentary of Humbert de Prully on the *Sentences* (pp. 17-21). These are also several briefer notes.

Morte ed Immortalità. By Michele Federico Sciaceca. Milan: Marzorati, 1959. Pp. vii + 383. Paper, L. 3500.

In a long introduction the author points out the psychological and philosophical aspects of death. In the first part, dealing with death, he begins by considering what he calls the "naturalistic" view of death in the philosophy of Spinoza, of romantic naturalism, of Schopenhauer. Then he considers death and immortality as philosophical problems, from a point of view akin to that of existentialism and personalism. In the second part, the author treats of immortality. He begins by considering the nature of immortality, contrasting it with what he calls "historical perpetuity." The transition between present human existence and suprahistorical immortality is the metaphysical act of death; in such a view, the continuity between the two modes of being almost disappears. Then he takes up the argument for immortality, arguing from the nature of man as a personal spirit, especially from the experience of consciousness and the nature of knowledge as a synthesis. In the third part, the author deals with suicide. He begins by asking how the moral problem of suicide is to be placed, especially in connection with "existence," freedom, and value. He considers the fundamental forms of suicide, as affirmation, as aesthetic act, and what he calls "metaphysical" suicide (of the Stoic hero or of the negative type for whom all particular reality is a limitation). Finally, he criticizes the arguments of St. Augustine and St. Thomas but accepts them in a "purified" Christian sense.

In much of his writing, M. Sciacca is occupied with a dialectical treatment of rationalistic idealism. This theme also appears in the present

volume, though in a less exclusive way. Since existentialist themes are also dealt with, it is likely that the book will have a wider appeal and a greater influence; certainly the sincerity and profundity of the treatment deserve wide attention.

Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs. By Hans Welzel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 114. Paper, DM 14.80.

In the eighteenth century, natural-law theory enjoyed a great vogue, and Pufendorf was a highly regarded author at that time. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries positivism held such a sway over the minds of a great many ethicists and political philosophers that a revival of natural-law theory seemed unthinkable. Yet the day has come, and so a study on Pufendorf is welcome. The author of the present study did this work as his dissertation but published it only in part; he has in the meantime published other works in moral and political philosophy.

In this study the author first lays down the basic historical background and the method he intends to follow. He begins his examination of Pufendorf's doctrine with the *entia moralia*, which are sharply distinguished from physical being yet have some kind of reality. Next he considers the basic principle of law and follows with a study of more particular principles down to positive law. The theory of the state is given separate consideration, as is also the theory of the right of punishment. A final chapter compares natural law and religion, and the state and the Church.

The author notes one weakness of Pufendorf's conception: a confusion about the ultimate grounding of the natural law. There are others: an overoptimistic conception of the power of reason to decide a priori even detailed conclusions, an absence of historical sense, and a failure to see the significance of cultural variation—all faults common to the age, not peculiar to Pufendorf.

Der personale Glaube. By Carlos Cirne-Lima. Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1959. Pp. 156. Paper, S. 60.

Seldom does a slim volume like this touch significantly on many fields; this study of faith as a personal relationship is one of the most stimulating and challenging works to appear in the '50s. The author employs the latest techniques yet at the same time relates his analyses significantly to a large body of traditional thought.

The book begins with a brief placing of the problem of faith from the tradition of Catholic theology supplemented by recent philosophical investigations. The next section is a phenomenological analysis of the act of faith in a person and in what he says. Particularly important here are

the distinction between faith and "pseudo-faith" (which is a syllogistic process which in human affairs usually leads to probability), and the distinction of three levels of knowledge: the intuitive (exemplified in perception), the abstractive-discursive (which is divided into concept, judgment, and reasoning), and the personal (which is faith in another or its absence). (It is to be noted that the "personal" in turn can be submitted to abstraction and analysis.)

The second section of the book is a study of the epistemological and metaphysical structure of interpersonal faith. After a brief discussion of the nature of metaphysics and its relation to this question, the author examines the material brought forth in the preceding phenomenological analysis. In his analysis of intuitive knowledge, he identifies this with the Thomistic *species intelligibilis*, transforming the latter from its traditional position as a precognitive cause of cognition to an act of cognition strictly so called. The *species intelligibilis* is then a passively received intellectual grasp of the total object, from which concepts and judgments arise, and which is further identified with the "immediate evidence" of which epistemologists speak. The level of abstractive-discursive knowledge is handled much in the traditional way; the traditional "three acts of the intellect" are assigned to this level. The third level of phenomenological analysis—namely, personal knowledge—is considered to be a "free knowledge." The author points out that the free choice according to St. Thomas is a composite act, involving both reason and will as standing in a mutual relationship. He then considers personal knowledge as a kind of converse situation, an act of intellect with which an act of freedom is connected as an internally constitutive part. In the analysis of faith as the highest form of personal knowledge, the author maintains that an act of faith is a "saying yes to another person," a total response to a total concrete reality.

The relationship of these various levels to each other is a complex one. Logical dependence (as in inference) operates strictly only within the third level. The intuition arises from the sensory phantasm but does not logically depend on it; it is logically self-motivated. Similarly, personal knowledge, and so also faith, arises from an intuition but does not logically depend on it; it is also self-motivated in the free acceptance of another person. Thus, as the author says, I may know one person very well and accord him very little faith, if any, whereas I may know another only slightly and yet accord him a quite full belief. The intuition is therefore logically a condition of faith as regards its content but not as regards its certitude.

In an appendix the author applies his analysis to the theological problem of the act of faith. The author points out that "saying yes to another person" implies "holding as true what another says." Thus he can take

account of the Conciliar definition. By applying his account of the *logical* independence of faith from its antecedent conditions, he can account for both the freedom and the certitude of the act of faith.

The most obscure element in the analysis is the interpretation of the relationship of the levels to each other in terms of an "a priori" condition.

La philosophie anglaise et américaine. By Serge Hutin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. Pp. 128. Paper.

This historical survey is directed not to specialists but to the general reading public, and to a group of readers to whom not only the precise subject matter is presumed to be unknown but even its more general environment (for example, the educational systems of Great Britain and the United States). In spite of these difficulties, multiplied by brevity of the space allotted to him, the author has succeeded in mentioning the names of most of the important philosophers (and of many unimportant ones) and indicating some points of their thought. He is sympathetic even toward tendencies which he thinks his readers will not understand or approve of (such as empiricism, the rejection of Cartesian dualism, and so on).

Platon. Logos und Mythos. By Kurt Hildebrandt. 2nd ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 396.

The first edition of this work was published in 1933. The present edition is a corrected reprint with the addition of a "postscript" (pp. 369-95) which reviews the later development of Platonic studies and concludes with some additional comments which refer to particular pages of this edition.

Hildebrandt's work is well known, but perhaps its long absence from the bookshelves is a reason for commenting on its nature and general structure. The work was intended to present an over-all view of Plato and to include in such a view all its aspects, particularly its function as a Greek ideal. It is more humanistic in inspiration, though it does not entirely neglect the results of philological study and philosophical analysis. Throughout, Plato's writing is considered in the light of his so-called "political activity." The work is divided into three parts. The first deals with his efforts to reform Athens. The second considers the foundations for a new kind of state in the souls of the future citizens. The third takes up Plato's distinction between thinking and doing, and views the writings in relation to politics and religion.

Pojecie Koniecznosci w Filozofii sw. Tomasza z Akwinu. By Stanislaw Mazierski. Lublin: Katolickiego, 1958. Pp. 119. Paper, 25 zl.

The author begins by examining the notion of necessity as it is presented by contemporary philosophers, and he concludes that in their view necessity is a relation between objects, never object or idea in itself. But he maintains that it is not a relation but a property of relations belonging to a certain class.

The author finds in St. Thomas four kinds of necessity: logical, ontological, causal, and moral. The last of these he does not intend to treat. He argues first that logical necessity depends on ontological necessity. Ontological necessity does not belong to a being or to an "object" in itself and properly speaking, but only to some properties of objects (for example, the relation between essence and existence). And, since being is analogical, the necessity of beings cannot be equal but admits a certain gradation. The author maintains that his third kind of necessity, causal necessity, has been overlooked in traditional philosophy. Causality, furthermore, can be viewed in two ways; it has a physical aspect and also a metaphysical aspect. In its physical aspect, causality is concerned with the constant succession of phenomena and gives rise to physical laws. In its metaphysical aspect, causality is explained differently by different philosophers. This means that we must be aware of the methodology in use by various philosophers. The author holds that according to St. Thomas physical relations are relatively necessary, metaphysical ones absolutely. The general formulae which express these relations he calls the "physical" and the "metaphysical principles" of causality.

The author holds that most Thomists call the metaphysical principle of causality an "analytic proposition of the second degree" (on the ground that the predicate expresses a property really distinct from the subject but contained in its definition), whereas the physical principle of causality is a synthetic one. The former is absolutely necessary and cannot be denied without contradiction; the latter is conditionally necessary and can be denied without logical contradiction, but its denial is an error.

At the end of his study, the author states that the notion of necessity and its related notions are not adequate expressions of reality but only a kind of schematic representation.

There are a bibliography and a French summary, but no index. Though some recent studies are mentioned, a number of studies dealing with the nature of these so-called "principles" are not listed. This may explain why the author takes into account only the division of certain judgments into analytic and synthetic.

Schöpferische Sprache und Rhythmus. By Felix Mayer. Ed. with a postscript by Erich Simenauer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959. Pp. 115. DM 12.

The author of this work was a trained and practicing psychiatrist who was interested in the problems of language for many years. This study of language is neither analytical nor historical but something like a phenomenological attempt to discover the essence of language in itself. The author begins by criticizing very sharply the logical view of language and the contention that there is only a conventional connection between language and thought. The sources for his investigation are principally dream-imagery, the language of gesture, the dance and rhythmic movement in general, song, and music.

Out of all this he develops the theory that there is a twofold point of view that man can take of himself and the world: an objectivating one proper to science and an ego-centered, emotional, living participation in the flow of reality. The first is characteristic of a visual world of space; the second of an aural-and-spoken world of movement, life, and feeling. Moreover, he takes the former one to be derivative and secondary. On the basis of this he criticizes the average man, who, he contends, has reduced the vital content of his life to an objective shadow-world where all is neatly arranged and dead.

There are many good points in the book. But just as the conventionalist view of language can be pushed to ridiculous and harmful extremes, the view that language is part of the expressive-affective life can be made into a weapon against science and the intellect. Precisely such an emphasis is highlighted by the postscript which makes of this theory of language an open anti-intellectualism.

Situation de la philosophie contemporaine. By Stanislas Breton. Lyon: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 200. Paper, 900 f.

This volume is the result of a series of lectures. The author begins by defining philosophy by three characteristics: (a) "radicalism"—the view of a problem in all its dimensions (the question of the meaning and value of the universe); (b) "thematization"—a sustained effort of investigation or solution; (c) "rationality"—a work of reason in its critical function of control and revision. By "contemporary" philosophy, he understands that which is immediately and in itself influential on living men—is read, studied, referred to. On this basis, the author finds three currents of contemporary philosophy: existentialism, Marxism, scientific philosophy. After a brief synoptic view of these currents, the author points out what he considers their common element: they are philosophies in situation and of

a situation. They are differentiated among themselves by their different understanding of three principles: (1) the principle of indetermination and transcendence; (2) the principle of determination and logical intelligibility; (3) the principle of determination of consciousness by existence.

After this general treatment, the author devotes the rest of his work to Marxism and existentialism. He considers Marxism principally as a philosophy of man and of culture; he takes up particularly the influence of Engels. He details some of the controversies: dogmatism and revisionism, scientific naturalism, historicity, revolution, slavery and freedom, and negativity.

After some general references to existentialism, he devotes his attention to the criticisms of that doctrine and the responses of the existentialists. Next, he takes up the problem of liberty; he deals with the relation between nature and freedom, the analysis of the free act, and the forms of liberty. He discusses in detail the analyses of Mounier, Sartre, and Heidegger.

This is a stimulating attempt to find a unifying point of view on contemporary philosophy.

Studi Jaspersiani. By Alberto Caracciolo. Milan: Marzorati, 1958.
Pp. 192. Paper, L. 1700.

This volume consists of a collection of articles previously published in Italian journals. The author is well acquainted with his subject and deals sympathetically with it. His purpose in combining these articles is to present what he conceives to be some of the basic themes of the German philosopher. The first study, by far the longest, deals with the positions of, and the discussion between, Bultmann and Jaspers on "demythologization" of religion. The second concerns the nature of philosophy. The third deals with the relation between philosophy and science. The fourth takes up Jasper's notion of tragedy, the fifth the interpretation of the art of Leonardo. A final chapter reviews the attitudes of other philosophers on Jaspers and his response.

La Teoria Linguistica di Benedetto Croce. By Santino Cavacuti. Milan: Marzorati, 1959. Pp. 192. Paper, L. 1700.

According to the author, the linguistic theory of Croce must be approached from the background of his idealistic monism and his neo-Kantian distinction between intuition and concept. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Crocean theory of art is purely an expressionism. As a result, language as such has simply no connection with logic. On the other hand, language is one of the essential, unchangeable categories of

spirit. Nevertheless, on account of the "circularity" of intuition and concept, language can be permeated with logic. As a result, the Crocean linguistics is a curious blend of a-priori idealism and psychological positivism.

The last chapter takes up two points, the influence of Croce upon linguistic theory and a critical revision of the theory itself. As the bibliography shows, the influence of Croce was almost entirely confined to Italian authors, with the exception of a few philosophical idealists in other countries.

***Tier und Mensch.* By Georg Siegmund. Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, Carolusdruckerei, 1958. Pp. 312. DM 12.80.**

The author of this work is a well-known theologian who has also written on "philosophical anthropology" (philosophical psychology), biology, and medicine. Here he intends to give a comprehensive view of the similarities and differences between man and animals. As he maintains, modern attitudes are confused: man is just an animal; animals need special protection; animals may be used in any way at all by man since they are just biological machines.

The work begins with a general view of the problem, in which stress is laid on the relevance which it has to man's understanding of what sort of being he himself is. Next is a discussion of the difference between man and animal according to the view of dialectical materialism. A third chapter criticizes a-priori evolutionism. The author insists that no "law" of development should be allowed to obscure relevant facts. Then in a series of chapters the uniqueness of the human being is viewed in terms of structure, development, and life. In a following series of chapters the animal is considered in itself, as a "psychic subject." These considerations are followed by several chapters devoted to a comparison between men and animals, in which language plays a very significant part. Referring to the theory that "rationality" is nothing more than the simultaneous presence and interworking of a multiplicity of high-order senses, the author studies the cases of blind and deaf persons and shows that any theory of the sensory nature of intelligence is untenable. The next-to-the-last chapter deals with the relation between man and the animals he has assumed into his life, a striking chapter which, however, seems a bit extreme. A final chapter sums up the conclusions of the study. There are a few pages of notes and an index of proper names, but none of the subjects.

This book should be very valuable for the general reader and for beginning students of philosophy and psychology, and is profound enough to provide material for even advanced discussions of the topic.

Über die Krisis des modernen Sondereigentumsbegriffes. By Cyril von Korvin-Krasinski, O.S.B. 2d ed. Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1958. Pp. 36. Paper, 3.30 f. s.

This is an enlarged version of an article that appeared in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 1954, pp. 64-87. The principal additions are answers to objections directed against the article and references to later writings and papal pronouncements. As is well known, the thesis of the author is that material things are negatively common to all men by natural law but, on account of original sin, they can be privately owned *jure gentium*—which he takes to be a part of positive law). Nevertheless, even when privately owned, they must be used for the common good. He maintains that both propositions are the common teaching of the early Church and of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Where this leaves the ethicist is evident; what it implies for the possibility of allowing for cultural development as a factor in the determination of natural law is equally evident. This is not to say that the point of the article is wrong or trivial; it does point to a vacuum in ethical argumentation which is not yet being filled.

La valeur dans la philosophie de Louis Lavelle. By Wesley Piersol. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 191. Paper.

This is a dissertation written for the University of Lyons; it is a systematic textual analysis and synthesis of Lavelle's chief doctrine. Lavelle has been classified as a partisan of "the philosophy of spirit" and of "subjectivity." This study will not change any of these judgments. But it is useful as a well organized summary of Lavelle's doctrine and as a relatively simple and clear introduction to it.

The book has four parts. In the first, Lavelle's teaching on the psychology of value is given: it concerns existence, is related to sentiment, will, and desire. In the second part, the characters of value are studied: its unity and multiplicity, the hierarchy of values, the relation between good and evil. The third part concerns the "incarnation" of value: it deals with possibility, time, progress, and liberty. The fourth part presents Lavelle's metaphysics of value. Value is closely related to being, in particular to existence; it is the spirit in act; it is revealed in and reveals "spiritual intimacy"—of the knower to himself, of value to the knower, of God to finite knowers.

There is a selective bibliography aimed at providing the means for further study.

Vom Sinn der Selbsterkenntnis. By Katharina Kanthack. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 211. DM 18.

The author intends her work to make explicit some points which are not merely in harmony with Heidegger but are in his writings, even though only in an implicit form. Hence she supposes and demands of the reader that he be familiar with his writings "bis zu seiner letzten Zeile" (p. 2).

In a preparatory section, the author explains that all historical systems of metaphysics are faulty in that they adopt a univocal meaning of being as found in some particular kind of being. She attacks the substance-accident categorization, connecting it with the tendency of all metaphysicians to think of man and of God as things. Other objections are those against the notion of truth as adequation between intellect and thing, and against the distinction between subject and object. She maintains also that psychoanalysis and the Sartrean understanding of man are full of the same defects.

The main part of the work considers the Self as "being-with" (*Mitsein*). The author first considers the source of this "being-with others" in the fact of the human community, its various possibilities, and its perversion in the so-called "mass man." Then she takes up "being-with in living incarnation." First she considers being with another as an individual and the problems and mistakes that occur in this relationship. Next she considers the relationship to others in general, the meaning of "the stranger," and similar themes.

It would be an education for positivists and behaviorists to read a work like this with an open and receptive mind; an encounter with language analysis might be advantageous for an existentialist writer. In any case, the book is worth some effort.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ABBO, JOHN A. *Political Thought: Men and Ideas*. Westminster: Newman Press, 1959. \$5.75.

ADLER, JOSHUA. *Philosophy of Judaism*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. \$3.00.

ALBERT, ETHEL M., and OTHERS. *Selected Bibliography of Values, Ethics and Esthetics in the Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, 1935-1958*. Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1959. \$7.50.

ALLEN, EDGAR LEONARD. *From Plato to Nietzsche*. New York: Association Press; Oct., 1959. \$3.75.

AUERBACH, M. MORTON. *Conservative Illusion*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. \$6.75.

AUROBINDO, SRI. *On Yoga*. Tome 1 and 2. Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers; Oct., 1959. \$6.00 ea.

———. *Practical Guide to Integral Yoga*. Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers; Oct., 1959. \$2.50.

AYER, A. J. *Logical Positivism*. Chicago: Free Press, 1959. \$6.75.

BACON, FRANCIS. *New Organon*. Ed. Fulton H. Anderson. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Dec., 1959. \$1.25.

BAGEHOT, WALTER. *Physics and Politics*. [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 164. \$3.25.

BALAKIAN, ANNA. *Surrealism*. New York: Noonday Press; Nov., 1959. \$4.50; paper, \$1.45.

BALDWIN, CHARLES SEARS. *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic to 1400*. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 342. \$4.50.

BARKER, ERNEST. *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*. New York: Dover Pubns.; Sept., 1959. \$1.85.

BARNES, HAZEL. *The Literature of Possibility*. Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press. \$5.75.

BECK, LEWIS WHITE. *Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason.'* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Jan., 1960. \$6.00.

BERGMANN, GUSTAV. *Meaning and Existence*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 274. \$6.50; paper, \$1.75.

This book is a collection of fourteen articles that have appeared since 1954. But they have much more than a unity of time. The author, in his introduction to this volume, says that in his view, "Minds, Meanings, Ontology, Analyticity, and Ideal Languages" [can be considered] as a fully expressive title" (p. vii). Given the author's view of ontology, there is indeed a close unity.

There seems to be in addition another unity. All the essays except two deal explicitly with the views of the philosophical analysts and their predecessors. In every case, the author takes issue with these views to move closer to a kind of realism. The two essays which at first sight seem not to be of the same kind deal with Ockham and Malebranche. Yet even here the treatment is almost entirely analytical.

There is a good index, which is of real necessity for this kind of book.

BERGSON, HENRI. *Philosophy of Poetry*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. \$2.75.

BERLE, ADOLPH AUGUSTINE, JR. *Power without Property*. New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1959. Pp. 192. \$3.75.

BERLIN, SIR ISAIAH. *Karl Marx*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 280. Paper, \$1.50.

BERTHOLD, FRED, JR. *The Fear of God*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 158. \$3.00.

BLACKHAM, HAROLD JOHN. *Six Existentialist Thinkers*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. vii + 173. Paper, \$1.25.

BLAKNEY, RAYMOND B. *An Immanuel Kant Reader*. New York: Harper & Bros.; June 1960. \$5.00.

BLANCHARD, BRAND (ed.). *Education in the Age of Science*. New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Oct., 1959. \$4.50.

BLUCK, R. S. *Plato's 'Phaedo.'* Trans. from the Greek, with introd., notes and appendices. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. 218. Paper, \$1.25.

BOCHENSKI, J. M. *History of Formal Logic*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press; Dec., 1959. \$10.00.

BOETHIUS. *Consolation of Philosophy*. Trans. Richard H. Green. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1960. 95¢.

BORDEAUX, HENRY. *Edith Stein*. Trans. Donald and Idella Gallagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xi + 87. \$3.50.

This little book is, as the translators say in their introduction, not a biography or a study of Edith Stein's thought but a series of meditations on the significance of her life for our time. The author presents his subject as a kind of dramatic symbol—the translators suggest that the reader view the chapters as "scenes in a modern mystery play in which Edith Stein and kindred spirits play roles fraught with symbolic meaning" (p. x). Indirectly, the reading of this book could help an American reader to grasp some of the spirit of a contemporary Christian philosopher.

There is a useful selected bibliography (pp. 85-87).

BOWRA, C. M. *Greek Experience*. New York: New American Lib. of World Literature; Oct., 1959. 50¢.

BREASTED, JAMES HENRY. *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1959. \$1.95.

BRETTALL, ROBERT (ed.). *A Kierkegaard Anthology*. New York: Modern Lib., 1959. Pp. 519. \$1.65.

BRICKMAN, WILLIAM W., and LEHRER, STANLEY (eds.). *John Dewey: Master Educator*. New York: Society for the Advancement of Education, 1959. Pp. 123. \$2.50; paper, \$1.95.

BROAD, CHARLES DUNBAR. *Scientific Thought*. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. Pp. 555. Paper, \$1.95.

BROMBERG, WALTER. *The Mind of Man*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 344. Paper, \$1.95.

BRONOWSKI, JACOB. *Science and Human Values*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 94. Paper, 95¢.

BROWN, BRENDAN F. *Natural Law Reader*. New York: Oceana Pubns.; Nov., 1959. \$3.50; paper, \$1.35.

BRUSHER, EDWARD. *Logic*. San Francisco: Fearon Pubs., 1959. Pp. 159. Paper, \$2.00.

BUCKLEH, ANEES K. *The Philosopher*. New York: Exposition Press, 1959. Pp. 108. \$3.00.

BUCKLEY, MICHAEL J. *Morality and the Homosexual*. Westminster: Newman Press; Feb., 1960. \$3.50.

BURKE, KENNETH. *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Rev. and abridged ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 336. \$3.25.

CAJETAN, THOMAS DE VIO, CARDINAL. *The Analogy of Names and The Concept of Being*. Tr. Edward A. Bushinski, c.s.sp., and Henry J. Koren, c.s.sp. 2d ed. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp. x + 95. \$2.25; paper, \$1.50.

This English translation was first published in 1953, and it is good to know that enough copies were sold to warrant reprinting. This second edition has had a few printing mistakes eliminated and has been slightly enlarged; there is an additional short comment in the introduction referring to some recent studies on Cajetan; these studies are quoted at the relevant point in the text, and the bibliography includes these and several other recent items.

CANAVAN, FRANCIS, S.J. *Political Reason of Edmund Burke*. "Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics," No. 3. Durham: Duke Univ. Press; Jan., 1960. \$5.00.

CANTRIL, HADLEY, and BUMSTEAD, CHARLES H. *Reflections on the Human Venture*. New York: New York Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. \$6.00.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Trans. Fritz Koelln and James Pettegrove. [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. Pp. 366. \$3.50.

CHATTOPADHYAYA, DEBIPRASAD. *Lokayata*. Los Angeles: Perkins Oriental Books, 1959. Pp. 723. \$10.00.

Checklist of Books and Pamphlets in the Social Sciences. Albany: New York State Lib., 1959. Pp. 42. Paper.

CHILDS, MARQUIS WILLIAM, and RESTON, JAMES (eds.). *Walter Lippmann and His Times*. New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1959. Pp. 256. \$3.95.

CHURCHMAN, C. WEST (ed.). *Experience and Reflection of E. A. Singer*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Oct., 1959. \$5.00.

CLAGETT, MARSHALL (ed.). *Critical Problems in the History of Science*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; Oct., 1959. \$5.00.

—. *The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1959. Pp. 711. \$8.00.

CLARK, SIR WILFRID E. LE GROS. *The Foundations of Human Evolution*. Eugene, Ore.: State System of Higher Education, 1959. Pp. 74. Paper, \$1.00.

COHEN, FELIX S. *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals*. [Reprint.] Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 303. Paper, \$1.95.

COLLIN, REMY GUSTAVE. *Evolution*. Trans. J. Tester. "Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism," Vol. 30. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 143. \$2.95.

Community. *Nomos, II*. Ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. viii + 293. \$5.00.

Nomos is the Yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy. The present volume includes the papers presented at the Society's second meeting in 1957, "somewhat enlarged and revised," including some of the discussions. The rest was written specially for this volume. There are sixteen papers, divided into two parts, "Community and the Law," and "Community and Society." Every reader will probably have his own way of organizing these papers, but one way of viewing them is to see a triad of positions. One group views man as having a nature governed by its own law which is elaborated with greater or lesser distinctness into moral patterns of societal organization. Another group takes organization as a fact and works back to structure and law as merely formal (that is, empty) principles. The third approaches community scientifically, in terms of its observable structures and substructures, and refrains from either affirming or denying ethical and moral considerations.

Students in the fields of political theory, jurisprudence, social ethics, and sociology will find this volume of papers very much worthwhile. Even the evidence of talk at cross-purposes manifest in the discussions will be enlightening—it reflects at a higher and intelligible level some of the problems of American thought.

COPPLESTON, FREDERICK, s.j. *A History of Philosophy*. Vol. VI. *Wolff to Kant*. Westminster: Newman Press; Mar., 1960. \$4.50.

CROCKER, LESTER G. *An Age of Crisis. Man and World in Eighteenth Century French Thought*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 512. \$7.50.

CRONIN, JOHN FRANCIS. *Social Principles and Economic Life*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 459. \$6.50.

† CROSSMAN, RICHARD HOWARD STAFFORD. *Plato Today*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 215. \$4.00.

CURRY, WALTER CLYDE. *Shakespeare's Philosophical Patterns*. 2d ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 261. \$5.00.

D'ARCY, M. C., s.j. *The Meaning and Matter of History*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1959. Pp. 309. \$5.50.

DART, RAYMOND A., and CRAIG, DENNIS BATHGATE. *Adventures with the Missing Link*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 276. \$5.00.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *The Historical Reality of Christian Culture*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1960. \$3.50.

DEBREU, GERARD. *Theory of Value*. New York: John Wiley & Sons; Sept., 1959. \$5.25.

DE LUBAC, HENRY, s.j. *The Discovery of God*. Trans. Alick Dru. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Mar., 1960. \$3.95.

D'ENTREVES, A. P. *Medieval Contributions to Political Thought*. New York: Humanities Press; Sept., 1959. \$3.75.

Dialogue on John Dewey. New York: Horizon Press. Pp. 155. \$2.50.

DIAMOND, MALCOLM L. *Martin Buber*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Apr., 1960. \$4.00.

DIRKSEN, ALOYS, C.P.P.S. *Elementary Patrology*. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1959. Pp. xiii + 314. \$4.00.

Though this volume is written from a strictly theological viewpoint, it can be useful to students of philosophy inasmuch as it gives

a general introduction to the lives, teaching activities, writings, and thought of the Church Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the first seven centuries of the Christian era. The second part of the book consist of two appendices; the first of these identifies minor writers and works (pp. 213-301); the second lists and briefly describes the lesser heresies of the early Church (pp. 303-14).

DONOHUE, JOHN W., s.j. *Work and Education*. Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 238. \$4.00.

This study investigates the place of work in the process of education. A preliminary chapter describes the problem historically and analytically. The author sketches the development of labor from simple manual crafts to a complex technological culture, and the gamut of views from the aristocratic contempt of manual labor to the technocratic exclusion of everything else.

In the next three chapters, three different views of the relation of work to human perfection and education are considered. The first view is that of Marxism, in which productive work is considered the noblest activity of man; pure science and even literature were known and enjoyed by Marx himself, yet his theory does not seem to allow these activities much place, nor is any detailed theory of education provided by him. The second view is that of Dewey, in which thought and action are brought close together by means of the instrumentalist notion of thought. Work in this view is not mere production; it is social and even moral activity; but it is also true that intelligence is never speculative. And it is well known that Dewey wanted manual activity in the school, not for its economic value but for its educational, even humanistic value. The third view is that of some literary humanists, according to which work is the servant of leisure. Work is admitted to be necessary, but civilization and culture are leisure-time activities; education, therefore, neither includes work nor is ordered toward work.

The second part of the book takes up the notion of a Christian synthesis. The author holds that in principle a Christian philosophy of life would hold both the dignity of work and the value of contemplation, but he also admits that a practical working out of this is another matter. For work belongs to the level of human history; it is a terrestrial value. Hence the views of some Christians tend to consider work as a pure means. On the other hand, a certain group of authors (mostly French or of French inspiration) have called for a new humanism which would incorporate technology, a view which its proponents call "incarnational." The author shows that Christians hold that work has a religious value; the productive work of a craftsman or farmer does "humanize" the material universe, and science as a whole does also insure an increased control over material nature. It is admitted that industrialism is a different kind of problem, yet it is also held that machine civilization does not necessarily dehumanize the production worker. (Perhaps this is more of an ideal than a proximately realizable possibility.) The Christian view sees in work personal, ethical, social, and supernatural values.

The translation of this optimistic synthesis into educational terms is attempted in the final chapter. Though the recommendations remain at a somewhat general level, they should be of interest and value to educators.

The book is concerned with an important problem not only for philosophers of education but also for ethicists, psychologists, and theologians.

DORSEY, JOHN, and SEEVERS, WALTER H. *Living Consciously*. Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press; Oct., 1959. \$4.95.

DOUGHERTY, KENNETH. *General Ethics*. Peekskill, N.Y.: Graymoor Press, 1960. \$3.00.

DUBAY, THOMAS, S. M. *Philosophy of the State as Educator*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xii + 237. \$5.95.

This is an analysis of the rights and duties of the state in education. The author begins with a short section on the philosophy of civil society, stressing its basis in natural law. In the second part, he takes three different views on the state's function in education (individualism, totalitarianism, and the Catholic position) and concludes with a general survey of various philosophies in the light of what ought to be the state's ultimate purpose in education.

In the third section there is a consideration of the relation between the state and other educational agencies, especially the Church and private groups. The author considers both the question of assistance and that of control. This section is concluded with a treatment of the public school. In the fourth section there is a discussion of the state's duties in regard to its own citizenry and other civil societies.

There is a brief bibliography and an index.

† EWING, ALFRED CYRIL. *Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. 190. \$4.50.

FARBER, MARVIN. *Naturalism and Subjectivism*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1959. Pp. 400. \$9.50.

FEARNSIDE, W. W., and HOLTHER, W. B. *Fallacy, the Counterfeit of Argument*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. 224. Paper, \$1.95.

FEIBLEMAN, JAMES K. *Religious Platonism*. New York: Macmillan Co.; Nov., 1959. \$4.50.

FEIFEL, HERMAN (ed.). *The Meaning of Death*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. xviii + 351. \$6.50.

FELLMAN, DAVID. *Problem of Civil Rights*. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. \$2.75.

FOGARTY, DANIEL. *Roots for a New Rhetoric*. New York: Teachers College, 1959. Pp. xii + 158. \$5.00.

FRANKEL, CHARLES (ed.). *Golden Age of American Philosophy*. New York: George Braziller; Jan., 1960. \$7.50.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Trans. from the German by James Strachey. Introd. and notes prepared for this edition by Gregory Zilboorg. New York: Bantam Books, 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, 50¢.

FROMM, ERICH; SUZUKI, D. T.; and DE MARTINO, RICHARD. *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1960. \$4.00.

FROTHINGHAM, OCTAVIUS BROOKS. *Transcendentalism in New England*. Introd. by Sydney E. Ahlstrom. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 415. Paper, \$1.75.

GARDINER, PATRICK (ed.). *Theories of History*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959. Pp. 549. \$8.50.

GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL. *Ethics: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Ronald Press Co.; Jan., 1960. Pp. 540. \$5.50.

GILBERT, ALLAN H. *Principles and Practice of Criticism*. Detroit: Wayne State Univ.; Sept., 1959. \$4.50.

GILBERT, NEAL WAR. *Concepts of Method in the Renaissance and Their Ancient and Medieval Antecedents*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Jan., 1960. \$5.00.

GILBERT, WILLIAM. *De Magnete*. Trans. P. Fleury Mottelay. New York: Dover Pubs., 1959. Pp. liv + 368. Paper, \$2.00.

First published in Latin in 1600, this treatise was not translated into English until 1893, and the English edition has long been out of print. The work is one of the classics of physical science, both because it laid the foundations of a very important part of physics and because it gives rich and detailed accounts of the author's own methods.

The present edition is an excellent printed reproduction, strongly bound, yet priced most reasonably.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Elements of Christian Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Mar., 1960. Pp. 360. \$5.50.

—. *Painting and Reality*. [Reprint.] New York: Meridian Books, 1959. Pp. 416. Paper, \$1.55.

GONDA, J. *Four Studies in the Language of the Veda*. New York: Humanities Press; Nov., 1959. \$6.00.

GOOCH, G. P. *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1959. \$1.60.

GREENE, JOHN C. *The Death of Adam*. Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 388. \$4.95.

‡ GUITTON, JEAN. *The Modernity of Saint Augustine*. Trans. from the French by A. V. Littledale. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1959. Pp. 89. \$2.50.

GURR, JOHN EDWIN, S.J. *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900*. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 196. \$6.00.

The scope of this study of the textbook tradition is clearly indicated in its title. The work is thorough, detailed, and fully documented.

The author's method is both historical and critical. He not only presents the texts but analyzes them in their historical context. He is chiefly interested in showing that a particular way of handling the principle of sufficient reason is internally connected with a particular view of metaphysics.

This study is important for several reasons. Though the authors treated are almost all minor figures, taken together they constitute a tradition which on the one hand continues and makes explicit previous philosophical thinking and on the other is the soil out of which new ideas arise, often by way of reaction. Often enough, students of philosophy become acquainted only with the great figures and are puzzled or misunderstand them because they are ignorant of the background. For contemporary Thomists, the study has an additional significance. It will show them one good reason why their own writings are interpreted in ways foreign to their own intent, inasmuch as they are looked on as merely continuing a prior tradition. It will also enable them to approach their philosophical inheritance more critically and to eliminate distorting accretions.

GUSTAVSON, CARL G. *A Preface to History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. Pp. ix + 222. Paper, \$1.95.

HABER, FRANCIS C. *The Age of the World: Moses to Darwin*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 303. \$5.00.

HADAS, MOSES. *Hellenistic Culture*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. \$6.00.

HAGMAYER, GEORGE, C.S.P., and GLEASON, ROBERT, S.J. *Counselling the Catholic*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959. Pp. xiv + 301. \$4.50.

This volume is intended to be on the practical level; but it is not a manual of practice, a case-book, or a set of rules. Its purpose is to help the counsellor, director, or parent to understand the emotional problems of people, especially the young. The several introductory chapters try to explain the factors which concretely enter into the

formation of a personality (rather successfully combining some points from depth psychology with more commonsense approaches). Then follow four chapters on the psychological causes of four basic problem areas with a number of principles of direction. Two chapters are devoted to more serious psychological problems with suggestions on how to make use of community resources.

The next part of the book gives a moral evaluation of action in the areas whose psychological structure was considered before. There is a final chapter on Catholicism and psychiatry. There are two appendices, one giving a brief account of some mental illnesses that a counsellor may meet with, another giving a list of the principal associations that offer specialized guidance and help. There is a brief selected bibliography.

This is the best book of its kind yet published; it is well-informed, calm, and judicious. It is an excellent guide for the solution of both the practical and the theoretical problems it deals with. It is also highly recommended to ethicists as an excellent concrete presentation of the factors that influence the voluntareity and modify the moral quality of human activity.

HANDLIN, OSCAR. *John Dewey's Challenge to Education*. Foreword by Arthur G. Wirth. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 59. \$2.50.

HARRIS, C. R. S. *Duns Scotus*. 2 vols. New York: Humanities Press; Sept., 1959. Set, \$15.00.

HARRIS, MARJORIE S. *Francisco Romero on the Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. \$3.75.

HAVARD, WILLIAM C. *Henry Sidgwick and Late Utilitarian Political Philosophy*. Gainsville: Univ. of Florida Press; Dec., 1959. \$6.00.

HEINE, HEINRICH. *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*. Trans. from the German by John Snodgrass. Introd. by Ludwig Marcuse. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. 200. Paper, \$1.45.

HENDEL, CHARLES W. (ed.). *John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 119. \$3.00.

This is the text of four lectures presented in March, 1959, at Yale University. The first paper, contributed by the editor, analyzes the new empiricism of Dewey and relates it to what he calls the philosophical tradition. Dewey, it is said, rejected the old (that is, British) empiricism on the ground that it is exclusive and atomic, and opposed tradition (that is, the classical rationalists) because they neglected experience. Dewey's greatness, it is claimed, lies in his reinstatement of the full range of experience, including its objective character. The second paper, by Nathaniel M. Lawrence, is entitled "Education as Social Process." This study admits the idealistic implications of Deweyan experience but stresses the activity and growth of the individual. Sociality is both the condition and the result of education considered as total growth. The third paper, by Richard J. Bernstein, deals with knowledge and value, and points out that Dewey denied the traditional (that is, the empiricist and rationalist) disjunction between cognition as passive and speculative and action as outside of knowledge. Dewey, it is said, did not reduce knowledge to the merely instrumental but recognized the reflective as a value in itself, especially in aesthetic experience. The fourth paper, by John E. Smith, returns to the theme of experience. He relates Dewey's criticism of British empiricism to the Darwinian theory and shows that his notion of experience was a valuable enlargement. Experience includes activity, and can even be considered as a transaction, thus relating knowing and doing. Professor

Smith then raises three serious questions: It is possible and legitimate to ignore all general questions? Is it reasonable to ignore the individual as much as Dewey does? Is Dewey's notion of metaphysics adequate?

—. *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Jan., 1960. \$4.50.

HOCK, ALFRED. *Reason and Genius*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. \$3.75.

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Strength of Men and Nations*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1959. \$3.50.

HODGES, AUBYN H., JR. *The Mystery of God*. New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1959. Pp. 46. \$2.00.

HOFFMAN, FREDERICK J. *Freudianism and the Literary Mind*. New York: Grove Press, 1959. Pp. 361. Paper, \$2.45.

HOGREFE, PEARL. *The Sir Thomas More Circle*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1960. Pp. vi + 360. \$5.75.

This is a study of the ideas of St. Thomas More and his friends and associates, and of their influence, especially through writings and plays. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the ideas of the "circle" are examined as forming a program of reform. These ideas are grouped by the author under the heads of nature and the law of nature, true nobility, religious reform, law, education in general, and the education of women. The author holds that none of these ideas is very original; but she points out that they were very sincerely held, that they were viewed as making up a coherent program of action, and that they were presented in a personal, lively, and moving way. In her presentation of these ideas from the writings and activity of the people themselves, the author is often felicitous, and usually understanding and fair. There are occasional lapses from a completely adequate understanding, especially with regard to some of the religious ideas and with the relation between nature and reason on the one hand and faith and revelation on the other.

The second part of the book examines the expression of these various ideas on secular drama.

HOWELLS, WILLIAM. *Mankind in the Making*. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Nov., 1959. \$4.95.

JAKOBOWITS, IMMANUEL. *Jewish Medical Ethics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. xlvi + 381. \$6.00.

JUNG, C. G. *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self*. Vol. 9, Pt. II of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*. (Bollingen Series, XX.) New York: Bollingen Foundation, Inc.; Mar., 1959. Pp. 344. \$4.50.

KAHN, CHARLES H. *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. Pp. 220. \$6.50.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xxv + 92. Paper, 80¢

This translation is, the translator tells us, slightly revised from the one he had previously published in 1949; the introduction is also somewhat revised from the one given to this work in a second edition published in 1950. This volume also contains the translation of *What Is Enlightenment?*

The translation is very readable and clear; the introduction is useful and pointed; the edition a well-made one.

—. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1960. Paper, \$2.35.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN. *Either/Or.* [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. 2 vols. Pp. 465, 372. \$6.75.
KOCHE, ADRIENNE. *Philosophy for a Time of Crisis.* New York: Dutton & Co. Pp. 382. \$5.95.
KOREN, HENRY J., C.S.S.P. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xii + 199. Paper, \$3.25.

This work is intended as a textbook for undergraduates. It supposes that the student has some knowledge of metaphysics but does not demand any detailed knowledge of modern science.

After a relatively long introduction explaining what the philosophy of nature is and its relations to other disciplines, the book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the nature of material things is examined. First, a chapter examines the arguments for the hylomorphic composition of things, from substantial change, multiplication of individuals, and temporality; then matter and form are considered in themselves. A third chapter considers the relation between hylomorphism and some data of science, while a fourth considers alternative theories (dynamism, mechanism, hylo-systemism). The second part is devoted to the properties of matter; there are chapters on quantity, motion, place, space, time, quality, and causality in sensible things.

A number of additional readings are suggested for each chapter, and a summary of each chapter is provided. At the end of the book, there are ten pages of review questions arranged by chapters.

KRÖNER, RICHARD. *Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press; Nov., 1959. \$6.00.
‡ KROOK, DOROTHEA. *Three Traditions of Moral Thought.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 354. \$5.50.
KUENZLI, ALFRED E. (ed.) *The Phenomenological Problem.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. x + 321. \$4.50.
KWANT, REMY C., o.s.a. *A Philosophy of Labor.* "Duquesne Studies," Philosophical Series, 10. Pittsburgh: Dept. of Publications, Duquesne Univ.; Jan., 1960. \$5.25; paper, \$4.50.
LAMONT, CORLISS (ed.). *Dialogue on John Dewey.* New York: Horizon Press; Oct., 1959. \$2.75.
LAMONT, CORLISS, and REDMER, MARY (eds.). *Dialogue on George Santayana.* New York: Horizon Press. Pp. 115. \$2.50.

LANGAN, THOMAS. *The Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. ix + 247. \$4.50.

The author contends that Heidegger has a consistently developed philosophy; that the later works carry on the project of the earlier; and that an understanding of either group requires a knowledge of the other. After a general introduction, the author divides his work into two parts. In the first part, the existential analytic of Heidegger is presented as centered around a work or a group of smaller writings. The basic ideas of being, *Dasein*, historicity, fundament, transcendence, the nothing, freedom and originative thinking, essential thinking and poetizing, and the essence of truth are presented in context and in a language that approximates Heidegger's own. In the second part, Heidegger's analysis of the Western tradition is seen as the counterpart of the analysis of the individual existent. Beginning with the notions of the epochal and eschatological nature of being, the history of Western thought is viewed as having three stages: a beginning with the Greeks, a crisis with Descartes, a downfall with rationalistic subjectivism or scientism and technique. From this

analysis, the nature of Heidegger's effort to surpass metaphysics is made clear.

In a final chapter, the author reviews the Heideggerian phenomenology. He contends that some criticisms (for example, that Heidegger is inconsistent, that he reads texts arbitrarily) are not valid, for they are either based on misunderstandings or do not touch his basic intentions. For his own part, the author has two criticisms, both internal to the phenomenology of man as existent: there are arbitrary presuppositions and limitations of evidence, and "the other" is almost totally ignored.

LAZOWICK, FRANK E. *The Science of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 388. \$6.00.

LEE, DOROTHY. *Freedom and Culture*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. 192. Paper, \$1.95.

LEIGH, RUTH. *Man's Right to Life*. New York: Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, 1959. Pp. 56. Paper, 35¢.

LEIGHTON, ALEXANDER H. *My Name Is Legion*. New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Nov., 1959. \$7.50.

LENZEN, V. F., and OTHERS. *Civilization*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959. Pp. 176. Paper, \$1.50.

LERNER, DANIEL, and OTHERS. *Evidence and Inference*. Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1959. \$4.00.

LEVI, ALBERT WILLIAM. *Philosophy and the Modern World*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. \$7.50.

LEVITT, MORTON. *Psychological Systems of Freud and Dewey*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1959. \$3.75.

LEWIS, CLARENCE IRVING, and LANGFORD, COOPER HAROLD. *Symbolic Logic*. [2d rev. ed.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. \$2.00.

LEYS, WAYNE A. R., and PERRY, CHARNER MARQUIS. *Philosophy and the Public Interest*. Chicago: Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy, 1959. Pp. 72. Paper, \$1.00.

This document was prepared for a symposium of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, University of Wisconsin, May 1, 1959. The authors consulted a number of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists.

After an introductory section which establishes the importance of the concept of the public interest and its significance for philosophers, the authors analyze its use and its various meanings. They begin by pointing out the ambiguity of the term, locate it in relation to a theory of democracy, and relate it historically. Then they examine various questions: the relation of public interest to public policy, the possibility of considering it as an aggregate of individual interests, the advantage of taking the notion on various levels of abstraction, the relevance of procedural approaches, the possibility of defining the term, the significance of political pluralism, explanations in terms of decision-making and role-theory, attempts at synthesis, non-governmental action in the public interest, and a concluding comment. The authors stress the conclusion that substantive theories are not in conflict with formal theories.

There are four appendices. The first deals with public interest in relation to governmental regulation; the second, with self-regulation; the third, with public interest in fiscal matters; and the fourth, with common defense and foreign policy.

The notes contain a large number of useful references to recent publications.

LOCKE, JOHN. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. 2 vols. Ed. Alexander

der Campbell Fraser. New York: Dover Pubns.; Nov., 1959. Set, \$4.50.

LUCE, ARTHUR ASTON. *Teach Yourself Logic to Think More Clearly*. New York: Association Press; Oct., 1959. \$3.75.

MACGREGOR, GEDDES. *Introduction to Religious Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Jan., 1960.

MACH, ERNST. *Analysis of Sensations*. [5th enlarged ed.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Dec., 1959. \$1.75.

MALEVEZ, L. *Christian Message and Myth*. Westminster: Newman Press; Nov., 1959. \$4.75.

MANDLER, GEORGE, and KESSEN, WILLIAM. *The Language of Psychology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. Pp. 301. \$6.75.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Man's Approach to God*. New York: University Pubs. \$2.50.

—. *The Responsibility of the Artist*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. \$2.95.

Unifying some themes he had previously discussed, M. Maritain in this volume discusses the nature of art and its relation to morality. As he had done in earlier works, he insists on the distinction between art and prudence (taking art in St. Thomas's sense), and maintains that in their objects these two virtues have no relation to each other. But because the same man is both a man and an artist, both art and prudence bear on his activity even as an artist; and so art and prudence have an extrinsic and indirect relationship. He next examines two slogans, "art for art's sake" and "art for the people," and shows how the first denies all relation between art and prudence, while the second subordinates art to prudence and, more practically, to politics. Yet he also shows the good meanings that could be given to these slogans, the one stressing the intrinsic value of art and its own internal consistency, the other the true meaning and relevance of the common good and the way in which art serves this purpose. In the last chapter, M. Maritain broaches the relation between artistic perfection and human perfection, and shows that there is a kind of asceticism and purity of art which are analogous to their moral counterparts.

—. *Sin of the Angel*. Trans. William L. Rossner; Westminster: Newman Press; Oct., 1959. \$3.00.

MARTIN, C. B. *Religious Belief*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 177. \$3.00.

MARX, KARL, and ENGELS, FRIEDRICK. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. New York: International Publishers; Jan., 1960. \$3.00.

—. *Holy Family*. New York: International Publishers; Jan., 1960. \$3.50.

MCCALL, RAYMOND J. *A Preface to Scientific Psychology*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. vi + 74. Paper.

This short work is intended to serve as an introduction to courses in psychology. Often enough, students expect something quite different from a course labeled psychology and flounder for weeks; often, too, textbooks quite adept in expounding the subject matter itself become hopelessly involved in explaining themselves. The author, who used to give this material as an introduction to his own students, was asked to make it available to others.

The booklet has two chapters. The first explains what a science is and tries to clarify such ideas as controlled observation and measurement, and then contrasts scientific statements with other types of statements, especially philosophical ones. The second chapter

explains the broad divisions of psychology. The book includes a review summary and sample questions on the matter.

MENNINGER, KARL AUGUSTUS. *A Psychiatrist's World*. Ed. Bernard H. Hall. Foreword by Marion E. Kenworthy. New York: Viking Press, 1959. Pp. xxvi + 931. \$10.00.

MICHALSON, CARL. *The Hinge of History: An Existential Approach to the Christian Faith*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1959. Pp. 256. \$3.95.

MILLS, C. WRIGHT. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; May, 1959. Pp. 242. \$6.00.

MONTAGU, ASHLEY. *Human Heredity*. Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. 397. \$5.00.

MOORE, G. E. *Philosophical Papers*. New York: Macmillan Co.; Nov., 1959. \$5.25.

—. *Principia Ethica*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. \$1.95.

MOWRER, O. HOBART. *Learning Theory and Behavior*. New York: John Wiley & Sons; Nov., 1959. \$5.75.

MULLER, HERBERT J. *Issues of Freedom*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1960. \$4.00.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR. *Value in Social Theory*. Ed. Paul Streeten. New York: Harper & Bros.; Nov., 1959. \$5.00.

Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1959. Ed. Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1959. Pp. 252. \$4.25; paper, \$3.00.

NORTHCROFT, FELMER STUART CUCKOW. *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959. Pp. xvi + 331. \$6.00.

O'DONNELL, THOMAS J. *Morals in Medicine*. [2d rev. ed.] Westminster: Newman Press; Oct., 1959. \$4.75.

OGDEN, CHARLES KAY. *Bentham's Theory of Fictions*. [Reprint of 2d ed.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. Pp. 161. Paper, \$1.75.

O'NEILL, REGINALD F., S.J. *Theories of Knowledge*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. xiv + 242. \$4.25.

This is a textbook in epistemology for college students who have already had some preliminary acquaintance with philosophy. It is divided into two parts, the first a positive exposition of a realistic theory of knowledge, the second a survey of other theories, presented as pure positions.

The first part begins with judgment and the immediate knowledge of truth and of the knower's power to know truth. Next come chapters on method (which is said to be the analysis of concrete acts of judgment), and the relation of truth to the knower and the known. Then follows the analysis of particular kinds of knowledge: sensation, concepts, judgment, reasoning, deduction, induction, and testimony. There is also a consideration of evidence as the norm and of the three kinds of certitude. The author tries to combine the best of the traditional "Scholastic" epistemology with the recent emphasis on judgment and immediate realism.

The second part discusses skepticism, doubt, the relativity of truth, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, Kantianism, and existentialism. There are a selected bibliography and an index.

The book has an excellent systematic organization. Each chapter begins with a selective bibliography, then continues by locating the problem in general, developing it more concretely, summarizing the argument, and concluding with definitions and sometimes brief

supplementary notes. In the second part the readings are given at the end.

ORYNSKI, WANDA. *Hegel*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1959. \$4.75.

OWENS, JOSEPH C., C.S.S.R. *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959. Pp. 448. \$4.50.

‡ PAUL, JULIUS. *The Legal Realism of Jerome N. Frank*. New York: International Publishers, 1959. Pp. 199. \$5.50.

PETIT, FRANÇOIS. *The Problem of Evil*. Trans. from the French by Christopher Williams. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959. Pp. 141. \$2.95.

PFEIFFER, JOHN EDWARD. *From Galaxies to Man*. New York: Random House, 1959. Pp. 246. \$4.95.

PHELAN, GERALD B. *The Wisdom of St. Anselm*. New York: University Pubs. \$2.50.

Philosophy of Abraham Lincoln, Ed. William E. Baringer. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1959. Pp. 167. \$3.50.

PIEPER, JOSEF. *Prudence*. Trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 1959. Pp. 96. \$2.75.

PLATO. *Gorgias*. Trans. W. Hamilton. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 85¢

—. *Phaedrus*. Trans. R. Hackforth. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Nov., 1959. \$1.00.

—. *Theaetetus*. Pt. I, *Theory of Knowledge*. Trans. Francis M. Cornford. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Sept., 1959. \$1.00.

[PLATO.] *Examination of Pleasure*. Trans. R. Hackforth. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Oct., 1959. \$1.00.

[—.] *Plato's Timaeus*. Trans. from the Greek by Francis M. Cornford and reprinted from his work, *Plato's Cosmology*. Ed. Oskar Piest. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. 143. Paper, 85¢

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 409. Paper, \$2.25.

RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. *Aristotle*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.75.

REINHARDT, KURT F. *Existentialist Revolt*. [Rev. ed.] New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co.; Jan., 1960. \$4.75.

RENSCH, BERNHARD. *Evolution above the Species Level*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. Pp. 528. \$10.00.

REXINE, JOHN E. *Religion in Plato and Cicero*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1959. Pp. 72. \$2.75.

RILEY, LYMAN W. (ed.). *Aristotle Texts and Commentaries to 1700 in the University of Pennsylvania Libraries*. A catalogue. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Sept., 1959. \$3.75.

RILEY, WOODBRIDGE. *Men and Morals*. New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co.; Dec., 1959. \$6.50.

ROBERTS, DAVID E. *Existentialism and Religious Belief*. Ed. Roger Hazelton. [Reprint.] New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 344. Paper, \$1.95.

ROSE, HERBERT JENNING. *Religion in Greece and Rome*. New introd. by the author. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 326. Paper, \$1.60.

ROUCEK, JOSEPH S. *The Case for and against Science and Scientism*. Bridgeport, Conn.: author, 1959. Pp. 40. Paper, \$1.00.

ROYCE, JOSIAH. *World and the Individual*. 2 vols. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. \$2.00 ea.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Wisdom of the West*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959. Pp. 320. \$12.50.

SARTORIUS, GEORGE ALFRED LION. *Ancient Science and Modern Civilization*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 111. Paper, 95¢.

SARTRE, JEAN-Paul. *Age of Reason*. New York: Bantam Books; Oct., 1959. 75¢.

SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR. *Freedom of the Will*. Trans Konstantin Kolenda. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Nov., 1959. 80¢.

SCHEMATIC, L. W. *Unity of the Universe*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1959. \$3.95.

SHERLEY, CHARLES S. *Modern Materialism*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1959. \$2.50.

SHEKEMAI, BENJAMIN MORRIS. *A Moral Philosophy for Management*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. 231. \$6.00.

SHEPPARD, A. J. *Intellectual Life*. Trans. Mary Ryan. Westminster: Newman Press; Sept., 1959. \$3.00; paper, \$1.50.

SHIBATA, KEN. *Dialectic and Dialectical Theories of World Capitalism*. Los Angeles: Perkins Oriental Books, 1959. Pp. 274. \$4.50.

SHOOTER, GEORGE N. *Education and Moral Wisdom*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1960. \$4.00.

SINGER, CHARLES JOSEPH. *A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xviii + 525. \$8.00.

—. *From Magic to Science*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. xxxi + 253. Paper, \$2.00.

This series of essays, some of which had been previously published, were first printed in 1928. They deal with people and movements of thought from the time of the late Roman Empire to the late Middle Ages. The author is justly considered one of the foremost historians of medicine. On the whole, the information presented in this book still retains its validity, though the interpretations uniformly suppose that mystical experience is an illusion and that theology is no better than magic.

The author has written a brief autobiography for this edition (pp. vii-xvii). The printing and binding are excellent.

SINGER, E. A. *Experience and Reflection*. Ed. C. West Churchman. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 440. \$5.00.

SMITH, HENRY C. *The Search for America*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. Pp. 172. \$2.95; paper, \$1.50.

SMITH, RAYMOND, O.P. *Establishing the Natural Law*. New York: Paulist Press, 1959. Pp. 48. Paper, 50¢.

—. *God Exists*. New York: Paulist Press, 1959. Pp. 48. Paper, 50¢.

SOLTAN, ROGER. *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Russell & Russell. \$7.50.

SOKOLOV, PITIRIM ALEXANDROVICH, and LUNDEN, WALTER ALVIN. *Power and Morality*. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1959. Pp. 204. \$3.50.

SPRAGUE, LEMER, and TAYLOR, PAUL W. (eds.). *Knowledge and Value*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 717. \$6.50.

STEELE, WARREN HOWARD. *Strength Through Beauty*. New York: Vantage Press, 1960. Pp. 158. \$2.95.

This book is said to be the application of a philosophical or religious insight. The idea seems to be that there is beauty in the universe and that man finds his fulfillment in the perception of this beauty. The present book is an interpretation of mental illness and unhappiness as consisting immediately in a depletion of nerve energy and this depletion in turn being caused by toxins, many of which are produced by the body itself. The author believes that recreation, attention to beauty, a moderate diet which he describes in some detail, and, in many cases, a period of fasting, will enable the body to remove all the toxins and thus to cure mental illness.

restore health and strength, and lead to full happiness, a feeling of buoyancy in living.

STIERNOTTE, ALFRED P. (ed.). *Mysticism and the Modern Mind*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 206. \$4.50.

This is a collection of eleven essays in the philosophy of religion by the editor and nine other writers. There is more or less a common viewpoint, with some exceptions, and this viewpoint is very close to scientific humanism. All the authors agree that mystical experience is to be accepted as a fact, but the "fact" which they accept is the *psychological reality* of the experience. The editor, in his introductory essay (p. 6) professes that the book is not oriented to a psychological study, and this is indeed true. He likewise professes (p. 9) that "mysticism can be given new life only by a ruthless rejection of any esoteric and occult encumbrances accumulated from the past."

John Haynes Holmes, who has the second general essay in the volume, is a retired minister. Henry Nelson Wieman puts the problem of mysticism as lying between an interpretation of it as an experience of the transcendent and another which views it as experience of totality. Lester Mondale, an Ethical Society leader, discusses Emerson's mysticism. Edwin T. Buehrer, a minister of a Unitarian church, writes on mysticism and Whitehead. Kenneth L. Patton, a minister of a Universalist church, deals with mysticism and naturalistic humanism. J. Hutton Hynd, active in Ethical Culture and humanist circles, writes on mysticism and ethics. John A. Irving, Professor of Philosophy in Victoria College, University of Toronto, does not definitely commit himself to the humanist viewpoint; he discusses the "limit of communication" in the light of analytical philosophy. N. A. Nikam, Professor of Philosophy at Mysore University, India, expounds ontological and ethical mysticism in Indian thought. Newton P. Stallknecht, Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University, relates mysticism and existentialism. The editor writes a concluding essay on what he considers the philosophical implications of mysticism.

If it is "nonphilosophical" to admit that some mystical experiences could be a contact of some sort with a transcendent reality, then it is seriously to be doubted whether any "philosophical" investigation of mysticism is possible at all. The book does not afford any evidence that an affirmative answer is the correct one.

STINNETTE, CHARLES R., JR. *Faith, Freedom, and Selfhood*. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press. Pp. 252. \$4.75.

STOODLEY, BARTLETT H. *The Concepts of Sigmund Freud*. Chicago: Free Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 274. \$6.00.

Strauss, Leo. *What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; Sept., 1959. Pp. 315. \$6.00.

SUMNER, WILLIAM GRAHAM. *Folkways*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1959. Pp. vii + 692. Paper, \$2.49.

This work has long been recognized to be one of the classics of sociology, and it is still a worth-while book to have on hand. It is true in many sciences that the foundational classics have a breadth of view and a sweep of reasoning that later works can no longer attain, and Sumner not only had an inclusive vision but was master of a great number of details. The work likewise testifies to the great progress made in the last half-century, for Sumner was also credulous, rationalistic, convinced that scientific progress had already, or was shortly about to, sweep away poverty, war, religion and so on.

SUPPES, PATRICK. *Axiomatic Set Theory*. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co.; Mar., 1960.

Symposium on Evolution. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1959. Pp. 119. \$3.00.

The papers in this volume were read at a commemorative symposium at Duquesne University. A short introduction, recalling some aspects of Darwin's life and the effect of his work, was given by Bernard J. Boelen. Evolution and the puzzle of the viruses are dealt with by Frederick C. Bawden. Human organic evolution is considered by Gottfried O. Lang, who considers the fossil record and its genetic interpretations, and concludes that the weight of evidence is in favor of an evolutionary origin of man. The philosophical aspects of evolution are discussed by Andrew G. van Melsen; this paper considers a number of problems: mechanism and vitalism, the nature of science, the distinction between living and nonliving, the relation between nature and man, and the connection between evolution and teleology. The final paper, by the Reverend Cyril Vollert, s.j., deals with evolution and the Bible. After carefully summarizing what biblical scholars presently hold about the meaning of the biblical accounts of the origin of the world and of man, the theological implications of evolution are weighed and found not to be in any essential conflict with revealed truth. The paper concludes with some remarks on the grandeur of the evolutionary view.

The papers by Professor Lang and Father Vollert are excellent and deserve wide attention; they can be understood by students and they will give much light to teachers.

TAX, SOL. (ed.). *Evolution after Darwin*. Vol. I, *The Evolution of Life*. Vol. II, *The Evolution of Man*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; May, 1960. \$10.00 each.

† TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE, s.j. *The Phenomenon of Man*. Trans. Bernard Wall. Introd. by Sir Julian Huxley. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. \$5.00.

Père Teilhard, in his preface (p. 29) explicitly disavows any intention of writing a philosophical or theological treatise and asks the reader to read it as a purely scientific work. Sir Julian Huxley, in his introduction, clearly reads it as a partly philosophical and religious book. Apart from the fact that there seem to be two different notions of what philosophy and theology are, there is a question of whether the author actually went further than he intended. As he says, his intention is to describe man as he manifests himself (the phenomenon, that is) in an evolving universe and to describe the whole of that manifestation. The book therefore presents in summary form the data of many diverse sciences (biology, anthropology, psychology) and draws sweeping generalizations which at the very least would be called by many "metascientific."

At any rate, it is the phenomenon of man which is to be explained in any philosophical account of man. Whether the book be philosophy or not, it is therefore of direct interest to the philosopher of human nature.

Père Teilhard's ideas are likely to be known in general, though perhaps most English-speaking readers are not familiar with his thought in detail. In general, the attempt is to view man as a whole, dynamically and historically, and the leading idea is that of evolution. The book begins with a summary statement of cosmogony. This is followed by a synthetic account of the formation and development of life, the biosphere. Here an attempt is made to enunciate certain "laws" of evolution. The next section deals with man: his

origin, his development, the rise and spread of the noosphere. The final section is entitled "Survival" and projects the movement of evolution into the future.

THOMPSON, KENNETH W. *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy*. Durham: Duke Univ. Press; Nov., 1959. \$3.50.

THOMSON, ROBERT. *The Psychology of Thinking*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Pp. 214. Paper, 95¢

THURSTONE, L. L. *The Measurement of Values*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Apr., 1959. Pp. 322. \$7.50.

TINBERGEN, NIKO. *Curious Naturalists*. New York: Basic Books Pub. Co.; Sept., 1959. \$5.00.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VIII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, \$2.00.

This volume is subtitled "Centennial Year Number," and several papers are concerned with Darwin. The first, by James K. Feibleman, deals with Darwin and scientific method. He considers Darwin an excellent example and from that instance professes to find that theoretical interpretation always precedes the facts. This notion of science quite understandably is rejected by many scientists, since such a method is not only unjustifiably selective but has often led to misreadings of the alleged facts. The second paper, by Paul G. Morrison, gives an account in terms of modern logic of evolution, which deals with it as a formal property. The next two papers deal with Bergson. Andrew J. Reck investigates the notion of duration, breaking it down into five steps and critically examining each one; he concludes that the connection between duration and a doctrine of human existence is the most fruitful contribution. Harold N. Lee studies and rejects Bergson's distinction of two radically different modes of knowing.

Edward G. Ballard attempts to define romanticism and to see the elements in culture which led to such a movement. Richard L. Barber tries to define metaphysics in an inclusive way to fit the various historical types. Carl H. Hamburg traces the development of Kant's formalism in ethics. Robert C. Whittemore looks for the deeper foundations of the ontology of Sartre and suggests that it could be found in Whitehead's doctrine of feeling.

UNTERMAN, ISAAC, *A Light amid the Darkness*. New York: Twayne Pubs., 1959. Pp. 208. \$4.00.

U. S. *Fighting Man's Code*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959. Pp. 160. Paper, 50¢

VIGNAUX, PAUL. *Philosophy of the Middle Ages*. New York: Meridian Books; Nov., 1959. \$3.75; paper, \$1.35.

VYVYAN, JOHN. *Shakespearean Ethic*. New York: Barnes & Noble; Nov., 1959. \$3.75.

WADE, IRA O. *Voltaire and 'Candide'*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1959. \$8.50.

WAISMANN, FRIEDRICH. *Introductory to Mathematical Thinking*. Foreword by Karl Menger. Trans. from the German by Theodore J. Benac. New York: Harper & Bros.; 1959. Pp. 260. Paper, \$1.40.

WALTZ, KENNETH N. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Aug., 1959. Pp. 272. \$5.50.

WARD, LEO R., c.s.c. (ed.). *Ethics and the Social Sciences*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame, 1959. Pp. 127. \$3.25.

WATSON, WILLIAM HERIOT. *On Understanding Physics*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 146. Paper, \$1.25.

WEINBERG, HARRY L. *Levels of Knowing and Existence*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Pp. xiv + 274. \$4.50.

WELTY, EBERHARD, O.P. *A Handbook of Christian Social Ethics*. Vol. I, *Man in Society*. New York: Herder & Herder, 1959. \$6.50.

WERTHEIMER, MAX. *Productive Thinking*. Ed. Michael Wertheimer. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. 318. \$5.50.

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. *Heraclitus*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959. \$4.50.

WHITE, HELEN CONSTANCE. *Prayer and Poetry*. New York, University Pubs. \$2.50.

[WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH.] *Whitehead's American Essays in Social Philosophy*. Ed. with introd. by A. H. Johnson. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. \$4.00.

WILD, JOHN. *Human Freedom and Social Order*. Durham: Duke Univ. Press. Pp. 261. \$5.00.

WILSON, COLIN HENRY. *The Stature of Man*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Pp. xiv + 171.

WILSON, N. L. *The Concept of Language*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press; June, 1959. Pp. 153. \$4.95.

WILSON, ROBERT N. *Man Made Plain*. Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1959. Pp. 375. \$5.00.

WOLFF, ABRAHAM. *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries*. 2d ed. prepared by Douglas McKie. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 349; Vol. II, pp. xv + 350-686. Paper, \$1.95 ea.

WOLLHEIM, RICHARD. *F. H. Bradley*. ("Pelican Original.") Baltimore: Penguin Books; Jan., 1960. \$1.25.

WOOD, ERNEST. *Yoga*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Pp. 272. Paper, 95¢

Most of this volume describes the various bodily and mental practices which belong to the various kinds of yoga. Introductory and concluding chapters explain the "philosophy" back of them—a mixture of figurative anatomy, a dualistic structure of man (spirit and body), and some brief and rather simple explanations of the "nondualistic" ontology professed by most Indian writers. The book is not intended for anyone with much knowledge of the history of philosophy (though the historical and factual errors probably will not bother most of its readers).

WULF, MAURICE DE. *System of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Trans. Ernest Messenger. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1960. \$1.25.

ZUVER, DUDLEY. *Retreat to Reality*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.; Oct., 1959. \$4.75.

INDEX TO VOLUME XXXVII

BRACKEN, HARRY M.	Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul	77, 171
CATANIA, FRANCIS J.	A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great . . .	11
GELPI, DONALD, s.j.	The Plotinian <i>Logos</i> Doctrine	301
GUZIE, TAD W., s.j.	The Evolution of Philosophical Method in the Writings of St. Thomas	95
KENNEDY, LEONARD A., c.s.b.	The Nature of the Human Intellect According to St. Albert the Great	121
KWANT, REMY C., o.s.a.	The Ambiguity of the Fact	287
LADRIÈRE, JEAN.	Hegel, Husserl, and Reason Today	171
LOFY, CARL A., s.j.	The Meaning of "Potential Whole" in St. Thomas Aquinas	39
NATANSON, MAURICE.	Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality	1
ROYCE, JAMES E., s.j.	Life and Living Beings	213
WESTLEY, RICHARD J.	A Philosophy of the Concrete and the Concreted: The Constitution of Creatures According to Gilbert de la Porée	257
WILLIAMS, MARTHA E.	Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value	29

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Chronicle	58, 196	
BIRD, OTTO.	The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in Abelard . .	53
MITCHELL, STEPHEN O.	Necessary Truths and Postulational Method . .	49
ONG, WALTER., s.j.	Philosophical Sociology	138

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS	250, 331
----------------------------------	----------

BOOKS REVIEWED

ADLER, MORTIMER J.	<i>The Idea of Freedom</i> (Clifford G. Kossel, s.j.)	63
ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.	<i>An Introduction to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"</i> (George Kimball Plochmann)	243
BUGBEE, HENRY G., JR.	<i>The Inward Morning</i> (Walter J. Ong, s.j.)	67
COLLINS, JAMES.	<i>God in Modern Philosophy</i> (William Oliver Martin)	316
HOLLOWAY, MAURICE R., s.j.	<i>An Introduction to Natura Theology</i> (Arnold J. Benedetto, s.j.)	327
HOOK, SIDNEY (ed.).	<i>Determinism and Freedom</i> (Joseph F. Collins, s.j.)	247
INSTITUTO PER LA COLLABORAZIONE CULTURALE.	<i>Enciclopedia Filosofica</i> (François Evain, s.j.)	329
KREYCHE, ROBERT J.	<i>First Philosophy</i> (Gerald A. McCool, s.j.)	328
LYNCH, WILLIAM F., s.j.	<i>An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the "Parmenides"</i> (Leo B. Kaufmann, s.j.)	326
MARC, ANDRÉ, s.j.	<i>L'Être et l'esprit</i> (W. Norris Clarke, s.j.)	236
O'NEIL, CHARLES J. (ed.).	<i>An Etienne Gilson Tribute</i> (James Collins)	321
ONG, WALTER J., s.j.	<i>Ramus and Talon Inventory and Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue</i> (George P. Klubertanz, s.j.)	70

RÉGIS, L. M., o.p. <i>Epistemology</i> (Michael Montague, s.j.)	237
SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. <i>The Elements of Logic</i> (Cornelius Ryan Fay)	143
DE TONQUÉDEC, JOSEPH, s.j. <i>La philosophie de la nature</i> , Part I, fasc. 2 (Robert O. Johann, s.j.)	65
WEISS, PAUL. <i>Modes of Being</i> (Walter E. Stokes, s.j.)	318
VON WRIGHT, GEORG HENRIK. <i>The Logical Problem of Induction</i> (George Kimball Plochmann)	142

BOOKS RECEIVED

ANTONELLI, M. T., and SCHIAVONE, M. *Studi in Onore di M. F. Sciacca*. Milan: Marzorati Editore, 1959. Pp. ix + 248. Paper.

BERGMANN, GUSTAV. *Meaning and Existence*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 274. \$6.50; paper, \$1.75.

BORDEAUX, HENRY. *Edith Stein*. Trans. Donald and Idella Gallagher. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1959. Pp. xi + 87. \$3.50.

CATULLUS. *Odi et Amo*. Trans. with introd. by R. A. Swanson. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xix + 128. Paper, \$1.00.

Centennial Year Number. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VIII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ., 1959. Pp. 121. Paper, \$2.00.

DONOHUE, JOHN W., S.J. *Work and Education*. Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 238. \$4.00.

DUBAY, THOMAS, S.M. *Philosophy of the State as Educator*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1960. Pp. xii + 237. \$5.95.

GILBERT, WILLIAM. *De Magne. Trans. P. Fleury Mottelay*. New York: Dover Pub., Inc. Pp. liv + 368. \$2.00.

GRENET, P.-B. *Ontologie*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1959. Pp. 215. Paper, 990 Fr.

HENDEL, CHARLES W. (ed.). *John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 119. \$3.00.

HOGREFE, PEARL. *The Sir Thomas More Circle*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1959. Pp. vi + 360. \$5.75.

[KANT, IMMANUEL.] *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Ed. Lewis W. Beck. Pp. xxv + 92. Paper, 80¢

KEEZER, DEXTER M. (ed.). *Financing Higher Education, 1960-70*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Pp. vii + 304. Paper, \$2.00.

KOREN, HENRY J., C.S.S.P. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. xii + 199. Paper, \$3.25.

LANGAN, THOMAS D. *Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical Study of Existentialist Phenomenology*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1959. \$4.50.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Responsibility of the Artist*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. \$2.95.

